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The criminal law on serious traffic offences is a fascinating area, which has 
not received as much attention as it deserves. This book aims to fill that void. We 
believe it contains valuable insights for legal scholars, legislators and members of 
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1Chapter 1
The Complex Nature of Serious Traffic Offences
Alwin van Dijk and Hein Wolswijk*
1.1 Introduction
This collection of essays is devoted to criminal liability for serious traffic offences. 
We will not attempt to provide an exact, universally valid definition of what consti-
tutes a serious traffic offence. In general, a serious traffic offence is an offence that 
is aimed at behaviour that is so serious that a strong censure, such as a custodial 
sentence or a driving disqualification, might be called for. The best available indi-
cator of seriousness, although it is far from perfect, is the maximum punishment 
that the legislator has assigned to an offence. Offences dealing with causing a 
severe result, offences pertaining to causing a concrete danger and some abstract 
endangerment offences typically fit the bill.
Chapters 2 through 6 of this book deal respectively with serious traffic offences 
in the Netherlands, England and Wales, France, Germany and Spain. Chapters 7, 
8 and 9 deal with general issues which are relevant to serious traffic offences. The 
authors elaborate respectively on the role of culpability and harm with respect 
to punishment severity, traffic-psychological insights that are relevant to accident 
causation and the concept of conditional intent in relation to extremely dangerous 
traffic behaviour.
If the contributions in this book show anything, it is that the subject of serious 
traffic offences is exceptionally complex. The first reason is that legislators in the 
traffic context face quite a few complex legislative choices. The second reason is 
that the traffic context has the tendency to generate hard cases that call the out-
ermost boundaries of essential doctrinal concepts into question. In Sections 1.2 
and 1.3, we will discuss some of the legislative and interpretative complexities. In 
Section 1.4, we provide a brief outline of the book.
* Alwin van Dijk is Associate Professor of Criminal Law at the University of Groningen, The 
Netherlands. Hein Wolswijk is Professor of Criminal Law at the University of Groningen, The 
Netherlands.
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1.2 The Complex Legislative Choices Underlying the Criminalization of Serious 
Traffic Offences
1.2.1 The Many Variables Involved in Drafting Serious Traffic Offences 
The legislator devising a system of serious traffic offences faces quite a lot of com-
plex legislative choices. The drafting of serious traffic offences revolves around 
three major questions: what actus reus is required, what kind of mens rea regime 
should apply and what penalties should be assigned? These are of course famil-
iar questions, which apply to all cases of criminal law drafting. It would appear, 
however, that there are more variables to consider with respect to each of these 
questions than in other contexts.
The main legislative tools with respect to the actus reus are result offences, 
concrete endangerment offences and abstract endangerment offences, as well as 
the use of special constituent or aggravating factors. With respect to the result 
offences, the question is what kind of results should incur liability. Since an enor-
mous amount of traffic collisions take place, it is practically feasible to differen-
tiate between the different results flowing from a collision. Should death, severe 
bodily injury, simple injury or damage incur liability for a result offence? Another 
characteristic of the traffic context is that there is an elaborate network of specific 
conduct rules the road user has to obey. The most serious rule violations might 
also surface in the domain of serious traffic offences. They can be serious traffic 
offences themselves (e.g. drink-driving or extreme speeding), they can be used 
as specifications of concrete endangerment offences (e.g. overtaking improperly 
or driving backwards), or they can be constituent or aggravating factors of result 
offences (e.g. being uninsured or not cooperating with an alcohol test).
The second important question concerns the mens rea regime that should 
apply. Should the offence, or part thereof, require proof of a mens rea form such as 
intent, recklessness or negligence? Other options are the creation of strict liability 
or allowing only a defence vis-à-vis the absence of culpability. The traffic context 
provides ample room to differentiate between different levels of blameworthiness. 
The millions of interactions that take place in traffic ensure that results, dangers 
and conduct violations are coupled to all possible levels of blameworthiness. It is 
up to the legislator to set the minimally required blameworthiness for an offence 
and to determine whether it is sensible to differentiate once this threshold is met.
It should be clear that the many possibilities to draft serious traffic offences 
can give rise to a colourful array of offences. It is for the legislator to determine 
the penalties that are attached to the various offences. An important theme is 
the determination of the maximum punishment for an offence. The relevance 
of the maximum punishment is not limited to the maximum that can actually 
be imposed by a court. In practice, sentences tend to be much lower than the 
available maximum punishment. Nevertheless, the maximum punishment gen-
erally provides a good indication of how the legislator rates the seriousness of the 
offence in relation to other offences. This expression of relative seriousness pro-
vides guidance to courts as to what kinds of sentences are appropriate for typical 
manifestations of a certain offence. Another important punishment theme, at 
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least in some criminal law systems, is the determination of minimum penalties. 
In this way, the legislator is able to exert more control over the actually imposed 
penalties. The last important punishment theme concerns the mode of punish-
ment. In the traffic context, there are more penalties to consider than the common 
penalties of imprisonment, fines and community service. There are quite a few 
potential penalties that are specifically tailored to the traffic context, such as a 
driving disqualification, confiscation of a vehicle, rehabilitation courses for road 
users, driver’s licence demerit points, speed locks or alcolocks.
1.2.2 Some Essential Legislative Issues
The many possibilities for variation with respect to actus reus, mens rea and pun-
ishment show that the legislator can deal in a lot of different ways with dangerous 
or potentially dangerous traffic behaviour. It should come as no surprise, there-
fore, that the criminal law systems examined in this book have made very differ-
ent legislative choices in that respect. We will briefly address five important issues 
that legislators in the traffic context encounter. These issues account for the most 
significant differences between the examined systems.
The first issue pertains to a difficult normative question. How should the legis-
lator deal with cases where low culpability behaviour leads to severe consequences? 
Criminal traffic offences are set apart from conventional criminal offences in that 
they are generally not committed by hardened criminals. Many serious traffic 
accidents are caused by fairly ordinary people who – at least up to that moment – 
were perceived as well-meaning human beings. Once the criminal law has set 
its sights on these ordinary people, they may face penalties that are otherwise 
reserved for the most heinous crimes. The most challenging cases in traffic law 
are those in which severe consequences (e.g. the death of a child) are matched 
with low moral culpability. Whether or not such behaviour warrants liability for 
an offence with respect to causing the result depends on the minimally required 
level of blameworthiness. From an objective point of view, the question is what 
deviation from the reasonable man standard is required. Is a small deviation from 
the objective standard already enough to create criminal liability? From a sub-
jective point of view, the question is whether below-average mental and physical 
capabilities should be taken into account. Does the fact that a defendant, given 
his mental and physical capabilities, could not have met the required objective 
standard negate liability for causing the severe result? It should be noted that the 
minimally required level of blameworthiness in a system may to a large extent be 
determined by the courts. However, the leading role of the legislator is patently 
clear in England and Wales, where the legislator in 2008 created an offence of 
causing death by careless driving, which seems to require only a small deviation 
from the reasonable man standard.
The second issue is how legislators should deal with cases where highly cul-
pable behaviour leads to actual danger, but not to a severe result. How should the 
criminal law cope with a driver who nearly kills another person in the process of 
undertaking a highly dangerous overtaking manoeuvre? Criminal law systems 
struggle with such questions. In systems that focus primarily on consequences, 
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such behaviour may well be labelled as a trivial offence. In the Netherlands, for 
example, the concrete endangerment offence of causing danger on the road only 
amounts to a misdemeanour (as opposed to a felony) with a two-month maxi-
mum prison term. As the misdemeanour requires not even proof of mens rea, it 
is not well suited to deal with highly culpable and dangerous traffic behaviour. In 
Germany and Spain, however, highly culpable traffic behaviour causing danger 
might lead to liability for a concrete endangerment offence that has a maximum 
punishment which is no less than thirty times higher.
The third issue is how to deal with cases where conduct that typically creates 
an unjustifiable risk does not lead to actual danger. Such conduct might be dealt 
with on the basis of abstract endangerment offences. In such offences, the offence 
definition does not specify the dangers or harmful consequences that justify their 
criminalization. In most criminal law systems, driving under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs is labelled as a serious offence, since it carries a substantial pen-
alty. The legislator faces some difficult choices in this regard. Should the offence 
set a behavioural standard, such as being unfit to drive, or should the law specify 
a certain level in blood, breath or urine? German criminal law employs a behav-
ioural standard with regard to driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. 
Fixed levels only have a place in an administrative offence. In quite a few other 
countries, however, fixed levels are part of a criminal offence. In that case, the 
obvious question becomes what level should be set. In England and Wales, the 
blood alcohol concentration is set at 0.08%. In the Netherlands, a level of 0.05% 
(or 0.02% for novice drivers) suffices. The Dutch legislator is currently consid-
ering to set fixed levels for several kinds of drugs as well. In most criminal law 
systems, other abstract endangerment offences in traffic, such as speeding, are 
not threatened with a serious penalty. In many cases, they are even dealt with 
under administrative law. In Spain, however, exceeding the speed limit by sixty 
km/h in urban streets or by eighty km/h on non-urban roads is a criminal offence 
which is threatened with a term of imprisonment between three and six months.
A fourth important issue concerns the question of whether the legislator 
should differentiate between different levels of blameworthiness when either a 
grave consequence or danger is caused. In Germany, all inadvertent behaviour 
resulting in death or serious bodily injury is brought under the same mens rea 
term (negligence). In the Netherlands, the maximum punishments for causing 
death and causing serious bodily injury are doubled in case of recklessness (as 
opposed to ‘plain’ negligence), which can be defined as extremely negligent behav-
iour. This can be contrasted with the respective concrete endangerment offences. 
In the Netherlands, the offence of causing danger on the road requires neither 
proof of intent nor of negligence. Liability is only negated if the court holds that 
a defence, such as ‘absence of all culpability’, applies. In Germany, on the other 
hand, the much more serious endangerment offence differentiates between inten-
tionally and negligently causing the danger.
The fifth important issue for the legislator to consider is to what extent the 
law should be tailored specifically to the traffic context. In some countries, there 
is a specific offence for negligently causing a result in traffic. In the Netherlands 
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and France, the maximum punishment for the negligent traffic offence is much 
higher than that of the general negligent offence. In Germany and Spain, how-
ever, negligent behaviour in traffic is covered by the general negligent offences. 
Another way to tailor offences to the traffic context is to identify specific conduct, 
such as speeding, drink-driving or not yielding right of way, with regard to con-
crete endangerment offences. Germany and Spain provide examples of that. Yet 
another way to incorporate the traffic context is to identify aggravating or con-
stituent factors with respect to the negligent result offences. In the Netherlands 
and France, aggravating factors such as intoxication, severe speeding or not coop-
erating with an alcohol test bring about a substantial increase in the maximum 
punishment. In England and Wales, there are two result offences with special 
constituent factors: causing death by careless driving whilst under the influence 
of drink or drugs, and causing death by driving whilst uninsured, unlicensed or 
disqualified.
1.2.3 Conclusion
This section has identified some of the complex normative and technical issues 
that underlie the criminalization of serious traffic offences. One would be hard-
pressed to find another area of the criminal law where there are so many possi-
bilities for variation. As such, it is no wonder that each of the countries examined 
in this book has ended up with an altogether different array of offences dealing 
with dangerous or potentially dangerous traffic behaviour. It seems to us that this 
conclusion provides food for thought. How come that systems that are comparable 
to each other in quite a few ways have taken vastly different paths in this area? 
The legislators of these and other countries would be well advised to evaluate the 
choices underlying their systems in light of the many available options in this 
area.
1.3 The Complex Interpretative Questions Emerging in Traffic Cases
The serious offences that are dealt with in this book are confined to the context 
of road traffic. However, the relevance of serious traffic offences is by no means 
limited to the traffic context. One of the fascinating aspects of this area of criminal 
law is that general doctrinal concepts are very much at the centre of attention. 
The millions of dynamic interactions that take place in traffic have a tendency to 
spawn interesting cases that call the outermost boundaries of essential doctrinal 
concepts into question. We will demonstrate this on the basis of three landmark 
cases in Dutch criminal law. These cases pertain to the lower boundary of intent, 
negligence and causation. These cases also demonstrate that the role of the courts 
is at least as important as the role of the legislator. As far as the interpretation 
of general doctrinal concepts goes, the legislator can typically not exert all that 
much influence. It is up to the courts to determine in more detail how the lower 
boundaries of the opaque general concepts are defined.
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One of the most important Dutch cases with respect to the concept of intent 
is the Porsche case.1 After getting drunk in several bars, the defendant and his 
friend embarked on a perilous journey in a Porsche. The Porsche turned corners 
with squeaking and burning tyres, travelled at excessive speeds and ran red lights 
with undiminished speed. Subsequently, the driver approached several cars very 
closely and then overtook them with a swift manoeuvre. Finally, the driver tried 
to overtake a Seat. After having aborted three overtaking attempts, the Porsche 
went to the other lane and collided head-on with an oncoming Volvo. The Volvo’s 
four occupants and the defendant’s friend died as a result of this crash. The Court 
of Appeal had convicted the defendant of intentional homicide on the basis of 
conditional intent, which can be defined as consciously accepting the substantial 
chance of causing the result. The Dutch Supreme Court quashed this conviction. 
The Court essentially raised the question of how the finding of conditional intent 
to kill another person could be reconciled with the foreseeable and undesirable 
prospect of the defendant’s own death as a result of the collision.
The Porsche case raises both conceptual and practical questions. From a con-
ceptual point of view, the question is how the boundary between conditional intent 
and conscious negligence is to be drawn. The relevance of this question goes well 
beyond the context of traffic law. From a practical point of view, the question is 
whether extremely dangerous traffic behaviour does in fact result in proof of con-
ditional intent. In the Netherlands, this happens quite frequently, the Porsche case 
notwithstanding. It is interesting to assess how systems with a similar concept of 
intent, such as Germany and Spain, deal with comparable cases.
Another important Dutch case, which concerns the lower boundary of neg-
ligence, is the Geervliet case.2 The defendant came from a gas station in the city 
of Geervliet and wanted to drive on to the adjoining road, which had an 80 km/h 
speed limit. The road was clearly marked with give-way road markings. The 
defendant brought his car to a near-stop and looked over his left shoulder to check 
for oncoming traffic. He did not see any traffic and went on his way. After about 
twenty metres, a motorcycle bumped into his left rear side. The motorcyclist sus-
tained serious bodily injury because of this. The Court of Appeal convicted the 
defendant of negligently causing severe bodily injury in traffic, but the Supreme 
Court quashed the verdict. According to the Supreme Court, the mere fact that the 
defendant, when he was checking for oncoming traffic, did not see the motorcy-
clist although the motorcyclist must have been visible to him, is not sufficient to 
establish negligence.
Legal scholars in the Netherlands debate amongst one another how this case is 
to be interpreted. Some scholars argue that lower courts can still convict in cases 
like this as long as they properly substantiate why the defendant acted negligently. 
Other scholars disagree, claiming that the Supreme Court gave a clear signal that 
momentary inattention is just not enough to establish negligence. This contro-
versy touches upon the fundamental question of what level of culpability is min-
imally required for criminal responsibility. It is interesting to assess how other 
1 Supreme Court 15 October 1996, ECLI:NL:HR:1996:ZD0139.
2 Supreme Court 29 April 2008, ECLI:NL:HR:2008:BD0544. 
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systems deal with such cases of momentary inattention. It would seem that lethal 
cases of momentary inattention in England and Wales can be brought quite easily 
under the definition of causing death by careless driving, where it is only required 
that the way the defendant drove fell below what would be expected of a competent 
and careful driver. This can be contrasted with the standard that applies in cases 
where only serious injury has resulted. Here, it has to be proved that the way the 
defendant drove fell far below what would be expected of a competent and careful 
driver (dangerous driving).
The last Dutch case concerns the criterion for establishing a causal connec-
tion.3 The defendant in this case failed to yield right of way to the driver of another 
vehicle. A passenger of the other vehicle sustained a skull fracture and a concus-
sion. In the hospital, the victim developed thrombosis on account of the injuries 
and the necessary bed rest. The thrombosis gave rise to a pulmonary embolism, 
which eventually resulted in the victim’s death twelve days after the collision. The 
medical examiner’s report stated that the victim’s injuries had been serious, but 
that these injuries should not necessarily have resulted in the victim’s death. The 
Court of Appeal convicted the defendant of negligently causing the death of the 
victim. The defendant’s attorney argued before the Supreme Court that there was 
no causal connection between the collision and the victim’s death. The attorney 
raised the question of whether medical mistakes might have been made. The 
Supreme Court left the conviction intact. According to the Court, the occurrence 
of a lethal pulmonary embolism after injuries resulting from a collision “is not 
of such a nature that the victim’s death could not be reasonably attributed to the 
defendant as a result of the collision”. The Supreme Court introduced the new 
causal criterion of the ‘reasonable attribution’, which came into place of the previ-
ously used foreseeability criterion. This criterion has been in use ever since and 
has developed into the prevailing standard throughout the criminal law.
It is no wonder that the general doctrinal concept of causation is tested to the 
limit in the traffic context. A first reason is that the interactionist nature of traffic 
brings in its wake that often more than one person is involved in the causal chain. 
This raises the question of when contributory fault negates criminal responsibility 
of the defendant. A second complexity with respect to causation is that it may not 
be easy to establish ‘but for’ or sine qua non causation between careless or danger-
ous driving (e.g. drink-driving or speeding) and the collision. Might the collision 
not also have occurred if the defendant had played by the rules? A third source for 
causal complexities has to do with the simple fact that a great many people sustain 
injuries in traffic. Some of these injured people are bound to die on account of 
processes that are not foreseeable in a specific case. The Dutch Supreme Court 
essentially removed any doctrinal barrier to establishing causation by introducing 
a rather empty criterion. The contributions about France and England and Wales 
demonstrate, however, that courts still struggle with difficult questions about 
causation.
The interesting cases emerging in the traffic context raise important and com-
plex interpretative questions whose relevance extends well beyond this context. 
3 Supreme Court 12 September 1978, ECLI:NL:HR:1978:AC2616.
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As  a rule, it is up to the courts, rather than the legislator, to define the lower 
boundaries of the opaque general concepts. The comparative chapters show that 
the courts of the examined countries interpret similar concepts such as condi-
tional intent, negligence or causation in a different manner. If anything, this 
demonstrates that the realm of possible interpretations is quite extensive. The 
courts of these and other countries would do wisely to evaluate their interpretative 
choices in light of the other available options in this area.
1.4 Outline
Chapters 2 through 6 of this book are devoted to the law of several European 
countries. Hein Wolswijk (the Netherlands), Sally Kyd Cunningham (England and 
Wales), Marie-Aimée Brajeux (France), Ingke Goeckenjan (Germany), and Manuel 
Cancio Meliá and Mariona Llobet Anglí (Spain) provide an analysis of serious traf-
fic offences in the respective countries. As was explained in the previous sections, 
these chapters reveal that there are significant differences in drafting and inter-
pretation of serious traffic offences. The authors do not only provide a description 
of the relevant provisions and case law of the examined systems, but they also 
offer critical and constructive observations with respect to essential legislative and 
interpretative choices.
Chapters 7, 8 and 9 deal with specific issues in the traffic context. Marius 
Duker examines the relative importance of culpability and harm in the sentencing 
of serious traffic offences in the Netherlands and England and Wales. He compares 
both the maximum punishments and the actual punishment practice of these 
two systems. He argues that both systems make a disproportionate difference 
between the punishment handed out for endangerment offences on the one hand 
and result offences on the other hand. Karel Brookhuis examines traffic offences 
from a behavioural perspective. He takes a closer look at the human factor in 
the causation of traffic accidents. He argues that drivers are sometimes unjustly 
blamed for causing a traffic accident, because the accidents should really be attrib-
uted to human limits. Alwin van Dijk provides a conceptual and psychological 
analysis of conditional intent and conscious negligence in the traffic context. The 
conceptual part contains a cognitivist and volitionist analysis of the legal concept 
of intent. The psychological part introduces a psychological framework (Desirabil-
ity Maximization Theory) which might serve as a general framework for analysing 
extremely dangerous traffic behaviour.
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Serious Traffic Offences: The Dutch Perspective
Hein Wolswijk*
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, Dutch substantive law regarding serious traffic offences will be 
discussed.1 The focus will be on the definitions of the offences and the accompa-
nying maximum prison terms.2 Under Dutch law, traffic offences can be divided 
into the following groups. The first group concerns conduct offences involving no 
direct harm to persons. To this group belong, amongst others, minor offences con-
sisting of violations of concrete provisions relating to speed limits, yielding right 
of way, etc. This group also includes the general offence of causing danger on the 
road and the offence of driving under the influence of substances compromising 
driving ability. The second group concerns negligent result offences, and encom-
passes essentially just one offence, namely negligently causing a traffic accident in 
which another person is killed or sustains serious bodily injury. Finally, there is 
the group of general intentional offences, like intentional homicide and intention-
ally causing serious bodily injury (and the attempt thereto).
I will give an overview of these groups of offences (Section 2.3). Subsequently, 
the focus will be on the negligent traffic offence (Sections 2.4 and 2.5). Both from 
a theoretical and a practical viewpoint, this is the most important specific traffic 
offence. It raises a number of questions, particularly regarding the lower limit 
of negligence in traffic. At the end, I will discuss some possible gaps in Dutch 
criminal traffic law (Section 2.6). But I will start out by providing some relevant 
background information on the Dutch legal system in general.
2.2 Some General Characteristics of Dutch Criminal Law3
Dutch criminal law classifies criminal offences as either felonies or misdemean-
ours. In the case of felonies, some kind of mens rea (intent or negligence; see below) 
must always be proved. Misdemeanours are less serious offences. The maximum 
penalty never exceeds one year of imprisonment. Most misdemeanours require no 
mens rea; only the actus reus needs to be proved.
* Hein Wolswijk is Professor of Criminal Law at the University of Groningen, The Netherlands.
1 All articles and quotations are translations into English by the author.
2 The sentencing practice is discussed extensively by Duker, this book, Chapter 7. 
3 Tak 2008 provides a helpful introduction into Dutch criminal law in English. 
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The requirements for liability for an offence, be it a felony or a misdemeanour, 
can be distinguished into the specific constituent (definitional) elements of the 
offence and general requirements, namely unlawfulness and blameworthiness 
(culpability). A person who has fulfilled the constituent elements of an offence 
is not criminally liable if he did not act unlawfully, i.e. he can successfully plead 
a ground of justification, for example acting in self-defence. Criminal liability 
may also be lacking because the perpetrator, although acting unlawfully, is not to 
blame for this act because of an excusatory ground, like a mental disorder. This 
three-staged structure – definition of the offence, unlawfulness and blamewor-
thiness – is the standard. As will be demonstrated further on, negligent offences 
deviate from this structure.
All defences may be invoked with respect to all offences; no single offence is 
excluded. That is why misdemeanours, although mens rea need not be proved, 
cannot be classified as absolute liability crimes. A defence that is highly relevant 
for traffic law is the excuse of ‘absence of all culpability’. This is a non-codified, 
case law-recognized excusatory ground. It is based on the fundamental principle 
of Dutch criminal law that says that there can be no punishment without guilt. 
Absence of all culpability serves as a kind of safety net: the defence offers a way out 
in those cases in which guilt is lacking, while a statutory defence does not apply, 
for example in case of an excusable mistake of fact.
The distinction between constituent elements and other requirements of lia-
bility has an important procedural counterpart: with regard to the charge, which 
includes only the constituent elements, Dutch criminal law requires that the court 
must be convinced that the offender has committed the offence as charged (Arti-
cle 338 of the Dutch Wetboek van Strafvordering (Code of Criminal Procedure; here-
after CCP). For acquittal on the grounds of justification or excuse, a lower standard 
of proof applies; one could say that the applicability of such a ground must be 
probable. With regard to justificatory and excusatory defences, the defendant has 
neither a burden of production nor a burden of persuasion, although, in practice, 
such a defence is normally raised by the defendant. But the court has – ex officio – a 
duty to ascertain whether a defence might apply.
A final remark should be made on the large discretion on the part of the pros-
ecution office and the courts. Under Dutch law, it is up to the public prosecution 
office to decide whether or not to charge a person with an offence (Articles 167 
and 242 CCP). The prosecution office is not obliged to charge a suspect, even if 
they strongly believe that an offence has been committed. They can decide on a 
waiver of prosecution if it is not in the public interest to prosecute (opportunity 
principle). Victims or other concerned parties are not allowed to bring charges.4 
The law also affords courts a great deal of discretion. This is apparent in numerous 
areas. For example, although courts are bound by the law, i.e. statutory law, as 
a result of the principle of legality, many basic general concepts, like intent and 
negligence, are not statutorily defined, but worked out by the courts on a case-by-
case basis. Discretion is most evident with regard to sentencing: Dutch criminal 
4 They have the right, however, to request the court to order the prosecution service to bring 
charges (Article 12 CCP).
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law establishes specific maximum punishments for each offence, but no specific 
minimum punishments. For example, with regard to imprisonment, a general 
minimum prison sentence of one day applies to all offences (Article 10.2 Wetboek 
van Strafrecht [Criminal Code; hereafter CC]).5 This is the case for even the most 
serious crimes subject to the highest maximum punishment (life imprisonment), 
such as murder, with judges being allowed to take extenuating circumstances into 
account.6
2.3 An Overview of Dutch Criminal Traffic Law
I will start the overview of Dutch traffic law with the offences involving no direct 
harm; then the intentional offences will be discussed. The negligent traffic offence, 
which is to be placed between these groups as regards severity, will be dealt with 
at the end, the reason being that its reach and its place within the system of traffic 
offences are best understood after the concept of intent has been explained.
2.3.1 Traffic Offences Involving No Harm (Conduct Offences)
Specific Traffic Regulations
The Dutch legislator has regulated traffic behaviour primarily by specific traffic 
rules and traffic signs. Most of these rules are laid down in the Reglement Ver-
keersregels en Verkeerstekens (Road Traffic and Traffic Signals Regulations; here-
after RTTSR). These specific, concrete rules concern, for example, speed limits 
and yielding right of way. From these rules, road users can directly infer how 
they have to behave in traffic. Violation of such a rule can be characterized as an 
abstract endangerment offence. The reason for criminalizing certain conduct lies, 
of course, in the fact that this may easily lead to endangerment of traffic safety, 
but endangerment itself is not a definitional element of the offence. Absence of 
endangerment of traffic safety, let alone absence of an actual breach of the pro-
tected interest, does not in any way affect the perpetrator’s liability. Violation of 
these specific traffic rules constitutes a misdemeanour.7 The maximum penalty is 
generally a penal custody of two months (or a fine).8
5 Where the court deems it advisable, it may even determine that no sanction shall be imposed 
(Article 9a CC). 
6 The judiciary has developed ‘orientation points’ for sentencing. They offer type-descriptions of 
common crimes indicating what sentence to impose. These non-binding orientation points are 
fairly influential in practice. They will be discussed in detail by Duker, this book, Chapter 7.
7 A lot of these violations, however, are dealt with by administrative law in accordance with the 
Wet administratiefrechtelijke handhaving verkeersvoorschriften (Traffic Regulations Administrative 
Enforcement Act) and punished with an administrative fine (see, in particular, Article 2 of this 
Act).
8 A few misdemeanours carry a maximum prison term of three months or a fine.
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General Traffic Provision
Next to the specific rules, conduct on the road is also covered by the general rule 
of Article 5 of the Wegenverkeerswet 1994 (Road Traffic Act 1994; hereafter RTA): 
“Anyone is forbidden to behave in such a way that danger on the road is caused 
or can be caused or that the traffic on the road is hindered or can be hindered.” 
This provision aims to protect traffic safety and fluency of traffic and contains 
the basic norm for traffic behaviour. It serves as a safety net with regard to any 
reprehensible behaviour that is not covered by the specific traffic rules. Article 5 
RTA functions also as a possible backup indictment if the defendant is charged 
with Article 6 RTA, negligently causing a traffic accident resulting in death or 
serious bodily injury. If the court does not establish a violation of Article 6 RTA, 
for example because the defendant did not act negligently or because the injury 
was not serious enough, the defendant may be convicted for the lesser offence of 
Article 5 RTA.
Article 5 RTA is a very broad provision, covering not only actual danger and 
hindrance, but also potential danger and potential hindrance. Because of its ‘open-
ness’, Article 5 has been criticized by some authors as being a violation of the legal-
ity principle. However, the prevailing view is that since it is impossible for the leg-
islator to describe and prohibit exhaustively all possible forms of dangerous traffic 
behaviour in specific, concrete rules, such a general provision is indispensable.9
Like the violation of the specific, concrete traffic provisions, violation of Arti-
cle 5 RTA is a misdemeanour, carrying also the same maximum penalty: violation 
of Article 5 RTA can give rise to a maximum punishment of two months’ impris-
onment (or a fine). From this – relatively – low maximum sentence, it appears that 
Article 5 RTA does not aim to cover criminal behaviour of an (entirely) different 
order – in the sense of being (far) more dangerous – than acts covered by the 
specific rules.
Although both the specific traffic offences and the general traffic offence of 
Article 5 RTA are misdemeanours, requiring neither intent nor negligence, the 
defendant may always invoke a ground excluding liability, like the defence of 
absence of all culpability. If it is held that the defendant could not have acted in 
any other way, for example because he is suddenly struck by a heart attack, the 
defendant will not be convicted.
Driving Under Influence
An important specific provision which does not regulate traffic behaviour as such, 
but the state of the driver is Article 8.1 RTA. This provision contains the general 
rule forbidding a person “to drive a motor vehicle, when he is under the influence 
of a substance to such an extent that he must be deemed to be unfit to operate 
a motor vehicle, while he knows or should reasonably be expected to know that 
the use of the substance – whether alone or in combination with another sub-
stance – may compromise his driving ability.” There is a specific rule with regard 
to alcohol, using (formal) limit values: driving is forbidden when upon analysis 
9 On this discussion, see Simmelink 1995, pp. 257-299; Krabbe 1999, pp. 115-118; Harteveld & 
Robroek 2012, pp. 41-44.
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the alcohol level appears to be greater than 220 micrograms per litre of exhaled 
breath and/or the blood alcohol level is greater than 0.05% (Article 8.2 RTA). A 
person who has been ordered to submit to a blood test is required to cooperate 
(Article 163.6 RTA). Violation of these rules, including the obligation to cooperate, 
constitutes a felony (Article 178 RTA), carrying the same maximum prison term 
of three months (Article 176.3 RTA).
Currently, a specific provision using limit values with regard to other sub-
stances than alcohol is lacking, so only the general rule of Article 8.1 RTA is appli-
cable. This rule is quite complicated, in particular where it says that the driver is 
under the influence of a substance to such an extent “that he must be deemed to 
be unfit to operate a motor vehicle”. According to case law, this requires neither 
actually dangerous or maladjusted traffic behaviour, nor deviant traffic behaviour 
or other external characteristics from which the inability to drive may be con-
cluded, nor a significant increase of the risk of creating an accident. Decisive is, 
according to case law, whether “the average driver in the specific circumstances 
of the case is supposed to be unfit to drive, and the serious suspicion, based upon 
this presupposition, that the defendant is also supposed to be unfit to drive”.10 
This means that a forensic test concluding that “the driving ability is probably 
influenced negatively” will not always be sufficient to prove that the defendant 
was supposed to be unfit to drive, and that additional details on the defendant’s 
driving behaviour will be important. Difficulties in applying this rule is one of 
the reasons the government has proposed legislation that provides for a specific 
provision with regard to narcotics, operating formal limit values, in line with the 
provision for alcohol.11
2.3.2 Intentional Offences
The Concept of Intent
The most serious offences that can be committed in traffic (or in any other con-
text) are intentional offences. Dutch law does not include specific intentional 
traffic offences. In case of intentionally causing injury or death, the traditional 
intentional offences come into play. Article 287 CC criminalizes intentional hom-
icide, intentionally taking the life of another person, carrying a maximum prison 
sentence of fifteen years. Article 302.1 CC criminalizes intentionally causing 
serious bodily injury to another person; the perpetrator is liable to a maximum 
term of imprisonment of eight years. Article 302.2 CC provides for an aggravating 
factor: where death ensues as a result of the act, the offender is liable to a term of 
imprisonment of not more than ten years. Article 302.1 CC in conjunction with 
Article 302.2 CC constitutes a so-called result-qualified offence, in which death 
is an objectified consequence of the conduct. This means that neither intent nor 
negligence is required with respect to the death; a causal connection between the 
conduct, i.e. intentionally inflicting serious bodily injury and death suffices. The 
existence of this result-qualified offence particularly shows that Dutch criminal 
10 Supreme Court 27 March 2012, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BT2669.
11 Kamerstuk 32859.
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law draws a sharp distinction between offences based on whether or not an intent 
to kill can be established. Specifically, unlike under English law, the perpetrator 
cannot be guilty of intentional homicide if, although he caused another person’s 
death, he ‘merely’ intended to cause serious bodily injury.
Dutch criminal law recognizes several gradations of intent, comprising not 
only ‘wilful intent’ (dolus directus) and ‘awareness of a high degree of probability’ 
(dolus indirectus), but also ‘conditional intent’ (dolus eventualis, bedingter Vorsatz), 
which is considered the lower limit of intent.12 The Dutch Supreme Court defines 
conditional intent as “consciously accepting a substantial chance of causing the 
consequence”.13 Conditional intent means that the perpetrator is aware of the 
substantial chance that a certain result will occur, yet nevertheless accepts that 
chance. The received opinion is that conditional intent under this definition 
includes not only a cognitive component (awareness of the substantial chance), 
but also, albeit slight, a volitional component (accepting the chance). As regards 
the latter point, according to the prevailing opinion, it is the volitional component 
that distinguishes (conditional) intent from negligence in the form of ‘conscious 
negligence’.14 With conscious negligence, the perpetrator is likewise aware of the 
substantial chance that the result will take place, but instead of accepting this 
possibility, wrongfully trusts that the result will not occur. If the perpetrator even 
lacks this awareness, he enters the realm of negligence in the form of ‘uncon-
scious negligence’.
If dangerous behaviour did not result in death or serious bodily injury, the 
defendant may be prosecuted for attempted intentional homicide or attempting 
to cause serious bodily injury. In case of attempt, the maximum prison term 
is reduced by one-third (Article 45 CC). The intent requirement for attempts in 
Dutch criminal law is the same as for complete crimes, meaning that conditional 
intent suffices.
Intentional Offences and Dangerous Driving
What is the practical relevance of intentional offences in the context of dangerous 
traffic behaviour? Answering this question must start with the Porsche ruling 
of 1996, a notorious case in Dutch criminal law.15 A young man and his friend 
had quite a few drinks at several bars. After that, they embarked on a dangerous 
journey with a Porsche. The Porsche was speeding, running through red lights 
and overtaking other drivers in a dangerous way. The driver of a Seat later testi-
fied that the Porsche attempted to overtake the Seat three times. Each time, the 
Porsche moved swiftly to the other lane and returned ever so quickly. After that, 
the Porsche did go to the other lane all the way. At that time, a Volvo coming 
from the opposite direction was close by. The Porsche collided with the Volvo. All 
12 See De Hullu 2012, pp. 225-232.
13 See, e.g., Supreme Court 25 March 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AE9049.
14 See, e.g., Supreme Court 25 March 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AE9049. The theory of intent is dis-
cussed extensively by Van Dijk, this book, Chapter 9. 
15 Supreme Court 15 October 1996, ECLI:NL:HR:1996:ZD0139. The Porsche ruling is also discussed 
(in much more detail) by Van Dijk, this book, Chapter 9.
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four occupants of the Volvo and the Porsche driver’s passenger were killed by the 
collision. The driver of the Porsche was charged with five separate counts of inten-
tional homicide. The Court of Appeal convicted the defendant of intentional hom-
icide; according to the court, the defendant acted with conditional intent. But the 
Supreme Court quashed this verdict because it was insufficiently substantiated:
5.4 In cases such as the present one, where the evidence leads one to infer that 
the defendant by his conduct caused substantial danger for his own life as well, the 
court must, however, take into account that it is – absent indications to the con-
trary  – not likely according to rules of general experience that the defendant will 
also accept the substantial chance that a head-on collision with an oncoming car 
will occur, as a result of which he will die himself.
5.5 In light of the aforementioned and taking into account that the evidence indicates 
that the defendant – apparently to avoid a collision – aborted several overtaking 
manoeuvres before [...] completing the fatal overtaking manoeuvre, which indicates 
that the aforementioned manoeuvre, at least in the defendant’s imagination and 
expectation would not result in a collision, [...] the finding that the defendant’s intent 
was directed at the death of the victims stands in need of further motivation.
The Supreme Court referred the case to another Court of Appeal, which acquitted 
the defendant on the charge of intentional homicide and convicted him of multi-
ple counts of negligent homicide in traffic.
The prevailing view in literature is that the Supreme Court in the Porsche 
ruling emphasized the volitional element of conditional intent: conditional intent 
requires not only awareness of the chance but also accepting it. This volitional 
element needed further substantiation, in light of the defendant’s behaviour and 
the notion that people are not inclined to put their own life in danger.16
At the time, it was thought that the Porsche ruling – in particular because of 
the reference to the notion that people are not inclined to put their own life in 
danger – would make a conviction for intentional homicide in traffic cases almost 
impossible,17 but this prediction has not turned out to be true.18 Although the Por-
sche ruling is still standing case law, quite a few people have been held liable for 
intentional homicide, in most cases because the perpetrator had conditional intent 
with regard to the victim’s death, i.e. it was established that the defendant con-
sciously accepted the substantial chance that he would cause another road user’s 
death. The fact that the Porsche ruling has not stood in the way of convictions for 
(attempted) intentional homicide in many cases has several reasons.19
16 De Jong 1999a, p. 4; Wolswijk 2000, p. 800; De Hullu 2012, p. 240.
17 This was also considered problematic in light of the maximum prison terms for negligent homi-
cide in traffic at the time: one year’s imprisonment and three years in case of intoxication (in case 
of multiple deaths, the maximum prison terms according to the rules on concurrent sentences 
were one year and four months respectively four years). In 1998, these terms were increased sub-
stantially (see Sections 2.3.3 and 2.5.1).
18 Vellinga 2012, p. 171. 
19 The descriptions of the cases discussed in the next paragraphs are adopted from Van Dijk 
forthcoming.
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First, the notion that people are not inclined to risk their own life is an assump-
tion; as the Supreme Court itself stated, there may be “indications to the contrary”. 
In some cases of very dangerous driving, where the defendant does not only risk 
the life of other road users but also his own, it is established that the defendant 
did intend to kill himself. In one case, the defendant drove his delivery van into 
another vehicle’s rear without braking. The defendant’s car travelled at between 
107 and 129 km/h on a 100 km/h road. The vehicles interlocked, went over a 
guardrail, collided with a traffic light and went down a slope. The defendant and 
the couple in the other car sustained injuries. The defendant had had an argu-
ment with his girlfriend and had consumed about fifteen beers in a bar (a BAC of 
0.113%; the legal limit being 0.05%; see Section 2.3.1). He later testified that he had 
wanted to commit suicide by driving into something at high speed. While driving, 
he told his girlfriend on the phone: “I’m driving 160 now and you’re going to hear 
how I demolish myself.”20 The defendant was convicted of two counts of attempted 
intentional homicide. In such a case of suicidal intent, the court is, of course, not 
relieved of establishing that the defendant’s intent was directed at the death of the 
victim, but it does make a conviction easier in light of the Porsche ruling.
Following on from this, there are cases where the defendant makes a self- 
incriminating statement directly regarding his position towards the victim’s 
death. In one case, the defendant drove his car after having consumed substantial 
amounts of alcohol. The police tried to stop his vehicle, but the defendant drove 
away for fear of having to spend the night in custody. He drove substantially faster 
than the 50 km/h speed limit, although he knew that it was usually busy at that 
time because the bars had just closed down. He turned off his lights on a dimly 
illuminated road and bumped successively into three bicyclists with illuminated 
rear lights. After each collision, he continued his journey, even pushing down on 
the accelerator in between. The defendant was convicted of two counts of inten-
tional homicide and one count of attempted intentional homicide. The Supreme 
Court briefly held that the Court of Appeal’s inference of intent was sufficiently 
substantiated. In its ruling, the Court of Appeal had referred to the defendant’s 
statement to the police: “I wanted to escape from the police at all costs.”21 If the 
court gives credence to the literal meaning of such a statement – the defendant 
wants to escape from the police “at all costs”, thus even at the cost of the lives of 
others – homicidal intent can indeed easily be proved. The question whether the 
defendant was also inclined to put his own life in danger or whether he did not 
think about this danger at all may be left unanswered.
The previous case is also illustrative for a different reason. In his advisory 
opinion, the advocate general provided another argument for holding that the 
inference of intent was sufficiently substantiated.22 He pointed out that, while the 
Porsche case concerned a deadly collision of several ‘strong’ road users (motor 
vehicles), this case concerned a violent confrontation between a ‘strong’ road user 
(the defendant in his car) and multiple ‘weak’ road users (bicyclists). Due to the 
20 ’s-Gravenhage Court of Appeal 11 November 2010, ECLI:NL:GHSRG:2010:BQ1112.
21 Supreme Court 23 January 2001, ECLI:NL:HR:2001:AA9594.
22 The advocate general is an independent legal advisor to the Supreme Court.
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relative invulnerability of the defendant, conscious acceptance of the deaths of the 
victims is perfectly compatible with not consciously accepting one’s own death. 
In a later case involving a collision between the defendant’s motor vehicle and 
a bicyclist, the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal’s following line of 
thought, which may be interpreted as a seal of approval for this argument: “From 
the defendant’s way of driving in his off-road vehicle one cannot but conclude 
that he was not concerned with its possible consequences for other road users, in 
particular vulnerable road users such as bicyclists.”23
The final case to be discussed concerned the following facts. The defendant 
was driving with his family. His wife was in the passenger seat and their eleven-
month-old daughter was in the rear in a child safety seat. The car ended up in 
a canal, leaving a thirty-five-metre tyre mark on the road and verge. There was 
no indication of braking. The defendant saved his daughter and helped his wife 
getting out of the water. The Court of Appeal ascertained that the defendant had 
deliberately steered the car into the canal. The court established conditional intent 
with regard to killing his wife. The defendant was acquitted, however, of attempted 
intentional homicide of his daughter. The Court of Appeal did not address the fact 
that the defendant also had risked his own life. Interestingly, according to the 
Supreme Court, the defendant’s claim that he had not intended to kill his wife 
because he had not accepted the chance of dying himself did not compel the court 
to further reasoning, because the Porsche case concerned “a dangerous traffic 
manoeuvre”, whereas this case concerned “a deliberate act of violence against the 
victim.”24 Apparently, the fact that the defendant committed a deliberate violent 
act against the victim may relieve the lower court from the difficult task of explain-
ing why the defendant risked his own life.
To conclude, it appears that the Porsche ruling need not stand in the way of 
convictions for intentional homicide. The applicability of intentional offences with 
regard to dangerous driving is not merely theoretical.
2.3.3 Negligent Homicide and Negligently Causing Serious Injury in Traffic
Legal Framework; Core Provisions
The Criminal Code includes several general negligent offences, like negligent 
homicide and negligently causing serious bodily injury. Negligent homicide 
(Article 307 CC) carries a maximum prison term of two years in case of ‘plain’ 
negligence and four years in case negligence takes the form of ‘recklessness’.25 
Negligently causing serious bodily injury (Article 308 CC) can give rise to a 
23 Supreme Court 27 February 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AN9360.
24 Supreme Court 29 September 2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BI4736. Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court refused to take the acquittal regarding the defendant’s daughter into account, because the 
appeal in cassation did not pertain to the acquittal.
25 The Dutch concept of recklessness (roekeloosheid) differs from the Anglo-Saxon concept of 
recklessness. Dutch criminal law only distinguishes between intent and negligence, with reck-
lessness being the most severe form of negligence, while in many other systems recklessness is 
a category of its own, next to intent and negligence. The meaning of recklessness is discussed in 
more detail in Section 2.5. 
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 maximum prison term of one year (negligence) or two years (recklessness). Next 
to these general offences, Dutch law since long contains a specific traffic offence 
of negligently causing death or serious injury, carrying a much higher maximum 
sentence. The law on this negligent traffic offence has been changed a couple of 
times and we will return to these changes later on in Section 2.5. The relevant 
provisions now read:
Article 6 RTA
Anyone who participates in traffic is forbidden to behave in such a way that a traffic 
accident which is due to his negligence takes place which causes another person to 
be killed or which causes serious bodily injury to another person or such physical 
injury that it results in temporary illness or impediment of the performance of daily 
routines.
Article 175 RTA
1. Violation of Article 6 will be punished with:
a. a term of imprisonment of not more than three years or a fine of the fourth 
category, if it is an accident that causes the death of another;
b. a term of imprisonment of not more than one year and six months or a fine 
of the fourth category, if it is an accident that causes bodily injury to another.
2. If it is a case of recklessness, violation of Article 6 will be punished with:
a. a term of imprisonment of not more than six years or a fine of the fifth cate-
gory, if it is an accident that causes the death of another;
b. a term of imprisonment of not more than three years or a fine of the fourth 
category, if it is an accident that causes bodily injury to another.
3. If the guilty person [was under the influence of alcohol or drugs or refused to co-
operate with an order to test for these substances], or if the accident was caused 
or was partially caused by the fact that he violated the speed limit as specified by 
this law to a serious extent, or he was very closely tailing another vehicle, or he 
did not yield right of way, or he was overtaking in a dangerous way, the terms of 
imprisonment as mentioned in the first and second section may be increased by 
one-half.
As is apparent from these provisions, the maximum punishment is determined by 
three factors. The first one is the result of the accident, caused by negligent traffic 
behaviour (Article 175.1 RTA): in case of death of another person, the maximum 
prison term is three years; in case of serious injury26 one year and six months. 
The second factor is the degree of negligence (Article 175.2 RTA): recklessness 
functions as an aggravating factor, doubling the maximum sentence. So in case 
of death, the offender is liable to a maximum prison term of six years; with seri-
ous bodily injury three years. Thirdly, and irrespective of the presence of the 
aggravating factor of recklessness, the maximum prison term is determined by 
26 For the sake of brevity, I will only refer to ‘serious injury’, although Article 6 RTA also mentions 
“such physical injury that it results in temporary illness or impediment of the performance of 
daily routines”.
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other, more specific aggravating factors (Article 175.3 RTA). These circumstances 
– like speeding and driving under influence – increase the maximum sentence 
by one-half, both with respect to negligence and recklessness. Noteworthy is that 
driving under influence, unlike the other factors, is an aggravating factor regard-
less of whether the intoxication has contributed to the accident in any way. All in 
all, the different factors have the effect that in case of negligently causing death 
(Article 175.1 RTA: three years), when negligence takes the form of recklessness 
(Article 175.2 RTA: multiplied by 2), and a specific aggravating factor applies (Arti-
cle 175.3 RTA: multiplied by 1.5), the maximum sentence is nine years of imprison-
ment. If the defendant has caused multiple deaths, he is, according to the rules on 
concurrent sentences, liable to a prison term of twelve years.27
The key element of the offence of Article 6 RTA is negligence. I will turn to 
the general concept of negligence under Dutch law shortly, but first two remarks 
must be made. In the following, when referring to the offence of Article 6 RTA, I 
will use – for brevity’s sake – expressions like negligently causing a serious traffic 
accident or causing a serious accident by negligence; it is implied that the accident 
resulted in either death or serious injury, as required by Article 6 RTA. The second 
remark concerns the object of negligence in Article 6 RTA. The text of this provi-
sion clearly indicates that negligence in Article 6 RTA refers to the accident, i.e. 
the accident must have been caused by negligence. However, it is less clear – and 
case law still has not clarified this issue – whether negligence also refers to death 
or injury. According to some authors, these results of the accident are objectified 
consequences, meaning that neither intent nor negligence is required with respect 
to death or injury.28 Negligence is thus related to the accident only, while a causal 
connection between negligently causing the accident and death or injury suffices. 
Others take the view that negligence refers to both the accident and the ensuing 
result; thus, negligence must have caused death or injury (via negligently caus-
ing the accident).29 I will not go into this discussion. In practice, the difference 
between these views is not of great relevance. In almost all cases, when the acci-
dent was caused by negligence, death or injury flowing from the accident can be 
considered as caused by negligence as well.
The Concept of Negligence 30
Under Dutch law, negligence – both plain negligence and recklessness – can 
be defined as a blameworthy, gross (or substantial) deviation from the required 
standard of care that has caused a certain unwanted result.31 The deviation from 
the standard of care may occur either while the defendant did not even consider 
the unwanted consequence of his conduct (unconscious negligence) or while he 
27 In case of conviction for more than one offence, only one prison term is imposed. The maximum 
prison terms are accumulated, but the total result will not be more than one-third above the max-
imum prison term for the most serious felony (Article 57 CC).
28 See, e.g., Krabbe 1999, pp. 121-123.
29 Van Dijk 2008, p. 37; Harteveld & Robroek 2012, p. 64. 
30 See, e.g., De Hullu 2012, pp. 253-256. 
31 Conceptually, causation (causing an unwanted result) is only an element of negligence when it 
concerns result offences (which most negligent offences are, like violation of Article 6 RTA).
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did consider the consequence but (wrongfully) trusted that it would not occur 
(conscious negligence).
Under this definition, the concept of negligence has a two-stage structure. 
Negligence consists of an objective part, a gross deviation of a duty of care, here-
after termed gross negligence, and a subjective part, i.e. the deviation must be 
blameworthy. The objective component can be analysed into different aspects. In 
general, a defendant’s act constitutes a deviation from the standard of care with 
regard to a certain unwanted result if the defendant could have foreseen that his 
behaviour would cause this result. In the context of Article 6 RTA, the foreseeabil-
ity of a serious traffic accident often follows from the violation of a concrete traffic 
rule that is supposed to prevent traffic accidents from happening. The reasoning 
is that the defendant could have foreseen that violating the concrete rule – not 
yielding right of way, speeding – would bring about an accident.32 Of course, this 
reasoning does not always hold. It may be, for example, that the violation of the 
concrete norm itself was not foreseeable (the traffic sign was invisible for road 
users), as a result of which the accident was neither foreseeable. On the other 
hand, the unwanted result may also be foreseeable if no concrete norm is vio-
lated, for example in case of driving with an inappropriate speed given the cir-
cumstances. Furthermore, foreseeability of the unwanted result only constitutes a 
deviation from the standard of care if the defendant took an unacceptable risk. This 
is particularly relevant in the field of traffic, since participating in traffic involves 
inherent risks; road users are not required to avoid any foreseeable risk, no matter 
how low. Another important objective aspect under Dutch law is that criminal 
negligence requires ‘more culpability’ than civil negligence. Criminal negligence 
always means gross negligence (culpa lata), i.e. a gross deviation from the standard 
of care. Whether this is the case may depend on – amongst other aspects – the 
defendant’s professional position. If the defendant is a professional bus driver, he 
bears a heavier responsibility, what German doctrine calls a Garantenstellung.33 
His responsibility is extended in the sense that his behaviour is not compared 
to what is to be expected from a (reasonable) normal road user, but to what is 
expected from a professional bus driver.
Negligence also has a subjective component: the deviation from the standard 
of care must be blameworthy. Blameworthiness requires that the deviation was 
avoidable. The defendant must have been able to comply with the required standard 
of care. In assessing the avoidability, the defendant’s mental and physical capabili-
ties are taken into account. Acute physical disabilities (e.g. a heart attack), chronic 
physical disabilities, mental disabilities, lack of experience or lack of education 
could be relevant for the assessment of the subjective component. Of course, the 
doctrine of prior fault (culpa in causa) is taken into account in this assessment. A 
person who knows or should know that he is unfit to drive cannot later claim that 
he could not have avoided the collision due to his condition.
From the definition of negligence as a blameworthy, gross deviation from the 
required standard of care follows that negligent offences have a different structure 
32 Vellinga 2012, p. 150.
33 De Hullu 2012, p. 255.
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than intentional offences. In case of intentional offences, proof of the definitional 
elements of the offence presumes but does not imply the presence of the general 
requirements for liability – unlawfulness and blameworthiness.34 A ground for 
justification or excuse does not negate intent. Furthermore, since the charge only 
includes the definitional elements of the offence, this also has the procedural con-
sequence that the absence of the grounds excluding liability is subjected to a lower 
standard of proof.35 With negligent offences, this is different. Unlawfulness and 
blameworthiness are definitional elements of a negligent offence. Consequently, 
negligence subsumes all grounds excluding liability. For example, speeding in 
order to rush a dying person to the hospital may be justifiable (necessity), in which 
case the defendant did not take an unacceptable risk and thus did not act neg-
ligently. Negligence also subsumes excusatory grounds. Such a ground, like an 
excusable physical or mental defect (e.g. unconsciousness as a consequence of a 
diabetic attack), negates negligence. Since unlawfulness and blameworthiness are 
definitional elements of a negligent offence and therefore included in the charge 
of negligence, this would also seem to imply that, unlike a charge of an inten-
tional offence, the standard of proof applicable to these grounds is the same as the 
standard that applies to normal definitional elements. For a conviction, the court 
then would have to be convinced, based on evidence, of their presence. In practice, 
however, the position of unlawfulness and blameworthiness does not differ that 
much from their position with respect to intentional offences. In cases of negli-
gence in traffic, courts go rarely into the blameworthiness of the defendant, i.e. 
the subjective component of negligence (and the same goes for unlawfulness). If 
the defendant grossly deviated from what a careful road user would have done, it is 
usually inferred that he could have acted differently. The court will only deal with 
the subjective component of negligence if there is an indication that the defendant 
cannot be held to the standard of the careful road user (which is seldom the case).
2.4 The Lower Limit of Negligence
Article 6 in conjunction with Article 175 RTA is the most important provision with 
regard to serious traffic offences. In practice, the negligence element causes diffi-
cult problems. Two of these problems will be discussed, both concerning demarca-
tion issues: the lower limit of plain negligence and the lower limit of recklessness. 
The second issue will be discussed in Section 2.5.
2.4.1 General Approach to Establish Negligence
One of the most difficult problems with regard to Article 6 RTA is the question of 
the lower limit of negligence. For many years, this issue played no significant role. 
In practice, it remained in the background and the Supreme Court did not give 
any guidelines as to what constituted negligence. Around the year 2000, there was 
34 See Section 2.2.
35 See Section 2.2.
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a turning point. In literature, the question arose whether negligence had become 
‘eroded’ in practice. Some authors stated that in case law the requirement of culpa 
lata – criminal negligence is gross negligence – had become without substance. 
More specifically, they stated that a single violation of a concrete traffic provision 
–  like speeding or not yielding right of way – was sufficient to establish negli-
gence.36 Probably due to this discussion, and to promote more legal certainty, the 
Supreme Court in its ruling of 1 June 2004 for the first time commented on the 
concept of negligence in more general terms. In this Winssen case, the Court 
stated:
[The Supreme Court is only allowed to determine whether negligence, as proved, 
could be inferred from the evidence that is ascertained by the lower court.] It comes 
down to the defendant’s conduct considered in its entirety, its nature and severity 
and the other circumstances of the case.
This implies that it is not possible to state in general whether one single traffic vio-
lation may be sufficient to find negligence proved. After all, various factors need to 
be taken into account in that respect, like the nature of the traffic violation and the 
seriousness thereof, and the circumstances under which it occurred. Furthermore, 
it should be noted that proof of negligence […] cannot already be derived from the 
seriousness of the consequences of traffic behaviour which violates one or more 
traffic rules.37
It has been said that this judgment does not really give any guidelines as to what 
constitutes negligence.38 This is partly true. The last remark of the quoted par-
agraph seems even rather self-evident. If proof of negligence could be derived 
from the seriousness of the consequences of the traffic violation, negligence in 
the sense of Article 6 RTA could always easily be proved, since the applicability of 
Article 6 RTA presupposes the presence of serious consequences, namely death 
or serious injury. Furthermore, the ruling does not give specific guidelines for the 
lower courts indeed. But this is hardly surprising once the starting point is that 
the establishment of negligence is determined to a great extent by the particular 
circumstances of the case. At the same time, the finding that this is the starting 
point and that, therefore, it is not possible to state in general whether one single 
traffic violation may be sufficient to find negligence proved is in itself not without 
meaning.
This starting point is also important in relation to the aforementioned issue of 
the Garantenstellung, i.e. the phenomenon that a person who engages in a certain 
activity should be competent to carry out this activity. A possible reasoning in this 
context would be that taking part in traffic as a road driver and violating a traffic 
regulation constitutes negligence because of this Garantenstellung.39 In this view, 
negligence is not gross just because a traffic rule has been violated, but because 
36 See, e.g., De Jong 1999b, pp. 833, 836.
37 Supreme Court 1 June 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AO5822.
38 Van Dijk 2008, p. 35.
39 Robroek 2010, p. 123.
CriminalLiabilityforSeriousTrafficOffences.indd   22 3-12-2014   10:16:23
23
Serious Traffic Offences: The Dutch Perspective
it has been violated by someone who, being a road user (and in the possession 
of a driver’s licence), did not act as he was expected to, namely as a competent 
road driver. Thus, the Garantenstellung would lift the traffic violation to the level 
of gross negligence. In this reasoning, violating a traffic rule would, in principle, 
constitute negligence. However, from the Winssen ruling it appears that this is 
not a valid reasoning in general. Although the Supreme Court does not rule out 
the possibility that one traffic violation constitutes negligence, it depends on the 
circumstances under which the violation occurred whether this is the case.40
Finally, the significance of the judgment lies in the facts of the case at hand.41 
The Court of Appeal had established that the defendant, driving a car at a speed 
of about 80 km/h on a two-lane road, after a slight left turn, did not keep to the 
right as much as possible, but suddenly, for no reason, had come so far to the left 
that she thereby ended up at the wrong side of the road and collided head-on with 
an oncoming vehicle driving on that side of the road. According to the Supreme 
Court, “such traffic behaviour can in principle bear the inference that the defend-
ant acted substantially inattentive and/or careless and that the traffic accident was 
due to the defendant’s negligence referred to in Article 6 of the Road Traffic Act 
1994.”42 This judgment illustrates the meaning of the general comments on negli-
gence in the above-quoted paragraph when applied to this specific case. At first, it 
may seem that the defendant can only be blamed for a single violation of a specific 
traffic rule, namely a breach of the requirement to keep as far to the right as possi-
ble (Article 3.1 RTTSR). But then specific circumstances are left out, to which the 
Supreme Court explicitly refers, the most important one being – probably – that 
the defendant, for no reason, came so far to the left that she ended up on the wrong 
side of the road. Her traffic behaviour was therefore a serious breach of the specific 
traffic rule.
2.4.2 Categories of Punishable Negligence
The Winssen ‘rule’ obviously needs to be specified. And although case law does 
not provide for explicit sub-rules – except for one, which will be discussed further 
on – research by advocate general Vellinga, an influential expert in this field of 
law, indicates certain types of cases in which in general negligence (in the sense of 
Article 6 RTA) can be proved.43
The first category relates to consciously taking an unacceptable risk. An exam-
ple would be the driver who, nearing a junction, sees another road user to whom 
he should give right of way, but (wrongly) thinks that he can cross the road in time 
before the other road user crosses the junction.44 The second category concerns 
cases in which lack of precaution leads to a violation of the duty of care, like driving 
with fogged windows, driving too fast to be able to react adequately to possible 
40 Vellinga 2012, p. 160.
41 Vellinga 2012, p. 160.
42 Italics added.
43 Vellinga 2012, pp. 168-169; see also Vellinga 1979, pp. 122-123.
44 See, e.g., Supreme Court 13 April 2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH3921.
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traffic situations or not reducing speed when crossing a priority junction.45 The 
third category concerns drivers with diminished driving capacity. Negligence is 
generally proved when the driver makes a mistake which is caused by being under 
the influence of alcohol or overtiredness. Case law is not entirely clear, however, 
in particular with regard to driving under influence. From some rulings, it clearly 
appears that the use of alcohol was relevant for the court in establishing negli-
gence, but without explicitly requiring that the use of alcohol actually played a role 
in causing the accident.46 Probably, the case law must be understood to mean that 
this contributing role is – dependent on the alcohol level – fairly easily assumed.
The second and third category have a common characteristic, which probably 
explains why the threshold of gross negligence is met: the defendant has increased 
the risk of causing an accident by a prior fault.47 He has increased this risk by 
showing a lack of precaution, in the form of a lack of thoughtfulness, of knowledge 
or of prudence that is needed.
Although this classification is certainly helpful, practice still leaves us with 
difficult cases, as it may be hard to determine whether the defendant was precau-
tious enough. The following judgment of the Supreme Court provides a dramatic 
illustration. In this case, the defendant, a van driver, caused the death of a young 
boy. He had stopped his van to give right of way to the boy and his mother who 
were both riding a bicycle. While both cyclists were crossing over, the boy fell. 
Due to the height of the van and his own small stature, the defendant did not see 
this. The mother made a gesture with her hand. While she meant to indicate that 
the defendant should stop, the defendant wrongly concluded from this gesture 
that the boy was not in the danger zone. Thereupon the defendant went on his 
way and ran the boy over. The Supreme Court accepted the conviction. In light of 
the limited view of the defendant and the care that the driver of a motor vehicle 
is required to take vis-à-vis very vulnerable road users, the defendant should have 
verified himself that the boy was not in any danger instead of relying on the gesture 
of someone else.48
Next to these three categories, Vellinga distinguishes a fourth category in which in 
general negligence can be proved: committing a traffic fault under conditions that 
are favourable to avoid this fault, like having good view or having knowledge of the 
local circumstances. With this category, it seems that the grossness of negligence 
can be inferred from the fact that avoiding the accident was relatively easy.49 How-
ever, development in case law has complicated the assessment of this category. 
This development concerns cases of so-called ‘momentary inattention’.
An important case in point is the Geervliet ruling from 2008. The defendant 
came from a gas station and wanted to drive on to the adjoining road which had an 
45 See, e.g., Supreme Court 21 April 2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BG9142; Supreme Court 25 January 
2011, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BO2595.
46 Supreme Court 29 April 2008, ECLI:NL:HR:2008:BD0709; Supreme Court 22 November 2011, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BR3005.
47 Vellinga 1979, p. 123.
48 Supreme Court 17 January 2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AU3447.
49 Vellinga 1979, p. 124.
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80 km/h speed limit. The road was clearly marked with give-way road markings 
(but without a stopping sign). The Court of Appeal determined that the defendant 
had been aware of the fact that he had to yield right of way. The defendant brought 
his car to a near-stop and looked over his left shoulder to check for oncoming 
traffic. He did not see any and went on his way. After about 20 metres, he became 
aware of ‘something’ braking. It appeared that a motorcycle had bumped into his 
left rear side. The motorcyclist sustained serious bodily injury because of this. The 
Court of Appeal convicted the defendant of Article 6 RTA, but the Supreme Court 
quashed the verdict. According to the Supreme Court:
the mere fact that the defendant, when he was checking for oncoming traffic, did not 
see the motorcyclist, to whom he had to yield right of way, although the motorcyclist 
must have been visible to him, [is not sufficient to establish negligence].50
Since the Court of Appeal based its verdict of negligence on the sole assumption of 
the visibility of the victim, the verdict was not properly substantiated. According to 
this ruling, which was confirmed by subsequent judgments,51 it seems that violat-
ing a traffic rule resulting from merely ‘momentary inattention’ in the form of not 
seeing the victim although he was visible – ‘failing perception’, ‘looking but not 
seeing’ – on itself is not enough to establish negligence.52 However, the Geervliet 
ruling gives rise to several comments and questions.
First, a disadvantage of this approach is that in some cases the defendant may 
prevent negligence from being proved by making a false statement. The defendant 
may state that he did look for oncoming traffic (and did not notice any traffic), 
while in reality he did not look at all. Or he may state that he did look but did not 
see oncoming traffic, while in reality he did see oncoming traffic.53
The second issue concerns the question when it is really a case of mere (momen-
tary) inattention. It has been said that the Geervliet ruling implies that a failing 
perception will only constitute negligence when it is the result of other culpable 
behaviour, of a lack of precaution.54 A clear case would be when overtiredness 
caused the failing perception55 or when the defendant failed to see the other road 
user (although he had looked) because he did not adapt his speed and thus made it 
more difficult to see oncoming traffic. According to Vellinga, the Geervliet ruling 
would thus mean that a proviso should be made with regard to the aforementioned 
fourth category, i.e. committing a traffic fault under conditions that are favourable 
50 Supreme Court 29 April 2008, ECLI:NL:HR:2008:BD0544. 
51 See, e.g., Supreme Court 27 May 2008, ECLI:NL:HR:2008:BC7860.
52 Vellinga 2012, p. 169.
53 Vellinga 1979, p. 198, note 402. This is not to suggest, of course, that such a statement always 
stands in the way of establishing negligence. The court may find such a statement implausible 
given the objective facts of the case. 
54 See, e.g., the advisory opinion to the Supreme Court of advocate general Knigge, ECLI:NL: 
PHR:2008:BE9800.
55 The aforementioned (practical) disadvantage may also come up with overtiredness: the defend-
ant may state that he was not tired at all, while furnishing proof of the opposite can be difficult. 
See also Brookhuis, this book, Chapter 8.
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to avoid this fault. In his view, the Geervliet ruling implies that committing a 
 traffic fault under conditions that are favourable to avoid this fault does not suf-
fice for negligence when the fault resulted from mere momentary attention.56 But 
another view is also possible, in which this fourth category still stands. In this 
view, likewise (and in line with the Geervliet ruling), there must be something 
more than a failing perception to establish negligence. But this can also concern 
the fact that the failing perception may easily have been avoided because of favour-
able conditions, for example because the weather was very clear.57
Which view represents the current law is not yet clear. The issue is further 
complicated by the fact that it will not always be clear whether a failing percep-
tion can actually be attributed to culpable behaviour of the defendant, to a lack 
of precaution. This can be illustrated by the following case.58 The defendant had 
caused a deadly accident when leaving a roundabout by colliding with a bicyclist. 
The defendant claimed not to have seen the cyclist when leaving the roundabout. 
The Court of Appeal considered that the defendant had not noticed the cyclist, 
although, from the moment he entered the roundabout, he could have easily seen 
the cyclist. How is this case to be assessed in terms of the two views? One could 
say that this is a case of committing a traffic fault (not yielding right of way) result-
ing from mere momentary attention (the defendant, when exiting the roundabout, 
looked but did not see the cyclist), under conditions that are favourable to avoid 
this fault: the conditions were favourable because the defendant could already 
have seen the cyclist from the moment he entered the roundabout. Put this way, 
Vellinga might argue that the defendant’s behaviour did not constitute negligence. 
However, the court in this case argued differently: “A driver has a special duty of 
care to anticipate traffic conflicts, and to ascertain the presence of other traffic 
users he may encounter and must yield right of way to”. The court finds that the 
defendant violated this duty of care, because at no time he noticed the cyclist, and 
finds negligence proved. In other words, the court turns these favourable condi-
tions into a normative proposition: the defendant did not exercise the required 
precaution, so not seeing the victim is the result of culpable behaviour (and thus 
he acted negligently). The ultimate question, therefore, remains what is required 
from a road user in such a case.
2.5 The Boundary Between Plain Negligence and Recklessness
2.5.1 Introduction of Recklessness as a Form of Negligence
The law on the negligent traffic offence has changed several times. Before 1998, 
the RTA provided for a maximum prison term of one year for negligent homicide 
in traffic (in case of negligently causing bodily injury: nine months). If the per-
56 Vellinga 2012, p. 169.
57 The court must, of course, refer to such conditions in its justification of finding negligence 
proved.
58 Arnhem Court of Appeal 4 May 2012, ECLI:NL:GHARN:2011:BQ4034.
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petrator was under the influence of a substance that may impair driving ability, 
like alcohol, a punishment of three years’ imprisonment could be imposed (bodily 
injury: two years).59 In case of multiple deaths (or injuries), a third could be added 
to the prison term according to the rules on concurrent sentences (Article 57 CC), 
resulting in a maximum prison term of four years.
The law was changed in 1998.60 This amendment involved, firstly, an increase 
of the maximum prison term up to three years for negligent homicide in traffic (in 
case of bodily injury: one year). Secondly, speeding was added as an aggravating 
factor, next to driving under influence. The third and most striking element of 
the amendment was that the presence of one of these aggravating factors tripled 
the maximum prison term, increasing it up to nine years (three years in case of 
bodily injury). The amendment was criticized by scholars on several grounds.61 
The maximum penalty of nine years in itself was considered almost draconian. 
Furthermore, the increase from three years to nine years in case of an aggravat-
ing factor seemed unbalanced, both within the context of the traffic offence (a 
leap from three to nine years) and in relation to the maximum penalties for the 
general offences of negligently causing death (Article 307 CC) or serious bodily 
injury (Article 308 CC), which were, at the time, nine respectively six months’ 
imprisonment. And finally, picking out driving under influence and speeding as 
aggravating factors seemed rather arbitrary. Were there not other circumstances 
– for example running a red light or tailgating – which might also legitimize an 
increased maximum? The criticism thus entailed a two-folded message: expand 
the list of aggravating factors, but lower the accompanying maximum prison term 
of nine years.
With the amendment of the RTA in 2006,62 resulting in the law as it now 
stands (see also above), the legislator took partly notice of this message. The amend-
ment involved an increase of the maximum prison term up to one and a half 
year for the traffic offence of negligently causing injury (Article 175.1 RTA) and, 
much more important, the introduction of extra aggravating factors: negligence 
in the form of recklessness – as opposed to plain negligence – leads to doubling 
the maximum sentence (Article 175.2 RTA), while on top of that other explicitly 
mentioned forms of hazardous driving – amongst others driving under influence, 
speeding and tailgating – multiply the maximum sentence with a factor of one 
and a half (Article 175.3 RTA). At the same time – these alterations being part of a 
larger project involving a general reassessment of the maximum sentences – the 
sentences for the general negligent offences were modified. With respect to neg-
ligent homicide, the maximum prison term was increased from nine months to 
two years (Article 307.1 CC) and with respect to negligently causing serious injury 
from six months to one year (Article 308.1 CC). Furthermore, like with the neg-
ligent traffic offences, recklessness has been introduced as an aggravating factor, 
doubling the maximum sentence. Thus, the general offence of negligent homicide 
59 This includes the refusal to cooperate with an order to test for these substances.
60 Wet van 24 juni 1998, Staatsblad 1998, 375.
61 See, e.g., De Hullu & Wedzinga 1997.
62 Wet van 22 december 2005, Staatsblad 2006, 11.
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carries, as we have already seen, a maximum prison term of four years in case 
of recklessness (Article 307.2 CC), while causing serious injury by recklessness 
carries a maximum prison term of two years (Article 308.2 CC).
One can easily see that the legislator in 2006 only partially met the above-
mentioned critique triggered by the amendment of 1998.63 The legislator did try 
to restore the balance of the maximum prison terms of the various negligent 
offences, both in the Criminal Code and the RTA, by reducing the differences 
between the maximum sentences. But the way in which this was accomplished, 
in fact runs diametrically counter to the critics’ message. The legislator chose 
not to lower the maximum prison term of nine years’ imprisonment for the most 
serious negligent traffic offence; instead, he increased the maximum prison term 
for the general negligent offence of Article 307 CC. Furthermore, the legislator 
did acknowledge that other factors than driving under influence and speeding 
should have an aggravating effect. But as a solution, the legislator did not choose to 
introduce either more specific aggravating factors or just one general aggravating 
factor encompassing all kinds of factors; instead, he inserted recklessness as a 
general aggravating factor, on top of which other specific factors can have an even 
more aggravating effect.
Leaving these issues aside, from a substantive law perspective the amendment 
of 2006 raises two questions in particular. How is the new concept of recklessness 
to be distinguished from plain negligence? And how does recklessness relate to 
the specific aggravating factors, like driving under influence and speeding?
2.5.2 Meaning of Recklessness
Recklessness is a form of negligence, and with its introduction, the legislator 
did not want to alter the boundary between (conditional) intent and negligence. 
According to the explanatory memorandum, the legislator intended to introduce a 
separate maximum penalty for recklessness “to make adequate punishment pos-
sible in all cases of very negligent behaviour whereby the perpetrator deliberately 
and with serious consequences has taken unacceptable risks. Recklessness thus 
requires not only gross negligence, but a very serious lack of care. In other words, 
it is the most serious reproach that someone can be made within the limits of a 
negligent offence.”64
In this passage, the bar for establishing recklessness seems to be set rather 
high. Still, this passage raises questions. What is meant by ‘deliberately taking 
unacceptable risks’? Does the legislator want to restrict recklessness to conscious 
negligence? And what kind of behaviour constitutes ‘a very serious lack of care’? 
The examples given in the explanatory memorandum do not contribute to a clear 
picture. As a “possible case” of recklessness, it mentions the situation where some-
one is reading a map while driving with the consequence that the person over-
looks a priority road.65 Considering this a case of recklessness may, in view of the 
63 De Jong et al. 2003, p. 261.
64 Kamerstukken II, 2001-2002, 28484, no. 3, p. 12.
65 Kamerstukken II, 2001-2002, 28484, no. 3, p. 12.
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aforementioned description, come as a surprise. The explanatory memorandum 
also reads that driving under the influence of alcohol or driving much too fast will 
“easily” constitute recklessness.66 This may seem less surprising, but at the same 
time raises another question, because driving under influence and driving much 
too fast as such are already aggravating factors (Article 175.3 RTA), multiplying the 
maximum penalty by 1.5: how then do these specific aggravating factors relate to 
the general aggravating factor of recklessness, which doubles the maximum sen-
tence? The memorandum thus perfectly illustrates the aforementioned problems: 
how to delineate recklessness from plain negligence (what is the lower limit of 
recklessness?) and what is the relation between the specific aggravating factors 
and recklessness?
Case law so far shows that the concept of recklessness is far from clear. In quite a 
few cases, the Supreme Court quashed convictions for recklessly causing a serious 
accident; in most of these cases, the Court’s view differed also from the advocate 
general’s advisory opinion to the Court. Recently, on 15 October 2013, the Supreme 
Court ruled in four cases concerning recklessness, in all of which the lower court 
had convicted the defendant. In these decisions, the Court tries to shed some light 
on the concept. The Court begins by stating that, as with plain negligence, the 
Supreme Court is only allowed to determine whether recklessness, as proved, 
could be inferred from the evidence that is ascertained by the lower court, and 
that, again as with plain negligence, it all comes down to the defendant’s actions 
considered in their entirety, their nature and severity and the other circumstances 
of the case. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind, according to the Supreme 
Court, that in the legislative history recklessness is considered the most serious 
form of negligence, leading to a doubling of the maximum penalty. The Court 
then continues:
3.3. […] Partly with a view to the penalty-increasing effect of this factor, the establish-
ment of recklessness, being the most severe form of negligence, should definitely 
conform to certain standards, and where appropriate, the judge should specifically 
give further attention to his reasoning of the finding of recklessness. This also ap-
plies in cases where recklessness essentially consists of acts as set out in Section 3 
of Article 175 RTA, since these acts constitute a ground for further increase of the 
maximum penalty applicable to recklessness according to Section 2 of that article. [67]
3.4. The foregoing implies that the question whether there is recklessness in the 
sense of Section 2 of Article 175 RTA in a specific case requires an assessment of the 
particular circumstances of that case. In assessing an appeal in cassation directed 
against decisions in specific cases, the Supreme Court can clarify the meaning of 
the concept of recklessness only to a certain extent. In assessing such cases, it may 
play a role whether the court has provided its decision that there is recklessness […] 
with an additional reasoning which recognizes the specific nature of the element of 
66 Kamerstukken II, 2001-2002, 28484, no. 3, p. 13.
67 The Court already used these wordings in earlier rulings (e.g. Supreme Court 22 May 2012, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BU2016).
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recklessness. After all, being the most serious mens rea form, bordering on intent, 
recklessness will only be present in exceptional cases. Furthermore, it should be 
noted that the specific legal meaning of ‘recklessness’ does not necessarily coincide 
with the meaning of ‘recklessness’ – in the sense of ‘rash’ – in common parlance.
3.5. To establish recklessness […] in a specific case, the court must determine facts 
and circumstances from which it can be inferred that the defendant has created a 
very serious danger by extremely negligent behaviour, and that the defendant was 
aware of this or at least should have been.
From the considerations under 3.3, it follows that in this regard the mere finding 
that the defendant has committed one or more of the acts mentioned in Section 3 
of Article 175 RTA, which independently lead to an increase of the maximum penalty, 
does not suffice in general.68
From these considerations, it appears that the Supreme Court sets the bar high 
and chooses a restrictive interpretation of the concept of recklessness. More spe-
cifically, the Court clarified the relationship between recklessness (Article 175.2 
RTA) and the other, specific aggravating factors (Article 175.3 RTA), in that reck-
lessness cannot be inferred from the mere presence of one or more of these spe-
cific aggravating factors, like speeding and driving under influence. Indeed, this 
is only fair; if the mere presence of such a factor could give rise to the judgment 
that the perpetrator drove recklessly, this seems a case of double accounting.69
It is also clear from the considerations that recklessness is not restricted 
to conscious negligence (the defendant “was aware” of a serious danger or “at 
least should have been”). The most important question, then, is the meaning of 
the phrase that recklessness requires the causing of “a very serious danger by 
extremely negligent behaviour”. What constitutes extremely negligent behaviour? 
And how does the requirement of “a very serious danger” relate to the conditional 
intent term of a ‘substantial chance’ (the meaning of which is not crystallized 
yet either). One may think that the first term is even stricter than the latter, but 
that would be quite remarkable, since it would mean that the degree of danger 
required for recklessness – a form of negligence – is higher than that required for 
conditional intent.70 Comparing the two is difficult anyhow, because the Court 
does not indicate the object of the very serious danger: is it about danger for a 
traffic accident or for a person’s life?
In any case, looking at the concrete decisions in the four cases, it appears that 
the threshold of causing ‘a very serious danger by extremely negligent behaviour’ 
is not easily met; the Supreme Court takes a restrictive view on recklessness. 
Probably the least remarkable decision – i.e. in view of the Court’s general obser-
68 Supreme Court 15 October 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:959; Supreme Court 15 October 2013, ECLI:NL: 
HR:2013:960; Supreme Court 15 October 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:962; Supreme Court 15 Octo-
ber 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:964.
69 There is another cause for concern: drink-driving is an aggravating factor even if the intoxication 
has not contributed to the accident in any way (no causal relationship is required).
70 Under Dutch law, conditional intent includes an objective component. ‘Consciously accepting 
a substantial chance of causing the consequence’ requires also the actual presence of this sub-
stantial chance.
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vations – concerns a driver who violated the speed limit to a serious extent, while 
his blood alcohol level was 0.126% (the legal limit being 0.05%; see Section 2.3.1). 
He had not reduced his speed when he drove onto a junction on which the traffic 
lights were green for him, and caused a deadly accident with a bicyclist. According 
to the Supreme Court, recklessness could not be established on these facts.71 In 
another case, in which the lower court’s conviction was upheld, the defendant was 
engaged with another driver, amidst other road users, in a cat-and-mouse game. 
While exceeding the speed limit – 115 km/h where 50 km/h was allowed – he ran 
a red light and drove onto a junction. This resulted in a collision with another car, 
which cost the lives of its passengers. The Supreme Court upholds the conviction 
and explicitly refers to the fact that the lower court provided its finding of reckless-
ness with an additional reasoning.72
More significant was the outcome of the other two cases, of which one is par-
ticularly noteworthy. The driver of a delivery van, driving on the lane for oncom-
ing traffic, tried to overtake the defendant’s car. The defendant accelerated and 
prevented the delivery van from returning to its own – right – lane. While trying to 
go back to his lane – the driver of the van noticed oncoming traffic – the cars made 
contact. The defendant’s car ended up on the left lane, where it collided with an 
oncoming car. As a result, the passenger of the oncoming car died, while its driver 
sustained serious injury. The lower court convicted the defendant for recklessness, 
but the Supreme Court deemed the evidence insufficient.73 This may come as a 
surprise. Is this not a case of causing a very serious danger by extremely negligent 
behaviour? However, drawing far-reaching conclusions from this ruling might be 
premature. The Supreme Court also remarked that the lower court, unlike with the 
previous case, “did not provide the evidence with an additional reasoning which 
recognizes the specific nature of the element of recklessness” (the lower court only 
enumerated the pieces of evidence).74 This remark should probably be considered 
as a hint to the lower courts: it may very well be that the Supreme Court would have 
upheld the conviction if the lower court had explained why, in its view, the defend-
ant behaved extremely negligently and thereby caused a very serious danger. Still, 
requiring such an additional reasoning in a case like this –  apparently, the facts 
as shown by the evidence did not speak for themselves – is in itself revealing as 
regards the Supreme Court’s strict view on recklessness.
2.6 Gaps in Dutch Criminal Traffic Law?
2.6.1 Harmful Consequences and Mens Rea
As we have seen, Dutch criminal traffic law provides for different kinds of 
offences. With respect to the specific offences (speeding etc.) and the general 
71 Supreme Court 15 October 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:964.
72 Supreme Court 15 October 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:959. For a similar case (a racing game), see 
Supreme Court 3 December 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:1554.
73 Supreme Court 15 October 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:960.
74 Cf. also the third case mentioned in note 68: Supreme Court 15 October 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:962.
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offence of endangering traffic (Article 5 RTA), neither consequences in the form 
of death, serious bodily injury or even an accident, nor mens rea in the form of 
intent or negligence play a role (only blameworthiness is required). Both char-
acteristics explain the relatively low maximum prison term of – in general – two 
months of imprisonment. On the other hand, we have the negligent traffic offence 
of Article 6 RTA and the general intentional offences like intentional homicide 
and intentionally causing (serious) injury. These offences require a form of mens 
rea and (severe) consequences, with the exception of attempted homicide and the 
attempt to cause serious bodily injury. From this spectrum of offences, it appears 
that the law focusses primarily on serious consequences provided the mens rea 
is at least culpa lata, while in case serious consequences are lacking mens rea is 
not required, only blameworthiness.75 Thus, Dutch criminal traffic law does not 
provide for specific criminalizations for all kinds of dangerous traffic behaviour. 
For example, causing less serious consequences – material damage or non-serious 
bodily injury – by negligent dangerous traffic behaviour is not a separate offence 
(although these scenarios will usually be covered by a specific traffic regulation or 
by the general provision of Article 5 RTA).76 In the following, I will confine myself 
to two other forms of dangerous traffic behaviour that are not specifically crimi-
nalized, in short causing a serious traffic accident by behaviour that falls short of 
negligence and intentional or negligent dangerous traffic behaviour not leading to 
serious consequences.
2.6.2 Causing a Serious Accident by Culpa Levis
Causing a serious accident resulting in death or serious injury in a way that does 
not meet the threshold of culpa lata, gross negligence, does not come within the 
ambit of Article 6 RTA. It may fall under the general prohibition of causing danger 
(Article 5 RTA) or a specific provision, in which case the maximum penalty is 
only two months of imprisonment. It has been suggested to criminalize causing 
a serious accident by culpa levis as a misdemeanour, carrying a higher maximum 
sentence than two months.77 Culpa levis would mainly relate to negligence in the 
form of (momentary) inattention.
This suggestion has several backgrounds. In the past – before the Winssen 
ruling in 200478 and the Geervliet ruling in 200879 – it was motivated by the idea 
that in practice proof of negligence is too easily assumed. Seen from a substantive 
law perspective, the concept of culpa lata was eroded: criminal negligence was in 
fact culpa levis. If culpa levis ought to be criminalized at all, the reasoning was, at 
least it should not be labelled as a felony.80 Another argument is also prompted 
75 See also Duker, this book, Chapter 7.
76 This is in line with the Criminal Code, which does not provide for general criminalizations of neg-
ligently causing material damage or negligently causing non-serious bodily injury.
77 Van Veen 1974, p. 146; Vellinga 1979, p. 199.
78 See Section 2.4.1.
79 See Section 2.4.2.
80 Vellinga 1979, p. 199. Another proposal, based on the same premise that in practice negligence 
need not always be gross, tries to keep the concept of negligence – as one sees it – undiluted. 
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by practice, not of Article 6 RTA, but of Article 5 RTA.81 If the court, in case the 
defendant caused a serious accident, does not find a violation of Article 6 proved 
because the defendant did not act grossly negligent, the defendant is usually con-
victed for the lesser offence of Article 5 RTA. And although this provision only 
prohibits causing danger, it appears that in such cases courts tend to take the 
consequence (materialization of the danger into a serious accident) into account 
when passing sentence. Thus, in a way, the offender is really convicted for the 
(non-existent) offence of causing a serious traffic accident by culpa levis. This may 
be considered an improper use of Article 5 RTA. At the same time, one could say 
that this practice indicates the need for such an offence. Indeed, when dangerous 
driving has led to a serious accident, there is something surreal about prosecut-
ing for the offence of – merely – causing danger, because for the perpetrator as 
well as for the victim or surviving relatives the result is inextricably linked to the 
offence. On the other hand, one could ask whether attributing liability for causing 
unwanted consequences, even very serious ones, by culpa levis should be dealt 
with by criminal law.82 In the Netherlands, where the punishability of certain var-
iants of unconscious negligence, in particular momentary inattention, has always 
been much debated,83 this may be a step too far.
2.6.3 Dangerous Traffic Behaviour Without (Serious) Consequences
Under Dutch law, driving dangerously not resulting in an accident can only con-
stitute a traffic misdemeanour, irrespective of the mens rea of the perpetrator (with 
the exception of an attempted intentional offence). Is that satisfactory? Is it not 
strange that the driver in the Porsche case (see Section 2.3.2), where intent with 
regard to the deaths could not be established, could not have been sentenced to 
more than a few months of imprisonment if nothing had gone wrong?
This focus on actual harm in the context of criminal traffic law is in itself 
in line with the general approach in criminal law. In Dutch law, felonies often 
require an actual injury of the protected interest. Still, there are exceptions. As 
regards felonies in the Criminal Code, an important exception, besides attempt 
liability, is formed by the group of offences that concern endangering the general 
safety of persons and property. This group is all the more interesting, since the 
traffic offence of Article 6 RTA is essentially an offence endangering the general 
safety of persons, apart from the fact that Article 6 RTA requires that the danger 
has materialized. An example of an offence belonging to this group is causing a 
fire resulting in an actual danger to objects or a person. Although this danger is an 
Negligence in criminal law should remain reserved for gross negligence. When practice shows 
that negligence need not be gross, then, for the sake of doctrinal clarity, the concept should 
not be used and the crime of negligently causing injury or death in traffic should be replaced 
by another legal construction. The proposed alternative is to turn this negligent crime into a 
result-qualified offence: violating a concrete traffic regulation (like speeding or running a red 
light) resulting in serious injury or death. See De Jong 1999b, p. 832.
81 Duker 2012, p. 323.
82 Duker 2012, p. 325.
83 De Jong et al. 2003, p. 266; Robroek 2010.
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objectified consequence of the conduct (with regard to the endangerment neither 
intent nor negligence is needed), the maximum sentences are quite severe. In 
case of intentionally causing a fire, the maximum sentence increases from twelve 
years’ imprisonment when goods are endangered to fifteen years when another 
person’s life is endangered and even to thirty years or a life sentence when death 
ensues (Article 157 CC); in case of negligently causing a fire, the maximum pen-
alties are six months, one year and two years respectively (Article 158 CC). These 
maximum prison terms for the negligent offence are significantly higher than the 
two months’ term accompanying the conduct traffic offences. At the same time, 
these terms are much lower than the maximum terms for the negligent traffic 
offence. Seen in that light, the maximum prison term of nine years accompanying 
the most serious variant of the negligent traffic offence stands even more out.84
Outside the Criminal Code, some areas of criminal law adopt a totally different 
approach. For example, liability for economic offences and drug offences does not 
depend on the occurrence of results in the form of violating or even endanger-
ing the underlying protected legal interest. The qualification of such an abstract 
endangerment offence as a misdemeanour or a felony, and the maximum penalty 
that comes with this qualification, depends solely on the absence or presence of 
intent. Mere possession of hard drugs, for example, is a misdemeanour, carrying a 
maximum sentence of six months; intentional possession – the perpetrator knows 
or at least consciously accepts the substantial chance he is in the possession of 
hard drugs (which is, of course, usually the case) – constitutes a felony, carry-
ing the much higher maximum prison sentence of six years.85 Of course, there is 
an important difference between drug offences and traffic offences. Unlike with 
traffic offences, it is hardly conceivable to link liability for drug offences to the 
occurrence of danger or violation of the protected interest. Making ‘selling drugs 
endangering public health’ an offence seems rather strange. In the context of 
drug offences, differentiation between felonies and misdemeanours via a mens rea 
requirement seems the only feasible option.
It shows that some categories of offences carry substantial maximum sen-
tences even when the protected interest need not be violated nor even endangered. 
Furthermore, traffic law may have its own reasons not to focus too much on the 
consequences, in particular a result in the form of death or serious injury, or even 
an accident.86 Firstly, dangerous traffic behaviour is at the order of the day, but 
seldom leads to serious consequences. It is mainly random whether dangerous 
driving leads to an accident (‘bad luck’). Secondly, whether an accident results 
in death or injury is also to a high degree dependent on factors – construction of 
vehicles, crumple zone, protective measures taken by other road users – which the 
dangerous driver does not control.
84 De Jong et al. 2003, pp. 263-264. Strangely enough, while the 2006 amendment increased the 
maximum prison term for negligent homicide and negligently causing serious injury, and intro-
duced recklessness as an aggravating factor (resulting in a total increase from nine months 
to four years and from six months to two years respectively), the maximum prison terms for 
offences with respect to endangering the general safety of persons were left unchanged.
85 Article 10.3 Opiumwet (Narcotics Act).
86 See Vellinga 2012, pp. 181-182.
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In light of the above, it indeed seems unsatisfactory that in case traffic behav-
iour did not lead to a person’s death or injury, or even an accident, the only avail-
able provisions are traffic misdemeanours, carrying a relatively low maximum 
sentence.87 The solution can be found in several options, in which both the 
required form of mens rea (intent or negligence) and the required danger (danger 
for a person’s life, danger for an accident) are important parameters.
2.7 Conclusion
As regards serious traffic offences, defined as dangerous traffic behaviour that car-
ries a substantial maximum penalty, Dutch law contains really only one specific 
provision: negligently causing a traffic accident in which another person is killed 
or sustains serious bodily injury (Article 6 RTA). This state of affairs as well as 
the content and the accompanying maximum prison terms of this sole provision 
raise several issues.
As regards its content, a distinctive feature of the provision is that its key ele-
ment – negligence – is a complicated concept, which raises, amongst others, the 
difficult question of the lower limit of negligence. This demarcation problem is 
probably even harder to solve under Dutch law, since criminal negligence stands 
for culpa lata, gross negligence, and thus has to be demarcated from culpa levis. 
Although the case law of the Supreme Court does lend some guidance, in practice 
the courts continue to struggle with this problem. And the introduction of reck-
lessness as an aggravating factor within the concept of negligence has created a 
new demarcation problem: establishing the boundary between plain negligence 
and recklessness. Although it is certain that the Supreme Court has taken a very 
restrictive view on recklessness, future case law must clarify the dividing line 
further.
With regard to the sentence, the offence of Article 6 RTA stands out as far as 
the maximum prison term is concerned. In case of negligently causing death the 
maximum term is three years (serious bodily injury: one and a half year); with 
recklessness these maximum terms are multiplied by a factor two, and when a 
specific aggravating factor applies the multiplying factor is one and a half. In its 
most serious variant, the maximum prison term is thus nine years. These prison 
terms differ to a great extent from the terms that accompany the general negligent 
offences like negligent homicide (two years with respect to plain negligence and 
four years with respect to recklessness). There is also a significant difference with 
the group of negligent offences that concern endangering the general safety of 
persons and property, criminalized in the Criminal Code, especially since the 
offence of Article 6 RTA could be considered such an offence. The maximum 
prison term for these offences, in its most serious form, does not exceed two years.
Finally, there is the position of Article 6 RTA amongst the other offences appli-
cable in traffic situations. Article 6 RTA is the only serious traffic offence (in the 
sense that it carries a substantial maximum prison term). However, it only comes 
87 Vellinga 1979, p. 199; Vellinga 2012, p. 197.
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into play when dangerous traffic behaviour results in serious consequences, i.e. an 
accident leading to death or serious bodily injury. In particular with regard to dan-
gerous traffic behaviour, one may ask whether this focus on serious consequences 
is in place.
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Chapter 3
Serious Driving Offences in England and Wales
Sally Kyd Cunningham*
3.1 Introduction
The law of England and Wales (E&W)1 is governed by common law, meaning that 
many offences are not defined by statute but originate from case law. This is true 
of the two main homicide offences in E&W: murder and (involuntary) manslaugh-
ter. However, in recent years a number of statutes have created serious driving 
offences, including several offences of causing death by driving. This chapter will 
begin by setting out the homicide offences that exist in E&W that might be appli-
cable where a death is caused on the roads. It then reports on recent developments 
in relation to one of the fundamental legal principles that applies to shape the 
criminal responsibility of those who cause death on the roads: the doctrine of 
causation. Finally, some background to the way in which these offences are inves-
tigated will be provided.
It should be noted at the outset that in E&W, the public prosecuting body, 
the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), operates under the opportunity principle, 
rather than the legality principle,2 and enjoys a considerable degree of discretion in 
relation to whether or not to prosecute suspected offenders. When receiving a file 
of evidence from the police, a CPS lawyer will apply two tests to the case to decide 
whether to prosecute and if so what offence to charge. These tests are the eviden-
tial test and the public interest test, as set out in the Code for Crown Prosecutors. 
The evidential test requires sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of 
conviction, and it is this test which usually determines whether a prosecution will 
take place, since in most cases of fatal collisions it will be deemed in the public 
interest to prosecute any case where the evidential test is passed. The only excep-
tion might be in a case where the deceased is a close relative of the defendant.3
* Sally Kyd Cunningham is Professor of Law at the University of Leicester, United Kingdom.
1 This chapter is confined to the jurisdiction of England and Wales and does not extend to other 
parts of the United Kingdom, such as Scotland and Northern Ireland, which have their own crim-
inal justice system and/or criminal offences. ‘English law’ in this chapter is intended to mean 
‘the law of England and Wales’.
2 See Fionda 1995.
3 Crown Prosecution Service 2013.
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3.2 Common Law Homicide Offences
3.2.1 Murder
Murder under English law involves an unlawful killing by a defendant (D) of 
another human being (V) with the mens rea of malice aforethought. Malice afore-
thought means intention to kill or intention to cause grievous bodily harm.4 Inten-
tion under English law can be either direct or oblique (indirect). Direct intention 
is present where the prohibited result (in this case death or grievous bodily harm) 
is D’s aim or objective in acting. Oblique intention is present when D acts know-
ing, but not necessarily wanting, the result to come about. The current case law 
requires that D foresee the result as a virtual certainty before D can be convicted 
of murder.5 Murder carries a mandatory life sentence.
3.2.2 Manslaughter
Where D foresees death or grievous bodily harm as a possible result of D’s actions, 
but that foresight falls short of a virtual certainty, D will be liable for manslaugh-
ter.6 Manslaughter is also committed where D commits an unlawful and danger-
ous act which causes death. This species of manslaughter, known as ‘constructive’ 
manslaughter, will only be committed by a driver where the unlawful act causing 
death is to use the vehicle as a weapon of offence in assaulting V and, in doing 
so, kills. It is not possible to prosecute the offence on the basis that D committed 
the unlawful act of, for example, dangerous driving, and caused death. It was 
decided almost eighty years ago that for the purposes of the offence of constructive 
manslaughter, the act must be criminal for some other reason than that it has 
been negligently performed.7 The reason for this is that were it otherwise, any 
driver who committed an infringement of the law (e.g. driving without due care 
and attention or drink-driving) would necessarily have committed manslaughter.
In a case of a death being caused by bad driving, the most applicable species of 
manslaughter available is that of gross negligence manslaughter. This version of 
the offence is governed by the House of Lords judgment in Adomako,8 in which the 
following requirements were established before a conviction will result:
1. D must owe a duty of care to V;
2. D must breach that duty;
3. The breach of duty caused V’s death;
4. The breach must amount to gross negligence.
4 Vickers [1957] 2 QB 664; Cunningham [1982] AC 566.
5 Woollin [1999] 1 AC 82.
6 Lidar (1999) LTL November 12, 1999.
7 Andrews v DPP [1937] AC 576.
8 [1995] 1 AC 171.
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In a case of causing death by driving, it is the last requirement that provides the 
hurdle to be overcome in proving a case of manslaughter. Whether negligence is 
‘gross’ is an entirely objective test, requiring the jury to assess whether, having 
regard to the risk of death, the conduct was so bad in all the circumstances to 
be criminal. This has been criticised as a circular test, and in the context of bad 
driving is only likely to be met where “The driving fell far below the minimum 
acceptable standard of driving such that there was an obvious and serious risk 
of death”.9 The CPS states that “Gross negligence manslaughter should not be 
charged unless there is something to set the case apart from those cases where a 
statutory offence such as causing death by dangerous driving or causing death by 
careless driving could be proved. This will normally be evidence to show a very 
high risk of death, making the case one of the utmost gravity.”10 This form of 
manslaughter is occasionally referred to as ‘motor manslaughter’, although there 
is no specific separate offence of that name, and ‘motor manslaughter’ merely 
refers to a case of manslaughter where the mode of killing involved the use of a 
motor vehicle.
Manslaughter carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. However, it 
is very rarely charged in cases of road death,11 because it is seen to be difficult to 
prove, and because of the existence of the statutory causing death offences, which 
are seen as easier to prove12 and which themselves carry considerable custodial 
penalties. It is these offences to which we will now turn.
3.3 Statutory Causing Death by Driving Offences
Four ‘causing death by driving’ offences now exist under the Road Traffic Act 
1988, as amended: causing death by dangerous driving (CDDD); causing death 
by careless driving (CDCD); causing death by careless driving whilst under the 
influence of drink or drugs (CDCDUI); and causing death by driving whilst unin-
sured, unlicensed or disqualified (CDUD). The basic requirements of each offence 
will be provided, with some reference to the applicable penalties. Each of these 
offences is constructive in nature, meaning that a ‘causing death’ offence has been 
built on top of a pre-existing conduct offence to create a new result crime. One of 
the features of these offences is that nothing more is required in terms of mens rea 
beyond that needed to prove the underlying offence. Consequently, it is possible 
for a driver to be liable for any of these offences without realising that his or her 
driving involved a risk of death or of any harm at all. In relation to the first three 
causing death offences, D will be measured against the standard of the competent 
and careful driver in establishing whether D was sufficiently blameworthy to be 
liable for the death. In relation to the fourth offence (CDUD), the offence is one of 
strict liability insofar as D need not realise D is committing the underlying offence 
9 Crown Prosecution Service 2013.
10 Crown Prosecution Service 2013.
11 See Cunningham 2001.
12 See Crown Prosecution Service 2013.
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(driving whilst uninsured, unlicensed or disqualified) and it need not be proved 
that even a competent and careful driver would have realised there was the risk of 
a collision.
3.3.1 Causing Death by Dangerous Driving (CDDD)
Causing death by dangerous driving was the first of the offences to be created, 
although when it first appeared on the statute books in 1956, it existed in its first 
incarnation as causing death by reckless or dangerous driving. The catalyst for 
a change in the law to create a specific offence of causing death by driving was 
that it was feared that many drivers who killed whilst driving badly escaped lia-
bility for manslaughter because juries were reluctant to convict a fellow driver of 
such a serious crime. The new offence met with some criticism, but survived in 
one shape or another, with the Criminal Law Act 1977 abolishing the offences of 
dangerous driving and causing death by dangerous driving, but preserving the 
offence of causing death by reckless driving.
Difficulties in defining recklessness as a form of mens rea, particularly follow-
ing the decision of the House of Lords in Seymour,13 meant that the offence was 
fairly short-lived in that form. Here, the House of Lords addressed the question 
of the necessary mens rea to be proved in cases of motor manslaughter (prior to 
the Court settling on gross negligence as the relevant test later in Adomako). The 
result of Seymour was that the mens rea element of both the statutory offence of 
causing death by reckless driving and common-law manslaughter was the same: 
objective recklessness. This, according to the cases of Caldwell14 and Lawrence15 
required that D had created an obvious and serious risk of causing the harm and 
that D either gave no thought to the possibility of such a risk or, having recog-
nised that there was some risk involved, had nonetheless gone on to take it. Given 
the complete overlap between the two offences (motor manslaughter and causing 
death by reckless driving), the practice became that alternative charges relating 
to the two offences should not be brought. It became common for the statutory 
offence to be charged rather than manslaughter, although even with the statutory 
offence the prosecution sometimes found it difficult to secure a conviction thanks 
to the test of objective recklessness, which was seen as setting the bar for mens rea 
too high.
These problems were addressed by the Road Traffic Act 1991, which amended 
the Road Traffic Act 1988 to replace causing death by reckless driving with causing 
death by dangerous driving, forming the current law. Section 1 of the Road Traffic 
Act 1988 states that:
A person who causes the death of another person by driving a mechanically pro-
pelled vehicle dangerously on a road or other public place is guilty of an offence.
13 [1983] 2 AC 493.
14 [1982] AC 341.
15 [1982] AC 510.
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Section 2A of the 1988 Act sets out the definition of dangerous driving, one of the 
main elements of the CDDD offence. Driving is dangerous if:
(a) the way he drives falls far below what would be expected of a competent and 
careful driver, and
(b) it would be obvious to a competent and careful driver that driving in that way 
would be dangerous.
‘Dangerous’ means that the driving creates a risk of injury to any person or of 
serious damage to property.16 Thus, CDDD is committed where D drives far below 
the standard of a competent and careful driver and is involved in a collision, as the 
result of which V dies.
The CPS provides guidance to prosecutors on the meaning of dangerous driv-
ing, as derived from case law. This was recently updated in 2013, and starts by 
stating that:
Dangerous driving includes situations where the driver has of his or her own free 
will adopted a particular way of driving, and also where there is a substantial error 
of judgement, that, even if only for a short time, amounts to driving falling far below 
the required standard. If the driving that caused the danger was taken as a deliberate 
decision, this would be an aggravating feature of the offence.17
It is clear from the case law that for D to be liable for dangerous driving (and by 
extension, for CDDD), it is not necessary to prove that D made a conscious decision 
to drive in a particular way, or that D was aware of a mistake or error of judgement 
that D has made which creates the risk to others. It is an entirely objective test, 
and it is enough that any competent and careful driver in that position would have 
realised that the driving was dangerous.
That the test leaves no room to take into consideration the particular level of 
driving experience of D was recently confirmed in the case of Bannister,18 overrul-
ing Milton v CPS.19 Both cases involved police officers found to have been driving 
at grossly excessive speeds20 late at night and who were, as a result, prosecuted for 
dangerous driving. The Court of Appeal in Milton found that the judge had been 
wrong to rule that D’s level of training was irrelevant to the test of whether D had 
driven far below the standard of the competent and careful driver. It was held 
that in determining what was expected of, or obvious to, a competent and careful 
driver, the court should have regard to any circumstance relevant to the issue of 
dangerousness which was within the knowledge of the driver, whether or not it 
16 Road Traffic Act 1988, Section 2A(3).
17 Crown Prosecution Service 2013.
18 [2009] EWCA Crim 1571.
19 [2007] EWHC 532 (Admin).
20 Milton drove at 148 mph in a 70 mph limit, at 114 mph in a 60 mph limit and at 60 mph in 30 mph 
limits. Bannister was found to be driving at 113 mph in a 70 mph limit when he span out of con-
trol and crashed.
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was unfavourable to the defendant. Consequently, the fact that D was a grade  1 
advanced police driver was a circumstance to which regard should be had when 
deciding whether he had driven dangerously.
Despite the Court insisting that to take D’s training into account did not 
detract from the objectivity of the test, there is little doubt that such reasoning was 
flawed. This was corrected in Bannister, in which D appealed against his convic-
tion for dangerous driving on the basis that it was relevant that he had completed 
an advanced training course which had enabled him to drive safely at high speed 
in the prevailing conditions, even if it would not have been safe for the ordinary 
competent and careful driver. The Court of Appeal, whilst allowing the appeal for 
a separate reason, took the opportunity to overrule Milton, reaffirming the need 
for an entirely objective test which is not to be individualised to any degree. It was 
held that to take into account the special skill of a driver would be to substitute 
the test of the ordinary competent and careful driver set out in Section 2A and 
in effect to re-write the test Parliament had clearly laid down. It is now clear that 
the special skill, or lack of skill, of a driver is an irrelevant circumstance when 
considering whether the driving was dangerous.
Nevertheless, the fact that the law on this point has been clarified does not 
necessarily make the test one that is easy to apply. The fact-finder (district judge 
or bench of lay magistrates in the magistrates’ court or the jury in the Crown 
Court) must assess D’s driving in accordance with what might be almost seen to 
be an imaginary individual; someone who drives in such a way that presumably 
they would pass the driving test if assessed, but who has no further training or 
advanced ability. What no doubt they actually do is to compare D’s driving against 
the standard of driving that they commonly experience on the roads, or which they 
themselves display. Given that they might not be particularly competent or careful 
themselves, this could prove problematic.21 A particular challenge for fact-finders 
in applying the test is to judge how a specific defendant who, because of his or 
her profession, drives in a way with which the fact-finder does not readily identify, 
ought to be assessed. Although it may be straightforward to reach the conclusion 
that it would be dangerous for anyone to drive at over 100 mph on a single car-
riageway, whether or not they have received advanced driver training, it might 
be more difficult to assess how the driver of a heavy goods vehicle or some other 
vehicle which actually requires additional driver training before it can be driven 
legally ought to have responded to a particular risk. A driver who can be said to be 
competent and careful in driving a motor car would not necessarily be able to drive 
a vehicle with which he or she was not familiar without further training, making 
the objective test almost nonsensical.
How is CDDD prosecuted? In terms of examples of driving which provide 
evidence of dangerous driving in that it is likely to fall far below the standard 
of a competent and careful driver and creates a risk of harm to others, the CPS 
provides the following:
21 For further discussion, see Cunningham 2007, Chapter 6.
CriminalLiabilityforSeriousTrafficOffences.indd   44 3-12-2014   10:16:24
45
Serious Driving Offences in England and Wales
• racing or competitive driving;
• failing to have a proper and safe regard for vulnerable road users such as cyclists, 
motorcyclists, horse riders, the elderly and pedestrians or when in the vicinity of 
a pedestrian crossing, hospital, school or residential home;
• speed, which is highly inappropriate for the prevailing road or traffic conditions;
• aggressive driving, such as sudden lane changes, cutting into a line of vehicles, 
or driving much too close to the vehicle in front;
• disregard of traffic lights and other road signs, which, on an objective analysis, 
would appear to be deliberate;
• disregard of warnings from fellow passengers;
• overtaking which could not have been carried out safely;
• driving when knowingly suffering from a medical or physical condition that sig-
nificantly and dangerously impairs the offender’s driving skills such as having 
an arm or leg in plaster, or impaired eyesight. It can include the failure to take 
prescribed medication;
• driving when knowingly deprived of adequate sleep or rest;
• driving a vehicle knowing it has a dangerous defect or is poorly maintained or is 
dangerously loaded;
• using a hand-held mobile phone or other hand-held electronic equipment 
whether as a phone or to compose or read text messages when the driver was 
avoidably and dangerously distracted by that use;
• driving whilst avoidably and dangerously distracted such as whilst reading a 
newspaper/map, talking to and looking at a passenger, selecting and lighting a 
cigarette or by adjusting the controls of electronic equipment such as a radio, 
hands-free mobile phone or satellite navigation equipment;
• a brief but obvious danger arising from a seriously dangerous manoeuvre. This 
covers situations where a driver has made a mistake or an error of judgement 
that was so substantial that it caused the driving to be dangerous even for only a 
short time.22
As will be seen in the next section, there is some overlap between the examples 
provided of dangerous driving and those of careless driving. The CPS is keen 
to stress that each case is unique and decisions as to charge are to be made on a 
case-by-case basis. As CDDD is an indictable only offence, meaning that it will 
always be tried at the Crown Court, the question whether a piece of driving is to be 
classified as ‘dangerous’ or not will always be determined by the twelve members 
of a jury, unless D agrees to plead guilty to the offence.
The maximum penalty for CDDD is fourteen years’ imprisonment, the high-
est fixed term penalty that exists in E&W (but not the only offence to which it is 
applied). A definitive sentencing guideline exists for all causing death by driving 
offences,23 as discussed by Marius Duker in Chapter 7 of this book. The guideline 
for each offence is structured in a similar way, with an offence falling within one 
of three ‘classes’, each of which has a different starting point and sentencing range 
22 Crown Prosecution Service 2013.
23 Sentencing Guidelines Council 2008.
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within the maximum sentence provided by statute. Where more than one person 
is killed, for example, this will be an aggravating factor in sentencing, potentially 
moving the offence up a class, but any sentence imposed for multiple deaths 
resulting from the same collision will be served concurrently rather than consecu-
tively,24 meaning that the sentence will not exceed fourteen years for CDDD. As for 
a minimum sentence, CDDD carries mandatory disqualification for a minimum 
period of twelve months,25 which must be followed by an extended driving test 
before D can regain his or her licence.26
3.3.2 Causing Death by Careless Driving (CDCD)
Until 2008, if a driver drove badly and caused the death of another person on 
the road and his or her driving failed to meet the test of falling far below the 
standard of a competent and careful driver, D would be convicted of the offence 
of driving without due care and attention, otherwise known as careless driving. 
That is a minor offence, in that the penalty is a fine and/or points on the driver’s 
licence, with no potential for a prison sentence. It was felt that the gap in sentenc-
ing between careless driving and CDDD was too great, and so the Road Safety Act 
2006 created the offence of causing death by careless (or inconsiderate) driving, 
which came into force in August 2008. The offence is triable either way, which 
means that less serious cases can be dealt with in the magistrates’ court and more 
serious cases will be sent up to the Crown Court, where the maximum sentence 
on conviction is five years’ imprisonment.
The offence is defined under Section 2B of the Road Traffic Act 1988, inserted 
by the Road Safety Act 2006, Section 20:
2B Causing death by careless, or inconsiderate, driving
A person who causes the death of another person by driving a mechanically pro-
pelled vehicle on a road or other public place without due care and attention, or 
without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road or place, is guilty 
of an offence.
Again, it is then necessary to look elsewhere in the statute for a definition of the 
underlying conduct offence. Careless driving is now defined under Section 3ZA of 
the Road Traffic Act 1988:
(2) A person is to be regarded as driving without due care and attention if (and only 
if) the way he drives falls below what would be expected of a competent and careful 
driver.
(3) In determining for the purposes of subsection (2) above what would be expected 
of a careful and competent driver in a particular case, regard shall be had not only to 
24 Noble [2003] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 65.
25 Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, Section 34.
26 Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, Section 36.
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the circumstances of which he could be expected to be aware but also to any circum-
stances shown to have been within the knowledge of the accused.
As with dangerous driving, this is an objective test, with the key to the offence 
being whether D’s driving has fallen below the standard of a competent and care-
ful driver, but not whether it is far below that standard. Unlike dangerous driving, 
however, there is no requirement that any risk of harm would have been obvious 
to a competent and careful driver.
It is also technically possible to prove the offence of CDCD on the basis of 
inconsiderate, rather than careless, driving. However, empirical research con-
ducted by the author has encountered not one single case of CDCD argued on 
this basis, which is not surprising given the test for inconsiderate driving under 
Section 3ZA Road Traffic Act 1988:
(4) A person is to be regarded as driving without reasonable consideration for other 
persons only if those persons are inconvenienced by his driving.
This hardly conveys the wrongdoing of driving that is likely to give rise to a fatal 
collision. To describe a victim of a fatal collision as having been ‘inconvenienced’ is 
to mislabel the conduct of the driver responsible. It is hard to conceive of a collision 
in which D could be said to have driven in a way which did not show reasonable 
consideration for other persons, but yet where the driving did not fall below the 
standard of a competent and careful driver and thus warrant the alternative label 
of careless driving. The CPS provides the following examples of behaviour that 
could amount to inconsiderate driving:
• flashing of lights to force other drivers in front to give way;
• misuse of any lane (including cycle lanes) to avoid queuing or gain some other 
advantage over other drivers;
• unnecessarily remaining in an overtaking lane;
• unnecessarily slow driving or braking without good cause;
• driving with un-dipped headlights which dazzle oncoming drivers, cyclists or 
pedestrians;
• driving through a puddle causing pedestrians to be splashed;
• driving a bus in such a way as to alarm passengers.27
Careless driving, on the other hand, is exemplified by:
• overtaking on the inside;
• driving inappropriately close to another vehicle;
• inadvertently driving through a red light;
• emerging from a side road into the path of another vehicle;
• tuning a car radio; when the driver was avoidably distracted by this action;
27 Crown Prosecution Service 2013.
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• using a hand-held mobile phone or other hand-held electronic equipment when 
the driver was avoidably distracted by that use (note that this is an offence  itself 
under Regulation 110 of the Road Vehicles (Construction and Use) (Amendment) 
(No.4) Regulations 2003). If this is the only relevant aspect of the case it is more 
appropriate to use the specific offence;
• selecting and lighting a cigarette or similar where the driver was avoidably dis-
tracted by that use.28
As can be seen, driving through a red light is only deemed to be careless if this 
was ‘inadvertent’; where it appears to be deliberate it would fall within the scope of 
dangerous driving. Further consideration ought to be given to possible defences 
in such cases, however. Where D drives through a red light as the result of a heart 
attack or some other medical episode which can be evidenced, D is unlikely to be 
charged with either offence, since a defence of automatism or insanity is likely to 
apply.29 It should be noted that prosecutors must use their common sense in apply-
ing the law and resolving a case which does not fall within the examples provided 
by the guidance. If D claims not to have seen the traffic signal or sign requiring 
D to stop or give way, the question to be addressed is whether a competent and 
careful driver would have seen the sign or signal and had a chance to conform to 
the requirement.
Actions such as using a mobile phone or lighting a cigarette are careless if that 
leads to the driver becoming ‘avoidably distracted’, but if it is such that D becomes 
‘avoidably and dangerously distracted’ it can amount to dangerous driving. Inter-
views with Crown prosecutors, however, confirm that where a fatal collision has 
occurred and there is evidence that D was using his or her mobile phone at the 
time, then a charge of CDDD, rather than CDCD, will likely be preferred.30 Clearly, 
if a fatal collision has occurred, then D was both avoidably and dangerously dis-
tracted by such use (unless there is some additional cause of the collision outside 
the control of D). This might be one example of where the distinction between 
careless driving and dangerous driving does not depend solely on how far below 
the standard of the competent and careful driver D falls, but on whether in doing 
so D created a risk of injury to others. Where a fatal collision has resulted, that 
in itself will provide evidence of such a danger (as compared to a case where D is 
found to be driving whilst using a mobile phone but luckily there is no collision).
The sentencing guidelines for CDCD split the offence into three levels of seri-
ousness, with the top level almost overlapping with the bottom level of CDDD 
and covering driving “falling not short of dangerous driving”, where D can expect 
a custodial sentence of around fifteen months. Disqualification from driving is 
mandatory, unless the court finds special reasons not to do so, whatever the level 
28 Crown Prosecution Service 2013.
29 Full discussion on the applicability of such defences is outside the scope of this chapter. Whether 
D is guilty of an offence may depend on whether D is at fault for getting behind the wheel of a 
vehicle despite feeling unwell. For a discussion, see Cunningham 2008, Chapter 2.
30 These interviews formed part of a project funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council. 
A report detailing the main findings of the project can be downloaded from: <www2.le.ac.uk/
departments/law/people/sally-cunningham>.
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of offence. At the bottom end of the spectrum, however, are cases arising out of 
momentary inattention, where a community order will be passed and D should 
escape a custodial sentence.
From this it can be seen that E&W has taken the step to criminalise to a serious 
degree those who commit an error behind the wheel, albeit that the sentence actu-
ally passed is likely to reflect the low level of culpability of D. From an empirical 
study conducted by the author, it would appear that some of the most prevalent 
cases of CDCD appear to be the ‘looked but did not see’ right of way violation 
cases: those where D, driving a car, pulls out into the path of a motorcycle.31 Clearly 
all drivers have an obligation to make sure the road is clear of all traffic before 
conducting such a manoeuvre, but it is these cases that tend to be placed within 
the bottom level in terms of sentencing and classified as ‘momentary inattention’. 
Typical of such a case was one where D attempted to turn right from a main road 
into a side road (it should be noted that unlike most European countries, E&W 
employs a system in which vehicles are driven on the left-hand side of the road). 
He had thought he had sufficient time to make the manoeuvre as the only vehicle 
he saw coming in the opposite direction, a car, was some way away. However, V, 
riding a motorbike at a speed of between 33-38 mph in a 30 mph zone, overtook 
that car and collided with the rear of D’s car. D pleaded not guilty to CDCD but 
was convicted by a jury and sentenced to 180 hours unpaid work and a two-year 
disqualification.
Often in such cases the deceased bears some responsibility for the collision, 
and the question becomes whether D has in fact fallen below the standard of the 
competent and careful driver. In cases where the evidence is that V would have 
been visible at the time D pulled out, this is likely to be instrumental in influenc-
ing a decision to charge CDCD. In cases where the evidence is equivocal, and it 
is suggested that due to V’s excess speed V may not have been visible at the time 
D made his or her decision to pull out, the CPS is more likely not to prosecute. 
In such cases the CPS lawyer must assess whether there is sufficient evidence 
to prove that D drove below the standard of a competent and careful driver; if it 
cannot be proved that V was visible to D when D pulled out then it may be decided 
that there is not a realistic prospect of conviction, since D may not have driven 
below the standard of a competent and careful driver.
Where V is speeding but would still have been available to be seen by D, the 
CPS will be minded to bring charges but that does not necessarily mean that a 
conviction will ensue. Of twenty-two cases of CDCD in the research sample of 
the author’s project only one resulted in an acquittal; a case in which D pulled out 
from a T-junction into V’s motorcycle’s path. The evidence of the police collision 
investigator was that V was travelling at 42 mph in a 30 mph limit but that he 
would have been available to be seen by D when D commenced his manoeuvre, 
although D’s defence at trial was that had V’s speed been at the top of the range of 
speed estimated V would not in fact have been in view. The jury (D elected to be 
tried in the Crown Court) found the 80-year-old defendant not guilty.
31 See Kyd Cunningham 2013.
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Many cases of CDCD result in guilty pleas being entered, however, meaning 
that D will not face a trial either in front of magistrates or a jury. A typical case 
of CDCD observed by the author was one in which D was waiting at a junction 
to turn right onto a main road. V was riding his motorbike along the main road, 
approaching from D’s right, having recently emerged from the entrance to a pub 
65 metres along the road from D. A witness (W) was waiting to turn right from the 
main road into the road in which D was waiting, across the lane in which V was 
approaching from the opposite direction. W made that turn just before D made 
the decision to pull out. D pulled out into the path of V, causing V to lose control of 
his motorbike and collide with D’s car. The Crown suggested that D failed to see V 
because her view was blocked by W’s car, and the fact that W made the turn led her 
to believe that it was safe for her to pull out, without ensuring for herself that such 
was the case. W had cleared the junction by the time D pulled out, and W said that 
D should have waited for V to pass and had pulled out too early. D claimed that 
she did not see V or his motorbike at any time prior to the collision, and the Crown 
accepted that she had suffered a momentary lapse of concentration.
D was arrested at the scene for causing death by dangerous driving. She said 
she looked right, looked left and pulled out, and that her mistake was that she did 
not look right again. The road on which the collision occurred had a 60 mph speed 
limit, and the speed of V’s bike at impact was calculated to be 20 mph, having 
accelerated up to 21-34 mph when he left the pub. V’s blood alcohol concentration 
was found to be over twice the legal limit, but this was not seen to be contribu-
tory to the collision. D was charged not with CDDD but with CDCD and initially 
pleaded not guilty, but changed her plea when a report provided by a defence 
expert agreed with that of the police collision investigator that V would have been 
visible to D and there was no explanation for her failing to see him.
The Crown accepted that the case fell into the bottom category under the sen-
tencing guidelines, with no additional aggravating features. In sentencing, the 
judge stated that no words were adequate to reflect the suffering of V’s widow, and 
he hoped that she understood the reason why the Court would not be imposing a 
prison sentence. A sentence could never reflect her loss in any case, he noted. He 
acknowledged that the family had been unable to complete their grief whilst the 
court case was outstanding. He went on to state that D was of exemplary character 
and was driving in a sensible manner prior to the scene of the crash. Her crime was 
to turn into the path of V in a moment of inattention; it was an error of judgement 
that had cost a man his life. The judge found that D’s view was partially obstructed 
by a car turning (that of W), but stated that D should have taken more care. D was 
sentenced to a medium community sentence of a twelve-month community order 
with a twelve-month supervision requirement, and was also disqualified for two 
years. This case is presented as one typical of cases of CDCD and was not one in 
which the sentence was seen to be controversial. It should be noted, however, that 
the Court of Appeal has had to deal with a number of appeals against sentence 
since the offence first came into force.32
32 Including: Campbell [2009] EWCA Crim 2459; Larke [2009] R.T.R. 33; Yates [2009] EWCA Crim 
2328; Rice [2009] EWCA Crim 1967; Laws [2009] EWCA Crim 2767; R v W, Gregson, Edge, Crooks 
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The possibility of creating a new offence of CDCD was first considered in 1988 
at the time when a review of the law was being conducted which eventually led 
to the Road Traffic Act 1991 being passed, replacing reckless driving with dan-
gerous driving and creating the new offence of causing death by careless driving 
whilst under the influence of drink or drugs (discussed below).33 At that time 
there was some support for an offence of CDCD without the aggravating factor of 
 drink-driving, but the majority who opposed it thought it was wrong in principle 
to look to the consequences rather than the culpability of careless driving, and that 
although a crime such as CDDD could be based on the consequences of driving, 
culpability was not high enough in careless driving to do the same. Carelessness 
might amount to no more than a minor error of judgement or a moment’s inatten-
tion, and the existence of an offence of CDCD was unlikely to act as a deterrent.
Two decades later, however, despite these arguments being no less germane, 
the offence of CDCD was introduced. By 2005 the Government felt that public 
pressure to deal more severely with drivers who kill had reached such levels that 
it could justify a new homicide offence. As the courts had taken the consequences 
of dangerous driving into account to allow multiple deaths to provide aggravating 
factors in sentencing for CDDD,34 it felt that consequences should also be relevant 
to D’s culpability in cases of careless driving.35 Interestingly, the proposed offence 
was opposed by the legal profession, with the exception of the CPS,36 although 
during the author’s recent project, involving interviews with Crown prosecutors, 
some CPS lawyers also expressed a degree of opposition to it. The advantage of 
the offence for prosecutors is that it closes the gap between the two bad driving 
offences when a death results. Prior to the Road Safety Act 2006, prosecutors 
struggled to explain to bereaved families in cases of careless driving involving a 
fatality that not only would their relative’s death not be mentioned in the charge, 
but that the most the driver would face if convicted was a fine and penalty points. 
Many families were unhappy with this and felt let down by the justice system. 
Now they have an offence which recognises the death in the label and gives the 
possibility of a prison sentence. However, it is only a possibility and, in many cases 
(those amounting to momentary inattention and falling within the bottom level 
for sentencing purposes), the penalty will be no more than a community sentence. 
The result is that families may still feel that justice has not been done. That said, 
prosecutors find that families are more satisfied with the fact that the case is being 
dealt with in the Crown Court rather than the magistrates’ court, feeling that their 
case ‘matters’ more and is being treated seriously.37
[2009] EWCA Crim 2299; Palmer [2010] EWCA Crim 1863; Marjoram [2010] EWCA Crim 1600; 
Henry [2011] EWCA Crim 630; Pitcher [2011] EWCA Crim 453; Geale [2012] EWCA Crim 2663; 
 Bagshawe [2013] EWCA Crim 127.
33 Department of Transport & Home Office 1988.
34 Cooksley [2004] 1 Cr App R (S) 1.
35 Home Office 2005a.
36 Home Office 2005b.
37 See report, above note 30.
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3.3.3 Causing Death by Careless Driving Whilst under the Influence of Drink or Drugs 
(CDCDUI)
Although CDCD under Section 2B of the Road Traffic Act 1988 is a fairly new 
offence, there was in existence already an offence of causing death by careless driv-
ing, but only one in which carelessness must be combined with drink-driving to 
cause a fatal collision. The offence of CDCDUI was introduced by the Road Traffic 
Act 1991, inserting Section 3A into the Road Traffic Act 1988. Section 3A provides:
3A(1) If a person causes the death of another person by driving a mechanically pro-
pelled vehicle on a road or other public place without due care and attention or 
without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road or place and –
(a) he is, at the time when he is driving, unfit to drive through drink or drugs, or
(b) he has consumed so much alcohol that the proportion of it in his breath, blood 
or urine at the time exceeds the prescribed limit, or
(c) he is, within 18 hours after that time, required to provide a specimen in pursu-
ance of section 7 of this Act, but without reasonable cause fails to provide it,
(d) he is required by a constable to give his permission for a laboratory test of a 
specimen of blood taken from him under section 7A of this Act, but without 
reasonable excuse fails to do so,
he is guilty of an offence.
Both the elements of drink-(or drug-)driving and careless driving must be proved. 
If D’s driving fell below the standard of a competent and careful driver and D was 
either unfit through drink or drugs, found to be over the legal BAC limit or D 
failed to provide a specimen, CDCDUI can be charged. There is no need to prove 
that it was the drink or drugs that caused D to drive below the standard of the 
competent and careful driver, just that both elements of the offence are present. 
However, if the standard of D’s driving is bad enough to amount to dangerous 
driving, a charge of CDDD should be brought instead of CDCDUI.38
That D was under the influence of drink will normally be proved through the 
second option above, involving a positive test for alcohol in the breath, blood or 
urine of D. The prescribed limit of alcohol is currently 35 micrograms of alcohol 
in 100 millilitres (35 µg/100 ml) of breath, 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 milli-
litres (80  mg/100  ml) of blood, or 107 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres 
(107 mg/100 ml) of urine.39 This is unusually high, compared to the rest of Europe, 
and despite calls to lower the level to 50 mg/100 ml blood,40 the government has 
remained resistant to further limits on the autonomy of drivers.
In relation to drug-driving, currently the offence can only really be proved 
under Section 3A(1)(a), in that there is evidence that D was ‘unfit’ through drugs. 
Change is on the way, however, after Section 56 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 
was passed. This provision follows a recent review of the law by Sir Peter North 
38 Department of Transport 1988, para. 6.19; Crown Prosecution Service 2013.
39 Road Traffic Act 1988, Section 11.
40 North 2010. See further Cunningham 2011.
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which considered whether a per se drug-driving offence similar to the BAC law 
ought to be introduced. North recommended that such an offence be introduced 
“as and when” research has established impairment levels for particular drugs.41 
Section 56 of the 2013 Act will insert a new Section 5A into the Road Traffic Act 
1988 to create an offence of driving, attempting to drive or being in charge of 
a motor vehicle with a specified controlled drug in the blood or urine in excess 
of the specified limit for that drug. A regulation-making power is given to the 
secretary of state to specify which controlled drugs are covered by the offence, and 
the specified limit in relation to each drug. The recommended limits for sixteen 
different drugs have now been approved and will see eight generally prescription 
and eight illicit drugs added into new regulations that are expected to come into 
force in March 2015.42
The sentencing regime for CDCDUI is similar to that for CDDD: a maximum 
of fourteen years’ imprisonment and mandatory disqualification for a minimum 
of two years.
3.3.4 Causing Death by Driving Whilst Uninsured, Unlicensed or Disqualified 
(CDUD)
It has never been accepted in E&W that drink-driving causing death, without 
the added culpability of carelessness, ought to be penalised more seriously than 
drink-driving itself. Unless D is drunk to the extent that his or her driving ability 
is adversely affected and D drives carelessly, if D is involved in a fatal collision with 
a BAC of more than 80 mg/100ml, D will be liable for the offence of drink-driving 
and not for the death. This is logical, in that had D been unable to avoid a collision 
even if sober (for example, it may be that the main cause of the collision emanated 
from V), then it would be wrong to attribute the death to D. However, such reason-
ing has not always been consistently applied to other forms of unlawful driving 
causing death. At the same time that the offence of CDCD was created, the gov-
ernment introduced a new constructive crime of causing death by driving whilst 
committing one of three underlying documentary offences. The Road Safety Act 
2006 inserted Section 3ZB into the Road Traffic Act 1988, providing that:
A person is guilty of an offence under this section if he causes the death of another 
person by driving a motor vehicle on a road and, at the time when he is driving, the 
circumstances are such that he is committing an offence under –
(a) section 87(1) of this Act (driving otherwise than in accordance with a licence),
(b) section 103(1)(b) of this Act (driving while disqualified), or
(c) section 143 of this Act (using motor vehicle while uninsured or unsecured against 
third party risks).
The offence, like CDCD, is triable either way, but can be seen to be less serious 
than CDCD in that it carries a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment. 
41 North 2010, para. 7.40.
42 Department for Transport 2014.
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It must be proved that D was committing one of the three underlying offences 
when he or she was involved in a collision in which another person died. Whether 
anything more need be proved has been open to interpretation until very recently.
CDUD was the government’s response to calls to do something about drivers 
involved in fatal collisions who should not have been behind the wheel of a car. 
An example was the case of Aaron Chisango, who was under the influence of 
drink and driving without insurance or a licence when his car collided with a 
young boy crossing the road. The media response to Chisango’s sentence of two 
months’ imprisonment for drink-driving43 is an example of what was behind the 
government’s motivation in introducing the law. The outcry was understandable 
to some extent (although it was no doubt aggravated by the fact that Chisango was 
reported to be an illegal immigrant), given the fact that Chisango had originally 
been charged with CDCDUI but the CPS chose to drop that charge on the basis 
that they were unsure they could prove that Chisango had driven without due care 
and attention due to “inconsistencies in witness statements”, despite evidence that 
he was driving at 39 mph in a 30 mph limit.44 Such media reports suggest that 
it was the decision of the CPS in such a case, rather than the law itself, which 
required examination and amendment. Nevertheless, the introduction of CDUD 
into the Road Safety Bill at the time this case was progressing was reported as 
being welcomed by the deceased’s family.45
In suggesting the new offence, the government claimed that the culpability of 
drivers it would cover was clear:
The mere act of taking a vehicle on to the road when disqualified is, in the Govern-
ment’s view, as negligent of the safety of others as is any example of driving below 
the standard expected of a competent driver, even if the disqualified driver, at a 
particular time, is driving at an acceptable standard.46
Unlicensed driving was deemed to demonstrate the same level of culpability. That 
a more stringent response should be made to those who drive illegally was sup-
ported by many, such as the police:
all persons getting into a car knowing they are breaking the law before they turn on 
the ignition, should be dealt with in a manner that is robust and provides a visible 
deterrent to all other would be uninsured/disqualified drivers.47
This view was supported by police officers interviewed by the author once the 
offence had come into force, but what it ignores is that the underlying offences 
themselves are strict liability, meaning that there is no requirement for the Crown 
43 See <www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/67295/Killer-drink-driver-walked-free.html>.
44 See above note 43.
45 ‘This illegal immigrant was drunk, had no insurance and was speeding when he killed our son’, 
The Sun, 16 October 2006.
46 Home Office 2005a, para. 4.2.
47 Home Office 2005b, p. 23.
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to prove that the driver knew that he or she was breaking the law when they set 
out to drive. Of the three underlying offences, driving without insurance is clearly 
the one which is most likely to be committed inadvertently, since D might be 
unaware that D’s insurance has failed to renew due to a technical difficulty such 
as a direct debit not being honoured by the bank. However, it is also increasingly 
possible that D may have been unknowingly driving whilst disqualified, thanks 
to an increased tendency of the courts to disqualify drivers in their absence under 
totting-up procedures.48
Whilst lawyers knowledgeable of the general principles of criminal law might 
balk at the creation of an offence which has been described as one which “lets rip 
a double-barrelled discharge of strict liability”,49 in that no mens rea is required 
either in relation to causing death, or in relation to the underlying offence, such 
objections were clearly not shared by Members of Parliament or members of the 
general public. Independent research to test public opinion on sentencing for 
causing death by driving offences found that participants considered CDUD to be 
more serious than CDCD and only marginally less serious than CDDD, and were 
astonished by the ‘low’ maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment.50 Such a 
response was explained by the assumption that this offence includes “an inherent 
avoidance or disobedience of the law which is deemed highly culpable”.51 As previ-
ously noted, however, the fact that these offences involve strict liability means that 
this assumption is not necessarily correct.
When the offence was first introduced it created some confusion amongst pros-
ecutors, defence lawyers and the courts as to what were its ingredients. Cases soon 
reached the Court of Appeal which, in the case of Williams,52 ruled that no fault 
was required on D’s part in relation to D’s driving for the offence to be made out. 
That case was applied shortly afterwards in the case of Hughes.53 In the course of 
the author’s research into cases decided between 2008 and 2011 it was found that 
those who had no reason to know that they were driving without insurance were 
susceptible to prosecution under this offence if they were involved in a collision in 
which the driver of the other vehicle, who was at fault for the collision, was killed.
However, the position has recently changed with the Supreme Court providing 
its interpretation of the requirements of the offence in Hughes54 in July 2013, on 
appeal from the Court of Appeal. This decision will be welcomed by many and will 
be discussed in more detail below. Suffice it to say at this point that the Supreme 
Court overruled the Court of Appeal’s decision and established that the offence 
of CDUD requires some degree of fault in D’s driving in relation to the causing 
of death. At this point in time it remains unclear as to exactly what is required in 
terms of fault, however. The Supreme Court was clear that fault would not have to 
be of the degree amounting to careless or inconsiderate driving:
48 See Corbett 2012.
49 Sullivan & Simester 2012, p. 753.
50 Sentencing Advisory Panel 2008, para. 145.
51 Sentencing Advisory Panel 2008, para. 145.
52 [2010] EWCA Crim 2552.
53 [2011] EWCA Crim 1508.
54 [2013] UKSC 56.
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Juries should thus be directed that it is not necessary for the Crown to prove careless 
or inconsiderate driving, but that there must be something open to proper criticism 
in the driving of the defendant, beyond the mere presence of the vehicle on the 
road [...].55
The example the Supreme Court gives is that of a driver who is exceeding the 
speed limit, but not by enough to make his driving careless, who collides with a 
drunk driver when he might have been able to stop and avoid a collision had he 
been driving within the speed limit.56 Whilst it is to be welcomed that common 
sense has prevailed in rejecting the concept of a homicide offence based on ‘double 
strict liability’ by at least partially removing one aspect of strict liability, this leaves 
prosecutors with a difficult task on their hands in determining when they ought 
to bring charges under Section 3ZB, since the Supreme Court has left it to the 
courts to work out the circumstances in which the offence is committed “as factual 
scenarios present themselves”.57
3.4 Serious Non-Fatal Driving Offences
Until 2012, any harm falling short of death caused by bad driving would be penal-
ised through the application of the appropriate conduct crime in the form of a 
driving offence, whether that be dangerous driving (maximum sentence: 2 years’ 
imprisonment), careless driving (maximum sentence: £5,000 and possible dis-
qualification) or drink-driving (maximum penalty: 6 months’ imprisonment for a 
first offence; mandatory disqualification). There also exists the offence of ‘wanton 
and furious driving’,58 a result crime requiring that bodily harm be caused, in 
existence since before the time of motorised vehicles. However, that offence, carry-
ing the same maximum penalty as dangerous driving (two years’ imprisonment) 
has been very rarely charged in recent years, with the CPS policy suggesting that 
it should only be charged where dangerous driving is inapplicable due to the vehi-
cle involved being non-motorised (a horse-drawn cart or bicycle, for example), or 
where the driving took place somewhere other than on a public road.59
3.4.1 Causing Serious Injury by Dangerous Driving (CSIDD)
In 2012 the Road Traffic Act 1988 was amended by Section 143 of the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act to insert a new Section 1A creating 




58 Offences against the Person Act 1861, Section 35.
59 Crown Prosecution Service 2013.
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1A Causing serious injury by dangerous driving
(1) A person who causes serious injury to another person by driving a mechanically 
propelled vehicle dangerously on a road or other public place is guilty of an offence.
(2) In this section ‘serious injury’ means –
[...] physical harm which amounts to grievous bodily harm for the purposes of the 
Offences against the Person Act 1861.
The offence came into force on 3 December 2012 and is triable either way, carry-
ing a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment if tried at the Crown Court. 
This  penalty allows the gap in maximum penalties between CDDD (fourteen 
years’ imprisonment) and dangerous driving (two years’ imprisonment) to be 
narrowed in cases where fortunately V survives a collision but unfortunately is left 
with serious injuries. It is too early to tell the extent to which the offence is likely to 
be used, although contact with police forces involved in the author’s recent study 
on the causing death offences suggests that few cases are yet to be charged. Recent 
news stories suggest that it might, however, be used in one of two ways. Firstly, it is 
likely to be charged in cases where there has been a fatal collision and D is charged 
with CDDD, but where there are also victims of the collision who survived and 
suffered serious injuries.60 Alternatively, it might be used in a case where D is sus-
pected of using her car as a weapon of offence in causing serious injuries, but the 
Crown suspects that proving the necessary mens rea for a more serious  non-fatal 
offence against the person might prove difficult.61 CSIDD is constructed to mirror 
CDDD, with the only difference being that grievous bodily harm (defined as ‘really 
serious harm’ in case law),62 rather than death, must be caused.63
3.5 Causation
The one common element of all of the offences in this chapter is that they require 
that the driving caused the prohibited harm, whether that be death or grievous 
bodily harm. Causation is, of course, a general principle of criminal law which 
pervades all result crimes, not just the ones under discussion here. However, it is 
in relation to the causing death by driving offences that the case law has struggled 
60 This occurred in the case of Anton Maizen who drove a lorry whilst fatigued and ploughed into 
the rear of a queue of traffic on a motorway and was charged with one count of CDDD and two 
counts of CSIDD. He pleaded guilty to all charges: Press Association, ‘Lorry driver jailed for fatal 
crash’, The Guardian, 31 August 2013.
61 Navlet Anderson was charged with both causing grievous bodily harm with intent under the 
Offences against the Person Act 1868, Section 18, and with CSIDD, after she drove into the front 
of a kebab shop, injuring a number of pedestrians. The Crown alleged that she had intended to 
strike one of the victims, with whom she had earlier had an altercation, with her car. At trial she 
claimed that she did not intend to harm V but that her flip-flop had become caught between the 
accelerator pedal and the floor of the car. The jury acquitted her of the Section 18 charge but 
convicted her of CSIDD. She was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment and disqualified for 
five years: BBC News, 21 August 2013, <www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-bristol-23778671>.
62 DPP v Smith [1961] AC 290.
63 See further Cunningham 2012.
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to establish the required degree of contribution to the death by D’s act of driving. 
The main problem here, as opposed to other criminal offences, is that where two 
vehicles collide it may be that both drivers are, to different degrees, responsible 
for the collision. This was acknowledged by the trial judge in the leading case of 
 Hennigan,64 who directed the jury in accordance with existing authority on causa-
tion that D’s driving must have been a substantial cause of the collision. In being 
asked by the jury for further direction on the meaning of ‘substantial’ the judge 
said:
‘Substantial’ means that it is not a remote cause of the death, but it is an appreciable 
cause of the death. It is rather like this: in a collision between two motor-cars there 
may be both drivers each 50 per cent to blame, and each would be a substantial 
cause of the collision. If on the other hand you get a situation where you can say that 
one of the drivers was four-fifths to blame and the other was one-fifth, you can say: 
‘I don’t regard one-fifth as being a substantial cause of the accident; if it is as low as 
that, then the fellow who really caused the accident was the one who is four-fifths 
to blame.’65
The Court of Appeal dismissed D’s appeal against conviction. In relation to the 
judge’s direction, the Lord Chief Justice said:
It is perhaps unfortunate that he dealt with the matter in the illustration he gave on 
the basis of apportioning blame, but when one analyses it, it is quite clear that the 
direction, if anything, was much too favourable to the appellant. The Court is quite 
satisfied that even if the appellant was only one-fifth to blame, he was a cause of the 
death of these two people.66
It was noted that there was nothing in the statute that required the driving to be a 
‘substantial’ cause, with the Court stating that “so long as the dangerous driving 
is a cause and something more than de minimis, the statute operates”.67
Hennigan has been the accepted authority for many years, but difficulties arose 
with its application once the new CDUD offence came into force. Here the Court of 
Appeal in Williams first interpreted the offence as requiring no blameworthiness 
on the part of the defendant in terms of bad driving, meaning that it might be 
that the deceased was entirely responsible for the collision and yet D could be 
prosecuted for causing his or her death. The Court suggested:
it is difficult to conceive of any other intention of Parliament than that if a person 
drove unlicensed or uninsured, he would be liable for death that was caused by his 
driving however much the victim might be at fault; it was therefore sufficient that the 
cause was not negligible.68
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The facts of Williams were that D had been driving his car on a dual-carriageway 
without a licence or insurance, as was a regular thing for him to do. A pedes-
trian stepped out from the central reservation directly into D’s path and there was 
 nothing D could do to avoid the collision. This was accepted by the Court, who also 
acknowledged that D had not been exceeding the speed limit and so was in no way 
at fault for the collision. Despite this, it was found that the death of the deceased 
could be attributed to D’s driving in that the driving of his car on that road at that 
time was one of the factors which led to the death.
This was taken a step further by the Court of Appeal with the case of Hughes. 
In that case D had collided with V’s oncoming car when the latter crossed onto 
D’s side of the road. It was accepted that, in terms of civil law, V was 100 per cent 
to blame for the collision, having driven whilst under the influence of drugs and 
whilst fatigued; that D could not have avoided the collision and that D’s driving 
was faultless. Nevertheless, D had been driving without insurance or a licence and 
so was prosecuted for CDUD. The trial judge, however, made a ruling that D could 
not be liable for CDUD on the facts of the case; a ruling against which the Crown 
appealed. The ruling was made before the judgment of Williams, and the judge 
made it on the basis that to say that D had ‘caused’ V’s death would amount to a 
contortion of an ordinary word:
The Oxford English Dictionary defines the transitive verb ‘to cause’ as ‘to be the 
cause of; to effect, bring about, produce, induce, make.’ In my judgment that re-
quires some activity, not passivity, on the part of the person said to be doing the 
causing.69
The Court of Appeal found that Williams was binding and quashed the judge’s 
ruling, ordering that the trial against D for CDUD resume.
What this suggested, as commented by Simester and Sullivan, is that CDUD 
was an offence which extended the ambit of English criminal law to include result 
crimes where any sine qua non connection between D’s action (his illicit driving) 
and V’s death would suffice as proof of causation.70 As a result, it meant that even 
had V ploughed into D’s vehicle whilst the latter was stationary in a queue of traffic 
or at a traffic light, D would have caused the death.71 Such a suggestion caused 
consternation amongst English lawyers, as evidenced in the author’s recent inter-
views with Crown prosecutors.72
However, as mentioned above, the Supreme Court has recently determined 
that the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of Section 3ZB in Williams and Hughes 
was erroneous. In Hughes the Supreme Court sought to examine whether the 
language Parliament used in the statute was unambiguous and could be said to 
have such far-reaching effects. In what might be seen as a pragmatic approach to 
statutory interpretation it concluded that it had not. By using the word ‘cause’ the 
69 Quoted in Hughes at para. 28.
70 Sullivan & Simester 2012.
71 Sullivan & Simester 2012.
72 See report, above note 30.
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statute must be interpreted as requiring that causation be determined on the ordi-
nary common law approach. The Court rejected the suggestion of the Crown that 
D could be said to have caused another’s death whenever he is on the road at the 
wheel and a fatal incident involving his vehicle occurs. To say so would mean that 
D would be found to have caused the death of a V who intended to commit suicide 
by stepping out in front of his car, or to have caused the death of a V who drove at 
D’s vehicle with murderous intent to kill one of the occupants. If Parliament had 
intended this to be the result then it would have used language other than “causes 
[...] death [...] by driving” to ensure that such was the case.
Instead the Court decided that causation would only be established for the pur-
poses of the offence when D has done or omitted to do something in his control of 
his vehicle which is open to proper criticism and contributes in some more than 
minimal way to the death. It is not enough that D’s driving was a ‘but for’ or sine 
qua non cause of death. To say otherwise, would be to suggest that planting a tree 
by the side of the road, into which a driver later crashes, would be to ‘cause’ the 
death of that person.73
It is too early to tell how the case of Hughes will influence the volume of CDUD 
cases going through the courts, but the obvious effect will be to reduce the number 
of prosecutions. Given that the number of cases is already fairly low (54 cases were 
brought in 2009-10 across E&W) it may be that the offence becomes rarely used, 
although it might still be of use in cases such as that of Aaron Chisango discussed 
above. It may well be that there will be cases in which victims are disappointed by 
the lack of a ‘causing death’ charge, but it is only right that the highest court of the 
land should reinstate a fundamental principle of criminal law in requiring legal 
‘causation’ to be applied to a ‘causing death’ offence.
3.6 Police Investigations, the CPS and the Role of the Bereaved
The investigation of fatal collisions by the police has undergone considerable 
change in the past decade. While Parliament has identified the importance of 
recognising the impact that road death can have on individuals’ lives through the 
introduction of new serious driving offences, as set out above, the police and CPS 
have also adapted their policies to the prevailing mood of citizens by demonstrat-
ing that they take road death seriously.
The police, through the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), has done 
so with the introduction of the Road Death Investigation Manual (RDIM), first 
written in 2001 and updated in 2007. The RDIM aims to provide advice and 
examples of good practice for the professional investigation of road deaths,74 and 
is based on the Murder Investigation Manual. It provides detailed information 
73 See Hughes at para. 25.
74 NPIA & ACPO 2007. Note that since the College of Policing was set up, much of ACPO’s work 
has been taken over by this new College, which appears to have replaced the RDIM with the 
Authorised Professional Practice on Investigating Road Deaths in 2013, available at: <www.app.
college.police.uk/app-content/road-policing-2/investigating-road-deaths/>.
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on how best to develop strategies on everything from crime scene management 
to family liaison. Key to the approach is the underlying message that these are 
serious cases with the potential to result in prosecution for a serious imprisonable 
offence.
Given the thoroughness of the RDIM, if it were to be followed to the letter in 
every single case, there is little doubt that bereaved families would feel secure 
in the knowledge that their case was being investigated to the highest standard. 
However, the status of the Manual is that it is advisory and it clearly states that the 
extent to which the procedures it recommends are adopted is a matter of discre-
tion for each individual police force.75 The result is that road death investigations 
are susceptible to substantial inconsistencies in quality and approach, depending 
upon the geographical location of the collision. Each force will implement the 
RDIM in different ways, with varying degrees of commitment, dependent in part 
upon the local police culture but largely on resources.
There is an increasing use of detective trained officers in the investigation of 
road death in some forces. The benefits of this initiative are seen to include greater 
training on interview technique that such officers receive. However, the best 
model is probably one which employs both traffic officers and detectives to work 
together in a centralised Collision Investigation Unit (CIU). The benefit of such 
an approach is that members of the CIU exhibit both the background knowledge 
of the technical side of traffic offences and the enhanced skills in investigation. 
Key to the successful prosecution of most cases is the evidence of the Forensic 
Collision Investigator, who uses marks on the road and calculations relating to 
speed and velocity on impact to reconstruct how a collision occurred.
Central to the experience of police investigations into their loved one’s death 
for bereaved families will be the role of the Family Liaison Officer (FLO). A decade 
ago, when the RDIM was first introduced, it was rare for FLOs to be used in cases 
of road death, although they were common in other cases of unlawful killing. 
Now, however, FLOs are seen as a fundamental element of the police investiga-
tion, and are key to the provision of information to bereaved families about the 
progression of the investigation.
Once the police have completed their investigation, they will submit a file 
of evidence to the CPS for consideration as to whether any charges ought to be 
brought against any surviving driver. A report published by Her Majesty’s Crown 
Prosecution Inspectorate (HMCPSI) in 2002,76 recommended that specialist pros-
ecutors ought to be trained to deal specifically with all road death cases. By 2008 
“substantial progress” had been made on this recommendation,77 and it is now 
common for each geographical area to employ a small team of specialists tasked 
with reviewing these cases. In addition to this, further quality assurance of charg-
ing decisions was implemented between 2008 and 2011 following the enactment 
of the Road Safety Act 2006, in that all charges had to be authorised by the Chief 
Crown Prosecutor of each area. It seems that this policy was implemented partly 
75 At p. 10.
76 HMCPSI 2002.
77 HMCPSI 2002, p. 60. It was noted, however, that there is no national specialist training available.
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in order for the CPS to monitor how the new causing death offences were being 
utilised in practice, demonstrating the impact that legislative change can have on 
working practices of the CPS.
Of particular interest is the evidence from the author’s own recent research 
that the police and CPS work very much as a team on road death investigations. 
Investigations are characterised by close working relationships between investi-
gating officers and specialist prosecutors, who communicate effectively in order to 
reach a conclusion as to the disposal of a case.
Despite the author’s own positive findings indicating that in the CPS Areas 
where her recent research was conducted there is clear evidence of best practice 
being adopted, dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system’s response to road 
death appears widespread. Media reports of specific cases in which bereaved fam-
ilies have complained about sentences passed are common, particularly at a local 
level, with occasional pleas to deal more seriously with drivers involved in fatal col-
lisions.78 Responses to ACPO’s consultation regarding the RDIM also uncovered 
extreme dissatisfaction amongst bereaved families with regard to their experience 
of the criminal justice system. There are clearly some cases where mistakes are 
being made, as indicated by remarks made by the judge in some cases.79 Surpris-
ingly, despite the offence of CDCD having been created as a response to victim 
pressure groups calling for the gap in sentencing between careless driving and 
dangerous driving causing death to be closed, there have recently been calls from 
at least one victim group for the new offence’s abolition.80 This last proposal seems 
to have been made on the basis that victims’ groups suspect that CDCD is being 
charged where CDDD would be the appropriate offence, leading to a downgrading 
of charges and lesser sentences. Although it is true that the official statistics show 
a drop in the number of convictions in CDDD since CDCD was introduced,81 the 
author’s own project found no evidence of downgrading,82 suggesting that either 
downgrading is occurring outside the CPS Areas researched or that there are alter-
native explanations such as the reduction in the number of road traffic fatalities 
over the period.83 The problem faced by the criminal justice system, including the 
CPS and courts, is that the culpability displayed by a careless driver who causes 
death may be low, albeit the consequences of such carelessness were disastrous. 
Although there are claims that drivers who kill face lower sentences than offend-
ers guilty of killing by other means, it has to be accepted that to compare those 
78 See, for example, Craig Woodhouse, ‘500 killer drivers cheat jail in 5 years’, The Sun, 23 Septem-
ber 2012, available at: <www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/4552401/.html>.
79 See, e.g., the case of Jordan Clayton sentenced by Judge Stephen Everett for CDCD on a charge 
of CDDD: ‘Judge criticises handling of bypass death trial’, The Bolton News, 15 February 2012, 
available at: <www.theboltonnews.co.uk/news/9531736.print/>.
80 See <www.StopDangerousDrivers.com>, supported by Karen Lumley MP: ‘MP gets tough 
on dangerous drivers who kill’, Redditch Advertiser 2, November 2012, available at: <www. 
redditchadvertiser.co.uk/news/10018232.MP_gets_tough_on_dangerous_drivers_who_kill/>.
81 In 2007 there were 233 convictions for CDDD; this fell to 114 convictions in 2011: Criminal Justice 
Statistics England and Wales 2011, Table A4.4.
82 Kyd Cunningham 2013.
83 Road deaths fell to an all-time low of 1,754 in 2012, Department for Transport 2013.
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guilty of CDCD or CDDD with convictions for manslaughter is not to compare 
like with like. For a bereaved relative, however, such arguments will be difficult to 
accept since the focus will be on the loss suffered.
In the past decade the police, CPS, courts and coroners have become far more 
attuned to the impact on the family that a road death and subsequent investiga-
tion have. This has been facilitated by the close working relationship between the 
police and CPS and by the Victim Focus Scheme (VFS). The VFS applies to cases 
of homicide, including CDDD and CDCD, both in the Crown Court84 and more 
recently in the magistrates’ court, the scheme having been extended in March 
2010.85 Under the VFS, a meeting will be offered by the CPS to a bereaved family 
once the decision to charge has been made, with the aim of informing the family 
of the processes involved in the case and what outcome they might expect. Further 
meetings should be offered at specific points in the process, including conviction 
and sentencing or acquittal. CPS lawyers interviewed by the author agree that 
meetings are very important to make families feel involved and that their views 
are taken on board and respected. Many prosecutors put themselves in the shoes 
of bereaved families, displaying a good deal of empathy.
Victims are also able to feel involved in the case against D by making a Victim 
Personal Statement (VPS), which is written in advance of any court case to be read 
by/to the judge in sentencing. Relatives will be informed that any VPS they make 
is unlikely to have an impact on sentencing, but that it is an opportunity for their 
views to be heard. One of the benefits of the new offence of CDCD is that many 
of these cases are dealt with at the Crown Court, with the effect that relatives feel 
that their case is being taken seriously, rather than being heard in the magistrates’ 
court which is often seen as dealing with ‘trivialities’. But whether or not a case 
is dealt with summarily or on indictment, what seems to matter most to many 
families is the defendant’s willingness or otherwise to accept responsibility and 
recognise the harm he or she has done. The problem with the adversarial system 
in E&W, however, is that there is much to prevent such apology being forthcom-
ing. A defendant is likely to be tempted to plead guilty at an early stage thanks 
to the discount in sentence that such a plea will bring, but the characteristics 
of road death investigations act as a deterrent to this. The fact that much turns 
on how forensic evidence from the scene of the collision is interpreted, and that 
defendants are unlikely to see such evidence or employ their own defence expert 
to test such evidence until close to the trial date, means that often the entry of 
guilty pleas is delayed.86
Although some families express a view that the sentence is less important to 
them than the acceptance of guilt, for many the fact that the new offence of CDCD 
provides for the possibility of a prison sentence where careless driving kills is 
seen as the main benefit of the new offence. In practice, however, it will often be 
the case that a driver will not face a prison sentence, since the application of the 
84 Crown Prosecution Service 2007.
85 See <www.cps.gov.uk/legal/v_to_z/homicide_cases_-_guidance_on_cps_service_to_bereaved_ 
families/>.
86 See Cammiss & Kyd Cunningham forthcoming.
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sentencing guidelines precludes a prison sentence in those cases falling within 
the bottom of the three levels of seriousness.87 The danger, then, is that bereaved 
families will have their hopes for a prison sentence dashed. This is where the VFS 
does an important job of managing expectations. Police FLOs and CPS lawyers are 
likely to go to some lengths to explain the sentencing regime to bereaved families 
in letters and at meetings prior to trial in order to ensure that the family under-
stands how likely the imposition of a prison sentence is. As a result of the recent 
consultation on the RDIM, ACPO has expressed interest in introducing restorative 
justice initiatives into cases of fatal collisions. A further consultation is, at the time 
of writing, seeking responses from bereaved families to questions relating to the 
perceived appropriateness of introducing restorative justice programmes in the 
aftermath of a fatal collision.
3.7 Conclusion
The law of E&W relating to serious driving offences is amongst the most puni-
tive in Europe and beyond. The past twenty-odd years has seen the creation of 
a number of serious result crimes being crafted out of existing endangerment 
offences, with the potential for more to be created in the future. For example, 
having recently introduced an offence of causing death by careless driving, and an 
offence of causing serious injury by dangerous driving, the next logical step might 
be seen to be the creation of an offence of causing serious injury by careless driv-
ing. It is in no way evident, however, that these offences are contributory factors in 
falling road casualty figures, or that they act to deter bad driving. Their primary 
role, it seems, is to provide the means for retribution in cases in which lives have 
been ruined by risk taking on the roads. Whether there are cultural reasons for 
victims of bad driving to call for ever-increasing penalties in comparison to their 
European counterparts is difficult to say, but it may be that the way in which the 
British media reports on such cases is at the heart of attitudes to the law in this 
area.
Whatever the reason, there appears to be no let-up in this punitive response 
to driving causing serious injury and death on the roads. In May 2014, the Min-
istry of Justice announced that it would be conducting a review of sentencing for 
such offences, and introducing new offences relating to disqualified driving. The 
Criminal Justice and Courts Bill seeks to create offences of causing death by dis-
qualified driving and causing serious injury by disqualified driving, by inserting 
Sections 3ZC and 3ZD into the Road Traffic Act 1988. The causing death offence 
would be indictable only, carrying a maximum penalty of ten years’ imprison-
ment, and would leave Section 3ZB to deal with just unlicensed and uninsured 
driving. The serious injury offence, on the other hand, would be triable either way, 
with a maximum penalty of four years’ imprisonment in the Crown Court.
87 Sentencing Guidelines Council 2008.
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Chapter 4
French Criminal Law and Serious Traffic Offences: 
Aspects of Fault and Causation
Marie-Aimée Brajeux*
This chapter will focus on the law relating to serious driving offences in the French 
criminal justice system, and aims to present some of the wider issues raised by 
the development of this area of the law. The first part will present some relevant 
background information regarding the political and legal approach to driving 
offences and road safety in general. The second part will then look in more detail 
at the law which targets serious driving offences. Those offences are based on the 
general offences for involuntary homicide and involuntarily causing injury and 
rely on similar conceptions of fault, effectively creating aggravated driving-specific 
offences. In the context of those driving-related offences, the combination of the 
concepts of causation and fault has created a very severe regime of liability, tem-
pered only by sentencing practices in the French criminal justice system.
4.1 Introduction: Relevant Background
This section will provide some background information about the French legal 
and criminal justice system, focusing on characteristics which are specifically 
relevant to the criminalisation of driving offences in general and serious driving 
offences in particular.
4.1.1 General Background: Civil Law and Codification
The codification of French law in the modern era has led to a diversification of 
the sources of law. Substantive law is contained in a number of codes, relating 
to the different areas of application of the law, ranging from tax law to contract 
and family law, but also social security, employment, etc.1 In relation to the crim-
inal law, this diversification of sources is also present, and leads to a distinction 
between what is called the ‘droit pénal général’ and the ‘droit pénal spécial’. The 
* Marie-Aimée Brajeux is a PhD candidate and part-time lecturer at the School of Law, Queen 
Mary University of London. She holds an LLM from University College London and a Double 
Maîtrise from Cambridge University and Paris II Assas University.
1 E.g. Code Civil, Code de l’Action Sociale et de la Famille, Code de la Sécurité Sociale, Code du 
Travail, Code Général des Impôts, etc. All codes are available at <www.legifrance.gouv.fr>, and 
an official translation is available for some of them. 
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former establishes general principles of liability and sanctions, while the special 
part of the law applies those principles in the context of specific offences. Most of 
these principles, both general and special, are contained in the Code Pénal, which 
is regularly amended by legislation, and is the principal source of law known to 
the courts. The most recent overhaul of the criminal legislation dates back to 1994, 
since which date the Code is generally referred to as the ‘Nouveau’ Code Pénal.2 
In addition to this Code Pénal, other codes exist, compiling and codifying legisla-
tion which relates to particular areas of law and which include provisions which 
will be relevant to the criminal law. For example, the Code de la Santé deals with 
medical law, while the Code de la Route deals with traffic law, both areas which 
are concerned to some extent with criminal matters. In each code, there are provi-
sions which outline criminal offences and sanctions, or specify the application of 
general criminal law principles to the specific area of law in question.
In terms of the criminalisation of traffic offences, the law can be found in 
both the Code Pénal and the Code de la Route. The Code Pénal presents general 
principles of liability and deals with the most serious offences such as murder and 
voluntarily causing injury, but also involuntary homicide and involuntarily caus-
ing injury, which can be committed while driving. As will be discussed later in 
this chapter, since 2003 the Code Pénal also contains specific offences for causing 
death or injury while driving, which are closely related to the general offences. 
There are, however, many other driving offences contained in the Code de la Route 
rather than the Code Pénal. This characteristic is important to understand the 
overall background of the French approach to criminalising driving offences, and 
also because of the confusion and overlap it sometimes creates. This situation will 
be discussed later on in this section, after a presentation of the general approach 
to driving offences in French criminal policy.
4.1.2 Driving-Related Offences: The Legislative Background
The stated aim of the French government in recent years has been to take a pro- 
active stance on road safety to tackle the high number of deaths on the road and 
improve road safety in general. In 2002, an executive committee on road safety 
issued a report promising a major overhaul of the criminalisation of driving 
offences.3 It was divided into two parts: the first one focusing on increased checks 
and sanctions to “change behaviour and ensure respect of the law”, and the second 
focusing on efforts to create a culture of road safety in all stakeholders.4 The report 
led to a law barely six months later, which was passed with little contest by Parlia-
ment5 and which contained a wide range of measures, mixing the creation of new 
offences and the introduction of regulatory measures with the amendments of 
2 For details of the reform which led to the creation of a ‘new’ Code Pénal, see Pradel 2012, para-
graphs 123-126. 
3 Rapport du comité interministériel de sécurité routière, 18 December 2002.
4 Rapport du comité interministériel de sécurité routière, 18 December 2002, parts I and II.
5 Act no. 2003-495, 12 June 2003. 
CriminalLiabilityforSeriousTrafficOffences.indd   68 3-12-2014   10:16:25
69
French Criminal Law and Serious Traffic Offences: Aspects of Fault and Causation
existing provisions.6 A detailed analysis of this reform would require more space 
than this work allows, but an overview of its approach to road safety reveals a 
three-pronged approach based on sensitisation, prevention and repression.
4.1.2.1 Sensitisation
The aim of sensitisation in French policy has principally been achieved through 
the use of multiple communication campaigns relating to the risks of driving- 
related accidents and deaths. A specific government department is dedicated to 
improving ‘road security’ and has produced, over the last decades, numerous 
shocking and often gruesome ads.7 These cover a range of topics, including gen-
eral driving advice, but also the risks of alcohol, tiredness and, more recently, the 
risk of using your mobile phone while driving. In more recent years, communica-
tion campaigns have focused particularly on the need for what can be referred to 
as ‘safety accessories’, such as the reflective vest, a signalisation triangle to use in 
case of a breakdown, and now alcohol-testing devices, which are all compulsory 
in any vehicle.8 One recent campaign enrolled the help of Karl Lagerfeld, the head 
designer of the fashion house Chanel, to advertise the need for the use of the 
reflective jacket.9
4.1.2.2 Prevention
Prevention also plays a major role in the French government’s approach to 
driving offences. The preventive rationale appears clearly in the enforcement of 
speeding-related offences and in particular the use of video cameras, which are 
very widely used in France,10 but also in the criminalisation of practices such as 
tampering with a motorcycle in order to increase its speed, known as ‘débridage’. 
While the Code de la Route criminalises the fabrication, import, commercialisa-
tion or distribution of items destined for this purpose in a relatively severe way,11 
the fact that the use of such items is not itself criminalised highlights the legisla-
tor’s intention to prevent rather than purely repress.
The preventative aim of the policy is also closely related to the sensitisation 
objective, in particular in relation to the use of safety accessories. The commu-
6 For a detailed discussion of the measures included in this reform, see Céré 2003.
7 One striking ad from about 15 years ago included a young driver and his friends jumping a red 
light at an empty junction, the driver looking in relief in his mirror after he passed the junction 
only to see the passengers gravely injured in the back seat. For more examples of the adverts, see 
the website <www.securite-routiere.gouv.fr>.
8 See below, Section 4.1.2.2. 
9 In a range of television spots and posters, he is photographed in his trademark black and white 
outfit wearing a reflective yellow vest, with the caption “it’s yellow, it’s ugly, it doesn’t go with 
anything but it could save your life.” See <www.securite-routiere.gouv.fr>. 
10 Since 2004, automatic speed cameras can be used to target speeding drivers. See the Executive 
Order of 13 October 2004, ‘Portant création du système de contrôle automatisé’. More recently, 
a new speed camera system has been approved for use on French highways, calculating the aver-
age speed of a car between two set cameras, rather than ‘flash-cameras’ which make measure-
ments in one position.
11 See Article L317-5. The sentence for the offence is relatively serious, at 2 years’ imprisonment and 
a 30,000 euro fine.
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nication campaigns about the need for such accessories have been accompanied 
by a multiplication of the offences relating to road safety, often referred to as 
‘endangerment offences’. The use and possession of certain key ‘safety accesso-
ries’ have been made compulsory, in the explicit hope of preventing accidents and 
 pre-empting risky behaviour.
For example, it is now compulsory to have an alcohol-testing device in one’s 
car at all times,12 as well as a fluorescent safety jacket and a signalisation triangle 
to use in case of a breakdown.13 While the jacket and triangle are perhaps less 
pressing concerns in terms of the prevention of serious accidents, the obligation of 
carrying an alcohol-testing device represents a clear response to the high propor-
tion of driving-related offences which are committed while drunk.14
This concern for prevention when developing driving offences can also be seen 
in the specific criminalisation of drug use while driving. The law has recently been 
amended to criminalise the act of driving while having used illicit substances, 
as opposed to driving under their influence (which is still the test in relation to 
alcohol).15 The aim of this particular choice of syntax was to ensure that all drug 
usage would be caught as a criminal offence, irrespective of the defendant’s state 
and level of cognitive impairment.16 Prevention is also illustrated in the criminali-
sation of phone use while driving. Using a phone “held in the hand” is an offence 
in itself, irrespective of the consequences of it, leading to a fine and an automatic 
loss of two licence points.17 This preventive provision has even been extended by 
the Cour de Cassation18 in a judgment which held that the defendant did not have 
to be talking on the phone for the offence to be committed. In this particular case, 
the act of checking texts “using only the thumb” was found to fulfil the conditions 
of the offence.19
12 Décret no. 2012-284, 28 February 2012, in application from 1 March 2012. The décret was 
amended by executive order on 28 February 2013, preserving the obligation but abolishing the 
relatively modest sanction of an 11 euro fine; no sanction remains.
13 Décret no. 2008-754, 30 July 2008. 
14 According to the most recent statistics on road safety, alcohol is a factor in about 30% of driving 
accidents resulting in death, and has been for over 20 years. The incidence of alcohol abuse in 
cases of injury is generally lower, 15.3% of cases leading to serious injury and only 9% leading to 
mild injury. See Bilan de l’accidentalité de l’année 2012 en France, Observatoire National Inter-
ministériel de la Sécurité Routière, available at <www.securité-routiere.gouv.fr>.
15 Article L235-1 of the Code de la Route criminalises driving while “having used” drugs, whereas 
the criminalisation of drunk driving is dealt with in Article L234-1, which makes an offence of 
driving “under the influence” of alcohol, with specific measurements as evidence of liability. 
Author’s translation.
16 The law was voted in May 2011 and amended Article 235-1 of the Code Pénal, although the Cour 
de Cassation has since restricted the definition of the offence by holding that ‘drug use’ could 
only be proved by blood tests and that even the admission of the defendant would not be suffi-
cient to establish liability.
17 Article R 412-6-1 Code de La Route. The first line explicitly refers to hand-held devices: “L’usage 
d’un téléphone tenu en main par le conducteur d’un véhicule en circulation est interdit.”
18 The Cour de Cassation is the supreme court in the French criminal and civil legal system. 
19 Cour de Cassation, 13 September 2011, Bull. Crim. 2011, no. 175. 
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4.1.2.3 Repression
Perhaps the most pervasive influence of the 2003 reform on the agenda relating 
to road safety, in addition to sensitisation and prevention, is the aim of repres-
sion.20 Beyond the straightforward introduction of a wide range of more or less 
serious offences related to driving a vehicle, including preventative offences as 
seen above, this concern for repression has three key aspects. First of all, a wide 
range of legislative and regulatory measures aim to achieve a more streamlined 
enforcement of the offences related to driving. For example, a recent law has 
introduced the possibility for a defendant to plead guilty in the early stages of an 
investigation relating to a driving offence.21 Although the process of a guilty plea 
is now available throughout the French criminal justice system, it is a lengthier 
procedure compared to this principle, which allows a driver faced with a fine to opt 
for the immediate (within 45 days) payment of a lesser fine, without challenging 
the accusation in court. This process was agreed in principle by the European 
Court of Human Rights,22 conditional to an appropriate appeal procedure. Other 
examples of streamlined enforcement can be seen in the existence of a presump-
tion of liability which applies to the registered owner of a vehicle involved in an 
accident. In principle, liability for any traffic incident is attached to the person 
driving the vehicle,23 but Article L121-3 states that there is a presumption of liability 
of the registered owner of the vehicle for any financial consequences flowing from 
the commission of an offence. Although the drafting of the article suggests an 
intention to limit the presumed liability solely to aspects of the financial liability,24 
commentators have suggested that, by using the words ‘responsabilité pénale’ 
– meaning criminal responsibility – the article effectively creates a presumption 
of full liability. Whatever the extent of the presumption,25 it is very difficult to dis-
place: the registered owner must provide proof of the vehicle’s theft or destruction, 
or give the identity and address of the actual driver of the vehicle at the time of 
the accident. Secondly, the objective of repression has been put forward by impos-
ing severe sentences for offences committed while driving. As will be seen in the 
following section, the criminalisation of serious driving offences is based on the 
aggravation of related ‘general’ offences. The sheer fact that an offence is com-
mitted while driving a vehicle will generally lead to a heavier sentence.26 Legisla-
tive policy has also imposed hefty penalties in relation to specific driving-related 
offences, and these sentences are sometimes increased by further legislation, for 
example in relation to the criminal offence of fleeing the scene of an accident, 
where a 2011 law increased the penalty from 2 to 3 years’ imprisonment and from 
20 For a fuller account of the ‘repressive turn’ taken by the 2003 reform, see Céré 2003.
21 Article 529-10 Code de Procédure Pénale.
22 European Court of Human Rights, 28 September 1998, Malige v France, 27812/95, paragraph 50. 
23 Article L121-1 Code de la Route. 
24 Paragraph 2 in particular lists the ‘effects’ that will not be attached to the payment of a fine under 
the presumption, such as an inscription to the defendant’s criminal record.
25 See Section 4.1.3 for a discussion of the extent of this presumption. 
26 See Section 4.2.1.
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a 30,000 to a 75,000 euro fine.27 Within driving-related offences, the sanctions 
available can also be increased depending on certain aggravating circumstances, 
such as the use of alcohol or the lack of driving licence.28 Finally, the third aspect 
of the repressive objective of legislative policy in relation to road safety concerns 
the use of complementary sanctions. In certain cases, generally involving death 
or serious injury caused by driving, complementary sanctions can be imposed in 
addition to the sentence for the offence itself.29 Two articles of the Code Pénal30 
introduce those complementary sentences, which are specifically related to driv-
ing and comprise a number of options:
•	 interdiction of driving any vehicle, even if it does not require a licence, for up to 
five years (or ten in the presence of one or more aggravating circumstances);
•	 cancellation of the defendant’s driving licence and prohibition from requesting 
one for five years;
•	 obligation to undertake a road safety sensitisation course, paid for by the 
defendant;
•	 immobilisation of the vehicle used in the commission of the offence for a max-
imum of one year (only if the defendant is the owner);
•	 confiscation of the vehicle in the same conditions.
Other complementary administrative sanctions such as fines and the withdrawal 
of points on the driving licence are also available on an automatic basis.31 This is 
generally dealt with by administrative courts.32
The three characteristics of sensitisation, prevention and repression in French 
legislative policy regarding road safety show how a relatively nuanced approach 
is taken in relation to the criminalisation of driving, lacing pure repression with 
objectives of prevention and sensitisation. This approach seems to have produced 
some positive results in relation to the number of traffic accidents and driving- 
related deaths over the last decades.33 However, the proliferation of legislative pro-
visions to tackle driving offences also seems to have created an ‘over-abundance’ 
of measures which can lead to confusion and overlap in the French criminal law, 
a situation which is potentially crystallised and aggravated by the codification 
regime.
27 Article L231-1 Code de la Route, reproducing Article 434-10 Code Pénal. Both were amended by 
Act no. 2011-267, 14 March 2011. 
28 See Section 4.2.1.
29 The sentence for the offence itself will generally be a custodial one, albeit often suspended.
30 Articles 221-8 and 222-44 Code Pénal.
31 The use of ‘automatic’ sanctions was approved in European Court of Human Rights, 28 Septem-
ber 1998, Malige v France, 27812/95.
32 See Articles L223-1 to L223-8 and R223-1 to R223-13 of the Code de la Route. 
33 According to the most recent report detailing 40 years of road safety interventions, the number 
of deaths per year has dropped from over 18,000 in 1972 to around 3,500 in 2012. See Bilan de 
l’accidentalité de l’année 2012 en France, Observatoire National Interministériel de la Sécurité 
Routière, available at <www.securité-routiere.gouv.fr>.
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4.1.3 Towards Legislative Overkill?
The existence of different legislative sources stemming from the nature of the 
French legal system can in itself sometimes lead to confusion,34 a tendency which 
has arguably been exacerbated by the multi-pronged approach to policy in relation 
to driving-related offences. Not only has there been a proliferation of offences to 
sensitise, prevent and repress traffic incidents, but these offences are not all con-
tained in the same code. As a result, certain concepts are defined in both codes, 
with no clear indication as to which should prevail, and there are numerous cross 
references, which are not always updated following legislative reforms to the paral-
lel provisions. One example of such confusion can be seen in the recent measures 
regarding the use and possession of alcohol testing devices in vehicles. A law was 
passed in February 2012, creating an obligation for all cars to have, at all times, a 
working alcohol-measuring device.35 Although this provision was set to come into 
effect on 1 July 2012, the application of the article outlining the sanction for failing 
to meet the obligation, contained in Article R233-1, was delayed until November 
2012. Beyond these chronological glitches, the drafting of the provisions can also 
lead to confusion: as a commentator pointed out, the obligation in practice calls 
for each car to hold not one but two testing devices. If a security-conscious driver 
uses a test one evening before going home, as it is encouraged he should do, and 
then proceeds to drive off in all legality with regard to the rules regarding alcohol 
consumption, he would however be in breach of Article R234-7, as the testing 
device would not be in working order anymore. Although the principal aim of this 
particular measure is sensitisation and is unlikely to lead to mass criminalisa-
tion,36 this somewhat blithe example points out a more pressing concern regarding 
the way road safety legislation has evolved, in an inconsistent manner, sometimes 
too reactively and with no clear strategic roadmap in terms of criminalisation.
The recent development of driving-related offences also raises some important 
issues relating to procedural confusion. The proliferation of offences and sanctions 
made available to the courts, as well as the introduction of measures streamlining 
enforcement can lead to confusion between the different levels of enforcement, 
procedure and indeed the grounds for liability, as shown by the rules surround-
ing the creation of a presumptive liability for driving offences. The overarching 
rule is contained in Article L121-1 of the Code de la Route, which states that: “the 
driver of a vehicle is criminally responsible for all offences committed by him 
while driving said vehicle.”37 This article explicitly, and somewhat redundantly, 
attaches liability to the driver rather than the owner of the vehicle but does not 
establish a presumption of liability per se in relation to the elements of the given 
34 Even after the reform leading to a ‘new’ penal code in 1994, reforms have taken place at an argu-
ably alarming rate, one leading commentator labelling it a “perpetual movement”. See Pradel 
2012, paragraph 126. 
35 Article R234-7 Code de la Route.
36 This was confirmed by the recent executive order which abolished all sanctions for failure to pos-
sess a working alcohol-measuring device. See note 12.
37 “Le conducteur d’un véhicule est responsable pénalement des infractions commises par lui 
dans la conduite dudit véhicule”.
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offence. The significance of this provision is better understood in relation to the 
second paragraph of Article L121-1 and Articles L121-2 and L121-3, which all provide 
exceptions to this rule. These exceptions apply to the financial sanction attached 
to specific offences or situations,38 and aim to attach ‘pecuniary’ liability in those 
cases to the registered owner of the vehicle rather than the driver. The overall 
objective here is therefore clearly one of streamlined enforcement, enabling a sim-
pler procedure: if the driver is not the owner of the vehicle, proving his identity 
could be more difficult and subject to a number of legal claims. It also aims to 
provide an easier access to the pecuniary dividends resulting from these offences, 
as the presumption applies to the registered owner of the vehicle, who by the very 
fact of his registration, will be easier to track down.
The exception in Article L121-2 concerns parking infractions and the payment 
of road tolls, a provision which is easily reconcilable with the objective of Article 
L121-1: when the infraction is minor and results only in the payment of a fine, 
with little to no subjective criminal responsibility, it makes more practical sense 
to attach the presumption to the registered owner of the vehicle in order to ensure 
payment of the fines. In the case of Article L121-3 however, the exception is poten-
tially more problematic. The latter concerns minor offences (infractions) which, 
while they are not necessarily serious and result principally in the imposition of a 
fine, do engage the criminal responsibility of the defendant, for example in rela-
tion to speeding, the observance of safety distances and road usage in general.39 
The liability which is presumed with respect to the registered owner is deemed 
pecuniary and is meant to relate solely to the financial consequences of the con-
viction of such an offence, as specified in the second paragraph of Article L121-3, 
which states that this type of liability cannot lead to a registered status as a crim-
inal, nor can it be taken into account in relation to rules regarding reoffending.40
The amendment to the provision aims to strike a balance between the need for 
streamlined enforcement with regard to fines and that of fairness and the appro-
priate allocation of criminal responsibility. Despite the terminological finesse 
attempting to draw a line between pecuniary and regular criminal liability, it is 
evident that the owner of the vehicle is in fact criminally liable, albeit not for all 
the penal consequences of the accident. This has been recognised in particular by 
a leading French commentator who affirmed when commenting on these meas-
ures, that the individual in question “is definitively criminally responsible, but his 
responsibility does not match its core consequences.”41 However, and despite the 
legislator’s attempts to separate the financial criminal liability from wider-ranging 
consequences, the article does lead to a presumption of liability for the registered 
owner in relation to the criminal offence in question, fine or no fine. This pre-
sumption is particularly strong: according to the Cour de Cassation, it cannot be 
38 Articles L121-2 and L121-3 refer to specific offences, while paragraph 2 of Article L121-1 creates a 
possible exception where the driver is contracted by another. 
39 Article L121-3 Code de la Route. 
40 Article L121-3 Code de la Route.
41 Mayaud 1999, p. 591.
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displaced simply by stating that somebody else was in charge of the vehicle,42 and 
can only be displaced by an official declaration of theft or destruction of the vehi-
cle, or the identification by name and address of the person who was in fact driving 
the car.43
Beyond the stated aims of legislative policy, the reality of law-making in relation 
to driving offences in French criminal law is therefore slightly more complex than 
the government’s strong policy would suggest. The multiplication of measures 
and different regimes has led to a complexification of driving-related offences and 
the sanctions attached to them. While the use of different texts such as the Code 
Pénal and the Code de la Route is a constant feature in French criminal law, the 
abundance of legislative reform targeting one or the other code has led to a wor-
rying degree of overlap and confusion relating to the applicable rules in relation 
to driving offences. Certain measures are present in both the Code Pénal and the 
Code de la Route, and not always in the same terms, which is confusing at best 
and potentially misleading at worst. Poor drafting can be linked to the reactive 
approach to legislation in this field, in which new laws are generally passed on 
the back of some incident or public campaign about a specific issue, rather than 
following a more thorough and reflective process.44 The complexification of the 
regime of driving-related offences is also reflected in the range of different proce-
dures, which are generally dealt with in different courts with sometimes vary ing 
degrees of expertise.45 In fact, it has been claimed that the 2003 reform has led to a 
regime of responsibility for driving-related offences which has become so specific 
that it can now be seen as a “technical area of criminal law [which] should be 
contained exclusively in the Code de la Route”46 and not in the more general Code 
Pénal.
In comparison with those sometimes complicated regimes of liability, serious 
driving offences resulting in death or personal injury in French criminal law are 
relatively simple, and their application in practice reflects some aspects of the leg-
islative agenda outlined in the first part of this chapter, with its aims of prevention, 
sensitisation, and overarching repression.
4.2 Liability for Serious Driving Offences
Having presented the background to road safety legislation in France, this second 
section will explore the principles of liability underlying serious driving offences 
42 Criminal Chamber of the Cour de Cassation, 21 September 2004, no. 03-86.660.
43 Criminal Chamber of the Cour de Cassation, 13 January 2009, no. 08-85.587, Bull. Crim. 2009, 
no. 11, and 2 September 2010, no. 10-82.394 and no. 10-82.393. 
44 E.g. changing ‘under the influence’ to ‘usage’ regarding the use of drugs while driving or increas-
ing the penalty for fleeing the scene of an accident.
45 First instance local courts, known as ‘juge de proximité’, which deal with the bulk of low-level 
driving offences, are known to make common mistakes linked to the complex legal provisions 
and this leads to many appeal cases.
46 Rassat 2011, paragraph 329. According to the author, the presence of driving offences in the gen-
eral Code Pénal represents a problem in terms of legislative method, and is not appropriate. 
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in French criminal law. Driving dangerously is not in and of itself recognised as an 
offence in French criminal law, although the Code de la Route criminalises a wide 
range of behaviour which would amount to dangerous driving. These cover speed-
ing47 but also various violations of driving regulations, including dangerous over-
taking, not indicating before turning and speeding up while being  overtaken.48 In 
addition to this myriad of smaller offences targeting dangerous driving, there are 
three main offences which deal with serious driving offences, based on the related 
‘general’ offences for involuntarily causing death and injury.49 Since 2003,50 each 
of those three articles set out in the Code Pénal contains a subsidiary offence when 
it is committed while driving a vehicle. The elements of serious driving offences 
are therefore essentially the same as causing death or injury through any other 
means, although the penalty will be higher, based on a  triple-tiered aggravation 
scale. However, the particularity of serious driving offences goes beyond a mere 
aggravation of sentences, and the evolution of the rules of causation and fault has 
affected the regime of liability for drivers who kill or injure others while driving. 
The first part of this section (Section 4.2.1) will present the relevant offences and 
the degrees of aggravation they introduce, and the second and third part (Sec-
tions 4.2.2 and 4.2.3) will examine how the evolution of the general principles 
of fault and causation has contributed to the creation of a very severe regime of 
liability for serious driving offences.
4.2.1 Offences for Involuntary Manslaughter and Involuntarily Causing Injury
4.2.1.1 The Substantive Offences
The French Penal Code creates three specific offences to deal with instances of 
involuntarily causing death or injury. Article 221-6 makes it an offence to involun-
tarily cause the death of another, while Articles 222-19 and 222-20 create offences 
of involuntarily causing injury to another, depending on the severity of the inju-
ries in question. The 2003 reform, designed to “reinforce the fight against road 
violence”, created three additional offences to target involuntary homicide and the 
causing of injury in the specific context of driving.51 For each type of offence, the 
general offence and the driving-related offence adopt the same terms, but the sen-
tence is increased if the result is caused while driving a vehicle.
47 Speeding is criminalised on an aggravating scale, imposing a fine and a withdrawal of points 
depending on the gravity of the offence (Articles R. 413-14 and R. 413-1-1 Code de la Route). If the 
speed is in excess of 50 km/h over the limit and the defendant is a recidivist, the sanction can be 
up to 3 years’ imprisonment (Articles L. 413-1 Code de la Route and 132-11 Code Pénal).
48 Respectively Articles R. 414-4, R. 412-10 and R. 414-16 Code de la Route. There are numerous 
other offences, most of which are punishable by a fine and withdrawal of points, or withdrawal 
of the driving licence entirely. 
49 In very specific cases where the intention to kill or commit violence can be proved, the defend-
ant can also be charged with murder, attempted murder or violent homicide with no intention 
to kill, based on Articles 221-1 and 222-7 Code Pénal. The use of a vehicle has consistently been 
recognised as a weapon since 1989. See Criminal Chamber of the Cour de Cassation, 14 March 
1989, Bull. Crim. 1989, no. 129.
50 Following Act no. 2003-495, 12 June 2003. See Section 4.1.2.
51 Act no. 2003-495, 12 June 2003.
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The Code Pénal states that “causing the death of another person by clum-
siness, rashness, inattention, negligence or breach of an obligation of safety or 
prudence imposed by statute or regulations, in the circumstances and according 
to the distinctions laid down by Article 121-3, constitutes manslaughter.”52 The list 
of possible mental states does not indicate specific discrete categories of mens rea, 
but rather reflects the general category of ‘non-intentional fault’, which is distin-
guished from intention in Article 121-3.53 Together, intention and non-intentional 
fault constitute the general notion of fault in the criminal law, which comprises 
states of mind equivalent to the common law notions of intention, recklessness 
and even negligence. According to Article 221-6-1, if causing death in that same 
way, where the “clumsiness, rashness, inattention, negligence or breach of an 
obligation of safety or prudence” is committed by the “driver of a motor vehicle”, 
then the sentence for manslaughter is increased from 3 years’ imprisonment and 
a 45,000 euro fine to 5 years’ imprisonment and a 75,000 euro fine.
If the same broad level of fault causes a serious injury to another – ‘seri-
ous’ being defined as causing a total incapacitation of work of more than three 
months – then an offence is committed according to Article 222-19.54 The causing 
of serious injury in the same manner while driving a vehicle also leads to an 
offence being committed, although the sentence will again be higher, going up 
from 2 years’ imprisonment and a 30,000 euro fine to three years’ imprisonment 
and a 45,000 euro fine.55
Finally, causing a less serious injury, where the incapacitation of work is equal 
to or less than three months, can also result in a criminal offence, whether it 
is caused by driving or not. For this lesser offence, however, the degree of fault 
required varies between the general offence and the driving offence. While Article 
222-20, which creates the general offence, can only be committed if there is a 
“manifestly deliberate violation of a particular obligation of safety or prudence 
imposed by statute or regulation”, the corresponding driving offence laid out in 
Article 222-20-1 refers to the offence being committed by “clumsiness, rashness, 
inattention, negligence or breach of a statutory or regulatory duty of safety or pru-
dence provided for by Article 222-19.” The degree of fault required for the offence 
of causing mild injury is therefore broader where it is committed while driving, 
and matches that required for other serious driving offences. The sentence is also 
higher, rising from 1 to 2 years’ imprisonment and from a 15,000 euro fine to a 
30,000 euro fine.
52 Article 221-6 Code Pénal. Official translation via <www.legifrance.gouv.fr>.
53 Article 121-3 Code Pénal. The notions of clumsiness, rashness, inattention or negligence men-
tioned in the provision are rarely explored individually, but appear to be subsumed into the con-
cept of negligence and imprudence, which constitute one part of ‘non-intentional fault’, along 
with other ‘qualified’ faults. The appreciation of these concepts of negligence and imprudence 
is traditionally done ‘in concreto’, examining the facts and competences of the defendant in the 
given case, rather than relying on a specific definition. See Section 4.2.2.1 on ‘fault’ and Brajeux 
& Spencer 2010 for a discussion of the concept of fault in French criminal law.
54 The fault requirement is the same as Article 221-6 and will therefore be determined in accord-
ance with Article 121-3.
55 Article 222-19-1 Code Pénal. 
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4.2.1.2 The Aggravating Scale
In substantive terms, serious driving offences therefore represent essentially an 
aggravation in sentencing based on the general offences. In practice, however, 
the driving-related offences based on Articles 221-6, 222-19 and 222-20 do not 
just create one level of aggravation in relation to sentencing, but also include two 
additional levels of aggravation based on the existence of certain specific circum-
stances, detailed in the second paragraph of each provision.56 This effectively 
creates three steps of aggravation for serious offences committed while driving, 
all based on one specific offence. Firstly, the sentence is raised by the sheer fact 
that the offence is committed while driving a vehicle, irrespective of any addi-
tional degree of fault. Secondly, each offence presents a series of circumstances in 
the presence of which the sentence will be further aggravated. Although some of 
these circumstances represent criminal offences in their own right, the aggrava-
tion they cause does not affect the defendant’s liability for the corresponding full 
offences. The circumstances in question are:57
•	 the driver has deliberately violated an obligation of safety or prudence imposed 
by statute or Regulations other than those outlined below;
•	 the driver was manifestly drunk or in an alcoholic state characterised by a level 
of alcohol in the blood or breath greater than the limits fixed by the legislative 
or statutory provisions of the Traffic Code, or where he refuses to take the tests 
provided for by the Code and designed to establish the existence of an alcoholic 
state;
•	 a blood test shows that the driver had used substances or plants classified as 
drugs, or where the driver refused to take the tests provided for by the Traffic 
Code that are designed to establish whether he was driving under the influence 
of drugs;
•	 the driver does not hold a valid driving licence as required by law, or his licence 
has been annulled, invalidated, suspended or revoked;
•	 the driver has exceeded the maximum speed limit by 50 km/h or more;
•	 the driver, knowing that he had caused or brought about an accident, did not 
stop and so tried to escape any criminal or civil responsibility that he might 
incur.
Thirdly and finally, in the presence of two or more of those circumstances, the 
articles stipulate that the sentence shall be raised even further.
As a result of these provisions, the aggravating scale for serious offences com-
mitted while driving can be summarised as follows:
56 Code Pénal, Articles 221-6-1, paragraph 2, 222-19-1, paragraph 2, and 222-20-1, paragraph 2. 
57 As contained in Code Pénal, Articles 221-6-1, paragraph 2, 222-19-1, paragraph 2, and 222-20-1, 
paragraph 2. Official translation via <www.legifrance.gouv.fr>.
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Table 4.1 Aggravating Scale for Serious Driving Offences
‘Straight’ By driving Aggravating 
circumstance
2 or more aggravating 
circumstances
Manslaughter 3 yrs / 45,000e 5 yrs / 75,000e 7 yrs / 100,000e 10 yrs / 150,000e
Injury (>3 mths) 2 yrs / 30,000e 3 yrs / 45,000e 5 yrs / 75,000e 7 yrs / 100,000e
Injury (≤3 mths) 1 yr / 15,000e 2 yrs / 30,000e 3 yrs / 45,000e 5 yrs / 75,000e
This table shows clearly the progression in tariff related to driving offences. Each 
offence is deemed more serious if it is committed while driving, and even more 
so if one or more of a range of circumstances can be proved. Before exploring how 
these offences have been applied in practice, the next section will look at how the 
general principles of fault and causation interact in French criminal law.
4.2.2 Fault and Causation in French Criminal Law: Complementary Concepts
The key elements in French criminal offences are similar in principle to the 
traditional elements required in most criminal offences throughout a range of 
legal systems: an act, a mental element, and a causal link between the act and 
the result. As was presented in the previous section, the act required for serious 
driving offences is explicitly defined in the substantive offences: it is the act of 
driving a vehicle. However, the fault requirement and the concept of causation are 
not written into the provisions themselves. In fact, as with many other offences, 
the offences that were outlined in the previous section do not define the concept 
of fault, but instead rely on general principles contained in the Code Pénal which 
establish the nature of both fault and causation to varying degrees of clarity. The 
following section will present an overview of the general concept of fault in French 
criminal law and how it relates to causation, outlining the particular characteris-
tics which are relevant when considering driving offences. In particular, legisla-
tive reforms and judicial interpretation have created a complementarity between 
the principles of fault and causation, which imposed a particularly severe regime 
of liability for serious driving offences.
4.2.2.1 Fault and Causation in French Criminal Law
Fault
The general concept of fault in French criminal law is defined in Article 121-3 of 
the Code Pénal: “There is no felony or misdemeanour in the absence of an intent 
to commit it.”58 Intention is therefore set out as the default requirement for all 
offences in French criminal law. The second paragraph of the article, amended 
in 1996, also recognises the possibility of criminal liability if specified by statute 
for “deliberate endangering of others”. The third paragraph adds that liability may 
also be found “in cases of recklessness, negligence, or failure to observe an obli-
gation of due care or precaution imposed by any statute or regulation, where it is 
58 Article 121-3 Code Pénal. Official translation via <www.legifrance.gouv.fr>.
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established that the offender has failed to show normal diligence, taking into con-
sideration where appropriate the nature of his role or functions, of his capacities 
and powers and of the means then available to him.”59
The provision was further amended in 2000, adding another paragraph which 
states that liability in cases of indirect causation will be established in the case of 
defendants who “have not directly contributed to causing the damage, but who 
have created or contributed to create the situation which allowed the damage to 
happen or who failed to take steps enabling it to be avoided.”60 In such a case, the 
individual will be “criminally liable where it is shown that they have broken a duty 
of care or precaution laid down by statute or regulation in a manifestly deliber-
ate manner, or have committed a specified piece of misconduct which exposed 
another person to a particularly serious risk of which they must have been aware.”61 
Although these successive and rather rapid62 amendments to Article 121-3 were 
explicitly aimed at clarifying the liability of mayors and public officers in cases of 
involuntary homicide,63 they have created new principles of fault and causation 
which apply to all such offences, irrespective of the function of the perpetrator.
Since 2000, French criminal law therefore recognises two levels of fault, 
related to the type of causal link between the act and its harmful consequences. 
If the causation is direct, then the individual will be considered liable if he has 
committed a simple fault, which includes intention, recklessness, negligence and 
any failure to observe an obligation of due care and precaution imposed by statute 
or regulation. If the causal link is indirect however, there is a requirement to prove 
a qualified fault, which includes either the deliberate violation of an obligation of 
due care or precaution laid down by statute or regulation ( faute délibérée), or con-
scious risk-taking in a particular situation ( faute caractérisée). The more remote 
the causal link, the higher the degree of fault which must be established.64 These 
two degrees of fault establish three alternative routes through which liability can 
be established if the material element of an offence is proved. The degree of fault 
which the prosecution will have to prove will depend on the causal link which 
59 See note 58. The latter part of this provision was added following pressure on the French gov-
ernment regarding the regime of liability for mayors and officials, who were often found guilty of 
involuntary homicide on the basis of fault according to Article 121-3. It aimed to narrow the con-
ception of fault by clarifying what would count as ‘negligence’. For more details on the origins of 
this reform, see Brajeux & Spencer 2010, pp. 1-24. 
60 Article 121-3 Code Pénal. Author’s translation.
61 Article 121-3 Code Pénal. Author’s translation. 
62 One commentator remarked that if four years represented an appropriate interval for sport-
ing events, it was undesirably short for a reform of basic principles of criminal liability. See 
Desportes & Le Gunehec 2003, paragraph 461.
63 The breadth of the concept of non-intentional fault in French criminal law led in the second half 
of the twentieth century to a high number of cases holding public and administrative personnel 
criminally liable for accidental deaths for which they were remotely responsible because of their 
official duties. These reforms were intended to limit and clarify the reach of liability in those 
cases. For a more detailed account of this trend, see Mouthouh 2000. 
64 Teachers, town mayors and other administrative agents could rarely be seen to be the primary 
or direct cause of death, but in cases where their degree of fault was particularly high, the aim of 
the reform was to hold them liable for deaths or injury despite the indirect causation. For more 
details of the origins of this legislative reform and its content, see Brajeux & Spencer 2010.
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exists in practice: if the causation is direct, only a simple fault will be necessary, 
whereas if the causation is indirect, the degree of fault required will be either 
deliberate or a conscious risk-taking.
Causation
The concept of causation, irrespective of its direct or indirect qualification, is not a 
straightforward notion in French criminal law. Three main theories are generally 
identified, each of which might theoretically be applied. First, ‘l’équivalence des 
conditions’ represents a concept of causation according to which all the events and 
actions which led to the occurrence of the harm or damage are treated as equiv-
alent, and each can be treated as its cause from a legal perspective. The second 
theory is referred to as ‘la proximité des causes’, which singles out as the legal 
cause that which is closest in time to the eventual damage, and the third one is 
‘la causalité adéquate’, according to which the most usual or appropriate cause of a 
particular type of damage will be the legal cause.65
In general, French criminal law rejects the strict theory of ‘proximité des 
causes’,66 preferring either the first or third theory. The principle of ‘causalité 
adéquate’ represents a minority of cases, illustrated by a famous case in which a 
careless driver knocked over the rider of a petrol-assisted bicycle, who promptly 
remounted, chased his accidental assailant yelling abuse, and in the process got so 
excited that he had a heart attack and died. The driver’s initial conviction for invol-
untary manslaughter was quashed upon appeal, based on the lack of a causal link 
between the initial accident and the actual death.67 The more punitive theory of 
‘l’équivalence des conditions’ represents the usual choice for French courts when 
dealing with causation in criminal cases, albeit with certain key restrictions: as a 
result, any event which has a logical connection, however remote with the eventual 
damage, can be considered as a legal cause. This approach was confirmed in a 
complex and sensitive medical case where the ‘faute’ happened in the initial con-
sultative stage of the operation and was mainly characterised by a lack of commu-
nication between the doctors involved. Despite the lack of temporal proximity, the 
Cour de Cassation found that the existence of an “essential and defining fault”68 
could form the basis of a causal link.
65 A student textbook uses the hypothetical case of a negligent driver who knocks down a pedes-
trian, who in hospital receives infected blood and years later dies of AIDS as an illustration 
of those three theories. According to the first one, both the driver and the doctors responsi-
ble for the transfusion could be treated as having caused the death of the pedestrian, whereas 
the second and the third theory would both focus on the transfusion itself as a cause of the 
death, and the driver would in all likelihood avoid liability for manslaughter. See Desportes & 
Le  Gunehec 2003, paragraphs 446-447. Author’s translation. 
66 Although reports leading to the 2000 reform of Article 121-3, related below, explicitly embraced 
immediacy as a necessary requirement of direct causation, the courts have never followed suit 
and generally adopt a broader conception of causation, whether before or after the reform. See 
Cotte & Guihal 2006. 
67 Criminal Chamber of the Cour de Cassation, 25 April 1967, Gaz. Pal., 1967, I, 343. And compare 
the case of the motorist whose victim died of an infection contracted in hospital. See note 91. 
68 Criminal Chamber of the Cour de Cassation, 29 October 2002, Bull. Crim. 2002, no. 196. 
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However broad it may seem, French criminal law’s reliance on the equiva-
lence theory is tempered in practice by the fact that an intact and certain causal 
link between the act and the harmful result remains a clear and indispensable 
requirement of criminal offences, especially those resulting in death or physical 
injury. This “principe de certitude” is held as a crucial rampart against the risk 
of “reducing criminal responsibility to the gravity of the mistake or mens rea and 
the harmful result, and deduce causation from these two combined.”69 In a speech 
assessing the 5-year anniversary of the 2000 reform amending Article 121-3, the 
President of the Criminal Chamber of the Cour de Cassation affirmed that the 
risk of “an indefinite extension of causation”70 had been avoided by the courts’ 
interpretation of the provisions, as illustrated by decisions which found a lack of 
causal link in situations where the cause of the harm could not clearly be identi-
fied or the chain of causation had been broken by another act.71
The 2000 reform also added an additional degree to the determination of 
causation, distinguishing between direct and indirect causation. Whereas direct 
causation is not itself substantively defined in the Code Pénal, indirect causation 
is given a definition, according to which “responsibility ensues from all the acts 
or omissions without which the accident could not have happened, even if they 
did not make it reasonably foreseeable, and also from all the acts from which the 
harm has originated, even if they have not played a triggering role in the process 
that caused it.”72 While the distinction between direct and indirect may seem easy 
to apprehend in theory, practice has not provided a clear guide as to where the line 
exactly falls between the two, as is exemplified by a very large body of case law, 
relating particularly to involuntary manslaughter.73
Beyond the definition of direct and indirect causation (or lack thereof in the 
case of the former), this two-tier approach to causation is mostly relevant for the 
interdependence it potentially creates between the concepts of causation and fault, 
as will be discussed in the following section.
4.2.2.2 Fault and Causation: Uncomfortable Bed Fellows or Nuanced 
Complementarity?
Through its amendment of Article 121-3, the reform passed in 2000 has effec-
tively linked the nature of fault to the finding of a causal link by the courts. The 
stated aim of the reform was to reduce the criminal liability of local mayors and 
teachers in accidents, while preserving responsibility in truly ‘deserving’ cases, in 
particular driving and work safety cases. However, this reform has also had wider 
implications in relation to the appreciation of the concept of fault in  criminal 
69 Mayaud 2003. Author’s translation.
70 Cotte & Guihal 2006, paragraph 9. 
71 The latter was illustrated by using a driving-related case in which the victim of the accident even-
tually died of an unrelated hospital infection. See note 91.
72 Article 121-3 Code Pénal. 
73 A summary of it, extending to some 50 pages, will be found in the commentary to Article 221-6 
of the Nouveau Code Pénal in the annual Dalloz edition of the Code Pénal. A much fuller account 
is given in Mayaud 2003. 
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law, and in particular cases concerning serious offences dealing with injury and 
manslaughter.
In some ways, this reform has therefore led to causation becoming the “Gord-
ian knot of criminal responsibility in non-intentional matters.”74 The division of 
the concept of causation into two separate categories has introduced a degree of 
complementarity between the nature of fault and the nature of the causal link, 
one relying on the other for its definition and determination. The essence of 
the decriminalisation process relating to the liability of public officials has been 
carried out through this concept of causation, and “the requirements regarding 
the fault are not the same anymore, depending on whether causation is direct or 
indirect.”75
At the time of the reform, concerns were raised that this complementarity could 
create a risk that the qualification of the causal link, by taking on such a crucial 
role in the determination of criminal liability, could be manipulated and that the 
concept of fault could be rendered obsolete.76 However, and although some proce-
dural difficulties relating to the requalification of the causal link during trial have 
been acknowledged,77 the consensus seems to be that rather than creating chaos 
and confusion, the reform has introduced a “nuanced articulation between fault 
and causation.”78 In terms of case law, the requalification of the causal link has 
not ultimately affected the findings of liability in the few concerned cases which 
are reported. Rather than dismissing the case entirely, in those cases the Cour de 
Cassation preserved the existence of liability by also finding that a higher degree 
of qualified fault existed.79 In other cases, the courts have refused to requalify the 
causal link as indirect, despite the high degree of fault present, thereby preserv-
ing the certainty of causation as a crucial principle of criminal responsibility.80 
Whether the success of the reform can in fact be attributed to the “deftness and 
precision” in the conception of these new legal categories, as was claimed by the 
President of the Criminal Chamber of the Cour de Cassation in 2006,81 in practice 
the stated aim of the 2000 law appears to have been achieved: to attenuate liability 
for mayors and official agents while preserving that of drivers and employers who 
kill or injure. The appreciation of this success therefore brings us back to the 
74 Mayaud 2005, p. 71. 
75 Mayaud 2005, p. 71.
76 Pradel 2000. 
77 See Véron 2011, in which the author warns that a change of qualification of the causal link can 
lead to a necessary rethink of the prosecution’s and defence’s arguments in the case mid-trial.
78 Mayaud 2007, p. 82.
79 See in particular Criminal Chamber of the Cour de Cassation, 12 September 2006, Droit Pénal 
no. 1, January 2007, comm. 4 (a medical case), and 31 August 2011, no. 10-88.093 (a workplace 
accident case). See commentary in Véron 2011. 
80 As shown by a recent case involving an aircraft incident which caused the death of two passen-
gers and in which the court refused to establish a causal link, whether direct or indirect, despite 
the high degree of fault. Judges of the Paris Court of Appeal refused to be blinded by the grossly 
and wilfully reckless behaviour of the defendant in assessing the causal link. Court of Appeal of 
Paris, 16 November 2001, no. 00/05087. See commentary in Mayaud 2002.
81 He also mentions the role of the judiciary and their pragmatic approach in applying and inter-
preting the provisions. See Cotte & Guihal 2006, introduction and paragraph 50. 
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regime of liability in serious driving offences, and the next section will examine 
how the principles of fault and causation combine to make that regime extremely 
severe.
4.2.3 Fault and Causation in Serious Driving Offences: Creating a Severe Regime of 
Liability
This section will present how the principles of fault and causation following the 
2000 reform of French criminal law have combined to make the regime of liabil-
ity for serious driving offences particularly severe. Causation in driving cases will 
in most cases be recognised as direct causation, a categorisation which only calls 
for a finding of simple fault under Article 121-3, as was presented in the previous 
sections. The definition of ‘faute simple’ in French law and the nature of driving 
regulations contribute to a quasi-automatic finding of fault, leading to a finding of 
liability in a high majority of driving cases.
4.2.3.1 Causation in Serious Driving Offences
In terms of serious driving offences, the nature of the accidents which lead to 
death or injury will often create a clear and obvious causal link, as “the physical 
contact between the person responsible for the accident or a thing controlled by 
him and the [victim – ‘siège du dommage’] generally comes within direct causa-
tion.”82 The vehicle is treated as an extension of the defendant, and the collision 
which will generally take place between that vehicle and the victim (or his vehicle) 
creates an immediate physical contact which causes the death or the injury. The 
circumstances of the case will therefore often be categorised as the immediate 
cause of the death or injury when assessing the facts of the case, bringing it 
squarely within direct causation.
In some cases however, the courts have also made use of the broad definition 
of direct causation and relied on the criteria of an act representing a determining 
parameter in the harmful result as sufficient to establish causation – and arguably 
preserve liability. So when a driver, travelling at excessive speed, lost control of 
his car after he accidentally hit a wild boar which had suddenly run across the 
road in front of him, causing him to swerve for 100 metres before colliding with 
an oncoming car whose driver died in the resulting crash, the Cour de Cassation 
refused to accept the argument that his ‘faute’ in driving at excessive speed was 
only the indirect cause of the death.83 And it took a similar line when the driver 
of a heavy lorry negligently crashed, so rupturing some of the sacks that he was 
carrying and releasing a cloud of powder which temporarily obscured the vision 
of some other drivers, who then crashed as well.84 These cases illustrate clearly 
the extent to which direct causation can be applied in driving cases when finding 
liability. The finding of a direct causal link in serious driving offences will not 
however necessarily be automatic, and some cases have led to findings of indirect 
82 Cotte & Guihal 2006, paragraph 19. Author’s translation. 
83 Criminal Chamber of the Cour de Cassation, 25 September 2001, Bull. Crim. no. 188. 
84 Criminal Chamber of the Cour de Cassation, 29 April 2003, no. 01-88.592.
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causation, or indeed no causal link at all. While cases relying on indirect causation 
for driving offences are rare, it has been recognised in at least two instances since 
the introduction of the reform. The first case, which went to the Cour de Cassation 
on appeal, concerned a garage owner who had lent a car to a client who then had a 
fatal collision, killing herself and injuring others.85 The garage owner was charged 
with involuntary homicide, based on the fact that the state of the tyres on the car 
had played a significant role in the accident, and that he had therefore indirectly 
caused the death and injury of the victims.86 This decision was followed in a more 
recent case by the Court of Appeal of Montpellier, which saw the conviction of a 
director of a transports company for involuntary homicide, based on his role in 
an accident where the hook of a trailer attached to one of his vehicles broke, caus-
ing a collision between the trailer and another car in which three people died.87 
Again, the defendant was found to have indirectly caused the death of the victims, 
because of his role in the company and his knowledge of the dodgy repair work 
that had been done to the faulty hook.88 These two cases illustrate the role that the 
complementarity of fault and causation highlighted above can play when estab-
lishing liability in serious driving offences. The reasoning in both cases shows 
clearly that the high degree of subjective fault the courts felt had been shown by 
the defendants seemed to lead to a finding of liability, despite the lack of a direct 
causal link. This reasoning mirrors the initial reasons for introducing the reform 
of causation, which called for the imposition of liability in cases where decision 
makers and official agents had indirectly caused death or injury by making seri-
ously bad decisions and taking unconscionable risks.89 These cases, while they do 
not represent the majority of driving-related cases, do suggest that this reasoning 
can apply to the driving-specific offence of Article 221-6-1 in the same way that it 
applies to the general offence provided for in Article 221-6.90
Finally, the courts have also introduced some limits to the certainty of the 
causal chain in some cases where the driving itself becomes too remote to be 
realistically attached to the harmful result. For example, in a case where a driver, 
temporarily blinded by the sun, hit a person on a pedestrian crossing, who was 
taken to hospital with a broken bone in his foot, where he contracted a ‘hospital 
infection’, and died, the Cour de Cassation quashed the conviction and sent the 
85 Criminal Chamber of the Cour de Cassation, 4 February 2003, Dr. Pénal 2003 comm. 71, obs. 
Véron.
86 The garage owner was also found to have committed a ‘faute caractérisée’ or acted in conscious 
risk-taking (necessary to establish liability in case of indirect causation), because of his specialist 
knowledge and the fact that he would have known the car was in a dangerous technical state. 
87 Montpellier Court of Appeal, 16 March 2010. 
88 In a similar reasoning to the 2003 decision, the defendant’s specialist knowledge and apparent 
disregard for safety were found to represent a characterised fault, thereby justifying the imposi-
tion of liability. 
89 See Section 4.2.2.1 on ‘causation’. 
90 It is worth noting that although liability in those cases seems mostly related to the defend-
ants’ roles and responsibilities, the fact that the harm was caused in a driving accident will trig-
ger responsibility under Article 221-6-1 of the Code Pénal, thereby calling for a higher possible 
sentence. 
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case back for a retrial, on the ground that the trial court had failed to examine 
whether, on these facts, there was any causal link at all.91
These few cases where an indirect causal link (or no causal link at all) is found 
show that general rules of causation do apply in driving-related cases, and that a 
finding of direct causation, while very likely, will not be automatic. However, in 
the many cases where the causal link is classified as direct, the fact that the offence 
was committed while driving will therefore affect the criteria of fault, and have 
serious consequences in terms of liability.
4.2.3.2 ‘Faute Simple’ and Quasi-Automatic Liability
As the causal link in most driving-related accidents will be classified as direct, this 
means that the fault requirement for any offence of involuntarily causing death 
or injury will be based on the concept of ‘faute simple’. According to Article 121-3, 
as was mentioned above, a simple fault is a very broad concept which can include 
recklessness and negligence, but also the “failure to observe an obligation of due 
care or precaution imposed by any statute or regulation” and the failure to show 
“normal diligence” in any particular role or function.92
In addition to the broad standards of negligence and recklessness, the notion 
of normal diligence is particularly relevant to serious driving offences. Statutes 
and regulations contained in the Code de la Route impose certain rules of conduct 
when driving, and thus create a standard of behaviour for any individual in his 
quality as a licensed conductor of a vehicle.93 Failure to observe these statutes and 
regulations with normal diligence will result in a finding of fault sufficient to 
establish liability for offences of manslaughter and causing injury. This reasoning 
was recognised by the Cour de Cassation in 1997, when it found that “failure by 
the driver of a vehicle to observe his obligations of prudence and security is neces-
sarily incompatible with the normal diligences that the Code de la Route imposes, 
and therefore entails a fault as defined by the law.”94 According to a leading com-
mentator, this decision adopts a common sense approach in creating a degree of 
fault by implication rather than presumption. The Cour de Cassation’s decision 
preserves the principle of a concrete appreciation of fault, but also recognises the 
far-reaching logical conclusion of the wording of Article 121-3 in relation to driving. 
As it was observed regarding the decision:
there is a natural incompatibility between the lack of control of a vehicle and the 
pretence of normal diligences, the failure inherent to the former being the very proof 
of the inexistence of the latter. Because the obligation of remaining in control of 
one’s vehicle cannot be conceived without the observation of all normal diligences 
91 Criminal Chamber of the Cour de Cassation, 5 October 2004, Bull. Crim. no. 230.
92 Article 121-3 Code Pénal. See Section 4.2.2.1 on ‘fault’. 
93 See notes 47 and 48 for examples of regulations contained in the Code de la Route. 
94 Criminal Chamber of the Cour de Cassation, 24 June 1997, Bull. Crim., no. 451: “tout manque-
ment par le conducteur d’un véhicule à ses obligations de prudence et de sécurité est néces-
sairement incompatible avec les diligences normales que lui impose le Code de la Route et car-
actérise à sa charge la faute définie par la loi du 13 mai 1996.”
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necessary to that degree of control, it goes without saying that a failure on that front 
implies the insufficiency of the required diligences, and entails by that very fact the 
fault which generates criminal responsibility.95
The infallible logic of this interpretation combined with the breadth of the notion 
of fault in French criminal law means that in almost all cases leading to death or 
injury because of a driving accident, the defendant will be found at fault. Even if 
he was not legally negligent or reckless, failure to control one’s vehicle by nature 
would almost systematically represent the proof of a failure to observe the normal 
diligences required when driving. To put it another way, a driver respecting the 
rules and regulations required of him and applying a normal diligence to con-
ducting his vehicle would be very unlikely to provoke a collision and cause death 
or serious injury.96 Just as there is no smoke without fire, the attitude of French 
courts in relation to findings of fault in cases of serious driving offences could be 
characterised as there being no accident without a simple fault.
4.3 Sentencing and Serious Driving Offences: A Mitigating Factor?
The combination of this conception of fault with the appreciation of causation in 
serious driving offences therefore creates an incredibly severe regime of liability 
for drivers who kill or injure others. This is in keeping with the legislative agenda 
put forward in terms of road safety over the last decades, and certainly matches 
the school of public opinion when it comes to dangerous drivers. This severity is 
also reflected in the very high sentences available to the courts for serious driv-
ing offences. As was presented earlier, the 2003 reform introduced stand-alone 
offences of causing death or injury when driving, with sentences ranging from 
2 years’ imprisonment and a 30,000 euro fine for causing minor injury with no 
aggravating circumstances to 10 years and 150,000 euros for involuntary man-
slaughter with 2 or more aggravating circumstances.97
In practice, the sentencing regime of these offences has followed suit and high 
sentences have been imposed in recent years for serious driving offences, and in 
particular a very high rate of custodial sentences. According to the latest figures 
in 2010, 96% of convictions for involuntary homicide by driving have resulted in 
a prison sentence,98 in addition to almost 60% of cases of causing injury (of what-
ever degree) by driving. There is one important catch to these figures,  however: 
95 Mayaud 1997, p. 838. Author’s translation. 
96 Case law does allow for a defence of ‘contrainte’ or ‘force majeure’, for instance when the driver 
suffers a “brutal and unpredictable” medical episode (Criminal Chamber of the Cour de Cassa-
tion, 15 November 2005, Bull. Crim. no. 295), although any contributory fault on the part of the 
driver will negate that defence, for example where the driver was aware of a pre-existing condi-
tion and had only slept three hours the night before taking the road (Criminal Chamber of the 
Cour de Cassation, 11 May 2004, RSC 2004. 878, obs. Mayaud). 
97 See Table 4.1 in Section 4.2.1.2. 
98 See ‘Annuaire statistique de la justice: Édition 2011-2012’, La Documentation française, Direction 
de l’Information Légale et Administrative, Paris 2012. 
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few of these defendants will ever actually see the inside of a prison cell. Indeed, 
the French criminal justice has a habit of making an extensive use of suspended 
sentences, and serious driving offences are no different. In fact, of the prison sen-
tences pronounced in 2010 against negligent drivers who kill or injure others, 
80% were fully suspended.99 Custodial sentences which involve actual prison time 
represent only a third of convictions for involuntary homicides while driving, and 
less than a fifth of convictions for involuntarily causing injury while driving.100
These figures help draw a more nuanced and contrasted picture in relation to 
the regime of liability for serious driving offences in French criminal law. The 
legislative agenda, substantive legal reforms and the judicial interpretation of the 
relevant provisions have all contributed to creating an incredibly severe regime of 
liability for negligent drivers who kill or injure others. And while the sentences 
given against such drivers have generally been relatively high, the extended use of 
suspended custodial sentences in the French criminal justice system introduces 
a significant degree of relief in terms of the severity of the regime of liability. 
Despite very strong public opinion against negligent drivers in France, a position 
which is arguably stoked by extensive and shocking communication campaigns, it 
seems accepted that a criminal conviction will generally carry a sufficient stigma 
to signify that disapproval. As accident rates continue to improve and general infor-
mation and awareness of road safety increases, it will be interesting to see how the 
school of public opinion will evolve when faced with serious driving offences.
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Chapter 5
Serious Traffic Offences: The German Perspective
Ingke Goeckenjan*
5.1 Introduction
In March 2011, a forty-year-old car driver suffered an epileptic seizure while driv-
ing in Eppendorf, a residential quarter of Hamburg.1 He lost control of his vehicle 
and crashed into several pedestrians and cyclists. Four people died, and three 
were seriously injured. The victims who lost their lives happened to be well-known 
personalities: a social scientist, an artist, and an actor and his wife.
The driver was prosecuted. During the criminal proceedings, it became appar-
ent that the defendant had been suffering from epilepsy for several years. He must 
have known that he was posing a danger to other road users: not only had he been 
advised to refrain from driving by his doctors, but he had also been involved before 
in car accidents as a result of his condition. In June 2012, the Regional Court of 
Hamburg convicted the defendant of negligent homicide in four cases, negligently 
causing serious bodily harm in three cases and intentional endangerment of road 
traffic. It imposed a penalty of three and a half years’ imprisonment2 – a sentence 
that excludes probation.
This case demonstrates some of the prominent characteristics of serious traffic 
crime: suspects seldom have a criminal record, and the violation of obligations in 
itself may seem relatively minor, but the consequences can be devastating. Accord-
ing to a distinction commonly made in German criminal doctrine, one might 
say that the “ills of the conduct” may be slight, but the “ills of the results” can 
be severe.3 In general, it can be said that traffic crime, in contrast to most other 
crimes, can potentially be committed by anybody at any time. Its only precondition 
may be a momentary inattentiveness while driving – which may happen to any of 
us.
In this chapter, I want to give an overview of how the German criminal law 
and criminal courts deal with serious traffic offences. At the beginning, some 
background information is presented necessary for comprehending the specifics 
* Ingke Goeckenjan is Associate Professor of Criminal Law at the University of Osnabrück, Ger-
many. The English translation of provisions of the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) is 
adopted from Bohlander 2008. The cited regulations of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Straf-
prozessordnung) are based on the translation of Duffett & Ebinger 2013 and the regulations of the 
Courts Constitution Act (Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz) on the translation of Müller-Rostin 2012.
1 Regional Court of Hamburg 5 June 2012, 628 KLs 18/11.
2 Regional Court of Hamburg 5 June 2012, 628 KLs 18/11.
3 See Roxin 2006, Section 10 margin no. 88 et seq.
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of serious traffic offences under German criminal law. After that, the most impor-
tant provisions relating to serious traffic crime will be described. Subsequently, I 
want to focus on two aspects: the requirements of conditional intent to kill in cases 
of dangerous driving and the lower limits of negligence. In doing so, I will give 
an insight into the jurisdiction of the highest German court in criminal matters, 
the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof ). Finally, some conclusions on the 
specifics of serious traffic crime under German law will be drawn.
5.2 Some Background Information
In German law, there is a distinction between two kinds of criminal offences 
( Section 12 Criminal Code). Felonies (Verbrechen) are unlawful acts that are pun-
ished with a minimum sentence of one year’s imprisonment. Misdemeanours 
(Vergehen) are punishable by a minimum sentence below one year’s imprisonment 
or by fine. This distinction is relevant with regard to criminal liability for attempt. 
Any attempt to commit a felony entails criminal liability, whereas attempted mis-
demeanours attract criminal liability only if the law expressly provides for this 
consequence (Section 23 Criminal Code). To commit an attempt any degree of 
intent, including conditional intent, suffices.
There is a third category of unlawful acts: regulatory offences (Ordnungswidrig-
keiten). In contrast to crimes, regulatory offences are minor violations and come 
under administrative law. They can only be sanctioned by fines, not by prison 
sentences. With regard to road traffic, most violations are actually dealt with by 
administrative law. The most important regulation is Section 24a Road Traffic Act 
(Straßenverkehrsgesetz). According to this provision, driving a motorised vehicle 
with a Blood Alcohol Content (BAC) of 0.05% or more is sanctioned by a fine up 
to 3,000 euros.
But as this book is focussing on serious traffic violations, more importance 
must be attached to criminal offences. Criminal liability generally requires intent 
(Vorsatz). Acts of negligence (Fahrlässigkeit) are only punishable if this is explicitly 
provided by law (Section 15 Criminal Code).4
If a crime is found to have been committed, the court is free to impose any 
punishment that is within the scope allowed by the relevant regulation. It is 
reported that the prosecution services in the respective court regions keep lists 
describing the types of traffic violations which indicate the sentence to request. 
It is important to know, however, that these lists are not binding (not even for the 
prosecution) but are mere internal guidelines. Most offences committed in the 
context of road traffic do not have an obligatory minimum sentence. The aspects 
that have to be taken into consideration in order to determine a fair sentence are 
4 Section 15 Criminal Code: 
Unless the law expressly provides for criminal liability based on negligence, only intentional 
conduct shall attract criminal liability.
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listed in Section 46 Criminal Code.5 They include, among others, the motives and 
aims of the offender, the attitude reflected in the offence, the consequences of the 
offence, the offender’s prior history and the offender’s conduct after the offence.
Besides the two principal penalties – fine and imprisonment – the courts can 
impose the ancillary penalty of a temporary driving ban for a period of one to 
three months (Section 44 Criminal Code).6 This sanction is of high importance in 
the context of traffic crime, since it is typically imposed in cases of drink-driving 
or endangering road traffic.
All criminal penalties require the proof of guilt. But in some cases of traf-
fic offences, the capacity for guilt is excluded due to abuse of alcohol. As a rule, 
German courts consider the excuse of insanity (Section 20 Criminal Code)7 if it 
turns out that the accused had a BAC of 0.3% or more at the time of the commis-
sion of the offence.8 Then criminal liability may only be established under the 
prerequisites of Section 323a Criminal Code (committing offences in a senselessly 
drunken state):
(1) Whosoever intentionally or negligently puts himself into a drunken state by con-
suming alcoholic beverages or other intoxicants shall be liable to imprisonment 
not exceeding five years or a fine if he commits an unlawful act while in this state 
and may not be punished because of it because he was insane due to the intoxi-
cation or if this cannot be excluded.
(2) The penalty must not be more severe than the penalty provided for the offence 
which was committed while he was in the drunken state.
5 Section 46 Criminal Code: 
(1) The guilt of the offender is the basis for sentencing. The effects which the sentence can be 
expected to have on the offender’s future life in society shall be taken into account.
(2) When sentencing the court shall weigh the circumstances in favour of and against the 
offender. Consideration shall be given to: the motives and aims of the offender; the attitude 
reflected in the offence and the degree of force of will involved in its commission; the 
degree of the violation of the offender’s duties; the modus operandi and the consequences 
caused by the offence to the extent that the offender is to blame for them; the offender’s 
prior history, his personal and financial circumstances; his conduct after the offence, 
particularly his efforts to make restitution for the harm caused as well as the offender’s 
efforts at reconciliation with the victim.
(3) Circumstances which are already statutory elements of the offence must not be considered.
6 Section 44 Criminal Code:
(1) If a person has been sentenced to imprisonment or to a fine for an offence committed in 
connection with the driving of a motor vehicle or in violation of the duties of a driver of a 
motor vehicle, the court may impose a ban prohibiting him from driving any class of motor 
vehicle or a specific class on public roads for a period of from one to three months. A driving 
ban shall typically be imposed in cases of a conviction under Section 315c subsection (1) 
No 1(a), (3) or Section 316 unless a disqualification order has been made under Section 69. 
[…]
7 Section 20 Criminal Code:
Any person who at the time of the commission of the offence is incapable of appreciating 
the unlawfulness of his actions or to act in accordance with any such appreciation due to 
a pathological mental disorder, a profound consciousness disorder, debility or any other 
serious mental abnormality, shall be deemed to act without guilt.
8 See Fischer 2013, Section 20 margin no. 19.
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(3) The offence may only be prosecuted upon request, authorisation or upon re-
quest by a foreign state if the act committed in the drunken state may only be 
prosecuted upon complaint, authorisation or upon request by a foreign state.
Even if somebody causes another person’s death or injury in a drunken state that 
excludes the capacity for guilt, the unlawful act can only be prosecuted accord-
ing to Section 323a Criminal Code. Exceptions are only made if the perpetrator 
is inducing the drunken state already with the intent to commit the subsequent 
crime (intentional actio libera in causa) or if he or she acts negligently with regard 
to both causing the incapacity for guilt and the subsequent unlawful act (negli-
gent actio libera in causa). Although there exist different lines of argumentation to 
justify this legal concept,9 the doubts as to its lawfulness prevail. The principle of 
legality (Article 103, Section (2) German Basic Law as well as Section 1 Criminal 
Code) also includes the prohibition of customary law (nullum crimen, nulla poena 
sine lege scripta). Since Section 20 Criminal Code regulates the requirement of 
guilt “at the time of the commission of the offence” and there is no written excep-
tion to this regulation, this legal concept violates constitutional law. The Federal 
Court of Justice refutes the lawfulness of the actio libera in causa at least in those 
cases where the law requires certain modalities of acting (such as driving a vehicle 
in traffic).10
If the accused is found to have committed a criminal offence in a state of insan-
ity or a state of insanity cannot be excluded, only security measures (Maßregeln 
der Besserung und Sicherung) can be imposed. With regard to traffic violations, 
the most important security measure is the disqualification order (Section  69 
Criminal Code).11 It is applicable if the defendant is convicted of a traffic offence 
or is not convicted merely because he or she was proved to have acted in a state of 
insanity or this could not be excluded. Furthermore, his or her act must show that 
the defendant is unfit to drive a motor vehicle. In contrast to the temporary driving 
ban under Section 44 Criminal Code, the disqualification order does not only 
ban from driving motor vehicles but deprives the convict of the driving licence. 
9 For further references, see Streng 2011, Section 20 margin no. 114 et seq.
10 Federal Court of Justice 22 August 1996, BGHSt 42, 235.
11 Section 69 Criminal Code:
(1) If a person has been convicted of an unlawful act he committed in connection with the 
driving of a motor-vehicle or in violation of the duties of the driver of a motor-vehicle, or has 
not been convicted merely because he was proven to have acted in a state of insanity or his 
having so acted could not be excluded, the court shall make a driving disqualification order 
if the act shows that he is unfit to drive a motor-vehicle. A further examination pursuant to 
section 62 shall not be required.
(2) If the unlawful act under subsection (1) above is one of the following misdemeanours:
1. endangering road traffic (section 315c);
2. driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs (section 316);
3. leaving the scene of an accident without cause (section 142) although the offender 
knows or should have known that a person was killed, seriously injured or significant 
damage to the property of another was caused in the accident; or
4. committing offences in a senselessly drunken state (section 323a), if the offence 
committed is one of the offences in Nos 1 to 3
the person shall typically be deemed unfit to drive motor-vehicles. […]
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The court has to determine a period of time while no new driving licence shall 
be issued (Section 69a Criminal Code). This period can be from six months to 
five years. If there is reason to believe that the maximum period will not suffice 
to avert the danger posed by the offender, the court may order a permanent ban 
(Section 69a, subsection (1), sentence 2 Criminal Code).
Jurisdiction in criminal matters is basically assigned to the Local Courts 
(Amtsgerichte) unless a sentence of imprisonment exceeding four years is expected 
(Section 24 Courts Constitution Act [Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz]).12 As traffic offend-
ers rarely face a prison term of more than four years, charges are usually brought 
before the Local Courts. Only under specifically regulated circumstances are traf-
fic crimes dealt with by Regional Courts (Landgerichte). In the Eppendorf case, for 
example, it can be assumed that the severity of the harm caused was the reason 
the case was brought before a Regional Court.
In general, both the defendant and the prosecution may appeal against first 
instance decisions.13 Which court is in charge of the appeal depends on the type 
of court that made the first instance decision. Against judgments of the Local 
Court, appeals can be brought before the Criminal Division of the Regional Court, 
which then ascertains the facts of the case anew (Berufung).14 Against the appel-
late judgment of the Regional Court, further appeal is only allowed on points of 
law (Revision).15 This further appeal has to be brought before the Higher Regional 
Court.16 The appellate court takes the ascertained facts for granted and only exam-
ines whether the law has been applied incorrectly and whether the verdict is not 
properly substantiated. If somebody is charged with a particularly severe or com-
plicated crime, a Regional Court or, even in some cases, a Higher Regional Court 
has first instance jurisdiction.17 Against their verdicts only an appeal on points of 
law (Revision) is admissible, which means that there is only one factual instance.18 
Only in these circumstances, the Federal Court of Justice is in charge of the appeal 
case.19
If a ruling is quashed by an appellate court on points of law, the case is usually 
referred back to the court of first instance. In the new decision, this court will 
have to take into account the appellate court’s rulings. Apart from that, German 
courts are not bound by a doctrine of stare decisis, such as is found for example 
in the United Kingdom. Any judge of a lower court is free to deviate from settled 
jurisprudence of higher courts. However, lower courts usually respect superior 
12 Within the Local Courts, the jurisdiction is divided between Local Court judges (Strafrichter) who 
decide on their own (Section 25 Courts Constitution Act) and courts with lay judges (Schöffen-
gerichte) which consist of one Local Court judge as the presiding judge and two lay judges (Sec-
tion 29 Courts Constitution Act). Local Court judges only decide on cases of minor offences in 
which a penalty more severe than a two-year sentence of imprisonment is not to be expected. 
13 Section 296 Code of Criminal Procedure.
14 Section 312 Code of Criminal Procedure; Section 74 Courts Constitution Act.
15 Section 333 Code of Criminal Procedure.
16 Section 121, subsection (1) no. 1 (b) Courts Constitution Act.
17 Sections 74 and 120 Courts Constitution Act. 
18 Section 333 Code of Criminal Procedure.
19 Section 135 Courts Constitution Act.
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 judgments for pragmatic reasons. If they did not, the lower courts would encour-
age the parties into an appeal with a predictable overturning of the outcome. 
Therefore, the lower courts pay close attention to the interpretation of the law by 
the higher courts, especially the Federal Court of Justice.
Similar to the situation in the Netherlands, German cases of traffic crime occa-
sionally centre around the question whether or not the intention to kill or harm 
other persons can be established. In other cases, it has to be determined whether 
or not the lower limits of negligence are fulfilled. On both questions, the Federal 
Court of Justice has developed substantial case law. There are several decisions 
that quash the lower courts’ rulings arguing that the ascertained facts do not suf-
fice to establish intent or negligence or, vice versa, that the ascertained facts may 
indeed give rise to criminal liability contrary to the verdict in the first instance.
5.3 Overview of the Provisions Relevant to Serious Traffic Crime
Now an overview of the most important penal provisions relevant to serious traffic 
crime will be given.
In German criminal law, there only exist few offences that refer exclusively to 
road traffic. In this respect, the most important offences in the Criminal Code are: 
Section 142 (leaving a scene of an accident without cause), Section 316 (driving 
while under the influence of drink or drugs), Section 315c (endangering road traf-
fic) and Section 315b (dangerous disruption of road traffic).
Section 142 Criminal Code (leaving a scene of an accident without cause) only 
aims at protecting the financial interests of the parties to the accident as to adjust 
the damage. It can therefore be specified as a property offence and cannot be 
regarded as a serious traffic violation.
Section 316 Criminal Code penalises driving while under the influence of alco-
hol or drugs:
(1) Whosoever drives a vehicle in traffic (Sections 315 to 315d) although due to con-
sumption of alcoholic beverages or other intoxicants he is not in a condition to 
drive the vehicle safely shall be liable to imprisonment of not more than one year 
or a fine unless the offence is punishable under Section 315a or 315c.
(2) Whosoever commits the offence negligently shall also be liable under subsec-
tion (1) above.
Although there are no fixed levels of blood alcohol in the written criminal law, the 
highest criminal courts have established certain limits of BAC through case law. 
It is important to note that these limits are only rules of evidence to determine 
if the accused was unfit to drive or not. If it is proved that a driver of a motor 
vehicle had a BAC of 0.11% or more while driving, it is irrefutably supposed that 
he or she was unfit to drive (absolute Fahruntüchtigkeit).20 With a BAC of at least 
0.03% but less than 0.11%, the defendant’s being unfit to drive is only assumed if 
20 Federal Court of Justice 28 June 1990, BGHSt 37, 89.
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there are further signs of evidence such as driving errors or other alcohol- related 
deficits (relative Fahruntüchtigkeit).21 The offence of driving while under the influ-
ence of drink or drugs does not require actual damage or even real danger to 
be caused. It is therefore called an ‘offence of abstract endangerment’ (abstraktes 
Gefährdungsdelikt).
If the drink-driving (or any other specifically regulated gross violation of traf-
fic rules) actually leads to a real endangerment of an object of protection,22 Sec-
tion 315c (endangering road traffic) comes into effect:
(1) Whosoever in road traffic
1. drives a vehicle, although
(a) due to consumption of alcoholic beverages or other intoxicants; or
(b) due to mental or physical defects,
 he is not in a condition to drive the vehicle safely; or
2. in gross violation of traffic regulations and carelessly
(a) does not observe the right of way;
(b) overtakes improperly or drives improperly in the process of overtaking;
(c) improperly drives near pedestrian crossings;
(d) drives too fast in places with poor visibility, at road crossings or junctions or 
railroad crossings;
(e) fails to keep to the right-hand side of the road in places with poor visibility;
(f) turns, drives backwards or contrary to the direction of traffic or attempts to 
do so on a highway or motorway; or
(g) fails to make vehicles which have stopped or broken down recognisable at a 
sufficient distance although it is required for the safety of traffic
 and thereby endangers the life or limb of another person or property of signifi-
cant value belonging to another shall be liable to imprisonment of not more than 
five years or a fine.
(2) In cases under subsection (1) No 1 above the attempt shall be punishable.
(3) Whosoever in cases under subsection (1) above
1. negligently causes the danger; or
2. acts negligently and negligently causes the danger,
 shall be liable to imprisonment of not more than two years or a fine.
Different from Section 316 Criminal Code, this offence requires an endanger-
ment, but it does not need to result in any actual harm or damage. Therefore, 
Section  315c Criminal Code is a so-called ‘offence of concrete endangerment’ 
(konkretes Gefährdungsdelikt). If the endangering behaviour also results in injury 
or death of other road users, liability for causing bodily harm or homicide can 
be established alongside with the liability under Section 315c Criminal Code. 
Section 315c penalises endangering road traffic not only if committed intention-
ally [subsection (1)], but also if committed negligently [subsection (3)]. The term 
‘carelessly’ in subsection (1) no. 2 refers to a selfish attitude that is required to 
21 Higher Regional Court of Cologne 2 June 1989, NZV 1989, 357.
22 I.e. the life or limb of another person or property of significant value belonging to another.
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establish liability for this specific intentional crime. Subsection (3) distinguishes 
between cases (no. 1) where the perpetrator acts intentionally with regard to the 
endangering behaviour (e.g. drink-driving) and negligently with regard to the 
concrete dangerous consequences for an object of protection (e.g. a near miss with 
potential harm for a pedestrian) and those cases (no. 2) where the perpetrator acts 
negligently with regard to both the endangering behaviour and the danger for a 
protected object. The liability for attempt under subsection (2) is relatively ineffi-
cient, since it requires the intent to act dangerously within traffic and to cause a 
concrete danger to a protected object which can be rarely proved in practice. But 
if the intent can be proved, it would suffice that the defendant has started the car 
while being drunk.
Similar to the aforementioned crime, Section 315b Criminal Code (dangerous 
disruption of road traffic)23 is also an offence of concrete endangerment. Whereas 
the provision described before penalises causing danger by driving (such as dis-
regarding traffic regulations while driving), it is punishable under Section 315b 
Criminal Code to dangerously interfere with road traffic from the outside (such as 
setting up obstacles). Section 315b Criminal Code, too, provides for a penalty up 
to five years’ imprisonment if the offence is committed intentionally. Under cer-
tain aggravating circumstances the crime can be punished with up to ten years’ 
imprisonment.
If somebody gets killed or injured in a traffic accident, the prosecutor must 
consider whether a charge of negligent or intentional homicide or causing bodily 
injury, respectively, is justified. In German criminal law there are no regulations 
that particularly penalise the causing of death or injury by dangerous driving. 
Instead, the general rules on homicide and causing bodily injury apply. How these 
regulations are interpreted by the highest German criminal courts will be dis-
cussed in the next section (5.4).
Before that, a quick light is shed on a peculiarity of the German Criminal 
Code: it contains a provision, namely Section 316a,24 that specifically criminalises 
23 Section 315b Criminal Code:
(1) Whosoever interferes with the safety of road traffic by
1. destroying, damaging or removing facilities or vehicles;
2. setting up obstacles; or
3. undertaking a similar act of interference of equal dangerousness,
 and thereby endangers the life or limb of another person or property of significant value 
belonging to another shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding five years or a fine.
(2) The attempt shall be punishable.
(3) If the offender acts under the conditions of section 315(3) the penalty shall be imprisonment 
from one to ten years, in less serious cases imprisonment from six months to five years.
(4) Whosoever negligently causes the danger in cases under subsection (1) above shall be 
liable to imprisonment not exceeding three years or a fine.
(5) Whosoever acts negligently in cases under subsection (1) above and negligently causes the 
danger shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding two years or a fine.
24 Section 316a Criminal Code:
(1) Whosoever for the purpose of committing a robbery […], theft with use of force […], or 
blackmail with use of force […] commits an attack against the life or limb or the freedom of 
decision of the driver of a motor vehicle or a passenger and thereby exploits the particular 
conditions of road traffic shall be liable to imprisonment of not less than five years. […]
CriminalLiabilityforSeriousTrafficOffences.indd   98 3-12-2014   10:16:26
99
Serious Traffic Offences: The German Perspective
an attack for the purpose of committing a robbery if the attack is directed against a 
car driver. This provision increases the penalty for the common offence of robbery, 
which entails a minimum sentence of one year’s imprisonment, to a minimum 
sentence of five years’ imprisonment. It traces back to a regulation enacted by the 
National Socialist government in 1938.25 Today, most legal academics agree that 
Section 316a does not fit in the system of the existing criminal law. Its protective 
function remains unclear. As in legal practice it does more harm than good, the 
academics are right to call for its abolition. Although Section 316a Criminal Code 
is highly problematic, it will not be discussed in further detail, since it is, at its 
core, a property crime, not a traffic offence.
The Road Traffic Act does not only contain regulatory offences such as the 
above-mentioned Section 24a, it also includes some criminal offences. Driving 
without a licence (Section 21 Road Traffic Act), for example, can be punished by 
fine or imprisonment of up to one year. But these are minor offences and will 
therefore remain out of consideration.
With this brief overview in mind, I would now like to concentrate on two 
aspects: the intent to kill somebody by dangerous driving, and the requirements 
of liability for negligence in road traffic incidents.
5.4 Specifics of German Law Concerning Serious Traffic Offences
5.4.1 Conditional Intent to Kill in Cases of Very Dangerous Driving
Dangerous driving that leads to the death of other road users or to the danger of 
such a result may give rise to charges of intentional homicide or attempt thereof.
In German criminal law, there are different types of intentional homicide. 
The first, Section 212 Criminal Code, which can been translated as ‘homicide’ 
(Totschlag), requires the intentional killing of another person:
(1) Whosoever kills a person without being a murderer under Section 211 shall be 
convicted of homicide and be liable to imprisonment of not less than five years.
(2) In especially serious cases the penalty shall be imprisonment for life.
A second type of intentional homicide, Section 211 Criminal Code, can be trans-
lated as ‘murder’ (Mord). In addition to the voluntary killing of another person, 
it requires at least one of nine special elements. Murder is, without exception, 
punished by lifetime imprisonment.
Section 211 Criminal Code
(1) Whosoever commits murder under the conditions of this provision shall be lia-
ble to imprisonment for life.
25 Act against street robbery committed with help of car traps (Gesetz gegen Straßenraub mittels 
Autofallen), 22 June 1938, RGBl. I, 651.
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(2) A murderer under this provision is any person who kills a person for pleasure, for 
sexual gratification, out of greed or otherwise base motives, by stealth or cruelly 
or by means that pose a danger to the public or in order to facilitate or to cover 
up another offence.
Both crimes call for intent. Although not explicitly provided for by law, German 
criminal courts and legal academics, as do the Dutch, recognise three degrees of 
intent: dolus directus of first degree, dolus directus of second degree and conditional 
intent. In cases of dangerous driving, as a rule, only conditional intent comes into 
question. But even conditional intent is rarely found to be proved by the German 
courts in such cases.
There exist several schools of thought as to how conditional intent should be 
defined. The most controversial issue is the question of whether conditional intent 
requires a volitional element in addition to the cognitive component of being aware 
of the risk of harmful consequences of one’s conduct.26 But the Federal Court of 
Justice and most academics agree that a volitional component, albeit a reduced 
one, is needed for establishing conditional intent. It is widely acknowledged that 
somebody acts with conditional intent if he or she recognises that there is a risk of 
causing the relevant result and yet accepts this risk or at least lives with it.27
In order to prove conditional intent to kill somebody, the Federal Court of Jus-
tice has developed a special rule of evidence. It assumes that humans generally 
have a high inhibition threshold for intentional lethal assaults. Therefore, the 
Federal Court of Justice holds that the objective dangerousness of an action for 
the life of others cannot suffice to infer intent. It may only be regarded as an 
indication of the defendant’s mens rea. The court demands a close examination of 
all the circumstances in each individual case.28 If there is evidence indicating that 
the defendant relied upon an assumption that the death would not occur, intent 
cannot be proved.
Referring to the inhibition threshold, the Federal Court of Justice has repeat-
edly overruled convictions for attempted homicide in cases where the defendants 
drove straight at a pedestrian giving a stop sign, even if the endangered person 
could only just save himself by jumping into the ditch.29 Experience shows that 
most people endangered in this way protect themselves by quickly leaving the 
road, the court argues. Therefore, it considers that it is reasonable to suppose that 
offenders in these situations usually rely on the assumption that nothing fatal 
will happen. However, in a case where the victim turned her back on the offender 
26 An overview of the different positions is presented in Roxin 2006, Section 12 margin no. 21 et seq. 
See Van Dijk, this book, Chapter 9 on the same issue in Dutch criminal law.
27 Settled case law, see for example Federal Court of Justice 22 April 1955, BGHSt 7, 363; Federal 
Court of Justice 4 November 1988, BGHSt 36, 1.
28 Recently again, Federal Court of Justice 22 March 2012, NJW 2012, 1524.
29 Federal Court of Justice 26 March 1992, StV 1992, 420; Federal Court of Justice 27 November 
1975, VRS 50, 94; Federal Court of Justice 7 June 1983, NStZ 1983, 407; Federal Court of Justice 
23 June 1983, NStZ 1984, 19.
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who was driving directly at her and running her over, the Federal Court of Justice 
upheld the conviction of attempted murder.30
At times, the threshold rule seems to yield peculiar results. In 1987, the Federal 
Court of Justice approved a verdict of the Regional Court of Darmstadt which had 
rejected a conviction of attempted homicide.31 The defendant, a farmer driving a 
tractor, had collided with a motorcyclist. The motorcyclist fell and got stuck under 
his vehicle. Because he was upset about day-trippers interfering with his harvest, 
the farmer purposely drove his tractor over the motorcycle, which crushed the 
victim’s ribs and caused serious internal injuries. The Federal Court of Justice 
upheld the first instance verdict with the argument – and I quote – “it might be 
possible that the defendant believed that the victim would not be killed and there-
fore did not have the intention to kill”. In my opinion, these short remarks cannot 
suffice to reject a claim of intent if the behaviour has been life-threatening in such 
a way.
The threshold rule can be regarded as fairly influential in German criminal 
jurisprudence. Generally, the Federal Court of Justice and the lower courts follow-
ing its interpretation are rather reluctant to establish intent to kill. Nevertheless, 
the Federal Court of Justice recently clarified that this rule must not be mistaken 
as an empty phrase32 – as the court had itself done in the farmer’s case, one might 
add. In this new case, the Federal Court of Justice quashed a verdict of a Regional 
Court which had acquitted the defendant of intentional homicide although he had 
stabbed the victim with a long knife in the back, causing injuries dangerous to 
life. The Federal Court of Justice argued that a mere reference to the rule of the 
high inhibition threshold cannot replace a thorough examination of the circum-
stances relevant for proving intent. This restriction on the threshold rule can also 
be expected to apply to future traffic crime cases.
The threshold rule, by and large, corresponds with the ruling of the Dutch 
Supreme Court in the Porsche case.33 The Federal Court of Justice, too, would 
consider it an indication against an intent to kill other road users if a collision 
would have caused substantial danger to the defendant’s own life. The analogy 
may best be shown based on a case decided by the Federal Court of Justice where 
the situation was reversed.34 Disappointed about a failed reconciliation with his 
girlfriend, the defendant, driving his car, called his father to announce he had 
decided to kill himself. Shortly after that, he provoked a head-on collision with 
another vehicle. The three passengers of the oncoming car, by lucky chance, were 
only slightly injured. The Regional Court of Mainz acquitted the defendant insofar 
as the charge of attempted murder was concerned. This verdict was overruled by 
the Federal Court of Justice, which criticised the court of first instance for not 
30 Federal Court of Justice 4 March 2004, NJW 2004, 1965.
31 Federal Court of Justice 23 July 1987, BeckRS 1987, 31100113.
32 Federal Court of Justice 22 March 2012, NJW 2012, 1524. 
33 Dutch Supreme Court 15 October 1996, ECLI:NL:HR:1996:ZD0139. See Wolswijk, this book, Sec-
tion 2.3.2; Van Dijk, this book, Chapter 9.
34 Federal Court of Justice 25 March 2010, NStZ 2010, 515.
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substantiating how the defendant would have intended to kill himself without at 
least accepting the killing of the passengers of the car with which he collided.
In the case of the epileptic car driver described at the beginning, the Regional 
Court ruled that his behaviour was so grossly negligent that it was on the verge of 
intentional killing.35 Nevertheless, the court declined to find him guilty of inten-
tional homicide and, as we have seen, convicted him of negligent homicide.
5.4.2 Requirements for Negligent Homicide in the Context of Road Traffic
As far as negligence is concerned, the question arises: what are the requirements 
of liability for negligence in road traffic incidents, and where do its lower limits lie?
The German Criminal Code does not expressly regulate what is meant by the 
term ‘negligence’. Section 222 Criminal Code simply stipulates that somebody 
who negligently causes the death of another person is punished by imprisonment 
of up to five years or by fine. Negligently causing bodily harm is punishable under 
Section 229 Criminal Code with penalties of imprisonment of not more than 
three years or fine. Even the General Part of the Criminal Code does not contain 
any further explanations.
Negligence remains a blurred concept. That is the reason why some academics 
think that liability for negligence does not comply with the constitutional princi-
ple of legal certainty and precision (Bestimmtheitsgrundsatz).36 This rule is part of 
the above-mentioned principle of the legality of penal regulations laid down in 
Article 103, Section (2) German Basic Law as well as Section 1 Criminal Code.37 
The prevailing opinion, however, is that liability for negligence complies with 
the Basic Law since its requirements have been elaborated by case law.38 What is 
commonly agreed is that negligence requires a violation of due diligence. With 
regard to traffic crime, any breach of the duties of care laid down in the road traffic 
regulations, even if caused by momentary inattention, may be the basis of liability 
for negligence.
This seems to be an insufficient limitation of the concept of negligence, but 
it is at least supplemented by the aspects of foreseeability and avoidability39 and 
by the requirement of a ‘functional causal relationship’.40 If it cannot be foreseen 
that a certain action might cause harm, it seems clear that a person cannot be 
held liable for these harmful consequences. And even if the negative results of an 
action can be foreseen but cannot be avoided, it would again be unfair to hold a 
person liable.
35 Press release of the Regional Court of Hamburg, 5 June 2012.
36 See also for further references Duttge 2011, Section 15 margin no. 33; Colombi Ciacchi 2005, p. 13 
et seq.
37 For further details and references see Schmitz 2011, Section 1 margin no. 23 et seq.
38 Settled case law of the Federal Constitutional Court. See lately Federal Constitutional Court 
23 June 2010, NJW 2010, 3209.
39 See Fischer 2013, Section 15 margin no. 14 et seq. with further references.
40 This translation comes closest to what is meant by the German term ‘Pflichtwidrigkeitszusam-
menhang’. It was therefore adopted from Bohlander 2009, p. 51.
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In order to justify a conviction of negligent homicide, the breach of due dili-
gence must lead to the death of another person. But mere physical causation is not 
enough. As indicated before, German legal doctrine recognises the prerequisite of 
a functional causal relationship between the violation of a legal duty and the actual 
results. If, for example, it is possible that the death of another road user would 
also have been caused by driving with due care, the defendant is not held liable 
for negligent homicide. In these circumstances, it cannot be proved that it was 
specifically the breach of duty that led to the negative outcome. In the leading case 
in this respect, the defendant, the driver of a lorry, ran over and killed a drunken 
cyclist when overtaking him.41 The defendant did not maintain the necessary and 
prescribed distance between the lorry and the bicycle. However, the possibility 
that the lorry driver would have collided with the cyclist in the same way, even if 
he had abided by the traffic regulation, could not be excluded. Thus, it could not be 
proved that it was specifically the breach of duty that led to the collision. According 
to the in dubio pro reo rule, the defendant was not held liable for negligent homi-
cide. But it remains subject to legal controversy whether this rule really applies to 
such cases.42
The concept of negligence has not only an objective, but also a subjective com-
ponent. What is objectively expected from a diligent car driver is mostly laid out in 
the road traffic regulations. The subjective component of negligence refers to the 
question whether the defendant, given his or her mental and physical capabilities, 
could have met these objective standards. As is true within the Dutch jurisdiction, 
German courts only deny negligence for lack of the subjective component in the 
very rare cases of physical or mental disabilities. For example, criminal liability 
would have been denied if the driver in the Eppendorf case had not known of his 
epilepsy before and had been hit by a seizure out of the blue. In that case, he could 
not have met the objective standards due to his physical disability.
In the case of the epileptic car driver, one might argue that he could not have 
acted differently in the situation of the accident, since the epileptic seizure abruptly 
made him lose control over his vehicle. In that specific moment, the accident was 
not avoidable for him. But one has to take into account that he knew of his illness 
and had experienced its consequences before. Therefore, negligence can be estab-
lished on the grounds of his previous endangering behaviour, i.e. his decision to 
drive a car knowing that he was unfit to do so.
Although negligent homicide is punishable by imprisonment of up to five 
years, German criminal courts in practice tend to impose only fines. The reason 
is that many people accused of negligent homicide in road traffic experience pro-
found sorrow for the victims and/or suffer from injuries themselves. However, if 
the defendant is proved guilty of drink-driving that has led to the deaths of others, 
the penalty is often imprisonment, in very serious cases even without probation.
In the light of this, it becomes apparent that the sentence in the Eppendorf case 
(three and a half years without probation) is relatively harsh.
41 Federal Court of Justice 25 September 1957, BGHSt 11, 1.
42 For further details see Roxin 2006, Section 11 margin no. 88 et seq. 
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5.5 Conclusions
Finally, I want to draw some conclusions.
In contrast to other European countries such as the Netherlands, where the 
criminal road traffic law has been considerably extended over the last few years, 
German traffic law shows a different picture: the most important provisions 
regarding serious traffic crime have not been changed in decades.43 One might 
even say it is one of the few fields of German criminal law not subject to any 
demands for expanding scope or sanctions whatsoever. The reason for this might 
be that the provisions are sufficient to meet the needs of the jurisprudence and 
public opinion in judging serious traffic violations.
Dutch criminal law has also been reported to show a significant gap between 
high penalties for causing serious consequences (even in cases of low culpability) 
and low penalties for highly dangerous behaviour that only by lucky chance does 
not lead to any harm.44 In German law, this gap seems much smaller. Drink- 
driving, for instance, can, as we have seen, be punished by imprisonment of up 
to one year, even if it has not led to any danger, let alone any actual harm. And 
negligently endangering road traffic entails a punishment of up to two years’ 
imprisonment, with the only prerequisite being that a situation of actual danger 
was caused. For negligent homicide, the maximum penalty provided is five years’ 
imprisonment.45
Although, by and large, German criminal law appears to satisfactorily address 
serious traffic crimes, there still remain some difficulties. One problem the courts 
have to deal with is in assessing whether the facts justify a conviction of inten-
tional or negligent behaviour. This difficulty arises because, in most cases, the 
court has no insight into the defendant’s personal views and perceptions at the 
time of the incident. But this is not a peculiarity of traffic offences – it is true for 
almost any type of crime.
Moreover, it remains difficult to determine the right sentence for cases of neg-
ligence. If the violation of obligations is relatively minor but its results are disas-
trous, two principles of sentencing are in conflict: the idea of social rehabilitation 
and the aspect of general deterrence. Whereas a harsh sentence appears not to be 
required to reintegrate the defendant if he or she has no prior criminal record, 
it may seem necessary to impose a considerable punishment in order to demon-
strate an effective reaction to the violation of protected legal interests.
43 Content and structure of the traffic offences in the Criminal Code still correspond largely to what 
was regulated by the Second Road Safety Act (Zweites Gesetz zur Sicherung des Straßenverkehrs), 
26 November 1964, BGBl. I, 921.
44 See Duker, this book, Chapter 7.
45 Apart from that, I think this gradation in criminal law for assessing dangerous behaviour that 
causes no harm and the same conduct that by chance produces serious results is much more 
striking in most other fields of liability for negligence. For example, if somebody inadvertently 
drops a massive garden pot onto a busy pavement below his or her balcony and, by lucky chance, 
nobody gets hit, he or she is guilty of nothing, not even a regulatory offence. If the pot by acci-
dent lethally hits a pedestrian, this may give rise to a conviction of negligent homicide with a 
maximum sentence of five years in prison. Therefore, this gap seems even more acceptable in 
traffic crime.
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With regard to the threshold rule, I think that the reluctance in establishing 
an intent to kill in cases of traffic offences is justified. The majority of drivers are 
usually confident that nothing serious will happen, even if they are knowingly 
breaking traffic regulations. Otherwise, they would be consciously endangering 
their own lives. But that is not true for most drivers. Young and inexperienced 
drivers, in particular, often cannot realistically evaluate the danger they are posing 
to others and themselves by driving in a risky way.
To me, readily passing a verdict of intentional homicide in cases of dangerous 
driving displays dissatisfaction with the penalties provided for negligence crimes 
and a desire for a retributive sentence. But, in my opinion, it is not the function of 
offences requiring intent to satisfy such needs. If it cannot be proved that some-
body has foreseen the risk of killing other people and has accepted this risk, the 
consequence has to remain clear: no intention can be established. To raise public 
awareness of the perils of road traffic is, instead, the task of politicians, educators 
and the media.
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Chapter 6
The Spanish Perspective on Traffic Offences: 
Tough on Danger, Soft on Harm, and 
Penal Populism
Manuel Cancio Meliá and Mariona Llobet Anglí *
6.1 Introduction
Spanish criminal law deals with road traffic offences mainly by means of ‘endan-
germent crimes’, contained in a chapter of their own in the Spanish Criminal 
Code (CC; Articles 379-385 ter).1 These felonies have been reformulated in many 
aspects in the last years, especially by a specific reform that took place in 2007.2 
Besides introducing new offences and regulations, this reform was specifically 
designed to limit the discretion of the courts in interpreting the legal wording, 
since they were acquitting in many cases where there was not any concrete danger 
(only ‘abstract danger’ or potential danger) – it was a possible interpretation of the 
wording of the law, which was not specific about this issue.
This specific criminal law reform was part of a huge campaign led by the 
government then in office aiming at generating a social conscience of the risks 
involved in breaking traffic rules, and underlining the comparatively high acci-
dent rates in Spain. In this framework, also the administrative law norms related 
to sanctions in traffic cases were reformed, introducing the so-called ‘licence by 
points’. However, little change took place in the organization of police units enforc-
ing traffic law, criminal and administrative. Perhaps as a result of this policy (at 
least, as the political agents that put the reform forward claim), accident rates have 
experienced a pronounced drop – this fact seems well established.
In the following pages, we first provide a brief presentation of the Spanish 
criminal law regarding road traffic offences, including both endangerment crimes 
and offences resulting in death or injury (Section 6.2). Then, we will analyse the 
reorientation phenomenon regarding prevention in the field of road safety through 
the endangerment assumptions (Section 6.3). Finally, the text will conclude with a 
* Manuel Cancio Meliá is Professor of Criminal Law at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 
Spain. Mariona Llobet Anglí is Associate Professor of Criminal Law at the Universitat Pompeu 
Fabra, Barcelona, Spain. Translation from Spanish by Henry Feltenstein Arechabala, to whom 
the authors express their gratitude.
1 See the Annex at the end of this chapter for the official English translation of the specific felonies 
against road safety.
2 Law (Ley Orgánica, LO) 15/2007 of 30 November. See on the political background of the reform, 
Pipaón Pulido, Pedreño Navarro & Bal Francés 2009, p. 13 et seq.; Rodríguez León 2008.
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brief assessment of the criminal law policy that has been followed in the develop-
ment of Spanish criminal traffic law (Section 6.4).
6.2 Basic Elements of Substantive Criminal Law: Traffic Offences under 
Spanish Law
As noted before, the occurrence of traffic accidents is not only fought in Spain 
using administrative law, punishing drivers who do not respect the rules in the 
Driving Code and its Regulations.3 The Criminal Code also includes a specific 
chapter, which bears the label ‘felonies against road safety’ within the more 
generic title dedicated to ‘felonies against collective safety’.
6.2.1 Endangerment Offences
The legal interest (Rechtsgut; bien jurídico) protected by Articles 379 to 385 ter CC 
is ‘traffic safety’, as a precondition for the protection of life and physical integrity 
of individuals.4 Therefore, indirectly the objective of the regulation is to safeguard 
individual legal interests. Consequently, the corresponding precepts refer to 
endangerment offences regarding life and physical integrity. That is, they punish 
dangerous behaviours for road traffic, even if in the particular case there have not 
been any injuries to any of its participants.
Specifically, driving at excessive speed, driving under the influence of alcohol 
or drugs, reckless driving with or without disregard for the lives of others and 
driving without a licence or permit are punished. In addition, the law defines two 
other counts where the actual use of a motor vehicle or moped is not required: the 
refusal to submit to testing for alcohol or drugs and placing obstacles on the road 
(by act or omission). With regard to the subjective aspect, wilful commission is 
always required. It is to be noted that this intent refers to the dangerous action; not 
to possible harmful outcomes. Negligence is not punishable.
The offence of driving at excessive speed (Article 379.1) punishes whoever sur-
passes by 60 km/h in an urban road or 80 km/h in a non-urban road the maxi-
mum speed permitted by regulations. The penalty is imprisonment for three to 
six months, a fine, or community service, and in any case, the deprivation of the 
right to drive motor vehicles and mopeds.
This concerns, therefore, a crime of abstract danger: it is enough simply to 
drive in the circumstances described. The precept contains the irrefutable pre-
sumption, based on statistical data, that driving exceeding such speed limits is 
dangerous per se.
3 See RDL 339/1990 of 2 March, approving the Articles of the Law on Traffic, Motor Vehicle Traf-
fic and Road Safety (Código de Circulación; CCIR), and RD 1428/2003, which approves the Ordi-
nance of Circulation (Reglamento General de Circulación; RGC).
4 See, for example, Alastuey Dobón & Escuchuri Aisa 2011, p. 14 et seq.; Molina Fernández 2011, 
pp. 1339-1340; Montaner Fernández 2011, p. 288.
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Thus, we must refer to the administrative regulation on the matter to differen-
tiate between an administrative and a criminal offence. Speeding cases that fall 
below the 60 km/h or 80 km/h threshold (depending on the type of road) will be 
punished by administrative law. For example, in Spain, the general speed limit on 
a highway is set at 120 km/h; it will therefore be a felony to drive above 200 km/h 
(201 km/h or more). On the other hand, it constitutes an administrative offence to 
drive between 121 and 200 km/h.
The offence of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (Article 379.2) 
includes two kinds of commission: first, driving under the influence of such sub-
stances; and second, driving surpassing an exhaled alcohol level of 0.60 mgs/l, or 
a blood alcohol level over 1.2 gs/l.
This is one of the offences with the highest number of convictions (over 
70,000 in 2012),5 almost all due to driving under the influence of alcohol. On the 
other hand, there are few convictions for driving under the influence of drugs, 
although some cases have been initiated.6 The drug tests are generally assigned 
to administrative proceedings and a smaller percentage to criminal proceedings.7
The general administrative limits established by Article 20.1 RGC are: 0.5 gs/l 
blood alcohol level or 0.25 mgs/l breath alcohol level.8 Therefore, we must differ-
entiate the crime from the administrative offence.9
First, for being a felony, driving has to be carried out “under the influence” of 
such substances (first part of Article 379.2). It is therefore the unanimous doctrine 
of both the Supreme Court10 and the Constitutional Court11 that their consumption 
undermines the psychophysical ability necessary for driving. Consequently, if a 
driver exceeds the limits permitted administratively but this does not affect his 
driving ability, it is not a criminal but an administrative offence. On the other 
hand, then, proof of an alcohol level (exceeding the administrative limits) is not 
essential to convict for the criminal offence.12
Therefore, to determine the influence of alcohol during driving, the courts 
consider relevant, along with the breath test results, other evidence such as the 
testimony of people who have witnessed the manner in which the driver drove 
5 Attorney General’s Report, 2012.
6 Montaner Fernández 2011, p. 295. In the case of drug use, there are difficulties of proof as there 
is no method of detecting these substances comparable to the breathalyser, so medical person-
nel should perform a blood or urine test. In recent years, however, the police have started using 
other detection methods consisting of a saliva sample.
7 Attorney General’s Report, 2012.
8 The limit set is lower in special cases, such as driving vehicles involved in public or emergency 
service, dangerous materials, etc.
9 See Miró Llinares 2010, p. 180 et seq.; cf. the extensive analysis of Alastuey Dobón & Escuchuri 
Aisa 2011, p. 16 et seq.
10 Supreme Court 15 April 2002, no. 636. At the present time, there is not an official publication on 
paper of the Spanish court judgments. Hence, we must go to the available databases: either the 
Judicial Documentation Centre, an agency of the Supreme Judicial Council (<www.poderjudicial.
es/search/>), or the various commercial databases, among which the most used is the Aranzadi/
Westlaw database.
11 Constitutional Court 26 February 2007, no. 43.
12 Constitutional Court 19 April 2004, no. 68.
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or behaved, particularly the law-enforcement officers who have issued the corre-
sponding police report. So, if there is evidence of dangerous manoeuvres or the 
existence of an accident, and there is also a higher degree of alcoholic influence 
than allowed, the chances of conviction are very high.13 However, if there is only 
proof of the former – abnormal manoeuvres or an accident – it is still possible to 
convict. This might occur when the subject has refused to take the test, when it 
was impossible to administer the test, when the test was positive but below the 
limit, or even when the test was not positive at all.
The matter of so-called preventive controls is more complex: those in which no 
anomalous manoeuvres are observed, but the driver is nevertheless required to 
perform a breath test. In these cases, in practice, the statement made by the traffic 
officers – as detailed as possible – in the report of the driver’s symptoms is very 
important for the eventual conviction. The more details are included by the inter-
vening officers (e.g. the driver’s alcohol breath odour, his speech, his difficulty 
maintaining verticality or coordinating his movements, etc.), the more evidence 
there is to support the assertion that substance abuse has adversely affected the 
driving to the point of it becoming dangerous.
In summary, a crime might exist even without exceeding the administrative 
rate and may not exist despite it being exceeded. The reason is that the following 
elements may also be taken into consideration to establish ‘driving under influ-
ence’: the existence of an accident, the violation of traffic regulations and/or the 
physical appearance of the driver.
The matter becomes more complicated with regard to driving under the influ-
ence of drugs. The legislation does not set a level of consumption that serves as a 
limit on the existence of an administrative offence. Article 27 RGC simply states 
that drivers commit a very serious offence when they have introduced into their 
body drugs or other similar substances. Therefore, in this case, we must prove that 
drug consumption has indeed affected driving ability.
Second (Article 379.2 in fine), in any case a crime will take place, rather than 
an administrative offence, when certain rates of alcohol are identified (more than 
0.60 mgs/l exhaled or 1.2 gs/l in blood). It is therefore an irrefutable presump-
tion of influence, that is, from this level on the inability to drive is presumed. 
In this case, according to the main jurisprudence precedent, the breath test is 
sufficient evidence for conviction of the crime of drink-driving, without requiring 
any other check.14 Because of this, the courts take into account the margin of error 
of ethyl-meters, which is discounted from the result given by them, to establish 
whether or not the limits have been exceeded.15
In short, the line between criminal and administrative law is established, 
based on the rules that govern this matter, as interpreted by the courts, with the 
following criteria:
13 Montaner Fernández 2011, p. 294.
14 Cf. Molina Fernández 2011, p. 1352.
15 The reference is the Ministerial Order 370/2006 of 22 November, which regulates the state 
metrological control of measuring instruments’ intended alcohol concentration in exhaled air.
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•	 Above 0.60 mgs/l or 1.2 gs/l: a criminal offence always takes place.
•	 Between 0.25 mgs/l or 0.5 gs/l and 0.60 mgs/l or 1.2 gs/l: a criminal offence 
occurs if the intake influences driving, and it is regarded as an administrative 
offence in the opposite case.
•	 Less than 0.25 mgs/l, or 0.5 gs/l: there can never be an administrative offence. 
That said, it is possible to apply the criminal offence, despite these rates not 
being surpassed, when there are other indications of substance intake that 
would negatively affect driving.16
The reckless driving offence (Article 380) punishes those who drive recklessly, if the 
life or integrity of persons has been put in danger. The penalty is imprisonment 
of six months to two years and the deprivation of the right to drive motor vehicles 
and mopeds. Since reckless driving is also sanctioned by administrative law, the 
element that determines the boundary between the criminal and administrative 
offence is the existence of a concrete danger.
According to the Supreme Court,17 such recklessness represents a notorious 
disregard for traffic safety standards as understood by an average citizen. Being 
an indeterminate concept, it is difficult to define. That is why the second part of 
 Article 380 states that it will be deemed ‘manifestly reckless’ to drive in excess 
of 80  km/h above the maximum speed in non-urban roads, and in excess of 
60 km/h above the maximum speed in urban roads, and with a blood alcohol level 
greater than 1.2 gs/l or an exhaled alcohol level greater than 0.60 mgs/l. Thus, the 
occurrence of the elements listed under Article 379 is an irrefutable presumption 
of reckless driving.
The crime of reckless driving with manifest disregard for the lives of others (Arti-
cle 381) is the harshest count among road safety infractions. The doctrine often 
refers to this offence as ‘suicidal or homicidal driving’. It dates to the late 1980s, 
and was created in response to the behaviour of subjects who, in the context of bet-
ting, drove on the highway in the opposite direction.18 Therefore, it is a specifically 
criminalized type of attempted murder, due to the reluctance of the courts to apply 
the general rules of attempt to commit a crime (Article 16 CC) when a specifically 
strong recklessness (which is identified in the doctrine with the classical dolus 
eventualis) occurs with the result of bodily harm. This offence is a specific excep-
tion to the general Spanish system about ‘attempt’: the general provisions and the 
interpretation of the courts require – in order to punish an attempted offence – a 
specific representation in the offender’s mind of the harmful result as a possible 
outcome of his action. Therefore, reckless behaviour per definition does not allow 
a conviction for attempted homicide according to the general system.
However, this specific criminalization has not been followed by a strong 
prosecution of such conduct. The practical application of this count is low com-
16 Rightly critical of this view, Molina Fernández 2011, p. 1350, who states: “for reasons of legal cer-
tainty, an alcohol level below the administrative limit (if not accompanied by other substances) 
should not lead to a charge”.
17 Supreme Court 8 October 2004, no. 2012.
18 Montaner Fernández 2011, p. 298.
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pared with other road safety offences and this is the traffic violation with fewest 
 convictions.19 However, in recent years, a higher level of police investigations and 
court efficacy has been observed.20
All that being said, most commonly this article is applied in response to driv-
ing in the opposite direction of travel. Apart from these scenarios, it is also usual 
to apply it if the following behaviour is observed: driving through parking lots, 
driveways or sidewalks with pedestrians at excessive speed,21 deliberately hitting 
other moving vehicles,22 reckless overtaking on the road23 or fleeing from the 
police by dangerous driving.24
The requirements to apply the count are threefold: (1) a ‘manifest recklessness’ 
in the sense described in the previous section; (2) a ‘manifest disregard for others’ 
lives’ (according to the Supreme Court, this is a subjective state of indifference 
to the possible harm that might befall others while engaging in extraordinarily 
dangerous behaviour25); (3) the existence of either a concrete danger for the life 
or integrity of persons (Article 381.1; punished with imprisonment of two to five 
years, a fine and disqualification from driving) or an abstract danger (Article 381.2; 
punished with imprisonment of one to two years, a fine and disqualification from 
driving).
The offence of refusal to submit to breath tests and drug screening (Article 383) is 
the closing clause regarding driving under the influence of substances. To refuse 
to perform such tests is in itself a formal crime, which coincides exactly with 
the administrative offence26 and whose constitutionality has been questioned for 
several reasons, among them, for infringement of the right not to testify against 
oneself or to confess guilt (Article 24.2 Spanish Constitution), and for establish-
ing a disproportionate penalty. Indeed, the penalty associated with this felony is 
imprisonment of six months to one year (with deprivation of the right to drive). 
This penalty is higher than that established in Article 379.2, driving under the 
influence of substances, whose verification is protected by this article. However, 
its constitutionality has been expressly recognized in several rulings.27
The offence of driving without a permit or licence (Article 384) punishes anyone 
who drives without being authorized. This lack of authorization can be for 
three reasons: (1) loss of the permit or licence derived from the loss of points;28 
19 About 170 of the more than 110,000 convictions in 2012 (see Attorney General’s Report, 2012).
20 According to the Attorney General’s Report, 2012, based on statistical data.
21 Supreme Court 26 January 2011, no. 8.
22 Valencia Court of Appeals 11 October 2012, no. 721.
23 Pontevedra Court of Appeals 20 April 2012, no. 149. For example, for not respecting the line 
(Navarra Court of Appeals 18 April 2011, no. 97).
24 Balearic Islands Court of Appeals 22 December 2011, no. 290.
25 17 November 2005, no. 1464.
26 It is important to note that the exact same behaviour can be sanctioned both administratively 
and criminally. However, the imposition of two sanctions is not possible, the criminal one having 
preference. The consequence is, then, that the administrative one will never be applied.
27 Constitutional Court 2 October 1997, no. 161. See also Constitutional Court 18 February 1988, 
no. 22.
28 See Law 17/2005, introducing a credit system that assigns points to each driver, which can be 
taken away if there is an infraction of the road regulations.
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(2)  precautionary or final removal of the driver’s licence by court decision; (3) lack 
of permit or licence derived from not having ever obtained one.
This felony is again a formal offence or a simple disobedience, whose bound-
aries with the administrative offence are impossible to define.29 Only in three 
borderline cases, the courts have opted for the application of the administrative 
offence: driving with expired, inadequate or foreign (not validated for use in Span-
ish territory) permits or licences.30
Finally, Article 385 punishes other breaches of road safety with imprisonment of 
six months to two years or a fine, and community service. The first part concerns 
placing unforeseeable obstacles on the roadway, spilling slippery or flammable 
substances, or altering signs (active behaviours). The second part concerns not 
re-establishing road safety when there is an obligation to do so (omission).
The precept states that such breaches have to create a serious risk to traffic 
circulation. Thus, this requirement is interpreted by the majority jurisprudential 
opinion as referring to a ‘concrete danger’, although the opposite solution (abstract 
danger) is also sustainable.31
6.2.2 Crimes with Concrete Results
Along with the offences mentioned above, there are, of course, the traditional felo-
nies and misdemeanours of homicide and causing physical injuries, both as inten-
tional and negligent acts. Articles 138, 147 et seq. and 617 CC envision the charge 
of intentional homicide and causing physical injuries. The first case is punishable 
by an imprisonment sentence of ten to fifteen years. It should be noted, however, 
that there has never been a conviction of such an intentional crime, or attempt 
thereof, unless pertaining to cases in which the vehicle is intentionally used as a 
weapon).32 As stated before, the Spanish doctrine and case law pose strong require-
ments to the conviction as attempt: as in German doctrine and case law (which is 
followed in Spanish-speaking countries on this issue), in principle, it is necessary 
to prove the existence of a specific mental representation of the harmful result as 
a real possibility. The second case, causing physical injuries, ranges from three 
months to twelve years, according to the severity of the injury. It is even possible 
to apply a fine or permanent traceability (house arrest) in milder cases (e.g. injury 
consisting of a cervical contracture or a bruise).
The offences that are concerned with traffic harm are, however, general negli-
gent crimes. Articles 142, 152 and 621.1 CC pertain to death and physical injuries 
caused by serious negligence. They are threatened with imprisonment of one to 
29 This criticism is shared by all theorists. However, among practising lawyers there are those who 
rate the introduction of the offence a success. Cf. Salom Escribá 2008, p. 330.
30 Although in the latter case, there is a difference of opinion in the courts. So, again, the exact 
same behaviour is sanctioned administratively and criminally, the criminal one having prefer-
ence, except in the three indicated cases, in which the administrative sanction will be applied 
according to the interpretation of the criminal courts.
31 Cf. Molina Fernández 2011, p. 1369.
32 Thus, for example, in the Supreme Court Decision of 18 February 2010, no. 218.
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four years for death,33 and three months to three years or a fine for causing bodily 
harm. Finally, the Criminal Code also penalizes slight negligence resulting in 
death (Article 621.2) or serious injury (Article 621.3) with a fine.34 In all cases 
where negligence occurs, the sentence will include the deprivation of the right to 
drive motor vehicles and mopeds when the injuries have been caused during road 
traffic.
The difference between the two kinds of negligence resides, according to the 
case law, in that serious negligence involves the omission of the most basic dil-
igence that is expected from anyone.35 In contrast, slight negligence violates the 
standard of care that only a careful citizen would apply. Thus, for example, accord-
ing to the casuistry of the courts in the traffic field, serious negligence would be: 
driving at high speeds; manoeuvres causing serious danger, such as overtaking or 
changing of direction; not respecting certain signs that represent an imperative 
mandate (stop, red lights, yield, crosswalk); seriously neglecting the mechanical 
maintenance of the vehicle (e.g. the braking system or the steering system); and 
driving while drowsy or under the influence of toxic materials. In addition, the 
concurrent circumstantial facts are of great importance, such as weather, traffic 
and roadway conditions.36 In contrast, slight negligence includes: the invasion by 
a few inches of the opposite traffic lane,37 performing sudden braking38 or careless 
manoeuvres during reverse parking.39
In the event of any harmful outcome as a result of excessive speed, driving 
under the influence of substances or recklessness, the Judges or Courts of Law 
shall only consider the most seriously penalized felony, applying the punishment 
in its upper half (Article 382 CC). This crime will not always be one of result 
(as opposed to danger). For example, some types of reckless driving (Article 381 
especially) are punished more harshly than physical injuries caused by negligence 
(Articles 152 and 620), and are even punished more harshly than the death caused 
by serious negligence (Article 142).
As can be seen in this brief reference to the relevant offences of unlawful kill-
ing and injuring in this area, there has not been – as opposed to what is usual 
in the laws of other countries – any modification of the ‘traditional’ regulation 
33 When there is one fatality, and no crimes against road safety have been committed, homicide 
by negligence is usually punished with a custodial sentence of between twelve and eighteen 
months. This avoids the entry into prison under Article 80 et seq. CC, which provide for the 
replacement of imprisonment not exceeding two years by other measures (fine, etc.), as long as 
certain requirements are met. However, there is an exception such as the Supreme Court deci-
sion of 26 October 2001, no. 1920, which imposed a penalty of four years.
34 If the behaviour is charged as slight negligence, the counts that are charged are misdemeanours, 
with different procedural treatment, and, above all, they are not subject to public prosecution. 
Misdemeanours penalized under Article 621 are only pursuable when reported by the person 
offended or his legal representative. 
35 Supreme Court 25 April 2005, no. 537.
36 Cf. Bizkaia Court of Appeals 10 December 2009, no. 853.
37 Bizkaia Court of Appeals 10 December 2009, no. 853; Ourense Court of Appeals 30 December 
2002, no. 159.
38 Tarragona Court of Appeals 18 December 2004, no. 23.
39 Castellón Court of Appeals 8 July 2010, no. 275.
CriminalLiabilityforSeriousTrafficOffences.indd   114 3-12-2014   10:16:27
115
The Spanish Perspective on Traffic Offences: Tough on Danger, Soft on Harm, and Penal Populism
specifically for the traffic sector: the general infractions of negligent harm still 
apply, with quite limited penalties when compared to the penalties to be imposed 
pursuant to the (new) endangerment crimes.
6.3 Reorientation towards Prevention and Control of the Courts’ Interpretation: 
Abstract Danger and the Harm Principle
The most relevant problems that some of these offences pose to criminal law theory 
and the constitutional foundations of criminal law are those generated by the leg-
islator’s decision to use criminal sanctions in cases where there is not any concrete 
endangerment. This is problematic from the perspective of the harm principle. 
Traditionally, Spanish doctrine and case law have supported a strict interpretation 
of the harm principle (in its German form of ‘harm or concrete endangerment 
to a personal legal interest’).40 Therefore, according to most scholars and court 
rulings, a criminal punishment for the setting of merely statistical or remote risks 
is held to be unconstitutional regarding criminal law (it would, however, be accept-
able in administrative sanctions’ law). The last reform, which includes cases of 
danger presumption (irrefutable presumption; praesumptio iuris et de iure), presses 
clearly in the direction of establishing merely ‘formal’ offences without any real 
risk suffered for personal interests, and challenges the harm principle as well as 
the difference between administrative and criminal law.41
In this sense, regarding crimes against road safety, we can observe the abrupt 
separation from traditional criminal law. In traditional criminal law, negligent 
crimes were considered unimportant and crimes of abstract danger (that protect 
collective or diffuse interests, among which traffic safety is included) were not 
included in the criminal law. However, since a relatively short time, criminal law 
has been focused on these matters, mainly due to two factors: first, technical, due 
to the appearance in our societies of risks introduced by the technological process, 
and second, of political origin, derived from the attribution of a social function to 
the State.42
Thus, negligent crimes and especially endangerment crimes or ‘risk-creation 
crimes’ have become more important. The development of the automotive indus-
try in the second half of the last century has caused an increase in the number of 
deaths and injuries in road traffic; consequences that almost never can be attrib-
uted to the intention of the driver. Instead, the violation of duty of care standards, 
that is, negligence, is entirely attributable to the driver.43 That said, negligence may 
only be punished when it produces a harmful result. Therefore, if this does not 
happen for random reasons, the behaviour goes unpunished even if it has resulted 
40 On the differences between this doctrine of legal interests and the Anglo-Saxon harm principle, 
see Von Hirsch 2003, pp. 13-25. 
41 Apart from eliminating the need to prove the ‘influence’ of alcohol on driving, making the stand-
ards of proof easier; Hortal Ibarra 2008, p. 155.
42 Mir Puig 2008, pp. 13-15.
43 Mir Puig 2008, p. 15.
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in very dangerous driving. Also, negligence is characterized precisely because the 
driver was confident that he would not have any accident. So the threat of pun-
ishment cannot deter him from driving in a dangerous manner.44 To do this, you 
have to directly prohibit such behaviour, which itself is characterized by the intent 
of the author, regardless of whether in the particular case an accident occurs or 
not: consequently, the crimes of danger are introduced.
Furthermore, from the perspective of the positive general prevention theo-
ries, the use of criminal law to punish risky behaviours in traffic reinforces the 
importance of road safety.45 Thus, the negative connotations of such behaviour 
are ingrained profoundly in the social consciousness. With these felonies, ulti-
mately ensuring the expectations of society regarding the feeling that conduct that 
clearly breaks driving rules has to be punished, the punishment is not left to the 
random production of a result, while the citizens are aware of the risks involved 
in driving.46
As is known, endangerment crimes or risk-creation crimes stand in opposition 
to ‘harm crimes’ and are characterized by punishing behaviour that is merely 
dangerous, regardless of how it affects individual legal assets. They lower stand-
ards for criminal liability, protecting collective or diffuse interests, such as traffic 
safety, in the context of social attitudes of zero tolerance towards road offenders.47 
Precisely, when risk factors are amenable to individualization, the law does not 
wait for the production of a harmful result to intervene (negligence), but crim-
inalizes the mere infringement of the duty of care standards. This is how the 
endangerment crimes appear,48 which can be of two types: abstract and concrete.
Crimes of abstract danger, defined as being of presumed risk, are characterized 
by punishing dangerous behaviour without requiring further result of danger.49 
The legislator assumes that certain kinds of behaviours are inherently intolerable 
and resolves to criminalize them regardless of whether, in the circumstances of 
the case, there was actually a situation of danger to others.
In contrast, the concrete endangerment crimes are characterized by the 
existence of a consequent result of danger. In Spain, both the Attorney General’s 
44 Mir Puig 2008, p. 16.
45 In a similar sense, Montaner Fernández 2009a, p. 224.
46 Gutiérrez Rodríguez et al. 2009, p. 26.
47 García Albero 2007, p. 2.
48 García Albero 2007, p. 10.
49 Note that the doctrine proposes a third category of crimes of danger, somewhere between the 
crimes of concrete and abstract danger: crimes of abstract-concrete nature. These are character-
ized by behaviours defined as suitable for producing certain results, beyond merely being con-
sidered statistically dangerous behaviours. Thus, the fundamental difference with the crimes of 
pure abstract danger is that while in these crimes the dangerous behaviour is implicit in their 
legal description, that is, the damaging ability of the behaviour is something that has been valued 
by the lawmaker and manifested itself through the definition, in crimes of  abstract-concrete 
danger the incorporation of the normative elements that must be met for the behaviour to be 
considered criminal is for the judge to determine (cf. Montaner Fernández 2009b, p. 9). An 
example of an ‘abstract-concrete danger’ crime is in Article 379.2, first part: driving under the 
influence of substances, in which judges must establish that the consumption has affected driv-
ing ability. 
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Office50 and the courts understand that such danger occurs when there is a con-
tact, a proximity between the dangerous behaviour of the driver and legal rights 
of third persons, in the sense that these come into the driver’s range. Therefore, 
when we note the presence of other vehicles, or even the existence of passengers 
inside the offending vehicle, the performance of dangerous behaviours is deemed 
to constitute a concrete danger. Only if the driver is alone and has not interacted or 
approached any vehicle – or, at least, this has not been demonstrated – the danger 
is abstract.
Since the reform introduced by Law 15/2007, as mentioned above, the offences 
that protect road safety are closer to the crimes of abstract than concrete danger.51 
Only the crime of reckless driving, as regulated in Article 380 CC, is punishable 
as being of concrete danger, since this provision requires that the life or integ-
rity of persons is ‘specifically endangered’. In all other cases (speeding, driving 
under the influence of substances and manifestly disregarding the life of others52), 
merely dangerous driving (based on statistical data) is a felony, thus pushing the 
function of criminal law as risk manager.53
That said, it can be seen how in the field of traffic offences the ex post facto form 
of protection of legal rights has been replaced by an ex ante intervention model 
consisting of preventive rules whose infraction is deemed a crime independently 
almost always of the concrete danger which is produced.54 Thus, the harm prin-
ciple is seriously questioned: there is an emergence of a ‘law of security’ at the 
expense of a repressive regulation of the injury to legal interests.55
However, there is still more. First, judicial discretion has been limited56 
through the use of irrefutable presumptions whose presence confirms the com-
50 See Enquiry (Consulta) 1/2006 of the Attorney General.
51 Gutiérrez Rodríguez et al. 2009, p. 32 et seq.
52 Although this offence (Article 381) carries a higher punishment if concrete danger occurs (com-
pare numbers 1 and 2 of Article 381).
53 Montaner Fernández 2009a, p. 219.
54 García Albero 2007, p. 8.
55 García Albero 2007, p. 8.
56 Queralt Jiménez 2008, p. 67 claims that it is the “manifest intent” of this reform. The former 
Minister of Justice expressly stated that it was to reach that goal (Pipaón Pulido, Pedreño Navarro 
& Bal Francés 2009, p. 14 et seq.). The lawmaker, in the preamble to Law 15/2007, recognizes that 
it is to bind the interpretation of the courts, considered very lenient, adding that the legal reform 
occurs with the “objective of defining [...] more rigorously all crimes and traffic safety related 
road safety, preventing certain behaviours classified as reckless driving may not go unpunished”. 
See García Albero 2007, pp. 7-15, who notes that it is perceived by various social agents as a 
“lack of commitment of the judiciary in the fight against road accidents” and a “cheapening of 
recklessness” (p. 7), so that the reform of the law would almost consist in “replacing judges by 
radars” (p. 15). González Cussac & Vidales Rodríguez 2008, p. 196 et seq. also establish that 
the response of the judiciary was “too light”, a large tolerance for these offences compared 
with other areas. Rodríguez León 2008, p. 19 contains the statements of the Director General 
of Traffic at the time, stating: “We feel that the judicial system has locked itself within too many 
procedural technicalities and abstract arguments [...].” For his part, Miró Llinares 2010, p. 163 et 
seq. believes that the room for interpretation of the lower courts implies a larger space for the 
political aims of penal reform, and Ortiz de Urbina Gimeno 2011, p. 13 identifies the target of the 
law in restricting judicial interpretation.
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mission of the typical behaviour, as the behaviour is regarded per se.57 Thus, for 
example, it is a criminal offence to drive above certain speeds (Article 379.1 CC), 
or to drive while exceeding certain rates of alcohol (Article 379.2 CC). Note how 
the danger of life or integrity is not an element of the type that must be proved. 
The object of protection is the rule that establishes such limits,58 which facilitates 
the proof of the commission of a criminal offence.59 Statistics show that driving in 
these circumstances is dangerous and there is no more to say.
Nevertheless, the speed limit fixed by criminal law, for example 201 km/h in 
non-urban roads, does not add extra dangerousness in statistical terms. As high-
lighted by García Albero,60 it is demonstrated that driving at high speed in general 
is a factor in the incidence of accidents, but not that driving with an excess of 
80 km/h on a highway is the specific cause of many accidents. There is no mate-
rial basis, in terms of danger, to select that particular behaviour and leave the 
rest to the field of administrative law. Therefore, “the determination of a typical 
threshold fulfils a purely communicative role, it is rather an expression of the need 
to formulate a social reproach to the ‘speed’, but not because that particular speed, 
presented as an icon, is inherently more dangerous than speeds barely below that 
limit”.61
Similarly, the rules of Article 379.2 CC, according to which the excess of certain 
rates of alcohol is a criminal offence per se, implying that this level of impregnation 
goes from a means of testing a typical element – driving under the influence – to 
becoming the object of the test itself.62 Moreover, the rate of 1.2 gs/l (in blood) is 
not an uncontroversial limit for which there is no doubt that every driver will be 
affected in his psychophysical powers.63 This is, again, because of a legislative 
decision that communicates limits above which the dangers of drink-driving, 
although always reprehensible, are considered to meet the threshold of criminal 
relevance. And this, regardless of whether it in an exceptional case does not affect 
the driving ability of a subject with an out-of-the-ordinary resistance to alcohol.
Second, some crimes are configured as mere formal violations,64 which do not 
even require the existence of ex ante or perceived danger. The clearest example 
of this technique is the mere driving without licence or permit, either because it 
has been lost, or because it was never obtained (Article 384 CC).65 This offence 
is simply intended to safeguard the administrative order and the effectiveness 
of certain formalities that are considered essential to discipline and control the 
57 García Albero 2007, p. 8.
58 The same, moreover, to what has been administratively prohibited; Queralt Jiménez 2008, p. 66 
et seq.
59 García Albero 2007, p. 11.
60 García Albero 2007, p. 10.
61 García Albero 2007, pp. 11-12. Obviously, as this author points out, it is not only a traffic phenom-
enon, but it appears in every criminal law related to security.
62 García Albero 2007, p. 18.
63 The evidence shows that this limit is 1.5 gs/l: at 1.5‰ everybody is affected, based on experimen-
tal results (cf. Molina Fernández 2011, p. 1351).
64 Prieto González 2008, p. 267.
65 However, it should be noted that some authors have tried to give this precept a certain material 
content, describing it as a crime of danger (cf. García del Blanco 2009, p. 409 et seq.).
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capabilities required for road traffic.66 Certainly, not all cases of driving without 
permission surpass the allowed level of risk.67 They are simple cases of disobe-
dience in which danger does not matter. So, this offence is something different 
and, even, something worse than crimes of pure abstract danger in which a risk, 
at least, is presumed.
Finally, we must refer to the offence of refusal to submit to the legally estab-
lished alcohol level tests, and the tests for the presence of toxic drugs, narcotics 
and psychotropic substances, whose underlying purpose is primarily functional.68 
Certainly, it is of little use to criminalize driving while exceeding certain rates of 
alcohol (Article 379.2 CC) if there is not a strengthening of the regulation as pro-
vided in Article 383 CC.69 Thus, this kind of ‘refusal crime’ as set out in Article 383 
CC – in the sense that this behaviour prevents the possibility of actually verifying 
the relevant alcohol level – is not an endangerment crime but a type of offence that 
warrants preventive efficacy of Article 379.2 CC.70 It is conceived as a complemen-
tary criminal standard of some of the crimes against road safety and its aim is to 
control “the investigation activities” of certain forms of conduct.71
In conclusion, one can say that the shift of liability to an earlier stage, the objec-
tification of the typical elements and the existence of mere formal violations are 
the three main features of the crimes against road safety in Spain. Consequently, 
there is a proximity of criminal law to the logic of punitive administrative law,72 
making it a mere reinforcement of that73 and increasing the criminal control over 
permitted risk.
Given this broad deployment of norms in the field of endangerment, as has 
been noted above, it is noteworthy, also in contrast to other European jurisdic-
tions, that there are no specific rules for traffic in those cases in which improper 
conduct leads to death or physical injury. As previously seen, in this context, the 
crucial point is that the negligence incurred is classified as ‘serious’ or ‘slight’. It 
is an abstract matter which generates a significant degree of uncertainty. In the 
concrete field of traffic infringements, this uncertainty can lead to the situation in 
which events that present a very similar level of culpability are punished by very 
different penalties.
6.4 Conclusions: ‘The Hen or the Egg’ and Penal Populism
Turning to a brief review of the regulation that has been outlined before, the first 
thing that seems clear is that there are a number of specific rules of traffic that are 
not compatible with the requirements of the harm principle, being purely formal 
66 Prieto González 2008, p. 265.
67 García del Blanco 2009, p. 414.
68 Martín Lorenzo 2009, p. 322.
69 Martín Lorenzo 2009, p. 324.
70 Martín Lorenzo 2009, p. 328.
71 Montaner Fernández 2009a, p. 226.
72 Montaner Fernández 2009a, p. 217.
73 Gutiérrez Rodríguez et al. 2009, p. 31.
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– the clearest case is the offence of driving a motor vehicle without administrative 
permission for this (Article 384 CC).74
Moreover, as we have seen, first, in its attempt to control the interpretation of 
the courts when they acquit for lack of risk, the legislature has created standards 
that are evidently over-inclusive because they cover behaviour that does not involve 
risk – abstract or concrete.75 On the other hand, however, the technique chosen in 
the two legal standards that ensure the criminal prosecution of some behaviours 
(in relation to a particular level of speeding and with a certain level of alcohol [Arti-
cles 379.1 and 2 and 380.2 CC]) can also lead to an under-inclusive result. Think, 
for example, of the case where the speeding occurs opposite a school (the subject 
drives at 85 km/h when the speed is limited to 30 km/h), which does not meet the 
standard in which recklessness can be automatically charged.
This attempt to control the courts and set a higher standard will fail, above 
all, because it must be expected that the literal interpretation of clauses designed 
to control the interpretation by the courts ends up consolidating a perception 
among the public according to which any behaviour below the fixed threshold for 
the specific penalty would not be criminally relevant at all. This is to say it is 
 worrisome that the clauses end up setting the minimum level of criminal rele-
vance – obviously reaching a completely opposite result than the one intended by 
the legislature.76
Finally, probably the greatest weakness of the regulation – which has not been 
reported widely enough in the doctrine – is that the new regulation does not affect 
what will almost certainly be the biggest problem perceived by the public as to 
the intervention of criminal law in terms of traffic: the failure (socially perceived) 
of a reaction when there has been a real injury. Indeed, as has been shown, the 
regulation applicable to negligent crimes has not changed, which leads to the 
avoidance of jail terms for most people who cause deaths by dangerous driving.77 
Contributing to this situation are several issues. First, the penalty limit of four 
years for any negligent homicide, and the usual practice that imprisonment not 
74 And it is worth noting that it seems unlikely that the Constitutional Court (which in recent years 
has been on several occasions in a deadlock because of deep political divisions in relation to 
various territorial and political issues) will declare unconstitutional any of these offences merely 
due to the formal absence of harmfulness.
75 The lawmaker is aware of this situation (although he does not openly acknowledge it). The only 
modifications made to the regulation introduced by Law 15/2007 and by Law (LO) 5/2010, of 
June  22, have been directed precisely to smooth punitive consequences (Alastuey Dobón & 
Escuchuri Aisa 2011, p. 9). Thus, it has relaxed the sanctions to be imposed (in Articles 379 and 
384 CC), giving more room to the penalty of community service, and, above all, introducing 
the clause of Article 385 ter CC, which allows the judge to lower the penalty very significantly in 
response to the ‘lower risk’ caused, and ‘other circumstances of the case’ (the lawmaker indi-
cated this in the preamble of Law 5/2010, XXV, to cater to the ‘principle of proportionality’). 
However, apart from generating a higher level of uncertainty as to the penalty, it seems a contra-
diction that the legislator leaves ample space for judges to fix the sentencing at the same time he 
restricts radically their ability to define the scope of the offences.
76 See Miró Llinares 2010, p. 165.
77 González Cussac & Vidales Rodriguez 2008, p. 197 considered it a “scandal” just before the 
entry into force of the reform.
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exceeding two years be suspended or replaced by other non-custodial measures 
regarding people with no previous criminal record (Articles 80 et seq., 88 CC). 
Second, the possibility to qualify the behaviour as slight negligence. And third, 
on the practical level, the role of some kind of lawyers in this type of cases who 
work for the insurance company, rather than for the victim or the perpetrator. 
Thus, they are uninterested in a criminal prosecution after an agreement between 
companies,78 and they prefer a streamlined process should the behaviour qualify 
as a misdemeanour.79
In conclusion, the situation that can be defined, no doubt, as being responsi-
ble for the social demand of criminal sanctions is not included at all in the penal 
reform. A strict criminalization of causing of injuries and deaths as a result of 
improper conduct in traffic, which is what explains the use of the expression (fol-
lowing the French precedent) of “road violence”,80 has been over the last years at 
the centre of the demands of victims’ associations81 as well as the media attention 
(there has been in Spain for a few years a steady body count of victims of accidents 
in the media, this being encouraged by the government). However, the punish-
ment for negligent crimes has not increased in the last reform. In short: the penal 
medicine is applied to the wrong limb.
Obviously, these regulation deficits are not free of charge: they generate 
costs. On the one hand, we should ask whether a regulation is adequate when 
it has  generated huge amounts of criminal proceedings (almost a third of all 
processes!)82 for a criminal justice system, such as the Spanish, which is already 
78 In the Spanish criminal procedure, there is still the possibility of a private prosecution. On the 
one hand, there is the so-called ‘popular prosecution’ (acusación popular), since any citizen has 
the constitutional right to prosecute almost all criminal offences. On the other hand – and this is 
very important in these cases – every victim of an offence is entitled to prosecute the defendant 
(acusación particular) in parallel to the public prosecutor, and put forward a real accusation (not 
only regarding the civil compensation, but also demanding a conviction). See Cancio Meliá 2012, 
pp. 245-252. Therefore, even if the public prosecutor has the duty to put forward every single case 
where there is a criminal behaviour (there is no opportunity principle), in the real court life the 
‘energy’ of the public prosecutor will be low if the victim does not exercise her right to prosecute.
79 This situation is facilitated by the fact that some victims (or some attorneys who work for the 
insurance company, rather than for the victim or the perpetrator) use their power to initiate the 
procedure in case of a misdemeanour (slight negligence) solely on the basis of compensation 
to get from the offender (cf. Corcoy Bidasolo 2008, p. 75 et seq.). Salom Escribá 2008, pp. 336, 
345 et seq. believes that the solution lies in the public prosecution always pressing charges of 
serious negligence (crime). In any case, this implies that many cases in which the occurrence of 
negligence is unclear will be heard before court. Instead of this, the company will prefer to pay 
the compensation and try to avoid a judgment.
80 Used by the lawmaker in the presentation of the reform introduced by Law 15/2007, following 
the French lawmaker. See also, for example, the considerations of García Albero 2007, p. 2, also 
used by Campo 2008, p. 353 (representative of an association of victims) or Escribá Salom 2008, 
p. 338 (prosecutor).
81 For example, the emphasis placed by an association of victims of accidents at this point, Campo 
2008, p. 351.
82 Although there are no reliable statistics on the number of processes, it can be concluded through 
various indirect sources (the number of indictments, the number of prisoners registered with 
the Ministry of Justice, and the prisoners convicted) that crimes against road safety have led 
to a third of all criminal proceedings during 2009, only two years after entry into force of Law 
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 heavily  overloaded. In this respect, it should be pointed out that the Spanish crimi-
nal procedure is based on the (procedural) legality principle, namely, the obligation 
of the prosecution to prosecute all criminal offences of which it is aware. In fact, 
one can say that the tying up of criminal law to the administrative regulation83 
relating to traffic offences will lead in the real court life to a selective prosecution 
of behaviours, due to the inadequacy of police forces intended for enforcement.84 
This cannot lead to anything but an erosion of criminal law, as the citizenry notes 
the existence of such selective prosecution. Moreover, as has been shown, there 
are obvious regulatory costs derived from such administrationalization85 of criminal 
law, as it directly violates the harm principle and the proportionality principle.
On the other hand, it is not clear that all these costs are actually compensated 
with a significant effect, derived from specific criminal regulation, in the mod-
ification of inappropriate behaviour in traffic.86 It seems clear that a significant 
reduction of traffic accidents in Spain in the last years is a fact.87 But the question 
arises, as the Spanish proverb goes: which was first, the hen of a changed social 
standard related to traffic offences (especially related to drink-driving), or the egg 
of the different legal (and specifically criminal law) treatment of these offences? In 
fact, the reduction in the number of accidents and harmful results, with a halving 
of the number of people killed in road accidents, began several years before the 
introduction of the reform in 2007. Thus, it should have been considered if penal 
reform was necessary by assessing other factors that surely had had some effect in 
reducing the number of accidents. The introduction of the penalty point system in 
2005, improvements in road infrastructure during those years (with a very notice-
able construction activity), and the renovation of vehicles and social-normative 
change regarding inappropriate behaviour in traffic should have been assessed.88 
In this sense, one may think that this kind of criminal law intends to put the focus 
on the perpetrators of the offences only and not on these other factors, such as the 
15/2007. It is clear, however, that a very low number of defendants end up going to prison (less 
than 1%). Cf. data and explanations in Ortiz de Urbina Gimeno 2011, p. 17 et seq.
83 Jiménez Queralt 2008, p. 63.
84 In this regard, due to the absence of comparable data, we can only speculate. It seems signifi-
cant that according to a study by the European Road Federation and a foundation of an insurer, 
in 2004 in Spain 25.2 traffic offences were identified per 1,000 vehicles, whereas in the Nether-
lands 850 penalties for 1,000 vehicles were identified. This does not seem to be explained by a 
higher level of compliance by Spanish drivers, suggesting that the enforcement density must be 
significantly lower in Spain (see Perona 2008, p. 359).
85 See Alastuey Dobón & Escuchuri Aisa 2011, p. 10 et seq.; Trapero Barreales 2011, p. 21 et seq., with 
further references to this view, common in legal literature.
86 See the analysis of Ortiz de Urbina Gimeno 2011, p. 22 et seq.
87 Cf. statistics on <www.dgt.es>. In any case, from 2000 to 2010 there has been a reduction by 
more than 50% of the number of deaths (from 4,706 to 2,130). See Ortiz de Urbina Gimeno 2011, 
p. 16. Expressed in the ratio of deaths per vehicle, it has gone from 378 deaths per million vehi-
cles in 1990 to 184 in 2000 and 70 in 2008. Cf. Miró Llinares 2010, p. 149 et seq.
88 Cf., for example, González Montoro 2008, p. 17 et seq.; Ortiz de Urbina Gimeno 2011, p. 26.
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change of public morality in our model of society with its unrestricted motorized 
mobility.89
A critical review of the policies developed in the area of traffic offences sug-
gests that we face an example of the kind of crime policy that uses criminal law 
for propaganda purposes,90 analysed under the concept of ‘symbolic criminal law’ 
(as developed in Germany by Hassemer) or ‘penal populism’ (as used in the Eng-
lish-speaking area).91 This is manifested by largely overstating the part played by 
the reform of criminal offences, by not sufficiently taking into account the practi-
cal costs (because of the high number of cases the courts face) and by neglecting 
the normative costs (because of the breaches of the harm principle) that such 
penal populism entails.
The Spanish legislator, in conclusion, jumped the train of social unrest for 
political gain in its reform of the regulation of traffic offences, generating a crimi-
nal regulation that may only be described as wrong and unfair.
Relevant Provisions in the Spanish Criminal Code*
BOOK II: Felonies and their penalties
TITLE I: On unlawful killing and its forms
Article 138
Whoever kills another shall be convicted of manslaughter, punishable with a sentence of 
imprisonment from ten to fifteen years.
Article 142
1. Whoever causes the death of another by serious negligence shall be convicted of man-
slaughter and punished with a sentence of imprisonment of one to four years.
2. When the manslaughter is committed using a motor vehicle, a moped or a firearm, the 
punishment shall also, and respectively, include deprivation of the right to drive motor 
vehicles and mopeds or deprivation of the right to own and carry weapons from one to 
six years.
3. When the manslaughter is committed due to professional negligence, the punishment 
of special barring from exercise of the profession, trade or cargo shall also be imposed, 
for a period of three to six years.
89 Regarding this social change, see considerations by García Albero 2007, p. 2 et seq., elaborating 
on the theme of the ‘risk society’. Cf. also Miró Llinares 2010, p. 148 et seq.; Trapero Barreales 
2011, p. 20 et seq.
90 See the analysis of Miró Llinares 2010, p. 152 et seq.
91 Regarding these instruments of political-criminal analysis, see Cancio Meliá 2006, p. 345 et seq.
* Source of the translation: Spanish Ministry of Justice, available at: <www.mjusticia.gob.es/cs/
Satellite/es/1288774502225/ListaPublicaciones.html?param1=1288775993122>. In Spanish crim-
inal law, pecuniary sanctions usually are imposed with the so-called ‘Scandinavian system’, that 
is, according to the economic condition of the offender, a daily rate is defined, and this amount 
is multiplied by the months or days fixed according to the gravity of the offence.
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BOOK II: Felonies and their penalties
TITLE III: On bodily harm
Article 147
1. Whoever, by any means or procedure, causes another an injury that detracts from his 
bodily integrity or his physical or mental health, shall be convicted of the offence of 
grievous bodily harm, with a sentence of imprisonment of six months to three years, 
whenever the injury objectively requires medical or surgical treatment for health pur-
poses, in addition to qualified first aid. Simple qualified surveillance or monitoring of 
the course of the injury shall not be deemed medical treatment.
 Punishment by the same penalty shall be applied to whoever, within the term of one 
year, has perpetrated the action described in Article 617 of this Code four times.
2. However, the act described in the preceding Section shall be punished with a sentence 
of imprisonment of three to six months or a fine from six to twelve months, when less 
serious, in view of the means used or the result caused.
Article 148
The injuries foreseen in Section 1 of the preceding Article may be punished with a sen-
tence of imprisonment of two to five years, in view of the result caused or the risk produced:
1. If weapons, instruments, objects, means, methods or ways that are specifically danger-
ous to life or health, both physical and mental, of the injured party, were used;
2. If perpetrated with wanton cruelty and premeditation;
3. If the victim is under twelve years old or is incapacitated;
4. If the victim is or has been the wife, or woman bound to the offender by a similar emo-
tional relation, even when not cohabitating;
5. If the victim is an especially vulnerable person who lives with the offender.
Article 149
1. Whoever causes to another person, by any means or procedure, to forfeit or lose the use 
of a major organ or limb, or a sense, or sexual impotence, sterility, serious deformity 
or to suffer a serious physical or mental illness, shall be punished with a sentence of 
imprisonment from six to twelve years.
2. Whoever causes to another person a genital mutilation in any form shall be punished 
with a sentence of imprisonment from six to twelve years. Should the victim be a minor 
or incapacitated, the punishment of special barring from exercise of parental rights, 
guardianship, care, safekeeping or fostership shall be applicable for a term from four 
to ten years, should the Judge deem it appropriate in the interest of the minor or inca-
pacitated person.
Article 150
Whoever causes another person to forfeit or lose the use of a non-major or limb, or a de-
formity, shall be punished with a sentence of imprisonment from three to six years.
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Article 152
1. Whoever causes any of the injuries foreseen in the preceding Articles due to serious 
negligence shall be punished:
1. With a sentence of imprisonment from three to six months, in the case of the inju-
ries described in Article 147.1;
2. With a sentence of imprisonment of one to three years, in the case of the injuries 
described in Article 149;
3. With a sentence of imprisonment of six months to two years, in the case of the 
injuries in Article 150.
2. When the acts referred to in this Article have been committed using a motor vehicle, 
moped or firearm, the punishment of deprivation of the right to drive motor vehicles 
and mopeds or the right to own and carry weapons for a term of one to four years, re-
spectively, shall also be imposed.
3. When the injuries are committed due to professional negligence, the punishment of 
special barring from practice of the profession, trade or office shall also be applied, for 
a term from one to four years.
BOOK II: Felonies and their penalties
TITLE XVII: On felonies against collective safety
CHAPTER IV: On felonies against road safety**
Article 379
1. Whoever drives a motor vehicle or a moped at a speed that exceeds the speed permitted 
by law by sixty kilometres per hour in urban streets, or by eighty kilometres per hour 
on non-urban roads, shall be punished with a sentence of imprisonment from three to 
six months, or with that of a fine from six to twelve months, or with that of community 
service from thirty one to ninety days, and, in all cases, with that of deprivation of the 
right to drive motor vehicles and mopeds for a term exceeding one and up to four years.
2. The same penalties shall be applied to whoever drives a motor vehicle or moped under 
the influence of toxic drugs, narcotics, psychotropic substances or alcoholic beverages. 
In all cases, whoever drives with a rate of alcohol in expired air exceeding 0.60 milli-
grams per litre, or a rate of alcohol in the blood exceeding 1.2 grams per litre, shall be 
sentenced to those penalties.
Article 380
1. Whoever drives a motor vehicle or a moped with manifest recklessness and specifically 
endangers the life or integrity of persons shall be punished with imprisonment of six 
months to two years and deprivation of the right to drive motor vehicles and mopeds 
for a term exceeding one and up to six years.
** Articles 379, 380.2, 384, 385 bis and 385 ter were not included in the original draft of the Spanish 
Criminal Code (1995).
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2. For the purposes this provision, driving under the circumstances foreseen in Section 1 
and in the second sentence of Section 2 of the preceding Article shall be deemed man-
ifestly reckless.
Article 381
1. Punishment by imprisonment from two to five years, a fine of twelve to twenty-four 
months and deprivation of the right to drive motor vehicles and mopeds during a peri-
od from six to ten years shall be handed down to whoever, manifestly disregarding the 
life of others, behaves as described in the preceding Article.
2. When the life or integrity of persons has not been specifically placed in danger, the 
penalties shall be of imprisonment from one to two years, a fine from six to twelve 
months and deprivation of the right to drive motor vehicles and mopeds for the term 
foreseen in the preceding Section.
Article 382
When through the acts penalised in Articles 379, 380 and 381, the doer were to cause, in 
addition to the risk prevented, a result amounting to a felony, whatever its seriousness, the 
Judges or Courts of Law shall only consider the most seriously penalised felony, applying 
the punishment in its upper half and, in all cases, ordering compensation of the civil lia-
bility that has been incurred.
Article 383
The driver who, when required to by a law-enforcement officer, refuses to submit to the 
legally established alcohol level tests, and those for the presence of toxic drugs, narcotics 
and psychotropic substances referred to in the preceding Articles, shall be punished with 
imprisonment of six months to one year and deprivation of the right to drive motor vehicles 
and mopeds for a term exceeding one and up to four years.
Article 384
Whoever drives a motor vehicle or moped in the cases loss of validity of his driving license 
or permit due to loss of all the points legally assigned, shall be punished with a sentence of 
imprisonment from three to six months, or with that of a fine from twelve to twenty-four 
months, or with that of community service of thirty one to ninety days.
The same punishment shall be imposed on whoever drives after precautionary or final 
removal of his driving license or permit by court decision, and whoever drives a motor 
vehicle or moped without ever having obtained a driving license or permit.
Article 385
Whoever causes a serious risk to traffic in any of the following manners shall be punished 
with a sentence of imprisonment of six months to two years or a fine of twelve to twenty- 
four months and community service from ten to forty days:
1. Placing unforeseeable obstacles on the roadway, spilling slippery or flammable sub-
stances or changing, stealing or cancelling out signs or by any other means;
2. Not re-establishing road safety when obliged to do so.
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Article 385 bis
The motor vehicle or moped used in the acts foreseen in this Chapter shall be deemed an 
instrument of the offence for the purposes of Articles 127 and 128.
Article 385 ter
In the felonies foreseen in Articles 379, 383, 384 and 385, the Judge or Court of Law, may 
hand down a reasoned judgement that may lower a sentence of imprisonment by one de-
gree in view of the lower extent of the risk caused and the other circumstances of fact.
BOOK III: On misdemeanours and their penalties
TITLE I: Misdemeanours against persons
Article 621
1. Those who due to serious negligence were to cause any of the injuries foreseen in 
Section 2 of Article 147, shall be punished with the penalty of a fine from one to two 
months.
2. Those who, due to slight negligence, were to cause the death of another person, shall be 
punished with the penalty of a fine from one to two months.
3. Those who, due to slight negligence, cause an injury that would constitute a felony 
shall be punished with a punishment of a fine from ten to thirty days.
4. Should the act be committed with a motor vehicle or moped, he may also be sentenced 
the punishment of deprivation of the right to drive motor vehicles and mopeds for a 
term from three months to a year.
5. Should the act be committed with a weapon, he may also be sentenced to deprivation of 
the right to own and carry weapons for a term from three months to a year.
6. Misdemeanours penalised under this Article shall only be pursuable when reported by 
the person offended or his legal representative.
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Chapter 7
The Relation Between Culpability and Harm in 




A recurrent theme in traffic law is the relationship between endangerment 
offences and result offences. Endangerment offences are not usually considered 
serious offences, but even a minor traffic error may already constitute a serious 
offence if it results in a serious accident. Is the far more severe sentence justi-
fied by the gravity of the consequences or should the degree of culpability be the 
paramount consideration when assessing the severity of a traffic offence? This 
question affects issues such as the way in which traffic offences are interpreted. In 
the Netherlands, for example, the debate in literature has focused on interpreting 
the term ‘negligence’ with respect to causing traffic accidents and the apparent 
ease with which fatal accidents are classified under this heading.1 The question 
also directly affects sentencing. This chapter focuses on the issue of sentencing 
rather than on the interpretation of traffic offences. Several authors in England & 
Wales have recently criticized the high penalties for fatal traffic accidents in cases 
where hardly any blame could be attached to the person responsible.2 The question 
arises as to how the jurisdiction of England & Wales compares to a country such as 
the Netherlands: how do the two jurisdictions deal with the relationship between 
culpability and harm in sentencing for traffic offences, and is the punishment 
– and its standardization – proportionate to culpability and harm? This compar-
ative analysis may also offer insights for greater standardization of penalties for 
traffic offences. By focusing on classical forms of punishment such as prison sen-
tences, fines, community service orders3 and disqualification, the enforcement of 
* Marius Duker is a Judge at the Amsterdam Court of Appeal (Criminal Law Division) since 1 Octo-
ber 2014 and has submitted this chapter as an Associate Professor of Criminal Law at VU Univer-
sity Amsterdam, the Netherlands. This chapter was first submitted in April 2013. Developments 
and case law after this period are generally not included.
1 See, e.g., Vellinga 2005, p. 175; Den Harder 2006, pp. 181-182; De Jong 2007. See also Duker 2012.
2 Hirst 2008; Cunningham 2008; Cunningham 2012. Specifically in connection with the required 
causal relationship between the illicit driving and the consequence, see Sullivan & Simester 2012. 
For an earlier discussion of England & Wales in Dutch literature, see Lensing 2003.
3 The usual categories of fines in England & Wales are subdivided into Band A (starting point: 50% 
of the offender’s relevant weekly income, with a range of 25%-75%), Band B (100% of relevant 
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road safety will not receive the attention it deserves because, to a large extent, road 
safety is given substance in measures other than these classical forms of pun-
ishment. Examples of such measures include systems of penalty points whereby 
driving licences are automatically withdrawn under administrative law following a 
certain number of violations,4 mandatory alcolock5 programmes for offenders who 
have driven with a very high blood alcohol content or repeatedly have driven while 
under the influence, or educational measures designed to prevent drink-driving. 
These sorts of measures are discussed in brief because of their relevance to road 
safety,6 but a sufficiently balanced comparison of how such measures operate in 
the Netherlands and England & Wales is beyond the scope of this chapter. My 
primary interest lies in obtaining insight into the relationship between dangerous 
driving and causing traffic accidents, and the penalties for these offences already 
provide sufficient insight in this respect. Theory building on punishment and 
research into the effectiveness of punishment are also disregarded here as there is 
no scope for a comprehensive discussion of their significance in the punishment 
of traffic offences.7
I will first discuss the most important endangerment offences and the corre-
sponding penalties in the two jurisdictions and will subsequently compare them 
to the penalties for negligently causing serious traffic accidents. The penalties 
prescribed by law do not always reflect actual sentencing practice; sentencing 
guidelines (‘guidelines’) provide more insight. As one of the aims of this chap-
ter is to promote these guidelines, I will discuss this specific standardization of 
penalties in more detail. I will end my comparative analysis by examining a few 
specific cases that briefly illustrate the differences between the Netherlands and 
England & Wales in practice and analyse any striking differences and similarities 
between the two jurisdictions. I will argue that the weight assigned to the conduct 
and the consequences in sentencing has not been consistently specified in the 
definitions of the various traffic offences and the corresponding maximum penal-
ties in either jurisdiction. In addition, I will argue that both jurisdictions, and par-
ticularly England & Wales, seem to make a disproportionate difference between 
the punishment handed out for endangerment offences and that given for result 
offences. Based on these two general observations, I make suggestions as to how 
the weight of the conduct and the consequences could be laid down consistently in 
the definitions of the offences, and how standardization of penalties could estab-
weekly income) and Band C (150% of relevant weekly income). In addition to the various cate-
gories of fines, community service orders are also subdivided in 3 categories: low level, medium 
level and high level. In terms of unpaid work, these categories equate to 40-80 hours of work, 
80-150 hours of work and 150-300 hours of work respectively (Magistrates’ Court Sentencing 
Guidelines, Definitive guideline, May 2008, pp. 148-150, 155 and 161).
4 See, e.g., Article 123b WVW 1994 (the Dutch Road Traffic Act). On this subject, see Kessler 2008.
5 An alcolock is an administrative measure that prevents a car from starting if the driver is above 
the drink-drive limit. 
6 See on this the fact sheets by the SWOV Institute for Road Safety Research. See, in particular, the 
fact sheets ‘Penalties in traffic’, ‘Alcolock’, ‘Rehabilitation courses for road users’ and ‘Demerit 
points systems’. The fact sheets are available at: <www.swov.nl/UK/Research/factsheets.htm>.
7 See, e.g., Cunningham 2008; Van Dijk 2008.
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lish a balance between the considerable harm caused by the dangerous driving 
on the one hand and the degree of the road user’s culpability on the other hand. 
Although this last question is particularly difficult to answer and requires further 
consideration of the effects of various penalties and measures, the  suggestions 
may contribute to the debate on this important theme. Finally, I would like to 
note that Sally Cunningham’s research was an important source for my modest 
research into English law, while I was also guided by her deliberations on various 
important aspects.
7.2 Comparing the Relevant Offences
7.2.1 Endangerment Offences
Dutch law provides for one general endangerment offence, i.e. Article 5 of the 
Wegenverkeerswet 1994 (Road Traffic Act 1994; hereafter: WVW 1994), which states 
that anyone is forbidden to behave in such a way that danger on the road is caused 
or can be caused or that the traffic on the road is hindered or can be hindered 
(‘endangering traffic’). This offence is a misdemeanour rather than a felony, and 
thus a relatively minor offence. Proof of mens rea is not required.8 The offence car-
ries a maximum prison term of 2 months and a maximum fine of 3,900 euros.9 
If convicted, the driver may be disqualified from driving for up to 2 years, and for 
up to 4 years if a previous disqualification, imposed as a final sentence, expired 
less than 2 years previously.10 The definition of the offence of endangering traffic 
is very broad as it makes no distinction between reckless traffic offenders and 
road users who create a dangerous situation as a result of momentary inattention. 
Hence, a broad range of dangerous traffic behaviour is covered.
In addition to this general prohibition, the Reglement Verkeersregels en Verkeers-
tekens (Road Traffic and Traffic Signals Regulations; hereafter: RVV) provides for 
more specific traffic regulations. The WVW 1994 stipulates that violating the 
RVV is considered an offence. Exceeding the speed limit, for instance, is a mis-
demeanour, carrying a maximum prison term of 2 months and disqualification 
for up to 2 years.11 Many of these offences are dealt with under administrative 
law.12 Nonetheless, specific traffic offences may be excluded and can therefore be 
dealt with under criminal law. These offences include driving without a licence, 
not keeping distance when driving at high speed and serious speeding offences. 
In these cases, however, an extrajudicial fine or a punishment order (a punish-
8 The defence ‘absence of all culpability’ may be invoked, however. See Wolswijk, this book, Sec-
tion 2.3.1.
9 The law uses the term ‘detention’ (hechtenis) for imprisonment with respect to misdemeanours. 
Detention is seldom, however, imposed for misdemeanours.
10 Article 179, Sections 2 and 5 WVW 1994.
11 Article 92 RVV and Article 177, Section 1 under d WVW 1994.
12 In accordance with the Wet administratiefrechtelijke handhaving verkeersovertredingen (Traffic 
Regulations Administrative Enforcement Act). See, in particular, Article 2, Section 1 of this Act.
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ment issued by the Public Prosecution Service) may also be imposed.13 A criminal 
offence of a totally different order is drink-driving, which is punishable as a felony 
if the blood alcohol content (‘BAC’) is 0.05%14 or higher, or 0.02% or higher for 
newly qualified drivers. This endangerment offence is considered to be far more 
serious than the other endangerment offences. In the Netherlands, drink-driving 
carries a maximum prison term of 3 months, both for newly qualified and other 
drivers.15 An offender may also be disqualified from driving for up to 5 years, and 
in the event of recidivism for up to 10 years.16 As discussed below, these periods of 
5 and 10 years for drink-driving alone are the same as for the most serious forms 
of negligently causing death or serious injury by driving.
In contrast to the Netherlands, England & Wales recognizes two general endan-
germent offences: careless driving and the more serious offence of dangerous driv-
ing. The difference between careless driving and dangerous driving is that care-
less driving falls below what would be expected of a competent and careful driver, 
while dangerous driving falls far below what would be expected of a competent and 
careful driver.17 Careless driving carries a maximum fine of 5,000 pounds and 
discretionary disqualification.18 A prison term can, therefore, never be imposed. 
Dangerous driving also carries a maximum fine of 5,000 pounds, but also a max-
imum prison term of 2 years and mandatory disqualification for a minimum of 
12 months.19 Although the question of whether conduct was careless or dangerous 
may be debatable in some cases, the outcome of that debate is obviously extremely 
important. The maximum prison term of 2 years is also considerably higher than 
the 2 months for the Dutch offence of endangering traffic, while this latter offence 
also includes cases of reckless driving, which in England & Wales fall under dan-
gerous driving.20
As in the Netherlands, there are other criminal offences in England & Wales in 
addition to these general endangerment offences that specifically concern the dan-
gerous nature of the traffic behaviour and which may lead to prosecution, usually 
for the Magistrates’ Court. One example is speeding, which carries a maximum 
13 The statistics of traffic offences dealt with in court show that these offences are frequently 
treated as a violation of Article 5 WVW 1994, but even more often as a violation of other special 
traffic regulations. Data received in person from the Ministry of Justice’s research and documen-
tation centre (WODC) for 2008 and 2009. 
14 As well as drink-driving, driving under the influence of other substances that may seriously 
impair the driving ability is also an offence (Article 8 WVW 1994).
15 Inducing an individual whom you know to be, or should know to be under the influence to drive 
a vehicle carries the same penalty.
16 Article 175 WVW 1994 and Article 179 under 1 and 4 WVW 1994.
17 Articles 2A and 3ZA Road Traffic Act 1988 (RTA 1988). On this subject, see, e.g., Cunningham 
2008, p. 48 et seq.
18 See, e.g., Cunningham 2008, p. 35. The English ‘disqualification’ is essentially the same as the 
Dutch ontzegging van de rijbevoegdheid, in which case the driving licence is revoked (Article 146 
Powers of Criminal Courts Sentencing Act 2000).
19 Section 34 Road Traffic Offenders Act (RTOA) 1988. See, e.g., Cunningham 2008, p. 25.
20 The relatively low maximum punishment for the endangerment offence might explain why 
very dangerous behaviour that does not cause a serious result is quite often prosecuted for 
attempted intentional homicide in the Netherlands. See, Van Dijk, this book, Section 9.2.2.
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fine of 2,500 pounds if the violation took place on a motorway, and discretionary 
disqualification. In most cases, however, fixed extrajudicial fines are imposed.21 
Drivers will be guilty of drink-driving if they have a BAC of 0.08% or higher, 
which is more liberal than in the Netherlands. This relatively high percentage 
of 0.08%, however, has attracted criticism.22 Drink-driving carries a maximum 
prison term of 6 months, a maximum fine of 5,000 pounds and mandatory dis-
qualification for a minimum of 12 months (or a minimum of 3 years in the event 
of recidivism).23 This prison term is considerably lower than that for dangerous 
driving, and this raises the question of which forms of dangerous driving are 
considered more serious than drink-driving in England & Wales. The penalty in 
England & Wales for dangerous driving is vastly different to the maximum prison 
term of 2 months for dangerous driving in the Netherlands, whereas the penalties 
for drink-driving in the two jurisdictions are much more similar. The maximum 
term of disqualification in particular is relatively long in the Netherlands. With 
some reservation, it could be argued that the use of alcohol relatively increases the 
sentence in the Netherlands more than in England & Wales.
7.2.2 Causing Death or (Serious) Injury by Driving
Dangerous driving that causes a serious traffic accident constitutes a completely 
different offence. Article 6 of the Dutch WVW 1994 prohibits individuals from 
behaving in such a manner that a traffic accident, attributable to them, takes place 
in which another individual is killed or sustains grievous bodily injury, or sustains 
bodily injury resulting in an illness or that causes the other individual to be pre-
vented from engaging in normal activity (i.e. negligently causing death or serious 
injury by driving or ‘NCDD’). A minimum degree of culpability for the accident is 
required, which is described as ‘significant carelessness’.24 NCDD carries a max-
imum prison term of 3 years in the event of death and 18 months in the event of 
grievous bodily injury. In case of ‘recklessness’, which requires the defendant to 
have created a very serious danger by extremely negligent behaviour,25 the maxi-
mum sentences are doubled. All mentioned maximum sentences can be increased 
by a further 50% if the road user was under the influence of alcohol, seriously 
exceeded the speed limit, drove too close to the other vehicle, failed to give way or 
performed a dangerous overtaking manoeuvre.26 Causing a fatal traffic accident 
21 See, e.g., Cunningham 2008, pp. 79-80.
22 See Cunningham 2011. She notes that alcohol use is involved in 10% of all traffic accidents in 
England & Wales (see Cunningham 2008, p. 66).
23 See Section 5 RTA 1988 and Section 34 RTOA 1988. On this subject, see, e.g., Cunningham 2008, 
pp. 60-65.
24 Supreme Court 1 June 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AO5822.
25 See, e.g., Supreme Court 15 October 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:959. The concept of recklessness 
under Dutch law is discussed extensively by Wolswijk, this book, Section 2.5.
26 Article 175, Sections 2 and 3 WVW 1994. The Supreme Court has ruled that the mere finding that 
the defendant has committed one or more of these acts does not, in general, suffice to establish 
recklessness. See, e.g., Supreme Court 15 October 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:959. See also Wolswijk, 
this book, Section 2.5.2. 
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by reckless driving whereby the road user failed to give way could thus result in a 
maximum prison term of 9 years.27 In each case, disqualification for a maximum 
period of 5 years, or 10 years in the event of recidivism, may be imposed.28
The maximum penalties in England & Wales are much higher: causing death 
by dangerous driving (‘CDDD’) carries a maximum prison term of 14 years (by 
comparison, the mere offence of dangerous driving attracts a sentence of 2 years) 
and disqualification for a minimum of 2 years.29 There is no provision in law for 
statutorily increasing the penalty for causing death by reckless driving,30 which is 
also covered by CDDD. Drink-driving, too, does not result in a special qualification 
being added to the offence of CDDD. The law in England & Wales thus includes 
fewer aggravating circumstances. As demonstrated below, however, the guidelines 
in this jurisdiction do include such circumstances. Contrary to the Netherlands, 
causing injury by dangerous driving was for a long time not recognized as an 
offence, with the Court of Appeal previously considering this as an aggravating 
circumstance within the scope of a prosecution for dangerous driving. The max-
imum sentence of 2 years for dangerous driving, however, was frequently consid-
ered too low by the courts. This was one of the reasons why the specific offence of 
causing serious injury by dangerous driving was recently added to the RTA 1988.31 
This carries a maximum prison term of 5 years and mandatory disqualification.32 
The difference between this sentence of 5 years and the 14-year sentence for a fatal 
accident reflects how much the fatal nature of an accident continues to affect the 
severity of the penalty in England & Wales compared to the penalty applying in the 
event of a non-fatal injury.
While causing death by driving constitutes an offence in the Netherlands only 
if it involves significantly careless driving, England & Wales has opted also to des-
ignate causing death by relatively minor traffic offences (i.e. by careless driving) as 
a felony: causing death by careless driving (‘CDCD’), which carries a maximum 
prison term of 5 years and a mandatory minimum disqualification for 12 months 
(this contrasts with the fixed penalty applying in the event of the mere offence 
of careless driving). Causing injury or serious injury by careless driving does 
not yet constitute a felony, although the extent of the injury may be taken into 
consideration when sentence is passed for the offence of careless driving. The 
endangerment offence alone, however, carries a maximum fine of 5,000 pounds, 
resulting in a vast disparity between the penalties for serious injury in the event 
of careless driving and the offence of CDCD. Causing death by careless driving 
when under the influence of drink or drugs (‘CDCDUI’) has been an offence for 
some time now and carries a maximum prison term of 14 years and disqualifica-
27 Even if the indictment includes more felonies, only one prison term is imposed. The maximum 
penalties are accumulated, but the total result will not be more than one-third above the maxi-
mum penalty for the most serious felony.
28 Article 179, Section 1 WVW 1994 and Article 179, Section 4 WVW 1994.
29 Article 34.4 (a) RTOA 1988.
30 Extreme forms of reckless driving may be prosecuted under the offence of gross negligence 
manslaughter, which is not discussed here (see Cunningham 2008, p. 122).
31 See Cunningham 2012; Kyd Cunningham, this book, Section 3.4.
32 On this, see also briefly Edwards 2012.
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tion for a minimum of 2 years. The consumption of alcohol, therefore, brings the 
maximum sentence for CDCD into line with the maximum sentence for CDDD, 
in which alcohol is not a statutory aggravating factor. The 14-year sentence is also 
well above the maximum sentence of 5 years for causing serious injury by danger-
ous driving. This demonstrates once again how much weight is attached to fatal 
injury in England & Wales and how this, particularly in combination with the use 
of alcohol, sharply increases the maximum sentence that can be imposed.
7.2.3 Conclusion
This outline of statutorily prescribed penalties shows the extent to which pen-
alties are increased by dangerous driving that results in serious accidents. The 
difference between endangerment offences and result offences is substantial in 
both jurisdictions. In the Netherlands, contrary to England & Wales, causing a 
traffic accident through inattentiveness of a minor nature is not considered an 
independent offence meriting a specific maximum sentence. This is only covered 
by a single endangerment offence, which may or may not be prosecuted. Causing 
material damage or minor injury also does not constitute a felony under Dutch law. 
In England & Wales, on the other hand, criminalization and the associated high 
maximum sentences depend even more on the gravity of the consequences, i.e. 
whether the victim died, while the offence of causing serious injury by dangerous 
driving was introduced only recently. With respect to aggravating circumstances, 
the focus in England & Wales over the years has been mainly on the consequences 
(i.e. causing serious injury by dangerous driving, CDCD and CDCDUI).33 As 
regards NCDD, the focus in the Netherlands, in terms of aggravating circum-
stances, is mainly on forms of dangerous or reckless driving. It is noteworthy that 
endangerment offences are punished relatively mildly. There is specific attention, 
however, for the dangerous effect of alcohol consumption, and relatively more so 
in the Netherlands than in England & Wales.34 It is also noteworthy that sentences 
for drink-driving are considerably more severe than those for excessive speeding, 
while it is debatable whether this difference is justified.35 Finally, disqualification 
is an important, if not the most important, penalty in both jurisdictions. While 
the disqualification periods are already relatively long for endangerment offences, 
and particularly for drink-driving in the case of the Netherlands, they become very 
long as soon as offences lead to accidents. Indeed, in England & Wales, minimum 
periods of disqualification frequently apply. All of this clearly reflects both juris-
dictions’ strong need to rigorously neutralize – at least for the time being – any 
danger that an offender may still pose.
33 Finally, causing death while driving without a licence, while disqualified or without insurance 
carries a maximum prison term of 2 years and mandatory disqualification for a minimum of 
12 months. See Kyd Cunningham, this book, Sections 3.3.4 and 3.7 for recent developments.
34 This does not, of course, apply to CDCDUI.
35 See also Cunningham 2008, p. 230.
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7.3 Sentencing Guidelines
7.3.1 Importance of Sentencing Guidelines in General
Since the late 1990s, criminal courts in the Netherlands have been using the 
so-called national benchmarks for sentencing when imposing penalties for fre-
quently occurring offences. Penalties are linked to certain types of offences as start-
ing points (‘benchmarks’), but the ranges for these penalties are not prescribed. 
Except for types of offences, the benchmarks specify almost no aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances that courts must include in their consideration. The 
national benchmarks are set within the judiciary by a national consultative body 
made up of chairpersons of the courts’ criminal law divisions. As these bench-
marks are not regulated by law, courts are not bound by them. There is no need 
to substantiate any deviation, and failure to apply the benchmarks does not give 
grounds for appeal or an appeal in cassation.36 However, in practice courts tend to 
use the benchmarks regularly when sentencing. This may promote consistency. 
On the other hand, courts provide only little justification of how they apply the 
guidelines in deciding about a sentence to impose.37 This is one reason why Dutch 
sentencing practice is based mainly on experience rather than on legal reasoning.
Sentencing guidelines in England & Wales are currently set by the Sentencing 
Council, an independent public body made up of various people involved in the 
enforcement of criminal law in some way. The Council’s primary task is to design 
sentencing guidelines in line with the provisions of the 2009 Coroners and Justice 
Act (CJA). If the nature of the offence permits, the guidelines must describe dif-
ferent categories on the basis of the degree of culpability, the harm caused and any 
other relevant factors.38 An appropriate range of sentences must be formulated for 
every offence, and with more specific ranges for any categories within an offence. 
Within these more specific ranges, the basic sentence serving as the starting point 
before any account is taken of other factors must be laid down. In addition, the 
guidelines must list any aggravating or mitigating factors the court is required to 
take into account when sentencing an offender, including criteria for determining 
the weight to be assigned to any previous convictions.39 Courts are required to 
follow applicable sentencing guidelines, unless they are “satisfied that it would 
be contrary to the interest of justice to do so”.40 The court is bound by the range 
formulated for a particular offence and required to substantiate any deviation.41 
36 Supreme Court 3 December 2002, ECLI:NL:HR:2002:AE8838 and Supreme Court 10 November 
2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BK2678.
37 See, e.g., Lensing 2003, pp. 77-79.
38 Section 121 CJA.
39 Section 121(6) CJA.
40 Section 125(1) CJA.
41 R. v Taylor (Shaun) [2012] EWCA Crim 630 as commented in Criminal Law Review 2012, 7, pp. 557-
560. See also Roberts 2012. An alleged wrong choice of category range can be brought before the 
Court of Appeal (Ashworth 2012).
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If an applicable guideline specifies categories, the court is not, however, bound by 
the applicable ranges.42
This CJA framework generally offers the courts a more directive structure for 
explaining the sentencing part of their judgment, compared with the framework 
in the Dutch benchmarks. Since the guidelines include ranges and opportuni-
ties for deviation, they offer ample scope for imposing a sentence appropriate to 
each individual case, while the binding effect does not seem to limit the court in 
its assessment to any disproportional extent.43 According to Roberts, Hough and 
Ashworth, sentencing guidelines and the CJA leave enough room for individu-
alization in sentencing, while at the same time structuring sentencing in gen-
eral terms.44 Research has shown that sentences in general rarely fall outside the 
offence range.45 As in the Netherlands, therefore, guidelines in England & Wales 
do not in themselves seem to pose a problem for individualized sentencing.
7.3.2 Guidelines for Endangerment Offences
The Netherlands does not have a national benchmark for the offence of endanger-
ing traffic or for violating other specific traffic rules. Unless an extrajudicial fine is 
contested, such cases rarely end up in court,46 and the Public Prosecution Service 
has no prosecution guideline on which to base the extrajudicial fine or demand 
for punishment in such cases involving no more than a traffic offence. There is, 
however, a specific prosecution guideline on the violation of specific traffic rules, 
such as driving without a licence, not keeping distance when driving at high speed 
and serious speeding offences.47 This guideline includes a recidivism regulation 
for all of the offences, whereby the extrajudicial penalty is steadily increased if a 
fine, whether extrajudicial or otherwise, has previously been imposed for the same 
offence. A summons will then have to be issued at some point. The first time, 
for instance, that a driver excessively exceeds the speed limit by, say, 69 km/h, 
the Public Prosecution Service will impose an extrajudicial fine of 1,100 euros 
and 2  months’ disqualification. If the same driver subsequently again exceeds 
the speed limit by 69 km/h, a summons will be served and the sentence recom-
mended by the Public Prosecution Service is increased to a fine of 1,560 euros and 
4 months’ disqualification.48 The courts can decide to align with the principles set 
out in the Public Prosecution Service’s prosecution policy. If such offences lead to 
42 This seems to be a way to prevent courts from selecting a category with a range befitting the 
sentence it intends to impose, instead of first selecting a category and subsequently looking at 
the corresponding penalty. On this new methodology of sentencing guidelines, see also Roberts 
& Rafferty 2011.
43 See, e.g., Ashworth 2012.
44 Roberts, Hough & Ashworth 2012. See also Roberts 2012.
45 Wasik 2012.
46 In the writ the defendant is summoned to appear before the subdistrict court, which handles 
minor offences.
47 Guideline for felonies and misdemeanours for which offence descriptions have been laid down. 
See Staatscourant [Government Gazette] 2012, no. 27256.
48 See note 47.
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accidents, but are not considered to constitute NCDD, prosecution for an endan-
germent offence will generally be based on the Guideline for Prosecution of Traffic 
Accidents, which is discussed in more detail below. If an accident does not result 
in serious injury, this guideline stipulates an extrajudicial fine of 350 euros.49
On the other hand, however, there is a national benchmark for the felony of 
drink-driving.50 This contains scales based exclusively on the amount of alcohol 
in a person’s breath or blood. The lowest category attracts a fine of 300 euros for a 
BAC of 0.054-0.08%, while the highest is punished by 18 months’ disqualification 
and a prison term of 3 weeks for a blood alcohol content of 0.276% or higher. 
Unconditional disqualification is not imposed below a blood alcohol content of 
0.151%. In the event of recidivism and “other aggravating circumstances, such 
as dangerous driving”, the next highest category applies, while disqualification 
is mandatory in the event of multiple repeat offences.51 The guideline therefore 
specifies no aggravating circumstances other than “such as dangerous driving”. 
It is remarkable that the guideline stipulates a prison term of 30 days for the most 
serious cases with several aggravating factors, which may also be replaced by 
60 hours of community service, while the maximum statutory penalty is a prison 
term of 3 months. Such a gap between the maximum in the guidelines and the 
statutory maximum exists for many of the offences in the Netherlands. Fines for 
violations of the RVV stipulated in the guidelines are also relatively minor com-
pared to the maximum prison term of 2 months.
Contrary to the Netherlands, England & Wales has specific Magistrates’ Court 
Sentencing Guidelines for the general endangerment offences of careless driv-
ing and dangerous driving.52 However, in England & Wales, too, it is assumed 
that these offences, in particular the offence of careless driving, will mainly be 
prosecuted in the event of an accident without a fatal injury or, in the case of 
dangerous driving, an accident without serious injury.53 Many traffic offences in 
England & Wales, too, are dealt with without a criminal trial. Some cases involve 
guilty pleas, while minor offences are punished by police-imposed fines. None-
theless, the guidelines reflect how careless and dangerous driving are assessed, 
while at the same time illustrating the extent to which possible consequences will 
be considered in the sentencing.54 Under both the guideline for dangerous driving 
and the guideline for careless driving, the courts must determine a fine based 
49 Guideline for Prosecution of Traffic Accidents. See Staatscourant 2012, no. 26820. Fines have 
been laid down in legislation as far as the administrative law enforcement of specific traffic 
offences is concerned.
50 As there are guidelines for refusing an alcohol test and for driving while disqualified.
51 It is not specified, for that matter, whether that should be an unconditional disqualification.
52 Magistrates’ Court Sentencing Guidelines, Definitive Guideline, May 2008. Guidelines are avail-
able at: <sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk>.
53 See e.g., Cunningham 2008, pp. 8 and 230 and Cunningham 2012. She notes with respect to 
careless driving that an offender may avoid prosecution by accepting a mandatory driving course 
(Cunningham 2008, p. 36).
54 The guidelines assume that the offender has no previous convictions and denies the offence.
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on a distinction between three categories of offence seriousness.55 In the case of 
both guidelines, a previous conviction may result in the next highest category 
being applied as the starting point for the sentence, especially if there are also 
other aggravating circumstances. The lowest category of offence seriousness in 
the guideline for careless driving is the “momentary lapse of concentration”, while 
the highest is an “overtaking manoeuvre at speed resulting in collision of vehicles 
or driving bordering on the dangerous”. In the first case, a fine amounting to half 
a week’s salary is imposed, while disqualification may be considered in the latter 
situation. In addition, the guideline contains a number of aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances to be taken into account by the court, including injury to 
other persons. However, as stated earlier, the law provides no scope for imposing a 
fine higher than 5,000 pounds for a serious traffic accident resulting in grievous 
injury, nor for long-term disqualification.
The guideline for dangerous driving is structured in the same way as the 
guideline for careless driving. In all cases, a mandatory minimum disqualifica-
tion of 12 months applies, and 2 years if the offender has had 2 or more disqual-
ifications for periods of 56 days or more in the preceding 3  years. The mildest 
form of dangerous driving is where dangerous driving leads to an accident result-
ing in only minor damage. In this situation, therefore, the consequence is the 
decisive factor. The starting point in sentencing is a community service order of 
80-150 hours. The middle category includes “incidents involving excessive speed”, 
which carry a prison term of 12 weeks. Here, too, damage as a consequence of the 
dangerous behaviour is a factor, while personal injury is considered separately 
as an aggravating factor. The highest category, too, addresses both conduct and 
consequence: “prolonged bad driving involving deliberate disregard for safety of 
others or incidents involving excessive speed […] by a disqualified driver”, which 
is prosecuted for the Crown Court. No guideline for the sentence to be imposed is 
specified in this respect. The consequences are a factor putting upward pressure 
on sentencing in the guideline for dangerous driving, too, even though they are 
not included in the definition of the offence itself.56
The Magistrates’ Court Excess Alcohol Guideline specifies four categories, 
based on the amounts of alcohol in the blood. The lowest category for a blood 
alcohol content of 0.081-0.137% is a fine of one and a half times the offender’s 
weekly salary and 12-16 months’ disqualification, while the highest category for 
a blood alcohol content of 0.276% or higher is a prison term of 12 weeks, a com-
munity service order of 150-300 hours and 29-36 months’ disqualification. Here, 
too,  disqualification must be for a minimum of 2 years if the offender has had 2 or 
55 A general guideline also applies for assessing the seriousness of offences (Overarching Prin-
ciples: Seriousness), and this applies to all offences in the Sentencing Council’s methodology. 
This guideline is available at: <sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk>.
56 The Sentencing Survey researched the most common aggravating circumstances in traffic 
offences without fatal injury (Sentencing Council, Crown Court Sentencing Survey, Annual Pub-
lication 2011, Office of the Sentencing Council, April 2012, p. 22). Aggressive driving and the 
damage it caused were found to be by far the most frequently mentioned aggravating circum-
stances, while genuine remorse was found to be the most important mitigating factor as regards 
traffic offences.
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more disqualifications for periods of at least 56 days in the preceding 3 years. These 
prison terms are considerably higher than those in the Dutch guideline, more or 
less in proportion to the higher maximum statutory sentences. In the event of 
a previous conviction for a traffic offence, a minimum of 3 years’ disqualifica-
tion applies. This guideline also contains several factors to be taken into account 
by courts when sentencing offenders. Involvement in an accident, for example, 
is an aggravating factor. For the purposes of comparison with serious speeding 
offences, reference is made to the English Magistrates’ Court Sentencing Guide-
line on Speeding, which stipulates a fine of 1 week’s salary and a disqualification 
for 1 to 8 weeks for exceeding the speed limit by 30 mph. This is quite similar 
to the Dutch guideline on this point. As regards recidivism, the guideline only 
stipulates that repeat offences must be taken into account. In this respect, I would 
point out that other measures, often in administrative law, do include sanctions 
for repeat traffic offences. An example of this is the system of penalty points for 
traffic offences that is used in both jurisdictions.
7.3.3 Guidelines for Causing Death or Injury by Driving
The Netherlands has a relatively detailed national benchmark for NCDD (see 
Figure 7.1).
Figure 7.1 National Benchmark for NCDD (Article 6 WVW 1994)57
Consequences 
for victim
Use of alcohol ‘Road hogs’, 
reckless driving
Serious error Significant error
Bodily injury, 
temporary illness
No alcohol Unconditional 












BAC ≤ 0.13% Unconditional 














BAC > 0.13% Unconditional 














57 The alcohol rate is here specified according to the blood alcohol level, whereas the benchmark 
specifies the limit only according to the rate of alcohol in expired air. A more recent version of the 
benchmarks (22 November 2013) is essentially the same, but the prison sentences of 2 months 
or less are substituted by community service up to 240 hours. This is not necessarily indicative 
of a change in punishment practice, as it is quite common to sentence an offender to community 
service rather than to a short prison sentence.
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NCDD benchmarks are distinguished by the nature of the consequence (injury, 
grievous injury58 or death), alcohol consumption (none, moderate or considerable) 
and the driving behaviour (significant road traffic error, serious road traffic error 
or reckless driving). A benchmark of 1,000 euros and 3 months’ disqualification 
applies for the lowest category. For the highest category (fatal accident caused by 
reckless driving while under the influence of large amounts of alcohol), a prison 
term of 4 years and 5 years’ disqualification applies (compared to 18 months’ dis-
qualification and 42 hours of community service for drink-driving alone). The 
latter benchmark of 4 years’ imprisonment is reduced to 8  months if no alco-
hol was involved, which demonstrates how much weight is attached to the con-
sumption of alcohol in the Netherlands. To a certain extent, the guideline gives 
equal weight to the degree of culpability and the gravity of the consequences: the 
same benchmark applies to reckless driving resulting in non-serious injury as 
58 Both grievous injury and such physical injury that it results in temporary illness or impediment 
of the performance of daily routines fall under the statutory definition of NCDD.
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for a (relatively minor) traffic error resulting in death. The national benchmark 
specifies no further aggravating or mitigating circumstances, and the implica-
tions of recidivism are not worked out in detail. It is remarkable that the sentences 
for the highest categories in this guideline are also far below the corresponding 
maximum statutory sentences. In general terms, the most severe sentences in 
each case amount to 50% of the maximum statutory sentences, which raises the 
question as to whether the maximum statutory sentences and the benchmarks are 
sufficiently dovetailed. The reason behind this large difference is unclear.
As noted earlier, causing a serious accident is not an offence in the Netherlands 
if the degree of culpability is not ‘significant’. An alternative can then be to pros-
ecute for the offence of endangering traffic (Article 5 WVW 1994) or for violating 
specific traffic regulations. Under the Public Prosecution Service’s policy, the 
occurrence of the accident then provides reason to summon the offender.59 There 
is no national benchmark for these cases, although the court may, but is in no way 
obliged to, tie in with the Public Prosecution Service’s guidelines. In the event, 
however, of a fatal accident, the Guideline for Prosecution of Traffic Accidents 
stipulates a fine of 700 to 1,400 euros and disqualification for 1 to 3 months. Here, 
the influence of the consequences is essentially reflected in the decision to prose-
cute rather than in the passing of the sentence, which carries little weight in these 
types of cases. This is because although courts explicitly take the consequences 
into account when passing sentence in these cases, they rarely impose sentences 
exceeding a fine and a short disqualification, and community service orders are 
imposed only occasionally.60 If reckless driving results in an accident not con-
stituting NCDD because the injury is too minor or the damage only material, 
offenders will also be summoned if they have “created an unacceptable degree of 
foreseeable danger”.61 However, the prosecution guideline does not provide any 
specific starting points for sentences in such cases.
The English guideline for causing death by driving prescribes considerably 
more severe penalties and covers several specific offences: CDDD, CDCDUI and 
CDCD.62 A guideline for causing serious injury by driving has not yet been pub-
lished. In the case of CDDD, a very broad range of 2 to 14 years and 3 categories 
apply. While consumption of alcohol is one aggravating factor, it does not, in con-
trast to the Netherlands, determine the range within which the starting point 
for sentencing must lie. The highest category has prison terms ranging between 
7 and 14 years, with a starting point of 8 years, and applies to cases in which a 
conscious choice was made to disregard the traffic rules and to ignore the grave 
danger to others. This seems to correspond with the aggravating circumstance 
59 Guideline for Prosecution of Traffic Accidents. See Staatscourant 2012, no. 26820.
60 See, e.g., Duker 2012. 
61 Instructions for Traffic Accidents. See Staatscourant 2013, no. 4861.
62 Sentencing Guidelines Council, Causing Death by Driving, Definitive Guideline, July 2008. 
The guideline is available at: <sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk>. The guideline includes an 
extensive general section on starting points for assessing the gravity of the offence. These usu-
ally come down to an explanation of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as listed in the 
specific guidelines. The offences of causing death by driving when unlicensed, disqualified or 
 uninsured are not discussed here.
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of reckless driving in the Dutch guideline (i.e. a prison term of 8 months and 
3 years’ disqualification, providing no alcohol is involved).63 The middle category 
has prison terms ranging between 4 and 7 years, with a starting point of 5 years, 
and applies to behaviour where the driver’s dangerous driving causes considerable 
risks. This seems to correspond with the serious traffic error in the Dutch guide-
line (i.e. a prison term of 6 months and 2 years’ disqualification). The lightest 
category has prison terms ranging between 2 and 5 years, with a starting point of 
3 years, and applies to behaviour causing significant danger, such as speeding or 
performing a highly dangerous manoeuvre. This seems to correspond with the 
significant traffic error, which is the minimum required for the Dutch offence of 
NCDD (a prison term of 2 months and 1 year’s disqualification).
CDCD, too, contains three categories, distinguished by the degree of culpabil-
ity: (1) momentary inattention; (2) other cases of careless driving; and (3) careless 
driving verging on dangerous driving. In the event of no more than momentary 
inattention, a community service order will in principle apply, in addition to man-
datory disqualification for a minimum of 12 months (this compares to the fine of 
between 700 and 1,400 euros and disqualification for 1 to 3 months that applies in 
the Netherlands). At the second level (i.e. other cases of careless driving), however, 
the starting point is already a prison term of 9 months, and in cases verging on 
dangerous driving a prison term of 15 months. The guideline for CDCDUI is even 
more stringent: for the middle category of ‘other cases of careless driving’, the 
starting point is a prison term of 3 years in the event of a blood alcohol content of 
0.08%. Here, the consumption of alcohol in combination with causing an accident 
has an enormous effect on the severity of the sentence. With respect to repeat 
offenders, the same applies as for CDDD and CDCD. In other words, previous 
convictions may take the provisional sentence beyond the range given particularly 
where there are significant other aggravating factors. The upper range of both 
guidelines, incidentally, either dovetails with or comes close to the maximum 
statutory sentence.
Although the categories and the lower limit of dangerous driving seem com-
parable to those of Article 6 WVW 1994, in reality they may differ. Going by what 
constitutes a significant traffic error in the Dutch benchmark for the offence in 
Article 6 WVW 1994, CDCD, for example, could also constitute the type of driving 
referred to in this offence. This would bring the English and Dutch starting points 
slightly closer together, because of the lower starting points in the guideline for 
CDCD compared to those in the guideline for CDDD.64 Although the extent to 
which offences dovetail with each other on the level of culpability is not the subject 
of this study, it can be inferred from the guidelines that significantly more severe 
sentences for causing fatal traffic accidents are stipulated at a policy level in Eng-
land & Wales.
63 The guideline contains detailed descriptions of cases, including the applicable category. With 
respect to this highest category, for example, driving with a BAC well above the limit is listed.
64 In England & Wales, too, an offender may be charged with causing death by careless driving, 
even though the behaviour is clearly dangerous (Shepherd [2010] EWCA Crim 46; on this see, e.g., 
Ashworth 2012). 
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7.3.4 Illustrative Casuistry
It can be inferred from the above that fatal traffic accidents in England & Wales not 
only constitute a serious offence sooner, but also lead to far more severe sentences. 
The question is whether this applies only to the law on paper or whether such 
differences also exist in practice. The guidelines offer no insight, for example, 
into the possibly considerable influence of personal circumstances on sentencing. 
Instead, they focus on the gravity of the offence, while the English guidelines even 
state that they are aimed at defendants who deny the offence. This suggests that 
sentences may be considerably lower in practice. The extent to which this applies 
is an interesting question for further study.
As far as I have been able to discover, only a few studies have so far been con-
ducted into sentencing in traffic cases in the Netherlands and England & Wales. 
In 2003, sentences averaging 43 months’ imprisonment were imposed for CDDD 
and 44 months for CDCDUI.65 Non-fatal accidents have often been prosecuted 
under the offences of dangerous or careless driving. A 2004 study found that in 
12% of the cases of careless driving the offender was given a disqualification, while 
15% of the convictions for dangerous driving resulted in an unconditional prison 
sentence.66 As the majority of these cases probably involved serious, but non-fatal 
accidents, the figure of 15% is plausible.
For the Netherlands, Van Tulder established that 4% of the cases convicted of 
only NCDD in 2001-2002 resulted in an unconditional prison sentence.67 In 2003, 
Lensing conducted a study of 252 Dutch court judgments for the same offence: a 
prison term was imposed in 12% of these cases, albeit only for reckless driving or 
multiple repeat offences. The duration varied from 1 month for a driver who lost 
control of the vehicle while overtaking and killed a cyclist to 3.5 years for a driver 
without a valid licence who knocked down a pedestrian by driving recklessly after 
consuming large amounts of alcohol, and who subsequently concealed evidence 
of the accident.68 The number of times a prison term was imposed in the Nether-
lands for traffic accidents suggests that the average sentence is considerably lower 
than in England & Wales.69 Compared to England & Wales, therefore, the Nether-
lands seems more reluctant to impose unconditional prison sentences.
An analysis of actual sentencing practice in the Netherlands and England & 
Wales goes beyond the scope of this chapter. I will make a brief comparison, how-
ever, in order to provide a tangible understanding of the differences between the 
two jurisdictions as regards sentencing in individual cases. For the sake of con-
venience, I have limited myself to five examples of fatal accidents, i.e. three from 
65 See Cunningham 2008, pp. 98 and 105. It should be noted that Cunningham (Cunningham 
2008, p. 102) observed that such cases, according to research (Shute 2009), are often referred 
by the Attorney General to the Court of Appeal on the basis that the sentence was unduly lenient.
66 Pearce 2004, p. 31.
67 At the time of that study, several circumstances currently seen as aggravating circumstances 
(reckless driving, for example) were not specified in law.
68 See Lensing 2003, p. 77.
69 Van Tulder 2003. Data received from the Ministry of Justice’s WODC indicate that, in 2009, 
around 700 summons were served under Article 6 WVW 1994.
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 England & Wales and two from the Netherlands. Hirst gives the example of a 2007 
case, in which the defendant was sentenced to 18 months in prison for CDDD. The 
defendant had been overtaking, but misjudged the situation and forced an oncom-
ing vehicle to brake. As a result of faulty brakes, the oncoming driver lost control of 
the vehicle and was killed in the subsequent crash. The offender, who had no prior 
traffic convictions, was not deemed to have been guilty of any deliberate course of 
dangerous or aggressive driving. He had made a momentary and uncharacteristic 
error of judgement, which was not the sole cause of the accident.70 In another 
case referred to by Hirst, the offender was sentenced to a prison term of 2 years 
for the same offence, which was committed because the offender was trying to 
tune in his new car radio and so failed to react to stationary traffic. Although the 
collision was not so serious that it would normally cause a fatal injury, this injury 
was fatal because the victim was not wearing a seatbelt. The offender had no prior 
convictions, had sustained injury himself and showed great remorse. Lastly, Ash-
worth gives the example of a CDDD case involving a substantial deviation from 
the guidelines: while driving home after an emotional visit to the hospital, the 
offender ended up on the wrong side of the road due to momentary inattention. 
This caused him to collide with a motorcyclist, who was killed as a result. The 
offender had no prior convictions. After serving 3 months in prison, he was even-
tually sentenced to a suspended prison term of 12 months on appeal.71
These three examples of cases in England & Wales would be in the grey area 
between the misdemeanour of endangering traffic and the criminal offence of 
NCDD in the Netherlands.72 Some such cases may only just constitute NCDD, 
while others may fall slightly short. I will give two examples of such cases in the 
Netherlands. In the first case, a delivery van driver without prior convictions over-
took a traffic queue on the left-hand side while exceeding the speed limit. The van 
driver failed to see that a cyclist was crossing at a junction in the lane in which 
he was driving. He bumped into the cyclist and the victim died of her injuries 
in hospital. The District Court acquitted the defendant of NCDD and convicted 
him of the misdemeanour of endangering traffic. The offender, who showed great 
remorse, was sentenced to 80 hours of community service and a 12-month sus-
pended disqualification.73 In the second case, the significant culpability required 
for NCDD was assumed. This case involved the driver of a car who, during twilight 
hours, exceeded the speed limit of 80 km/h by 11 to 19 km/h and failed to reduce 
speed at a bicycle junction. Although he had seen cyclists at the junction, his speed 
meant he was unable to brake in time so that he killed one of the cyclists.74 He was 
given a suspended prison sentence of 2 months, 180 hours’ community service 
and a lengthy (the exact length is unclear) disqualification. These sentences seem 
considerably milder than those in the above cases in England & Wales.
70 See Hirst 2008, p. 347.
71 See Ashworth 2012, p. 86.
72 See Wolswijk, this book, Section 2.4 on the lower limit of negligence.
73 Haarlem District Court 14 October 2009, ECLI:NL:RBHAA:2009:BK0483.
74 Supreme Court 24 June 2008, ECLI:NL:HR:2008:BC7914.
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7.3.5 Conclusion
Sentences stipulated in legislation and sentencing guidelines differ considerably 
in the two jurisdictions, depending on whether the dangerous driving results in 
serious accidents. The differences are also substantial in terms of sentencing prac-
tice. In England & Wales, lengthy unconditional prison sentences are imposed as 
soon as driving behaviour with fatal consequences goes beyond momentary inat-
tention, while such sentences are usually imposed in the Netherlands in the event 
of reckless driving or drink-driving with fatal consequences. In England & Wales, 
sentences for accidents involving alcohol consumption are even higher. The penal-
ties for dangerous driving, such as drink-driving or seriously exceeding the speed 
limits, are relatively closer to each other in England & Wales and the Netherlands: 
these sentences usually involve no more than fines and disqualifications for, at 
least in the Netherlands, periods of 6 months, with alcohol consumption carry-
ing more weight in both jurisdictions than any other form of dangerous driving. 
Repeated drink-driving may lead to considerably longer periods of disqualification, 
which may be seen as a severe punishment. Extreme speeding, however, seems 
to attract lower sentences than offences involving consuming amounts of alcohol 
only just above the legal limit. Community service orders are rarely imposed, let 
alone prison terms, in respect of some endangerment offences.
As noted earlier, sentences for endangerment offences, particularly in England 
& Wales, are not in proportion to the sentences imposed when offences result in 
serious accidents. This latter aspect causes sentences in the guidelines, including 
unconditional prison sentences, to soar. It is remarkable in this respect that the 
English guidelines for causing death by driving seek to align with the higher max-
imum statutory sentences, while the Dutch national benchmark is much lower 
than the statutory maximum. Focusing so strongly on the serious consequences 
carries the risk, however, of disregarding the offender’s sometimes minor degree 
of culpability.75 Section 1.18 of the English Overarching Principles for Seriousness 
Guideline states that:
where unusually serious harm results and was unintended and beyond the control 
of the offender, culpability will be significantly influenced by the extent to which the 
harm could have been foreseen. If much more harm (...) has been caused by the of-
fence than the offender intended or foresaw, the culpability of the offender (...) may 
be regarded as carrying greater (…) weight as appropriate.76
In England & Wales however, the indignation felt in response to fatal traffic 
accidents has led to a level of sentencing that sometimes exceeds the sentences 
75 See Cunningham 2012. See also Hirst 2008; Van Dijk 2008.
76 In this guideline, the starting point is that culpability of the offender in the particular circum-
stances of an individual case should be the initial factor in determining the seriousness of an 
offence. Section 1.17 of these principles stipulates that harm must always be judged in the light 
of culpability. 
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handed down in certain manslaughter cases.77 The question arising from this is 
how a balance in the standardization of penalties for traffic offences can be found 
between condemning the considerable harm the dangerous driving has caused on 
the one hand and the degree of the road user’s culpability on the other hand. This 
question is too extensive to be answered comprehensively here, but I will explore 
some aspects of it in more detail below. It is important, however, first to explain 
that the weight the behaviour and the consequences carry in the sentencing does 
not seem to be consistently laid down in the descriptions of the various offences 
and corresponding maximum sentences in either jurisdiction. This is a matter of 
labelling, which I will discuss briefly.
7.4 More Consistent Standardization in Punishing Behaviour and Consequence
Until recently, only a fatal accident in England & Wales constituted a specific result 
offence in traffic, and this is still the case for careless driving. Causing accidents 
that result in serious injury, less serious injury or large material damage are not 
independent offences and no corresponding maximum sentences are in place. In 
such cases, recourse is sought to the endangerment offences. Under the guide-
lines for endangerment offences, consequences constitute aggravating circum-
stances, and a particular category usually applies. It is fair to assume, therefore, 
that the various degrees of seriousness of the consequences are taken into account 
in actual sentencing. But the way in which behaviour is qualified – in other words, 
the legal label that is attached to it – does not correspond with the essence of 
what the offender is blamed for: even though the charge is only an endangerment 
offence, the fact that it is prosecuted and the sentence that is imposed actually label 
the case as a result offence because the injury will be central to the assessment. 
To some degree, this also happens in the Netherlands: traffic errors resulting in 
slight forms of injury, regardless of whether one or more victims are involved, do 
not constitute a result offence, but must be prosecuted on the basis of the offence 
of endangering traffic, for example. Nevertheless, these kinds of errors are of a 
different order than merely an endangerment offence, because of the accident 
they caused.78 Criminalizing result offences more consistently could already be 
achieved by, for example, introducing no more than three separate offences with 
respect to material damage, injury (regardless of the seriousness of the injury) and 
death. Guidelines could then be used to detail further variation.
It can, therefore, be seen as inconsistent to be forced to prosecute for an endan-
germent offence alone if the accident caused is insufficiently serious. It would 
be equally problematic, however, to be forced to prosecute for an endangerment 
77 See, e.g., Hirst 2008.
78 See also Hirst 2008. It could be questioned whether there is good reason to distinguish specific 
result offences for traffic, or whether reference must be made to the general negligence offences 
of causing injury or death. While this question was researched by Cunningham 2008, I will not 
deal with this matter here and will take the existence of specific result offences as a starting point 
in this context.
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offence in cases of serious or fatal traffic accidents, when the traffic error does not 
meet the culpability required for a result offence. England & Wales has dealt with 
this problem by making CDCD an offence, but this issue was previously subject to 
debate. The Court of Appeal held in Krawec,79 a case of a careless driving offence 
that had resulted in a fatal accident, that the unforeseen and unexpected results of 
the carelessness were not in themselves relevant to the penalty. The reason for this 
seems to be that the minimally required culpability for a fatal accident should not 
be circumvented in this manner. The Court of Appeal abandoned this approach in 
Simmonds,80 when CDCDUI had in the meantime become a specific traffic offence 
carrying a high maximum sentence. According to the Court of Appeal, it would 
be anomalous to disregard the fatal accident when – merely as a result of the fact 
that no alcohol was consumed – it is only possible to prosecute for the offence of 
careless driving.81 In my view, the Court of Appeal did not rigorously abandon 
the principle formulated in Krawec, but instead merely attempted to prevent an 
inconsistency that followed from the statutory methodology of criminalization.82 
Viewed this way, the Court of Appeal appears to acknowledge the problematic 
character of these sorts of prosecutions. In the Netherlands, too, the offence of 
endangering traffic is very frequently the alternative charge in prosecutions for 
negligently causing death or grievous injury in the event of serious traffic acci-
dents caused by relatively minor traffic errors (such as braking too late, failing to 
notice a road user or taking a corner too widely). The accident is then often part of 
the indictment and the courts explicitly take it into account in passing sentence, 
which gives the impression of the offender being convicted for NCDD after all.83 
Such cases usually involve traffic errors that, without the accident, would barely 
have been reason for an extrajudicial fine. I suspect that the same applies to many 
CDCD cases in England & Wales.
Under Section 143 (1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, a court considering the 
seriousness of any offence must consider the offender’s culpability in committing 
the offence and any harm that the offence caused, was intended to cause or might 
foreseeably have caused. It can be inferred from this that it is the court’s duty 
to consider any form of damage in passing sentence, even if the causing of the 
damage is not an element of the offence. In the Netherlands, too, it is generally 
accepted that the court may take the consequences of offences into account in 
passing sentence, regardless of whether they constitute statutory aggravating cir-
cumstances. What is exceptional about the offences discussed here, however, is 
that they concern either endangerment offences or result offences and, therefore, 
would seem by their very nature to exclude each other. The fact that an accident 
occurred due to dangerous driving is of such substantial importance vis-à-vis 
other sentence-determining factors that it no longer constitutes an endangerment 
offence. If consequences, serious or less serious, are to be taken into account with 
79 Krawec [1985] RTR 1.
80 Simmonds [1999] RTR 257.
81 See, e.g., Cunningham 2008, p. 36.
82 This point also seems to be made by Cunningham (see Cunningham 2012, p. 270).
83 See Duker 2012.
CriminalLiabilityforSeriousTrafficOffences.indd   150 3-12-2014   10:16:29
151
The Relation Between Culpability and Harm in Sentencing Traffic Offences
respect to endangerment offences, the offences should be criminalized as such. If 
it is desirable to also prosecute the causing of traffic accidents due to minor traffic 
errors, I believe it would be consistent, with a view to punishment, to make this 
an offence. If the legislator does not opt for a specific result offence in cases where 
culpability is minor, this should also mean, in my view, that this aspect should not 
be included in the assessment if it is decided to summon and pass sentence for an 
endangerment offence. This is because the criminalization of the result offence 
requiring a specific degree of culpability (‘significant carelessness’) implies that 
criminal prosecution of negligence result offences has a function only at that spe-
cific degree of culpability.
7.5 Efficacy as a Benchmark for More Balanced Sentencing
7.5.1 Sentencing Practice and Scientific Research as a Basis for Policy 
Even if traffic offences are to be consistently criminalized based on the seriousness 
of the behaviour and the gravity of the consequences, the question still remains 
as to how a balance can be found (assuming standardized penalties for traffic 
offences) between condemning the considerable harm the dangerous driving has 
caused on the one hand and the degree of the road user’s culpability on the other 
hand. Above all, the efficacy of the punishment in the broadest sense of the word 
(prevention as well as retribution) could be favoured. This is not as obvious as 
it may seem: what constitutes an effective level of punishment is often judged 
in abstract terms. What constitutes efficacy, however, could also be made more 
concrete.
Firstly, this can to a certain extent be inferred from actual sentencing practice 
as various circumstances can be taken into account in individual criminal cases: 
the particular gravity of the consequences, the harm caused and the needs of the 
victims, as well as the personal circumstances and attitude of the offender. All 
the objectives sought to be achieved through the punishment are in those cases 
reflected in the decisions. A thorough analysis of actual sentencing practice is, 
therefore, an important basis, particularly for shaping guidelines for both endan-
germent and result offences.84 An interesting example of this can be found in 
England & Wales: under the CJA, the Sentencing Council must take account of 
the courts’ actual sentencing practice when developing guidelines, including the 
way in which existing guidelines are applied and the extent of any deviation from 
them. There is also an obligation to report on that practice annually. In my view, 
the national benchmarks in the Netherlands could also be accounted for more 
visibly, based on an analysis of sentencing practice.
84 If personal circumstances in practice considerably reduce the sentence, while guidelines are 
based on the act component of the offence, such guidelines could prescribe more severe sen-
tences than would be imposed in practice. An explanation of what causes the difference between 
the guideline and the practice could then be given.
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Secondly, what constitutes effective punishment can be inferred from research 
into the effects of punishment. More general research into the causes of accidents 
and the effects that traffic offence punishments have on road safety could help 
to either regulate sentencing practice or, if necessary, correct it. Punishing traf-
fic offences is firstly meant to improve road safety.85 Standardization of penalties 
should therefore partly reflect research into how criminal law can most effectively 
contribute to road safety. Here, too, England & Wales provides a good example: 
the CJA 2009 requires the Sentencing Council to take the proven efficacy of 
certain sentences into account when establishing sentencing guidelines. In the 
Netherlands, a lot of research is conducted by the SWOV Institute for Road Safety 
Research, an organization responsible for scientific research into road safety.86 
One of its recent reports87 found, for example, that cyclists and elderly people were 
especially likely to be victims of traffic accidents. This could be a basis for more 
specific measures, maybe even in the area of criminal law as well.88 A more detailed 
analysis of causes of accidents in England & Wales can be found in the Reported 
Road Casualties in Great Britain, published by the Department for Transport.89 
This in turn provides a basis for the Strategic Framework for Road Safety.90 This 
generates a great deal of knowledge about how road safety can best be enhanced 
and the most effective way in which criminal law can contribute to this.
7.5.2 How Can Criminal Law Effectively Contribute to Road Safety?
An in-depth analysis of what studies conducted into the effects of punishment 
have so far shown goes beyond the scope of this chapter,91 but it can be inferred 
from research that combating dangerous driving irrespective of the consequences 
thereof is the best way to prevent accidents. A caveat of the analysis in this chapter, 
however, is that its emphasis on the relationship between endangerment offences 
and result offences means it focuses on classical forms of punishment, whereas 
prevention of traffic accidents in general strongly benefits from all kinds of spe-
cific measures, often not even of a criminal law nature. Furthermore, consistent 
enforcement and a greater chance of being caught are often more important than 
the nature and severity of a penalty. Regular traffic spot checks are, therefore, 
essential. However, extra attention also needs to be paid to high-risk groups such 
as newly qualified drivers and the opportunities presented by measures such 
85 On punishment objectives in relation to traffic law, see Cunningham 2008, pp. 172-196.
86 Information and scientific research is available at: <www.swov.nl>. See note 6 on fact sheets on 
penalties in traffic.
87 Wijlhuizen et al. 2012.
88 The report heavily criticizes the limited knowledge about the exact causes of accidents. The 
organization has now therefore begun a more advanced and in-depth study into causes of acci-
dents (Davidse 2012).
89 The annual reports are available at: <www.gov.uk>.
90 The framework is available at: <www.gov.uk>.
91 In this respect, too, I refer to Cunningham 2008.
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as alcolocks.92 In this regard, Cunningham places a lot of emphasis, based on 
research, on the importance of changing attitudes. Many road users overestimate 
the control they have over their behaviour in traffic and do not see traffic offences 
as criminal behaviour.93 Insofar as criminal prosecution and punishment may 
have added value for enhancing road safety, that value could be reflected inter alia 
by, under certain circumstances, imposing higher penalties for specific endanger-
ment offences as a means of expressing greater moral disapproval.
The proportionality of punishment for serious traffic accidents may not be 
seen as something that ought to be included in general road safety policy. Severe 
penalties for – serious – traffic accidents are not usually presented in studies and 
policy reports as something of particular interest and as having a safety-enhanc-
ing effect.94 The objective of severe punishment, however, may be that it serves as 
retribution in proportion to the gravity of the offence. In that context, weight could 
also be given to the gravity of the consequences. However, research has shown that 
societal views on punishment for serious traffic accidents become more lenient if 
people look at individual cases in depth.95 Public indignation about these sorts of 
offences cannot automatically, therefore, be used as an argument for the level of 
punishment seen particularly in England & Wales. Dutch research into victim sat-
isfaction also shows that victims and surviving relatives in general feel less need 
for severe penalties as a form of retribution than, say, for emotional support and 
the feeling of being heard.96 If victims do feel a need for retribution, it is usually 
attributable to the offender’s intention in performing the action.97 A traffic error 
is thus viewed as less serious than reckless driving. Courteous treatment of vic-
tims and surviving relatives, and providing them with sufficient information, may 
sometimes ease the anger caused by the harm inflicted.98 An offender’s sincere 
remorse for what happened is obviously also an important element.
7.5.3 Indifference as a Sentence-Determining Factor for a More Balanced Policy
It can be inferred from the above that insofar as prosecution and punishment, 
as well as specific measures such as education, alcolocks and regular traffic spot 
checks, may help to improve road safety, the focus should be proportionally more 
on combating dangerous driving and less on seeking to prosecute offenders who 
92 Goldenbeld & Van Schagen 2008. See also Cunningham 2008, p. 2, who in this regard refers 
to, among others, Rothengatter 2002, p. 250. It was found in the EU Commission’s recommen-
dation on enforcement in the field of road safety, 6 April 2004 (2004/345/EC) that speeding, 
drink-driving and driving without a safety belt are predominant causes of injuries and casualties 
and should thus be prevented as much as possible. The recommendation encourages member 
states to take specific measures to enforce such offences more effectively. It was also found that 
traffic offences should result in effective, proportional and deterrent sanctions and not in a mere 
warning, as sometimes is the case for, say, driving without a safety belt.
93 See, e.g., Cunningham 2008, pp. 179-182 and 195-196.
94 See, e.g., Hirst 2008.
95 See Roberts et al. 2008. See also Cunningham 2008, p. 219.
96 See Ten Boom & Kuipers 2008, pp. 53-58.
97 See Malsch 2013.
98 On the experiences of victims in England & Wales, see, e.g., Cunningham 2008, p. 219 et seq.
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caused serious accidents as a result of unintentional traffic errors. Against this 
background, I believe it is not only fair to attach less importance to the conse-
quences in the case of minor traffic errors, but it is also fair to argue that seri-
ous endangerment offences, such as drink-driving and extreme speeding, are 
punished too lightly both in the Netherlands and England & Wales. As long as 
no accidents are caused, most serious speeding offences never result in a prison 
term, suspended or otherwise, and only rarely in a community service order, while 
in the case of drink-driving offences, even those involving considerable amounts 
of alcohol, such sentences are imposed only in the most extreme cases. If we are 
to improve road safety, it would seem important to focus, as far as punishment is 
concerned, on those people who are indifferent to the danger they cause to oth-
ers.99 Reckless driving – which can be an indication of such indifference – that 
results in an accident causes penalties to soar, even in the Netherlands. But this 
is different in the case of endangerment offences. Indifference can be found as an 
aggravating factor in the English guidelines for endangerment offences, while in 
both jurisdictions extreme speeding or drink-driving rarely lead to more than a 
fine, and only in the most extreme cases to lengthy disqualifications. If reckless 
driving can result in lengthy unconditional prison sentences (also in the Nether-
lands) as soon as it causes a serious accident – which I believe is not necessarily a 
disproportionate punishment – the sentence for reckless driving, too, should rise 
above the level of fines and mere incapacitation by disqualifications. In any event, 
I see no clear reason for punishing serious speeding offences less severely than 
drink-driving.100
Although the recidivism factor is not central to the guidelines, I believe it to 
be an important indication of a road user’s indifferent attitude. Under Section 143 
(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the court must treat each relevant previous 
conviction as aggravating. Principles for weighing recidivism must be formu-
lated on the basis of the CJA (Coroners and Justice Act 2009).101 Dutch law treats 
recidivism in similar felonies as a circumstance that may increase the maximum 
penalty by one-third. Recidivism in the case of endangerment offences such as 
drink-driving and speeding may justify a lengthy disqualification, which may be 
experienced as a very harsh punishment. Furthermore, at least in the Nether-
lands, a relatively strict system of administrative invalidation of the driving licence 
applies for repeated traffic offences. However, as far as a ground for moral disap-
proval is concerned, recidivism currently seems to me to play only a modest role 
in the standardization of penalties, given that road users’ self-overestimation and 
indifference are believed to pose an important risk to road safety. In both jurisdic-
tions, recidivism is not a determining factor in the categorization provided for in 
guidelines. Essentially, the only role that recidivism plays in traffic offences is that 
a higher category may be applied, but this does not necessarily mean a considera-
ble increase in the punishment. Previous traffic offences have no relevance at all in 
99 In this regard, see Cunningham 2008, pp. 3, 195-196 and 212-213, where she distinguishes 
between violations and errors. See also Cunningham 2007.
100 For England & Wales specifically, see also Cunningham 2008, p. 230.
101 Section 121(6) CJA.
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the Dutch benchmark for NCDD. If the consistency102 or seriousness of previous 
offences indicates an indifferent attitude towards the safety of others, this would 
seem to be a circumstance meriting a more determinative and distinguishing role 
in guidelines, both for endangerment and result offences.
7.5.4 Custody Threshold
Finally, a crucial question in the context of serious traffic offence cases is when to 
take the step – all circumstances considered – to deploy the ultimate means of the 
unconditional prison sentence. After all, imposing an unconditional prison sen-
tence will obviously change the way the traffic offence and the person committing 
it are perceived. Balanced punishment of traffic offences in my view also means 
having uniform basic principles on the appropriateness of that punishment. Eng-
land & Wales has some general basic principles with respect to imposing uncondi-
tional prison sentences. Section 152 (2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 stipulates 
that the court must not pass a custodial sentence unless it is of the opinion that 
the offence, or the combination of the offence and one or more offences associated 
with it, was so serious that neither a fine alone nor a community sentence can 
be justified for the offence. These principles are worked out in more detail in the 
Overarching Principles for Seriousness Guideline published by the Sentencing 
Guidelines Council (from 2004).103 These stipulate inter alia that prison terms 
can be imposed only for the most serious offences, and only then if it is “una-
voidable”. However, an unconditional prison sentence is already prescribed – in 
certain circumstances and regardless of recidivism – for dangerous driving. It 
seems that unconditional prison sentences are recommended in England & Wales 
in the event of serious accidents, even those involving less serious forms of poor 
driving behaviour. There seems therefore to be a tension, which I will not examine 
here in greater detail, between the general basic principles for imposing uncondi-
tional prison sentences and the guidelines for serious traffic offences.104 England 
& Wales nevertheless sets a good example for the Netherlands by including basic 
principles on this subject, however generally they may be formulated.
Neither Dutch law nor the national benchmarks contain explicit basic principles 
on when an unconditional prison sentence is appropriate. While causing injury 
by a ‘significant’ traffic error only leads to a fine in addition to disqualification, 
causing injury by a ‘serious’ traffic error already results in a short  unconditional 
102 Repeatedly committed minor traffic offences could also be included, but the fact that fines are 
issued to the person in whose name the vehicle is registered and who may not have been driving 
the vehicle when the offence was committed should be taken into account.
103 The Sentencing Guidelines Council was replaced by the Sentencing Council in 2010.
104 This tension is also manifest in the Magistrates’ Court Sentencing Guidelines (p. 163). Prison 
terms of up to 1 year (51 weeks) may be imposed as suspended sentences (Section 189(1) Crim-
inal Justice Act 2003). It is remarkable that the guideline states that a suspended prison sen-
tence can be imposed only in cases in which a prison sentence would also have been imposed 
if suspended imposition of the sentence had not been possible. To me this seems to compel a 
cautious attitude towards imposing suspended prison sentences and may be also, therefore, a 
reason to impose an unconditional prison sentence.
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prison sentence.105 On the other hand, the guideline for driving under the influ-
ence consistently leaves open the choice, even in the most extreme cases, between 
a community service order, a suspended prison sentence or an unconditional 
prison sentence. In practice, however, unconditional prison sentences are seldom 
imposed in any of these cases. A general basic principle as to when an uncondi-
tional prison sentence is appropriate is hard to concretize, but it may be possible 
to devise basic principles for specific offences such as traffic offences. Such prin-
ciples could give more substance to the debate on the weight of culpability and 
harm in traffic law. I believe an analysis of the cases in which short unconditional 
prison sentences were imposed is important in order to establish whether there 
is a more or less clear line between imposing or not imposing an unconditional 
prison sentence. Such analysis could also provide a basis for formulating uniform 
basic principles, and I would expect, in the case of the Netherlands, that reckless 
driving and the consumption of alcohol in result offences would be important ref-
erence points in this respect. In endangerment offences, they would be important 
reference points as well if accompanied by serious recidivism.
7.6 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the penalties for traffic offences in the Netherlands 
and England & Wales. My specific focus was on how the relationship between 
culpability and consequences is reflected in the punishments for traffic offences 
in these jurisdictions. A comparison of the two jurisdictions demonstrated that 
endangerment offences are punished at a reasonably similar level, and that 
drink-driving is severely punished in comparison, for example, to offences involv-
ing extreme speeding. Penalties in both jurisdictions were found to soar as soon 
as the same traffic offences lead to an accident, especially if the accident is fatal. 
The level of punishment in England & Wales in such cases is significantly higher 
than in the Netherlands. In both jurisdictions, the penalties for causing traffic 
accidents are not clearly reflected in the descriptions of the various offences, either 
because it is only in the event of fatal injury that the offence constitutes a result 
offence or because the behaviour does not constitute an offence unless the degree 
of culpability is ‘significant’. Insofar as there is a desire to punish the causing of 
traffic accidents as a result of minor traffic offences and to assign weight to the 
different forms of damage, such could also be included in the descriptions of the 
various result offences.
In addition, more balance in the standardization of penalties for endanger-
ment offences and result offences could be achieved by more clearly focusing 
on the efficacy of punishment. Research into actual sentencing practice and the 
effects of punishment for traffic offences could then play a key role. Some inter-
esting examples of regulations can be found in England & Wales in this regard. 
Based on research and in line with frequently expressed views, such as those of 
105 In a recently updated version of the benchmarks (22 November 2013) prison sentences of 
2 months or less are substituted by community service up to 240 hours. See also note 57.
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Cunningham, I argue that road users’ indifference to the danger they can cause 
to others is an important reference point for effectively assessing traffic offences. 
Not only could penalties be milder for result offences in which no indifference is 
involved, but indifference could also be a reason to punish particular endanger-
ment offences more severely, i.e. imposing punishment above the level of fines 
and short periods of disqualification. More weight than at present could then be 
attributed to recidivism. Finally, clear basic principles as to when an unconditional 
prison sentence is appropriate in serious traffic offence cases may contribute to 
a sharper debate on culpability and harm in traffic law and, therefore, to more 
balanced punishment.
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Chapter 8
Traffic Offences in a Behavioural Perspective
Karel Brookhuis*
8.1 Introduction
For some 100 years now, the popularisation of driving motor vehicles has grown 
exponentially, with all kinds of side effects. Traffic density increased, though the 
infrastructure was adapted to the fast-rising number of vehicles, while increas-
ing numbers of crashes took its toll. The large global number of traffic accidents 
involves high economical costs and human suffering, as indicated by a firm 
place in the top three death-rate causation in most industrialised countries.1 
The research questions that are studied in this particular field of human behav-
iour, labelled as traffic psychology, concern among others, imperfect perception, 
insufficient attention and inadequate information processing of the driver, often 
because of a low-vigilance driver state on the one hand or a driver state of extreme 
workload on the other.2
Since World War II, car ownership and car mileage have increased steadily 
in Europe. In the Netherlands, for example, the number of motor vehicles has 
grown from less than 1 million to about 8 million at the time of writing (and 
is still rising), covering distances from less than 20 billion kilometres to almost 
200  billion kilometres these days. The number of accidents with fatal and/or 
severe injury outcome initially rose quickly as well. This trend came to a stop in 
the mid-70s when authorities, car manufacturers and research institutes started 
to combine forces in order to counter this dreadful increase successfully. A variety 
of accident-reducing measures, such as intelligent driver support devices, were 
developed and implemented, leading to a gradual fall in casualties. Within the 
context of growing vehicle numbers and (new) electronic systems, driving a motor 
vehicle demands ever more skill and alertness of the driver; the driving task needs 
constant attention and control.
Driving a motor vehicle is a complex task, where the primary activity seems 
to be controlling the vehicle to stay on the road properly, moving from A to B, 
while as a secondary task, but simultaneously, the driver has to process infor-
mation about speed limits, manoeuvres of other drivers who are doing similar 
* Karel Brookhuis is Professor of Traffic Psychology at the University of Groningen, The Nether-
lands.
1 See Smiley & Brookhuis 1987.
2 See, e.g., De Waard & Brookhuis 1991, 1997; Lenné et al. 1997; Nilsson et al. 1997; Brookhuis & 
De Waard 2000, 2002; Leung & Starmer 2005; Ng Boyle et al. 2008.
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things, other traffic participants who are not and all kinds of other irrelevant, 
 distracting objects. Looking in the wrong direction or taking your mind off 
driving at a critical moment can lead to disastrous consequences while driving. 
Recently, driver inattention and distraction are estimated to be responsible for 
20% to 30% of police-reported traffic crashes, depending on the exact definitions 
of ‘inattention’ and ‘distraction’.3 Craft and Preslopsky found from two large crash 
causation studies in the USA that driver inattention/distraction was coded for 
20% of truck drivers and 29% of passenger vehicle drivers.4 Already in 1977, the 
broad notion of ‘recognition errors’ predominated the collection of causes that led 
to the now-common conviction that human factors are involved in more than 90% 
of all accidents.5
In the present contribution, the human factor in traffic accidents and causation 
is unravelled, with consequences for culpability and liability. In the context of a 
disgraceful blaming culture in our society, system failure is often regarded as 
human failure, confusing cause and effect, with large consequences for some par-
ties involved. Solutions are sought and presented below in the realm of intelligent 
driver assistance systems.
8.2 Theoretical Framework
In order to ensure adequate driving, i.e. proper control over the vehicle, many 
factors are relevant for the required driver performance. Fuller’s Task-Capability 
Interface model may provide some help in classifying these requirements.6 The 
model (Figure 8.1), in short, describes that a driver must continuously try to keep 
the driving task demands within the limits of what he or she is capable of (C>D 
in Figure 8.1). If the task demands are too high (C<D), loss of control may occur, 
for instance in lane and distance keeping. The task demands increase in the case 
of tasks that are secondary to driving such as, for instance, adverse weather or 
complex traffic.7
The increased demands may be compensated for, rather simply, by reducing 
speed in order to regain control over the vehicle, which is proposed to be the 
result of a desire to maintain feelings of risk at an acceptable level (risk allosta-
sis  theory).8 The increased demands could be compensated for by exerting more 
effort.9 However, the capacity to do so is not unlimited.10 As the demands exceed 
the individual’s capabilities, when compensation falls short, casualty odds show 
an upward trend in an exponential way.
3 Gordon & Regan 2013.
4 Craft & Preslopsky 2013.
5 Treat et al. 1977.
6 Fuller 2005.
7 Respectively Brookhuis et al. 1991; Hoogendoorn et al. 2013.
8 Fuller 2011.
9 De Waard 1996.
10 See, e.g., Brookhuis & De Waard 2010.
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Figure 8.1 Task-Capability Interface Model (Fuller 2005)
8.3 Human Errors and Support
But however fallible drivers are and however many mistakes they make – whether 
they encounter unexpected difficulties, make wrong judgements or decisions, or 
miss relevant signals or objects while driving – fortunately, in practice only occa-
sionally does this collection of failures lead to accidents. One reason for that is 
related to the ample margins in the traffic environment nowadays. For instance, 
modern roads are normally wide, leaving lots of room for stray movements or 
swaying, and when moving across the line, in most cases there is a more or less 
forgiving (i.e. soft) border. So, in spite of the statistics, drivers are not easily per-
suaded that they themselves run risks11 and that they are accident-prone at regular 
times and would need support. Nevertheless, intelligent driver support has been 
introduced and accepted quite recently, mostly in the form of electronic driving 
aids that provide relevant information to the driver. Very recently, electronic sys-
tems were introduced that even take over parts of the driving task in case the 
11 Svenson 1981.
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driver is in need. Many driving aids, however, whether just informing or actually 
interfering with the driving task, take the form of so-called comfort systems. A 
nice example of the latter type of systems is the so-called lane departure warning 
assistance (LDWA), as already introduced by some car manufacturers. LDWA will 
give a warning whenever the vehicle is crossing the white line marking the lane, 
either in the form of a sound or a corrective steering movement. The manufac-
turer sells this system as a voluntary comfort system, in an effort to avoid liability.
Studies in Greece concerning the effectiveness of casualty reduction measures 
in the ICT field demonstrated that the largest reduction is to be expected from 
electronic vehicle crash protection systems (15%). For instance, advance cruise 
control (ACC) or intelligent cruise control (ICC) is estimated to reduce head-on 
collisions up to 10%. Measures against driving while intoxicated, for instance in 
the form of detection systems such as alcolocks, were second with 11% in this 
list. Finally, road safety engineering measures, aiming at increasing obviousness 
of what sort of behaviour is expected, were reported to result in a reduction of 
6.5%.12 Due to the high cost of the latter type of measures, infrastructure improve-
ments by themselves are not expected to significantly contribute to a reduction of 
road fatalities. However, a suitable combination of new information technologies 
with existing infrastructure, or with limited improvements of it, may lead to cost- 
effective solutions and may become the catalyst towards achieving the EU goal of 
halving the number of road accidents in the period between 2010 and 2020.13
8.4 Human Habits and Limits
It all boils down to providing suitable, specific information to the driver at the 
right moment, amounting to a feasible level of information processing capacity, 
depending on the individual. In principle, that is what road authorities try to 
realise, certainly these days.14 But even then, disregarding typical human nature 
and certain limits that are not so obvious, suitable information provision might 
easily lead to unjustified enforcement. For instance, habituation and change blind-
ness (looking but not seeing [the obvious]) was studied in depth by Harms and 
Brookhuis in a driving simulator study, resulting in massive neglect of a speed 
limit.15
Twenty-four participants drove on a simulated motorway (Figure 8.2, right 
panel) in similar circumstances, with portals equipped with speed signs and a 
VSL (Variable Speed Limit) indicating a speed limit of 80 km/h. They covered 
the same route 19 times in a driving simulator, distributed over 5 separate days to 
drill a pattern of equal driving situation, in other words to get into a form of habit. 
In this case, the objective was to become habituated to driving with an indicated 
speed limit of 80 km/h. However, in the 19th trial (ride), the VSL was changed 
12 For an overview, see Brookhuis et al. 2011.
13 European Commission 2010. 
14 See, e.g., Brookhuis 2013.
15 Harms & Brookhuis forthcoming.
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from 80 km/h to 100 km/h. After that, a last trial was conducted with no speed 
indication.
Figure 8.2 Upper left panel: a standard Dutch motorway with portal and VSL indicating 80 km/h; 
upper right panel: a ‘standard’ simulated Dutch motorway with similar VSL. Lower panel: 
the successive trials of 18 times with a 80 km/h VSL, the 19th with a 100 km/h VSL and 
finally without speed indication.
In the 19th trial, most drivers did not change their speed, whilst only a minor-
ity of the participants (37.5%) were able to report the change on the VSL. Driver 
speed, verbal reports, glance frequency and glance duration while driving showed 
whether drivers who did not notice the changed speed limits failed to look at the 
speed limits or looked at them but just failed to notice that they had changed. In 
the last (20th) trial with no indication, the participants (gradually) increased their 
speed. After that, they were asked to complete the questionnaires, confirming 
that they had not seen the change. The continuous offer of a speed indication of 
80 km/h had habituated them so solidly that most of them missed the obvious, but 
small, change. Although no harm would have been done directly in this case in 
actual traffic, i.e. no punishment, a change from 100 to 80 km/h would immedi-
ately have brought drivers into a situation of serious traffic offence, speeding with 
20 km/h! However, not deliberately at all! Nevertheless, serious accidents in such 
a situation might well lead to a sentence in court. The offender could be held liable 
for negligently causing death or severe bodily injury.
8.5 Human Alertness
Another problem with information processing in traffic that is observed in many 
studies, if not already in actual everyday life, is reduced alertness. There are many 
possible sources to be pointed out with respect to reduced alertness which are 
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different from habituation, such as (situational) stress, distraction or reduced vig-
ilance. Smiley and Brookhuis concluded from numerous studies on vigilance that 
more than 90% of all traffic accidents are to be attributed to human failure, many 
of which are caused by inattention at the wheel, mediated through, for instance, 
fatigue or drowsiness.16 According to Vallet,17 it is generally a loss of alertness 
which is the principal cause of fatal accidents (34%), while fatigue as ‘single factor’ 
is estimated to be responsible for (only) 7-10% of all accidents by Tunbridge et 
al.18 This under-representation of fatigue-related accidents is now well recognised 
and results largely from the absence of direct evidence of sleepiness or tiredness 
being a factor. There is no quantitative measure of this effect on drivers. If driv-
ers survive an accident caused by sleepiness, they are unlikely to spontaneously 
report it; if they do not survive, there is often very little direct physical evidence. 
Maycock assessed the contribution of sleepiness to car accidents and found that 
car drivers admitted tiredness to be a major contributory factor in 7% of accident 
involvement.19 In a survey of 4,621 UK male drivers, Maycock found that 29% of 
the population surveyed had been close to falling asleep whilst driving at some 
time during the previous year.20 Horne and Reyner also reported that 20-25% 
of road accidents on motorways in the UK were sleep-related vehicle accidents.21 
Croke, analysing Australian heavy vehicle accidents, concluded that specifically of 
the high-cost accidents (>50,000 Australian dollars), more than 50% (!) could be 
attributed directly to driver fatigue as a major causal factor.22 Ouwerkerk reported 
that in a survey among 650 European truck drivers, the experience of falling 
asleep is not uncommon in this professional group.23 Of the total sample, 60% 
of the drivers admitted that they had almost fallen asleep at least once, and 16.6% 
responded they had actually fallen asleep. Almost half of the latter group had an 
accident as a consequence in that case. Several groups have been identified as 
being at high risk for sleep-related driving incidents, including individuals who 
suffer from sleep abnormalities (e.g. apnoea),24 shift workers who often experi-
ence poor sleep quality on rotations and commercial drivers who work long and/
or irregular hours.
Driving while suffering from sleepiness (whether consciously or not), driving 
after five hours or less of sleep and driving at night, i.e. between 2 am and 5 am, 
were associated with a substantial increase in the risk of a car crash resulting in 
serious injury or death. Reduction in the prevalence of these three behaviours 
may reduce the incidence of injury crashes by up to 19%.25 Thus, reduced alert-
ness, for instance by sleepiness/drowsiness, is a major factor in accident  causation. 
16 Smiley & Brookhuis 1987.
17 Vallet 1991.
18 Tunbridge et al. 2000.
19 Maycock 1995.
20 Maycock 1996.
21 Horne & Reyner 1995.
22 Croke 2000.
23 Ouwerkerk 1987.
24 See Howard et al. 2000.
25 Connor et al. 2002.
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 However, contrary to the case of habituation, it is more difficult to establish cul-
pability when a driver who is obviously not capable to drive due to drowsiness 
causes an accident, because the driver in this case is often not even suspected. 
One reason for this is because furnishing of proof is difficult, to say the least, 
unless it is frankly admitted. In some cases, however, proof of drowsiness can be 
based on other sources. On 14 July 2003, a major accident occurred on the main 
Dutch artery A2, killing two people, causing a giant traffic jam. A big tanker truck 
lost control and drove into a traffic jam, setting two cars on fire, after which the 
highway A2 was shut down for several hours. Major road works at the point of 
accident complicated the arrangement of signs and traffic, and the surveyability 
because of the quantity, so insufficient attention to all signs seemed the primary 
cause of the accident. However, since it concerned a major accident, the driving 
hours and background of the (foreign) truck driver were investigated afterwards. 
Only then it turned out that a suspicion of sleepiness could be corroborated.
Another prominent example of reduced alertness with respect to the pri-
mary task of driving safely is typical for modern times. A review of the literature 
demonstrates that the introduction, implementation and penetration of infor-
mation devices (ICT) in the vehicle have increased progressively.26 In particular, 
the boost of cellular telephones, navigation systems and now smartphones (com-
bining the latter two) has led to an increase in distraction opportunities within 
the vehicle. Notwithstanding the legal obligation to take care that as a driver one 
should be capable of controlling the vehicle properly at all times, paying attention 
to information providing systems has become part of the driving task. As long 
as the demands for information processing stay within limits, this need not be a 
problem.27 However, particularly being engaged in a telephone conversation bears 
potential risk.28 The pros and cons of initiating or accepting a telephone call in 
terms of risk is predominantly dependent on the level of absorption in the con-
versation. This may be difficult to judge, in particular with respect to the decision 
whether to accept an incoming call. Some people, however, cannot resist the urge 
to ‘be online’ continuously, which in the case of driving is undoubtedly perilous 
in the long run. For this reason, having a telephone conversation while driving 
is prohibited in some countries, while in others such as the Netherlands, only 
hands-free telephoning is allowed. Liability in case of an accident may be clear 
when engagement in a telephone conversation is suspected and thereupon proved 
through the provider, but actual enforcement in daily practice, i.e. in normal traf-
fic, by the police is probably not feasible, if not impossible. Moreover, the violation 
of privacy claims might obstruct proof in some cases as well.
26 Knapper, in preparation.
27 See Fuller 2005; Brookhuis & De Waard 2010.
28 Brookhuis et al. 1991.
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8.6 Tentative Conclusion
The message until now is confusing, hopefully. While offences in traffic are fre-
quently committed, sometimes leading to serious incidents, some offences (for 
instance, those attributable to human limits) should not be blamed on the driver, 
but are. Other offences (for instance, in the case of culpable lack of alertness), 
however, should be attributed to the offender, but are not. The conclusion should 
be that even major traffic offences do not always constitute an adequate or justified 
pretext for far-reaching sentences. On the other hand, some people might smoothly 
manage to escape appropriate sentencing while having offended seriously.
8.7 Towards a Possible Solution
Since information processing capability seems to be one of the central issues in 
relation to the consequences of the given examples of the human shortcomings 
while driving, intelligent driver support may provide a solution in the future.29 
First and foremost point of action would be to monitor and control speed, accord-
ing to the posted speed limit by means of Intelligent Speed Assistance (ISA) as 
introduced quite some time ago.30 ISA would restrain the driver from speeding, 
handling vehicle speed in an automatic fashion. Implementing ISA widely would 
decrease accident likelihood and increase transport efficiency considerably.31 Next, 
the ISA should be upgraded to a Personal Intelligent Assistant (PIA),32 which 
would be able to take over control with respect to communication between the 
driver and the environment. For instance, no telephone conversation should be 
put through when the situational demands are too high, while the caller should be 
informed about the reason. Finally, PIA should be capable of ‘reading’ the driver’s 
physical condition33 and to communicate accordingly to assist with the majority 
of occurring problems while moving, i.e. driving, riding or walking anywhere. If 
the mental load is too high, speed should be reduced and support provided. In the 
field of traffic and transport, the first unsteady steps are already taken on the path 
towards this goal. The contours of a Personal Intelligent Travel Assistant (PITA) 
have been worked out already for a limited application (travel information), but up 
to an amazingly far horizon, be it predominantly theoretical as yet.34 However, PIA 
would combine all the characteristics just mentioned and assist the driver up to 
real safety and efficiency.
29 See Brookhuis 2008; Dijksterhuis et al. 2011.
30 Brookhuis & De Waard 1999.
31 Carsten & Tate 2005.
32 See Brookhuis 2008.
33 See Dijksterhuis et al. 2013.
34 Chorus 2007.
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Chapter 9
A Cognitivist and Volitionist Analysis of 
Conditional Intent and Conscious Negligence 





This contribution aims to answer two related questions. First, how should intent 
in Dutch criminal law be interpreted? Second, what rules of inference should 
be used to assess intent? Both these questions are examined in the context of 
extremely dangerous traffic behaviour. A notorious case in Dutch criminal law 
– the Porsche case – serves as a springboard for this analysis.
In this prolegomenon, I will explain why it is essential to answer these ques-
tions in relation to traffic cases in the Netherlands. In order to do so, it is necessary 
to examine how the Dutch Supreme Court in general deals with cases pertaining 
to extremely dangerous traffic behaviour. Furthermore, it will be explained why 
the analysis in this contribution may be relevant to other criminal law systems as 
well. Finally, an outline of the chapter will be provided.
9.1.2 The Porsche Case and Its Aftermath
On 3 April 1994, the stage was set for one of the worst traffic accidents ever to take 
place in the Netherlands. After getting drunk in several bars, the defendant (D) 
and his friend embarked on a perilous journey in a Porsche. The Porsche turned 
corners with squeaking and burning tyres, was driven at excessive speeds and 
ran red lights with undiminished speed. Subsequently, D approached several cars 
very closely and then overtook them with a swift manoeuvre. Finally, D tried to 
overtake a Seat. After having aborted three overtaking attempts, the Porsche went 
to the other lane and collided head-on with an oncoming Volvo. The Volvo’s four 
occupants and D’s friend died as a result of this crash.
* Alwin van Dijk is Associate Professor of Criminal Law at the University of Groningen, The 
Netherlands.
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This tragic incident gave rise to a notorious and hotly debated Supreme Court 
judgment. The Court of Appeal had convicted D of intentional homicide on the 
basis of conditional intent, which can be defined as consciously accepting the 
substantial chance of the result. The Supreme Court quashed this conviction, 
appealing to assumptions of a psychological nature. The Supreme Court essen-
tially raised the question of how the finding of conditional intent to kill another 
person could be reconciled with the foreseeable and undesirable prospect of D’s 
own death as a result of the collision.
At the time of the 1996 Porsche judgment, it was generally expected that the 
Supreme Court’s ruling would pose an all but insurmountable barrier to estab-
lishing homicidal intent in traffic cases. Almost two decades later, it is clear that 
this prediction turned out to be off the mark. Gradually, more and more lower 
courts convicted for intentional offences. Almost no convictions that went to the 
Supreme Court were quashed. Interestingly enough, the Court never backed down 
from the Porsche case. It appears that providing a more elaborate explanation as to 
why intent can be established is all that is needed to get around the Porsche case.
In an extended version of this contribution, I examine seven categories of 
cases where homicidal intent has been proved.1 The categories pertain to facts 
and circumstances that justify a ‘cassation proof’ inference of homicidal intent. 
This essentially means that the facts and circumstances of the presented cases 
are (or might be) substantiated in such a way that the Supreme Court would not 
quash the judgment. I have no space here to describe specifically how lower courts 
deal with extremely dangerous traffic behaviour. It is important to note, however, 
that there appears to be great disparity in the way in which comparable cases are 
handled by different lower courts. One and the same case might just as well lead 
to a conviction as to an acquittal, depending on the court that handles the case. 
Generally, the one outcome is just as cassation proof as the other outcome.
9.1.3 The Cassation Free Zone
To explain the great disparity between courts, a brief description of the Dutch 
cassation procedure is in order. A distinction must be made between issues of 
law and issues of fact. The Supreme Court is authorized to fully assess the lower 
court’s application of the law. Thus, a decision could be quashed if the wrong 
standard for conditional intent is applied. The Supreme Court has limited power, 
however, with respect to issues of fact. The selection and evaluation of facts is 
the prerogative of the lower courts. Although the Supreme Court cannot directly 
assess the facts, it does have some power. The selection and evaluation of facts, the 
reasoning in the decision and the inference of intent from the facts (or the deci-
sion not to establish intent) are assessed according to an intelligibility standard. 
A decision is quashed if it is deemed ‘unintelligible’; a decision is not quashed if 
it is deemed ‘not unintelligible’. The intelligibility standard appears to be quite 
steep: the Court only quashes a decision if it is deemed completely unintelligible.2
1 See Van Dijk forthcoming.
2 See Van Dorst 2012, p. 197.
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Let us imagine that the facts and circumstances of a great variety of serious 
traffic cases are placed on an evidentiary strength continuum. The further one 
moves to the right, the higher is the evidentiary strength with respect to homi-
cidal intent. It is possible to make two intelligibility assessments with regard to 
each point of the continuum. First, how intelligible is it to infer homicidal intent, 
given the correct interpretation of intent? Second, how intelligible is it to entertain 
reasonable doubt as to homicidal intent, given the correct interpretation of intent? 
These assessments are mirror imagines of each other. The more intelligible the 
inference of intent is, the less intelligible is the presence of reasonable doubt (and 
vice versa). The two intelligibility assessments are placed above and under the 
evidentiary strength continuum in Figure 9.1.
Figure 9.1 Intelligibility of Convictions and Acquittals
low intelligibility conviction −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−++++++++++++++++++++ high intelligibility conviction
low evidentiary strength  high evidentiary strength
high intelligibility acquittal ++++++++++++++++++++++++++−−−−−−−− low intelligibility acquittal
The upper assessment refers to the intelligibility of a conviction, given a certain 
evidentiary strength and the correct interpretation of intent. The bottom assess-
ment refers to the intelligibility of an acquittal, given a certain evidentiary strength 
and the correct interpretation of intent. The minus sign refers to ‘cassation’; the 
plus sign refers to ‘no cassation’. It is possible to distinguish between three types 
of cases.
1. Left side: a conviction is unintelligible (cassation); an acquittal is intelligible 
(no cassation).
2. Right side: a conviction is intelligible (no cassation); an acquittal is unintelligi-
ble (cassation).
3. Overlap in middle: a conviction is intelligible (no cassation); an acquittal is 
intelligible (no cassation).3
The third category is of particular interest for the purposes of this contribution. 
This category concerns cases where both a conviction and an acquittal would be 
justifiable from a cassation perspective. It is submitted that this ‘cassation free 
zone’ may be quite broad given the large margin of appreciation that is extended 
to lower courts. The Supreme Court tends to construe many decisions as being 
‘not unintelligible’.
3 The figure shows that acquittals are less likely to be deemed unintelligible by the Supreme Court 
(see Van Dorst 2012, pp. 129-130). This ultimately results in a larger overlapping area.
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9.1.4 Two Sources of Disparity: Evidentiary Rules and Substantive Law 
The question is how the disparity between courts in the cassation free zone can be 
explained.4 It is submitted that there may be two substantial sources of disparity 
in Dutch criminal law. First, courts may assess facts and circumstances of a case 
in a different way. Second, courts may entertain a different interpretation of sub-
stantive law.
The disparity between courts can be partially explained by the use of differ-
ent rules of inference. Courts have different opinions about how likely it is that 
certain tokens (e.g. crossing a red light whilst intoxicated) are indicative of homi-
cidal intent.5 It is obvious that differences in the evidentiary strength attributed to 
tokens could result in a different outcome of a case. Such decisions are beyond the 
reach of the Supreme Court if the rules of inference are ‘not unintelligible’.
Another potential source of disparity lies in the interpretation of substan-
tive law. It is submitted that it is quite unclear how intent should be interpreted 
according to the Supreme Court. This ambiguity does not necessarily hinder 
lower courts in employing the concept. All that is required is that they use the 
same – ambiguous – terminology as the Supreme Court to designate intent. It 
is perfectly possible, however, that lower courts using the exact same language 
to designate intent ascribe to completely different interpretations of intent. For 
example, one court may hold that intent is a psychological concept that requires a 
degree of awareness bordering on oblique intent, whereas another court may hold 
that intent is a normative, non-psychological concept, for which no mental state 
is required.6 These different interpretations could obviously result in a different 
outcome of a case. However, such decisions are beyond the reach of the Supreme 
Court as long as the correct terminology is employed and the decision passes the 
intelligibility test with respect to issues of fact.
9.1.5 Aim and Relevance of This Contribution
Variance between courts is indicative of some kind of error. If two courts reach a 
different outcome in an equal case, one of the decisions must generally be wrong. 
Variance between court decisions and error of court decisions can be reduced in 
two ways. First, courts should employ the same, correct interpretation of intent. 
Second, courts should make use of the same, correct rules of inference to assess 
intent. These solutions are connected to each other, since evidentiary rules pertain 
to the substantive concepts that must be assessed.
One of the goals of this contribution is to provide more clarity on how to inter-
pret and assess intent, so as to give lower courts proper guidance. The analysis will 
4 It is noted that disparity also occurs outside the cassation free zone, because many decisions, 
some of which are unintelligible, never reach the Supreme Court.
5 To be more precise: it is about different rules of inference, given the same interpretation of intent. 
It is obvious that rules of inference are contingent on the probandum in question.
6 The latter interpretation may lie outside the realm of acceptable interpretations. In the extended 
contribution (Van Dijk forthcoming), I submit that some courts, in establishing homicidal intent, 
may secretly ascribe to a normativist, non-psychological view on intent.
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for the most part focus on the first source of disparity and error (interpretation of 
substantive law). The Porsche case serves as a springboard for this analysis. The 
central question is whether a cognitivist or a volitionist interpretation provides the 
best explanation for the Porsche ruling. In the process of analysing substantive 
law, I introduce a psychological theory that is relevant to the second source of dis-
parity and error (evidentiary rules). It is submitted that this theory – Desirability 
Maximization Theory – can serve as a general framework for analysing traffic 
cases.
Although this contribution pertains to Dutch criminal law, it is endeavoured 
that the analysis might be relevant to other criminal law systems as well. Quite a 
few legal systems recognize conditional intent or employ a similar concept such as 
recklessness. The question whether a cognitivist or a volitionist criterion is to be 
preferred has therefore a much broader relevance. The evidentiary framework that 
is introduced, Desirability Maximization Theory, also has a broader relevance. It 
is a general theory that serves to predict whether a certain mental state has been 
present. As such, it might have value with respect to all psychological mens rea 
terms.
9.1.6 Outline
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 9.2 provides relevant background 
information on the relationship between homicidal intent and dangerous traffic 
behaviour. The section delves briefly into the relevant law, legislative history, doc-
trinal views and the Supreme Court’s case law. It also contains a more extensive 
description of the Porsche case. In Section 9.3, I provide a cognitivist analysis of 
the Porsche case. The Porsche case is subjected to a psychological analysis accord-
ing to a rational theory of choice (Desirability Maximization Theory). Section 9.4 
contains a volitionist analysis of the Porsche case. Several volitionist theories 
that might explain the Porsche ruling are being examined. The final conclusion 
(Section 9.5) deals with the question of whether it is generally plausible to infer 
homicidal intent in cases of dangerous traffic behaviour.
9.2 Homicidal Intent in the Context of Dangerous Traffic Behaviour
9.2.1 Introduction
This section provides some relevant background information with regard to the 
application of homicidal intent to traffic cases. Section 9.2.2 provides an intro-
duction to the concept of conditional intent. Section 9.2.3 delves briefly into the 
applicable statutes for serious traffic cases. Sections 9.2.4, 9.2.5 and 9.2.6 deal 
respectively with legislative history, doctrinal views and the Supreme Court’s case 
law with regard to conditional intent. Subsequently, a more extensive description 
of the Porsche case will be given (Section 9.2.7).
CriminalLiabilityforSeriousTrafficOffences.indd   177 3-12-2014   10:16:30
178
Criminal Liability for Serious Traffic Offences
9.2.2 Why Is Homicidal Intent Ascribed to Dangerous Road Users?
Barring exceptional situations, drivers do not act in order to kill other human 
beings. Even people who drive at excessive speeds, overtake dangerously or are 
extremely drunk aim to reach their destination without causing accidents. How 
then is it possible that the legal concept of intent is applied to such cases? An essen-
tial explanatory factor is the broad interpretation of intent in the Netherlands. The 
Dutch concept encompasses not only direct intent (purposely) and oblique intent 
(knowingly), but it also encompasses conditional intent. The following definitions 
provide a provisional outline of these concepts.7
Someone acts with direct intent of causing a result if he acts because he wants that 
result and believes that his action might have that result.
Someone acts with oblique intent of causing a result if he acts whilst being virtually 
certain that the result will happen.
Someone acts with conditional intent of causing a result if he acts whilst consciously 
accepting a substantial chance that the result will happen.
In case of direct intent, the result provides a reason for acting.8 The person acts in 
order to achieve the result. This characteristic is absent in oblique and conditional 
intent. We can only say that the foreseen virtual certainty or substantial chance of 
the result does not provide a sufficient reason for not acting. Whether or not the 
acceptance condition adds anything vital to the definition of conditional intent is 
a major bone of contention.
This contribution deals only with conditional intent. Conditional intent is the 
lowest form of intent, bordering on the highest form of negligence. Conditional 
intent can be defined as consciously accepting a substantial chance of the result. 
This interpretation of intent is surely at odds with the plain meaning of the English 
terms ‘intent’ or ‘intentionally’. It is also at odds with the legal interpretation of 
these terms in the United States and England and Wales. Conditional intent bears 
resemblance to ‘recklessness’ in the United States Model Penal Code: consciously 
disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk.9 It is also related to ‘Cunning-
ham recklessness’, the dominant interpretation of recklessness in England and 
Wales. In R. v. Cunningham, recklessness was held to require that “the accused 
has foreseen that the particular kind of harm might be done and yet has gone on 
to take the risk of it”.10
7 The definitions are only meant to give a rough idea of these concepts. They are not consistent 
with all views on intent that are featured in this contribution. It is noted that the term ‘act’ in the 
definitions also refers to omissions.
8 See Duff 1990, pp. 58-63.
9 Article 2.02.2(c).
10 R. v. Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396.
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The Dutch term that is translated as ‘intent’ (opzet) has the same plain mean-
ing as the English term. To answer the question why this concept has been 
interpreted so broadly, we must return to the introduction of the Dutch Criminal 
Code (CC) in 1886. The legislator introduced two kinds of offences: felonies and 
misdemeanours. Felonies generally had an intent requirement, but in exceptional 
cases negligence sufficed. The general offence of negligent homicide (Article 307 
CC) was such an exception. Between 1886 and 2006, the maximum prison term 
for negligent homicide was only nine months. In contrast, the maximum prison 
term for intentional homicide was (and still is) fifteen years. The Supreme Court’s 
acceptance of conditional intent in 1954 can be plausibly explained by the fact that 
intentional felonies either did not have a negligent counterpart or had a negligent 
counterpart with a much lower maximum punishment. A more literal interpre-
tation of intent would often thwart the imposition of an appropriate punishment.
The broad interpretation of intent makes it less surprising that intent is 
ascribed to road users behaving dangerously. This is still far from self-evident, 
however. In other countries that accept conditional intent, it is only ascribed to 
road users in highly exceptional cases.11 This raises the question of why there is 
such willingness to prosecute and convict for intentional offences.12 One explana-
tory factor may be that the high maximum penalties that now apply for negligence 
in traffic (see next section) can only be imposed in case of death or serious injury. 
The misdemeanour of causing road danger only carries a two-month maximum 
prison term. Thus, very dangerous behaviour that does not cause a serious result 
can be punished much more severely if D is convicted of attempting to commit 
an intentional offence. The intent requirement for attempts is the same as for 
complete crimes: conditional intent suffices.
9.2.3 Applicable Offences in Traffic Cases
I will now provide a brief overview of applicable offences in serious traffic cases in 
the Netherlands. The most important offence for this contribution is intentional 
homicide. The only difference between intentional homicide (Article 287 CC) and 
the graver offence of murder (Article 289 CC) is premeditation. This aggravating 
factor, which also applies to the other intentional offences described below, is not 
examined in this contribution. The offence definition of intentional homicide 
makes someone liable to a maximum prison term of fifteen years if he “intention-
ally takes the life of another”. Other relevant offences are Article 302 CC (inten-
tionally causing severe bodily injury) and Article 300 CC (intentionally causing 
injury or pain). In these offences, causing a more severe result than intended is an 
aggravating factor. For this factor to apply, only causation must be established. All 
mentioned intentional offences, except Article 300 CC, can give rise to inchoate 
liability. In case of attempt, the maximum punishment is decreased by a third.
11 Germany provides a good example. See Goeckenjan, this book, Section 5.4.1.
12 See further the extended contribution (Van Dijk forthcoming).
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Article 6 Road Traffic Act (RTA) contains a special offence for negligently caus-
ing death or severe bodily injury in traffic.13 This offence pertains to two grades of 
negligence: negligence (schuld) and recklessness (roekeloosheid). It should be noted 
that recklessness does not necessarily require a mental state: the fact that D should 
have been aware of creating a very serious danger may suffice.14 The maximum 
prison term in case of causing death is three years for negligence and six years for 
recklessness. The maximum punishment for both negligence and recklessness is 
increased by one-half in case of specified aggravating factors (four and a half years 
or nine years). The aggravating factors boil down to intoxication, non-cooperation 
with a substance test, severe speeding, tailgating, not yielding right of way and 
dangerous overtaking. All mentioned maximum punishments are halved in case 
of causing severe bodily injury.
If dangerous traffic behaviour does not lead to death or severe bodily injury, 
the negligent offence does not apply. In that case, Article 5 RTA (causing road 
danger) provides an alternative. This offence is only a misdemeanour and carries a 
two-month maximum prison term. Although there is no explicit mens rea require-
ment, it is possible to invoke an absence of culpability defence.
Table 9.1 contains an overview of relevant offences. The maximum punish-
ment is provided in relation to several previously mentioned circumstances. The 
circumstance of ‘multiple victims’ relates to the rules on concurrent sentences. If a 
traffic collision has multiple victims, the maximum punishment will be increased 
by one-third.

































13 See Wolswijk, this book, Chapter 2.
14 See Supreme Court 15 October 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:959: “To establish recklessness […] the 
court must determine facts and circumstances from which it can be inferred that the defendant 
has created a very serious danger by extremely negligent behaviour, and that the defendant was 
aware of this or at least should have been.”
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9.2.4 The Emergence of Conditional Intent 15
The Dutch Criminal Code came into effect in 1886. Minister of Justice Modder-
man, who had been part of the commission that devised the code, is a key figure in 
legislative history. He has had a profound influence on doctrinal thinking. Noth-
ing has proved more important than his assertion before Parliament that intent 
is both about ‘wanting’ and ‘knowing’. The distinction between the volitional ele-
ment (‘wanting’) and the cognitive element (‘knowing’) provides the cornerstone 
for almost all scholarly treatises.
Modderman argued before Parliament that conditional intent should be recog-
nized. He maintained that acting whilst foreseeing that this would result in a par-
ticular consequence can be regarded as conditional intent. Modderman gave an 
example that can be seen as a precursor to the Porsche case. According to Modder-
man, a horseman who keeps on galloping through the streets without taking any 
precautionary measures, although he understands that a child will be crushed if 
he continues, does not act with conscious negligence, but with conditional intent.
From this and other passages, it cannot be inferred how much uncertainty 
with respect to causing the result is allowed for conditional intent. It is obvious, 
however, that Modderman’s conception of intent stretches well beyond the bound-
aries of direct intent, where the actor’s volition provides a reason for acting. This 
raises the question of how his view can be reconciled with his assertion that intent 
is both about ‘wanting’ and ‘knowing’. Modderman solved this conflict with an 
intriguing rhetorical move. According to him, a person who acts with conditional 
intent may not have desired the consequence, but he wanted it nonetheless.
The distinction between ‘desiring’ (wensen) and ‘wanting’ (willen) is hard 
to defend linguistically, both in Dutch and English. This strained construal of 
‘ wanting’ compels one to say that smokers want to die of cancer or that dentists 
want to cause pain. The absurdity is most obvious if someone directly intends Φ, 
15 See Van Dijk 2008, pp. 212-223 and 411-413.
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but knows that not-Φ might happen. We now have to say that this person both 
wants Φ and not-Φ.
Modderman’s broad view on intent was not well received in Parliament. On 
the day the Criminal Code was accepted by Parliament, Modderman declared 
that questions about the twilight zone between intent and negligence should be 
resolved by legal practitioners and scholars. In 1954, more than seventy years after 
Modderman’s words, the Supreme Court finally settled this issue by recognizing 
conditional intent.16 Over the years, the Supreme Court has used different expres-
sions to demarcate conditional intent. An invariable aspect of current definitions 
is that the chance should be substantial. The simplest definition of conditional 
intent is: conscious acceptance of a substantial chance. The Supreme Court’s case 
law will be outlined after a brief digression into scholarly views on intent.
9.2.5 A Cognitivist, Volitionist and Normativist Theory of Intent 17
Introduction
Scholarly handbooks have played an important role in the further development of 
conditional intent. In this section, I examine the views that are laid down in some 
important handbooks that appeared between 1991 and 2003.18 These views provide 
a good starting point for analysis. Two aspects are of interest. First, all handbooks 
purport to do no more than give a description of the law at the time. Second, all 
handbooks rely heavily on the parliamentary history and analyse intent by refer-
ence to a volitional element (‘wanting’) and a cognitive element (‘knowing’). At 
first blush, there would seem to be general consensus about the interpretation of 
intent. Closer analysis shows, however, that the terms ‘wanting’ and ‘knowing’ are 
interpreted in strikingly different ways. These differences are primarily relevant 
with regard to the lower boundary of intent (conditional intent). In the following, 
I classify the examined views according to three distinct theories of intent: a cog-
nitivist, volitionist and normativist theory.
Cognitivist Theory 19
The cognitivist theory takes intent to be a psychological concept. Although intent 
is analysed using ‘wanting’ and ‘knowing’, the cognitive element is heavily 
 emphasized. Someone acts with conditional intent of causing a result if he acts 
whilst foreseeing that there is a substantial chance of the result occurring. The 
volitional element is analytically dependent on the cognitive element: someone 
who acts whilst knowing the result might happen is held to have wanted the result.20 
As Nieboer stated succinctly: knowing + acting anyway = wanting.21
16 Supreme Court 9 November 1954, NJ 1955, 55.
17 See Van Dijk 2008, pp. 223-230 and 241-261.
18 Although these handbooks are somewhat outdated, the theoretical assumptions are still useful.
19 See Nieboer 1991, pp. 145-182; Strijards 1992, pp. 111-134.
20 Section 9.3.7 contains an explanation for this connection.
21 Nieboer 1991, p. 155.
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The boundary between conditional intent and so-called conscious negligence is 
solely determined by awareness of the substantial chance. Someone acting despite 
awareness of the substantial chance acts with conditional intent. If someone is 
not aware of a substantial chance whilst acting, there can at the most be conscious 
negligence. In that case, both the cognitive element and the contingent volitional 
element are not fulfilled. Only wants that are tied to foreseeing a substantial 
chance are regarded as ‘wanting’ in this context. The awareness that is implied 
by the term ‘conscious negligence’ is constituted by a lesser kind of awareness. 
This is present if someone acts whilst being aware of a non-substantial chance of 
the result. Acting despite this lesser kind of awareness is insufficient to fulfil the 
volitional element.
Volitionist Theory 22
The volitionist theory that is espoused by Remmelink also takes intent to be a 
psychological concept. In this view, the volitional element is emphasized. The 
cognitive element is held to be equally present in conditional intent and conscious 
negligence: the difference revolves exclusively around the volitional element. 
Conditional intent is present if someone decides that he wants to act even if the 
undesired result may be attached. If he wants this result nonetheless, rather than 
abandoning his act, then his intent is also directed at this result. Conscious neg-
ligence is present if someone considers the disastrous result, but dares to proceed 
because he does not believe in its fulfilment, and would cease his act if he did 
expect the result to happen. Remmelink illustrates this as follows.
This may be the case with a driver who drives at high speed through a busy street to 
catch his train. The possibility of a collision flashes through his mind, but is pushed 
back by the consideration that he has often done this without causing accidents [...]. 
If he does run over someone, then conscious negligence can be adopted. If he drives 
this fast because he is chased by the police and wants to abscond at any price, then 
intent is to be adopted in case of a collision. He puts up with that result, he pays that 
price, as long as he absconds.23
Remmelink argues that the volitional element is completely present in conditional 
intent; the cognitive element, however, is diluted to a mere realization of the pos-
sibility of a result. In conscious negligence, the cognitive element is the same, 
but the volitional element lacks completely. In contrast to the cognitivist theory, 
‘knowing’ and ‘wanting’ are not analytically connected. The difference between 
intent and negligence revolves exclusively around the volitional element.
The question is how this volitional element should be interpreted. Remmelink 
attaches great importance to the actor’s attitude. A negligent actor would hate it if 
the result were to happen, whereas the intentional actor would be indifferent. The 
actor’s attitude is gauged by means of a criterion that pertains to a hypothetical 
situation. The intentional actor would continue his act even if he had been more 
22 See Remmelink 1996, pp. 201-241.
23 Remmelink 1996, p. 205.
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certain about the result. The negligent actor would desist. Remmelink seems to 
imply that the actor actually must have contemplated what he would do if he had 
been more certain about the result. That means that the volitional element is 
negated in the following two cases. First, if the actor has considered that he would 
not act if he were more certain. Second, if the actor has not considered what he 
would do if he were more certain.
Normativist Theory 24
The normativist theory holds that intent is not a psychological concept. Intent can 
be defined as a normative (non-psychological) concept if the court, in ascertain-
ing intent, does not necessarily have to make an assertion about a mental state. 
This definition conveys that the normative character is a matter of substantive 
law. According to the normativist theory, the probandum is of a non-psychological 
nature. The mere fact that intent is proved on the basis of objective circumstances 
does not make for a normative concept.25 The normativist view in the handbooks 
in question must be set against the background of the dissertations of Peters and 
Brouns.
Peters radically departed from the legislator’s view that intent is a psychological 
concept.26 He argued that the terms ‘wanting’ and ‘knowing’ should be discarded, 
because mental states are completely irrelevant for the determination of intent. 
In his view, intent is the social meaning attributed to a psycho-physically neutral 
act. In Peters’s words: “It is possible, then, that an act has the meaning of ‘inten-
tional homicide’, just because what has been done ‘goes for’ intentional homicide, 
although the actor did not have the intention to kill.”27
Brouns defended three propositions in his dissertation.28 (1) Intent is not only 
‘knowing’, but also ‘wanting’. (2) Intent is not a mental state. (3) The meaning of 
intent varies according to the offence definition. Brouns’s normativist view can 
best be explained by the fact that he does not make a sharp distinction between 
the concept of intent (substantive law) and the manner in which intent is proved 
(evidentiary law). Objective circumstances used to prove intent are taken to be part 
of the concept of intent. This may also explain his view that intent does not have a 
uniform meaning, i.e. in some offences ‘wanting’ is more important, whereas in 
other offences ‘knowing’ is more important. It may well be that for some offences 
the evidence is generally more cognition related, whereas the evidence for other 
offences tends to be more volition related.
All handbooks in this category imply that intent is not a completely psycho-
logical concept. A potentially confusing aspect of these views is that the tradi-
tional psychological terms ‘wanting’ and ‘knowing’ are retained. The traditional 
terms are simply redefined in a normativist vein. All handbooks follow Brouns’s 
view that intent has no uniform meaning. Why, when and how the volitional and 
24 See Kelk 1998, pp. 163-220; De Hullu 2000, pp. 193-265; De Jong & Knigge 2003, pp. 97-139.
25 See Blomsma 2012, p. 130.
26 Peters 1966.
27 Peters 1966, p. 315 (English summary).
28 Brouns 1988.
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cognitive element vary is not elucidated. This makes it very difficult to compare 
this theory to the two psychological theories of intent. Since intent is a normative 
concept, it is possible that the volitional and cognitive element are fulfilled when 
someone does not ‘want’ or ‘know’ in a psychological sense. In this respect, the 
normativist theory is broader than the psychological theories. In other cases, it 
may be more restrictive. Intent according to a psychological theory may not always 
amount to intent in a normativist sense.
9.2.6 The Supreme Court’s View on Conditional Intent
All authors analysed in the previous section purported that their characterization 
of intent was in accordance with the legislative history and the Supreme Court’s 
case law of that time. It has been demonstrated, however, that the terms ‘wanting’ 
and ‘knowing’ were interpreted in strikingly different ways. The question which 
of these ‘descriptions’ is most in line with the legislative history or the Supreme 
Court’s view at that time will not be explored. The examined handbooks are to 
some extent outdated, because the Supreme Court has since gone on to be more 
explicit about the interpretation of intent. This section will briefly examine the 
Supreme Court’s more recent case law.
In 2003, the Supreme Court decided two important cases regarding HIV 
transmission (HIV I and HIV II). In the HIV II case, the Court of Appeal had 
convicted D of attempted intentional homicide.29 The court based its judgment 
about the substantial chance of death partially on the gravity of the result at stake. 
This interpretation accorded with certain scholarly views that ‘substantial chance’ 
should be interpreted as ‘unacceptable chance’. Thus, when a life is at stake, even 
a tiny chance may be regarded as unacceptable. The Supreme Court rejected this 
view. It held that the concept of substantial chance ought not to depend on the 
nature of the result. In all cases, the chance must be substantial according to rules 
of general experience.
The Supreme Court held that a substantial chance of death could not be 
inferred from the evidence, but implied that a 0.4% chance of transferring HIV did 
amount to a substantial chance of severe bodily injury. This view was later revoked. 
The Supreme Court held that there could only be a substantial chance of severe 
bodily injury in HIV cases in “exceptional, risk-increasing circumstances”.30 This 
condition was not even fulfilled in case of numerous instances of unprotected 
intercourse between D and V (victim).
As it stands now, it is unclear what chances can be regarded as substantial in 
this and other contexts. However, the ruling that the concept of substantial chance 
ought not to depend on the nature of the result is still relevant. In the HIV I case, 
the Supreme Court also gave some general directions as to the interpretation of 
conditional intent. These considerations are also still valid today.
29 Supreme Court 24 June 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AF8058.
30 Supreme Court 20 February 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:AY9659 (HIV IV).
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[To establish conditional intent] it is not only required that the defendant has knowl-
edge of the substantial chance that the result will occur, but also that he consciously 
accepted (took for granted) that chance at the time of his act. From the mere fact that 
this knowledge is present [...] it cannot necessarily be inferred that he  consciously 
accepted the substantial chance of the result, because in case of that knowledge 
conscious negligence might also be adopted. Of someone who has knowledge of 
a substantial chance of the result, but who [...] assumed that the result would not 
 occur, it can be said that he acted with (gross) inadvertence but it cannot be said 
that [he acted with conditional intent].31
It is difficult to say which of the three previously described theories best explains 
the Supreme Court’s current stance on intent. The normativist theory is the most 
difficult to reconcile with the Supreme Court judgment. The Supreme Court uses 
quite a few psychological terms to delineate intent. Furthermore, in a later pas-
sage the Supreme Court explicitly sets forth that statements by the defendant or 
witnesses may provide insight into “what went on in the defendant’s mind” at the 
time of the incident.
At first blush, the Supreme Court’s delineation of conditional intent seems to 
accord best with the volitionist theory, because the Court states that knowledge 
can both be present in intent and negligence. However, the Supreme Court fails 
to provide a proper volitional criterion to distinguish conscious negligence from 
intent. As will be further explained in Section 9.3, it is still possible to advance a 
cognitivist interpretation.
9.2.7 The Porsche Case
The chronicle of the Porsche case began on 3 April 1994 around 17.00 hour when 
D, a twenty-six-year-old car salesman, drove to his friend’s home to help him move 
some Porsche spoilers.32 After that they visited four bars, driving a Porsche 928s. 
In each bar, they drank up to five beers. Subsequently, the friends embarked on 
a perilous journey that would end up killing five people. Witnesses declared that 
the Porsche turned corners with squeaking and burning tyres, was driven at 
excessive speeds and ran red lights with undiminished speed. At the road where 
the collision occurred, the Porsche approached several cars very closely and then 
overtook them with a swift manoeuvre. Around 19.40, a Seat driver became aware 
that a Porsche had raced up on his tail. He testified that the Porsche had aborted 
three overtaking attempts, moving swiftly to the other lane and returning ever so 
quickly. The fourth overtaking attempt led to a head-on collision with a Volvo 340.
The Porsche was completely in the other lane when it collided with the Volvo. 
All four occupants of the Volvo, two related couples, died instantaneously. D’s 
friend died shortly afterwards. The wounded D left the burning wreck of the 
Porsche and fled to the home of his friend’s brother. Around 23.00 hour, he was 
31 Supreme Court 25 March 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AE9049.
32 The description of the facts of this case is based on the original case file and the Supreme Court 
judgment (Supreme Court 15 October 1996, ECLI:NL:HR:1996:ZD0139).
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apprehended in a hospital. At 0.15 hour, a blood sample was taken. His blood alco-
hol content turned out to be 0.072%. At first, D claimed that an unknown man 
had been driving, but he claimed later that his friend had been the driver.
The collision occurred on a straight road with an 80 km/h speed limit. It was 
still light and oncoming traffic was clearly visible. The Volvo’s lights were on. The 
Porsche left a 21.30-metre skid mark and the Volvo left no skid marks. It was esti-
mated by the police that the Volvo had been driving between 70 and 75 km/h. The 
Porsche’s speed was estimated to have diminished with 64 km/h whilst braking. 
D declared that the Porsche’s original speed had been between 120 and 130 km/h.
The Court of Appeal convicted D of multiple counts of intentional homicide. 
The court sentenced D to a six-year prison sentence. The court did not waste many 
words on explicating its judgment. The court ascertained that shortly before the 
collision the Porsche had been driving at high speed, that two red lights had been 
crossed, that dangerous overtaking manoeuvres had occurred and that D had 
consumed alcoholic beverages just prior to the collision. The court subsequently 
held that conditional intent with regard to the death of “other road users” could 
be inferred from the fact that D had participated in traffic “in the aforementioned 
manner”.
D appealed to the Supreme Court. The well-known attorney Spong argued on 
D’s behalf that the decision should be quashed on the basis of Remmelink’s influ-
ential view. The core of Remmelink’s volitionist view, which was articulated in 
Section 9.2.5, can be represented as follows.
In conditional intent the volitional element is completely present; the cognitive 
 element, however, is diluted to a mere realization of the possibility of a result. In 
conscious negligence, the cognition is the same, but the volitional element lacks 
completely.33
Spong argued that accepting conditional intent, especially the volitional element 
thereof in traffic tragedies such as these, is difficult to reconcile with D’s presumed 
will to live. Subsequently, he insisted that the question of whether the volitional 
element of conditional intent is fulfilled should not depend so much on conduct 
that occurred ten minutes before the collision. Instead, the conduct that occurred 
during or immediately before the collision should be paramount.
In criminal cases, the Supreme Court is provided with an independent advi-
sory opinion by an advocate general. Meijers, the advocate general in the Porsche 
case, strongly disagreed with Spong, sympathizing instead with Peters’s norma-
tivist view.34 According to Meijers, all factors taken into account by the Court of 
Appeal, even those that were manifested at an earlier stage, are pertinent. These 
factors betray an attitude of cynically and ruthlessly putting up with serious con-
sequences that may be expected on a busy road. In Meijers’s view, this attitude 
should be labelled as intent in the context of criminal law. This is justified in light 
33 Remmelink 1996, p. 205.
34 See Section 9.2.5.
CriminalLiabilityforSeriousTrafficOffences.indd   187 3-12-2014   10:16:31
188
Criminal Liability for Serious Traffic Offences
of societal considerations that have to do with oppression and with both special 
and general prevention.
The Supreme Court reached a different conclusion. The Court started out by 
stating in general that a road user acts with conditional intent if he “consciously 
accepts the substantial chance that others will die”, rather than “counting on a 
good outcome”. The Supreme Court then ruled that proof of intent in the case at 
hand was insufficiently motivated.
5.4 In cases such as the present one, where the evidence leads one to infer that 
the defendant by his conduct caused substantial danger for his own life as well, the 
court must, however, take into account that it is – absent indications to the contra-
ry – not likely according to rules of general experience that the defendant will also 
accept the substantial chance that a head-on collision with an oncoming car will 
occur, as a result of which he will die himself.
5.5 In light of the aforementioned and taking into account that the evidence indicates 
that the defendant – apparently to avoid a collision – aborted several overtaking 
manoeuvres before [...] completing the fatal overtaking manoeuvre, which indicates 
that the aforementioned manoeuvre, at least in the defendant’s imagination and 
expectation would not result in a collision, [...] the finding that the defendant’s intent 
was directed at the death of the victims stands in need of further motivation.
The cornerstone of this judgment is formed by the assumption that it is not 
likely that D would have accepted the substantial chance of his own death. The 
Supreme Court quashed the decision and referred the case to the Arnhem Court 
of Appeal. It should be noted that a ruling that a verdict is insufficiently motivated 
does not necessarily entail that it is impossible to convict. The court is required to 
 re-examine the case in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling. If it cannot properly 
motivate a finding of intent, then it will have to acquit.
This is what happened in the Porsche case.35 D was convicted of negligent 
homicide in traffic instead, although the court felt that the applicable maximum 
penalties of the Road Traffic Act could not do justice to the societal need for pun-
ishment. The maximum penalty in this particular case was four years’ impris-
onment. However, D could only be sentenced to three years and eight months 
of imprisonment on account of a previously imposed punishment for another 
offence. Under current law, the Road Traffic Act would probably allow for a maxi-
mum punishment of twelve years’ imprisonment (a combination of recklessness, 
an aggravating factor such as drink-driving and the fact that multiple deaths were 
caused).36
9.2.8 Conclusion
This section has provided some relevant background information on the interpre-
tation of intent in relation to dangerous behaviour in traffic. As it turns out, it is 
35 See Arnhem Court of Appeal 10 March 1997, ECLI:NL:GHARN:1997:AJ6387.
36 See Section 9.2.3.
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far from clear how the elusive concept of conditional intent is to be interpreted. 
It appears that the cognitivist and the volitionist theory are the best candidates 
to explain the Supreme Court’s case law on intent. In Section 9.3, I argue for a 
cognitivist interpretation of intent on the basis of the Porsche case. Section 9.4 
examines several volitionist theories that pertain to the boundary between condi-
tional intent and conscious negligence.
9.3 A Cognitivist Analysis of the Porsche Case
9.3.1 Introduction
The generally accepted academic view is that the Supreme Court emphasized the 
volitional element of intent in the Porsche case.37 This claim is to be understood 
against the background of an exclusive volitionist distinction between condi-
tional intent and conscious negligence. This entails that the cognitive element 
in conscious negligence is fulfilled, but that the volitional element is not fulfilled 
(‘knowing’ + ‘not wanting’). This interpretation of the Supreme Court’s judgment 
accords with the argument that was brought forward by D’s attorney Spong. He 
had argued, on the basis of Remmelink’s volitionist view, that the volitional ele-
ment of intent is difficult to reconcile with D’s presumed will to live.
The generally accepted academic construal of this case seems to be based on a 
simple piece of reasoning. First, the Supreme Court’s assumption that D did not 
want to kill himself and others is more or less automatically tied to the absence of 
the volitional element of intent. Second, it is more or less automatically assumed 
that the cognitive element of intent must have been fulfilled. Thus, the case fits 
nicely into the mould of the volitionist theory (‘knowing’ + ‘not wanting’).
In this section, I will argue against these premises. The automatic connection 
between the Supreme Court’s speculations about D’s volitions and the volitional 
element of intent is called into question. Instead, I will argue that the speculations 
about D’s volitions are but a means to say something about the cognitive element. 
In this view, the Porsche case fits just as well into the mould of the cognitivist 
theory.
I will clarify my view by elaborating on four assumptions, which might explain 
the Porsche case: (1) self-preservation assumption; (2) danger perception assump-
tion; (3) rationality assumption; and (4) non-awareness assumption. In the pro-
cess, I introduce a psychological framework (Desirability Maximization Theory) 
that may be applicable to other traffic cases as well.
37 See ’t Hart 1997; Wedzinga 1997, p. 501; De Jong 1999, p. 4; Wolswijk 2000, pp. 800 and 804-
805; De Jong & Knigge 2003, p. 109; De Hullu 2012, p. 240; Harteveld & Robroek 2012, p. 70; 
Machielse 2013, note 3.3 on ‘opzet’. See also Wolswijk, this book, Section 2.3.2.
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9.3.2 Self-Preservation Assumption
1. D did not want to die.
The Supreme Court ruling can be plausibly explained by the self-preservation 
assumption. This assumption holds that human behaviour is generally directed 
towards self-preservation. The self-preservation assumption is a plausible psy-
chological assumption.38 Some psychologists even go so far as to claim that the 
self-preservation instinct – the goal of staying alive – is the superordinate goal 
towards which all behaviour is oriented.39 Such a sweeping claim is difficult to rec-
oncile with risky road behaviour, however.40 The weaker self-preservation assump-
tion that is appealed to here only holds that people generally have a very strong 
desire to stay alive. The anticipation that certain behaviour might well result in 
their own death provides a strong motivation not to act.
Due to the omnipresent character of the self-preservation instinct, the assump-
tion can be made regardless of the case at hand. The Supreme Court did, however, 
find additional support in the fact that D had aborted several overtaking manoeu-
vres. According to the Court, D apparently did this to avoid a collision. This is evi-
dence for the validity of the self-preservation assumption in this particular case: 
it can be inferred that his behaviour shortly before the collision was not directed 
towards causing a collision and killing himself. It might be added that there is 
also evidence with respect to a later stage. Braking is the most natural collision 
avoidance manoeuvre.41 The braking manoeuvre shows that D did not want to 
cause a collision at that time as well.42
9.3.3 Danger Perception Assumption
2a. If there is a substantial chance of V dying, there is also a significant chance of 
D dying.
2b. If D had been aware of the substantial chance of V’s death, he would also have 
been aware of a significant chance of his own death.
The danger perception assumption has an objective component (2a) and a sub-
jective component (2b). The objective component deals with the relation between 
the objective chance of V’s death and the objective chance of D’s death. The term 
‘objective’ is meant to convey that it does not refer to D’s estimation of the chance, 
38 See Karni & Schmeidler 1986; Muraven & Baumeister 1997. See for a similar argument in a legal 
context: Grass 1983-1984, p. 512.
39 See Pyszczynski, Greenberg & Solomon 1997, p. 5.
40 But see Taubman Ben-Ari, Florian & Mikulincer 1999, claiming that risky driving may accord with 
the self-preservation principle, because it serves as a symbolic means to protect oneself from 
the awareness of one’s finitude.
41 See Markkula et al. 2012, p. 1120.
42 The Court of Appeal did not mention the braking manoeuvre. This explains why the Supreme 
Court did not use this argument.
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which is termed the ‘subjective chance’.43 The subjective component is about the 
relation between the subjective chance of V’s death and the subjective chance of 
D’s own death.
What can we say about the objective chance of death for V and D? The end 
state of the Porsche case was a head-on collision between a Porsche 928s and a 
Volvo 340 DL. Since the Porsche is built for speed and is much heavier than the 
Volvo, the collision may have been much more dangerous to the occupants of the 
Volvo than to D.44 However, a high-speed head-on collision seems to be rather 
dangerous, even if one is driving a Porsche. If there is a substantial chance of V 
dying, there must at least have been a significant chance of D dying.
The subjective component deals with the relation between a mental state that 
is required for proof of intent (awareness of a substantial chance of V’s death) 
and his estimation with respect to the chance of his own death. If D had been 
aware of the substantial chance of V’s death, it is highly likely that he would also 
have been aware of a significant chance of his own death. This conclusion may be 
strengthened by taking self-preservation into account. From a self-preservation 
perspective, it is more important to recognize danger to oneself than danger to 
non-related others. From an evolutionary perspective, it may even be beneficial 
to overestimate danger to oneself, because it is better to err on the safe side.45 
The cost of overestimating danger is much less than the cost of underestimating 
danger, since one mistake can already be fatal. All in all, it is hard to imagine that 
the necessary condition for intent is fulfilled (awareness of lethal danger to others) 
whilst D has not perceived significant danger to himself.
The abovementioned argument takes the Volvo’s occupants as a reference 
point. It is to be noted, however, that the Porsche’s other occupant also died and 
that homicidal intent with regard to him was also established by the Court of 
Appeal. The death of the other occupant underscores the dangerousness of this 
collision. Furthermore, it is even more difficult to fathom that D had been aware 
of the substantial chance of his friend’s death whilst not having been aware of the 
(almost) equal chance of his own death.
9.3.4 Rationality Assumption: Desirability Maximization Theory
3a. The option involving a significant chance of his own death would be less desir-
able to D than other options.
3b. D would not opt for the least desirable option.
3c. Thus, D would not act whilst being aware of a significant chance of his own 
death.
43 In the legal context, a so-called ‘objective chance’ is still subjective in nature because it is based 
on an informed probability estimation of a certain event. This might be labelled as an ‘inter-
subjective chance’. See Gillies 2000, pp. 169-186. See also Van Dijk 2008, pp. 391-394.
44 See Evans 1994. The heavier car will drive the lighter car backwards. Occupants of the lighter car 
will therefore experience higher decelerations.
45 See Gilbert 1998. Otte 2001, p. 11, argues the opposite for the Porsche case. In his view, it is very 
difficult to imagine one’s own death.
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Desirability Maximization Theory
According to the causal theory of action, intentional conduct is caused (in the right 
way) by beliefs and desires.46 The fact that someone goes to the store to buy a com-
puter can be causally explained by one’s desire to buy a computer and one’s belief 
that this computer can be bought there. In a forthcoming book, I will argue that 
the most convincing psychological account of action is given by what I call Desir-
ability Maximization Theory.47 This theory is a more precise,  decision-theoretic 
version of the causal theory of action.
The first aspect of this theory involves the desirability maximization thesis. If 
someone can choose between multiple options, he will always choose the option 
that is more desirable than (or at least as desirable as) any other option open to 
him.48
The second aspect of this theory specifies how someone determines the 
desirability of possibilities and options. An option (overtaking) may have several 
possibilities (possibility 1: collision; possibility 2: no collision). The desirability of 
a possibility is determined by two factors: conviction and appreciation. The con-
viction is a determination of the probability of the possibility. The appreciation is 
a determination of how much the possibility is valued. I submit that it is possible 
to assign numbers to convictions and appreciations. The numbers designate the 
strength of these mental states.
The conviction grade (conviction) is an expression of the belief state. The convic-
tion grade is modelled after the scale that is used to express objective probabilities. 
Someone who is fully convinced that Φ will happen has a conviction grade of 1 
(100%) with regard to Φ. Someone who is fully unconvinced that Φ will happen 
or is fully convinced that Φ will not happen has a conviction grade of 0 (0%) with 
regard to Φ. Someone who is equally convinced that the mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive possibilities Φ and not-Φ (e.g. head or tail) will happen has a conviction 
grade of 0.50 (50%) with regard to Φ. These three reference points are the most 
straightforward. It is, of course, also possible to assign numbers to intermediate 
convictions.
The appreciation grade (appreciation) is an expression of the desire state. The 
appreciation grade is expressed on an arbitrary scale between -100 (maximum 
negative appreciation) and 100 (maximum positive appreciation). An appreciation 
grade of 0 means that someone is indifferent with regard to the possibility. The 
46 See Davidson 1980, pp. 3-19; Mele 1992; Moore 1993.
47 Desirability Maximization Theory is a subjective, psychological version of Expected Value The-
ory. It must be distinguished from Subjective Expected Utility Theory (Savage 1954). The latter 
rational choice theory is not a psychological theory. It is a behaviouristically inspired mathemat-
ical theory about the representation of subjective probabilities and utilities. Its function is pri-
marily normative: detecting inconsistencies between different choices. Desirability Maximiza-
tion Theory aims to be descriptive and predictive. See for similar psychological theories: Mellers 
& McGraw 2001; Ajzen & Fishbein 2008; Weiss, Weiss & Edwards 2009. The forthcoming book 
about Desirability Maximization Theory will be published after the previously mentioned other 
forthcoming book, which is an extended version of the present contribution.
48 This thesis accords with Davidson’s well-known principle P1. Davidson 1980, p. 23: “If an agent 
wants to do x more than he wants to do y and he believes himself free to do either x or y, then he 
will intentionally do x if he does either x or y intentionally.”
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other numbers have no meaning by themselves, but say something about the 
relative level of appreciation.49 An appreciation grade of 8 is twice as high as an 
appreciation grade of 4. Furthermore, a negative appreciation can be cancelled out 
by a positive appreciation of the same strength. Thus, an appreciation grade of 5 
with regard to winning 100 euros if a coin comes up heads and an appreciation 
grade of -5 as to losing 70 euros if a coin comes up tails add up to 0.50
The central tenet of Desirability Maximization Theory is that the desirability 
of a possibility is determined by multiplying the conviction grade by the appre-
ciation grade. Both the appreciation grade and the desirability are expressions of 
the desire state. The desirability can be positive, neutral (0) and negative as well. 
If an option has multiple possibilities, the desirabilities must be added together. 
This leads to the overall desirability of the option. The desirability of the option 
can then be compared to the desirability of other options. The option with the 
highest desirability is chosen (desirability maximization thesis). The theory can 
be represented as follows.
D  =  C1 × A1 + C2 × A2 + . . . + Cn × An
D desirability of the option
C1 conviction grade with regard to possibility 1
A1 appreciation grade with regard to possibility 1
Application to the Porsche Case
I illustrate the theory by applying it to the Porsche case. The relevant question 
here is how much the option of overtaking is desired compared to the option of 
not overtaking. Let us assume that the desirability of not overtaking is 0. That 
means that D will overtake if the total desirability of the option of overtaking is 
positive. Let us further assume that D has a conviction grade of 0.50 with regard 
to the possibility that the overtaking manoeuvre will kill himself. On account of 
the self-preservation assumption, this possibility must be extremely negatively 
appreciated (e.g. -80). According to Desirability Maximization Theory, the desira-
bility of this possibility is -40 (0.50 × -80). The option of overtaking can only have 
a positive desirability if the possibility of a successful overtaking manoeuvre is 
extremely highly appreciated. Assuming that D’s conviction grade with regard to a 
successful overtaking manoeuvre is also 0.50,51 his appreciation of this possibility 
should be higher than 80 (e.g. 90). This is pictured in Tables 9.2 and 9.3.
49 It is submitted that the appreciation grade can be expressed on a ratio scale. See, e.g., Davis 
1980.
50 This example conveys that losing money generally has a greater impact than winning money 
(loss aversion). See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman 1991.
51 It is assumed that the conviction grades with regard to the mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
possibilities sum to 1 (additivity).
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Table 9.2 Desirabilities of Possibilities
Possibility Desirability Conviction Appreciation
Killing oneself 0.50 × -80 = -40 0.50 -80
Successful overtaking 0.50 × 90 = 45 0.50 90
Not overtaking 0
Table 9.3 Desirabilities of Options
Option Total desirability
Overtaking -40 + 45 = 5
Not overtaking 0
Table 9.3 indicates that the total desirability of the option of overtaking (5) is higher 
than the desirability of not overtaking (0). This means that D will elect to overtake 
the other car.
The numbers required to induce D to overtake raise serious questions. A de-
sire to experience thrill and adventure can certainly motivate some drivers to take 
risks.52 It is hard to imagine, however, that the possibility of thrill seeking is so 
much appreciated that the possibility of killing oneself is outweighed. This ac-
cords with research indicating that thrill seekers who behave risky do not perceive 
this as such themselves.53 This means that the objective risk may be much higher 
than the subjective risk (conviction grade).
A positive desirability for the option of overtaking can only be plausibly 
obtained by assuming that the conviction grade for the possibility of killing one-
self is substantially lower. This entails that the conviction grade for the other pos-
sibility of successfully overtaking will be substantially higher. A conviction grade 
of 0.10 as to killing oneself goes together with a conviction grade of 0.90 for a 
successful overtaking manoeuvre.54 In that case, an appreciation grade of just 9 
with regard to a successful overtaking manoeuvre (desirability = 0.90 × 9 = 8.1) 
is sufficient to outweigh the negative desirability of killing oneself (desirability = 
0.10 × -80 = -8). This is somewhat less implausible, but it is still hard to imagine 
that trivial motives such as thrill seeking are so much appreciated.
It is, of course, possible to attribute a much lower conviction grade to D. It is 
to be noted, however, that the conviction grade with respect to killing oneself is 
connected to the conviction grade with respect to killing others via the danger 
perception assumption (see Section 9.3.3). If D had been aware of the substantial 
chance of V’s death (as is required for proof of intent), he would also have been 
52 See Rothengatter 1988; Jonah 1997; Harris & Houston 2010.
53 Heino, Van der Molen & Wilde 1996, p. 78, state that the term ‘willingness to take risks’ may 
be inappropriate. “Sensation seekers, as compared to sensation avoiders, do not evaluate their 
behaviour as being more risky. Therefore it can not be said that they take more risk deliberately.”
54 It is assumed that the conviction grades (0.10 and 0.90) with regard to the mutually exclusive 
and exhaustive possibilities sum to 1 (additivity).
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aware of a significant chance of his own death. Thus, in applying Desirability Max-
imization Theory here, we must assume the chance of D’s own death to be at least 
significant. If the conviction grade for one’s own death gets so small as to seriously 
reduce the negative desirability of killing oneself (e.g. 0.01 × -80 = -0.80), this is 
unlikely to go together with the required awareness of a substantial chance of 
another person’s death.
Desirability Maximization Theory aims to predict behaviour on the basis of 
underlying mental states. In this case, however, it is used to demonstrate that 
certain behaviour cannot be plausibly explained by a mental state (awareness 
of one’s own death) that is thought to be connected to homicidal intent. Three 
assumptions are required.
3a. The option involving a significant chance of his own death would be less desir-
able to D than other options.
3b. D would not opt for the least desirable option.
3c. Thus, D would not act whilst being aware of a significant chance of his own 
death.
Assumption 3a has been demonstrated above. It is phrased in the conditional 
tense to convey that D did not actually make this determination. To get from the 
preference assumption 3a to action assumption 3c, we need auxiliary assumption 
3b. Assumption 3b is based on the desirability maximization thesis: someone will 
always choose the option that is more desirable than (or at least as desirable as) 
any other option open to him. If this connection between preference and action is 
accepted, it follows that D would not overtake whilst being aware of a significant 
chance of his own death.
Applicable in Practice?
Desirability Maximization Theory is a rational theory of choice. The theory 
appeals to a rather thin notion of rationality.55 The beliefs (conviction grade) and 
desires (appreciation grade) that form the reasons for action are left unexamined. 
Conduct is still regarded as rational if a reasonable person in the actor’s position 
would have had different beliefs or desires. Rationality is solely determined on the 
basis of a given set of beliefs and desires. Desirability Maximization Theory holds 
that convictions and appreciations are mentally integrated to form desirabilities, 
which in turn form the basis for the maximization of desirability. If convictions 
and appreciations are integrated correctly and if the option with the highest desir-
ability is acted upon, the action is regarded as rational.56
55 See Elster 1983, pp. 1-15, about thin theories of rationality.
56 It is important to note that the oft-cited finding by Kahneman & Tversky 1979 that people system-
atically violate the axioms of Expected Utility Theory does not affect Desirability Maximization 
Theory. These findings pertain to consistency between choices, whereas Desirability Maximiza-
tion Theory is about unique choices. Kahneman and Tversky’s research programme on biases 
and heuristics has unfortunately instilled a widespread belief that humans are prone to make 
irrational decisions.
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The question can be raised whether people are actually capable of perform-
ing the complex mental arithmetic that the theory seems to require. I cannot 
address this question thoroughly here, but I submit that the theory has sufficient 
descriptive power. I briefly address two important aspects. First, it is not implied 
that people actually have numbers in their heads. The theory only holds that the 
strength of beliefs and desires can be represented by numbers. Such numbers 
could in principle be elicited via psychological procedures.57 Second, it is not 
implied that mental arithmetic actually takes place. The multiplicative integra-
tion of convictions and appreciations (C × A) takes place by means of an intuitive 
fractionation strategy.58 The output variable (desirability) is located on the same 
dimension as the required input variable (appreciation). The appreciation grade is 
simply adjusted in proportion to the conviction grade.
The claim made here is that humans implicitly act in accordance with Desira-
bility Maximization Theory. This means that even people with no formal knowl-
edge about probability theory are expected to conform to these rules.59 It is, of 
course, not claimed that people conform perfectly to the theory. People are bound 
to make mistakes in the mental integration of convictions, appreciations and 
desirabilities. This might lead to a ‘wrong preference’: someone prefers (and acts 
upon) an option he should not have preferred based on his underlying convictions 
and appreciations. It is submitted, however, that the theory is good enough to be 
used in practice. This is especially so if the theory is applied to clear-cut cases 
like the Porsche case. If the negative desirability of one possibility (getting killed 
oneself) is so high that it can hardly be outweighed, the margin for error is quite 
large. Thus, even rather substantial calculation errors would still lead to the ‘right 
preference’: i.e. not overtaking is more desirable than overtaking.
Even if it is accepted that people more or less conform to Desirability Maximi-
zation Theory, the question remains how it can be applied to legal cases. In crim-
inal cases, the actus reus is usually quite clear, but it is often unclear what mental 
states, if any, explain D’s conduct. Applying Desirability Maximization Theory to a 
case basically requires solving an equation with an unknown number of variables 
(what options and possibilities were considered?) with unknown values (convic-
tion grade; appreciation grade; desirability).
With respect to the number of options and possibilities, it is submitted that 
human beings tend to consider a relatively small number in order to make a deci-
sion.60 Due to a limited processing capacity, humans will only focus on salient 
options and possibilities. The serious consequences that are relevant in the legal 
context (e.g. death or injury) are bound to have a large impact in decision making 
if they are considered by the actor. When one tries to reconstruct the decision 
making process, it is, therefore, generally acceptable to limit the representation 
of convictions and appreciations to just a few important options and possibilities.
57 See, e.g., Von Winterfeldt & Edwards 1986.
58 See Lopes & Ekberg 1980.
59 See, e.g., Schlottmann 2001 about expected value judgments of five-year-old children.
60 See Ajzen & Fishbein 2008; Weiss, Weiss & Edwards 2009.
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With respect to the unknown values of the convictions and appreciations that 
are represented, it is pointed out that Desirability Maximization Theory is pri-
marily meant as a tool to structure the discussion. It is generally not required to 
actually assign numbers. In the Porsche case, for instance, it could be easily ascer-
tained that the mental state required for homicidal intent is hardly reconcilable 
with any conviction grade for D’s own death.
The main insight from Desirability Maximization Theory is that the desira-
bility of a consequence is contingent on the anticipated likelihood of that conse-
quence. In some cases, this insight might be used to demonstrate that unwanted 
consequences need not deter people from acting if the consequence is deemed 
less likely. This is especially so if the consequence is not as negatively appreciated 
as the loss of one’s own life. The prospect of causing death or injury to others 
provides an example. Such a prospect is generally negatively appreciated, either 
intrinsically or because it might lead to other unwanted consequences such as 
criminal liability.61 A low conviction grade may explain why options involving the 
possibility of such an unwanted consequence may be preferred nonetheless. It 
must be borne in mind, however, that the conviction grade must be high enough 
to qualify as a ‘substantial chance’. For the purposes of discussion, I shall assume 
in this contribution that the lower boundary can be set at 10%.62 Such a conviction 
grade (0.10) leads to a tenfold decrease of the prospect’s undesirability. Thus, a 
10% chance of an unwanted result, such as injuring a police officer who is trying 
to stop a suspect’s car, might be accepted in order to abscond.63
Desirability Maximization Theory as a Discussion Tool
Desirability Maximization Theory can also serve as a tool to structure the schol-
arly debate about intent. It is exceptionally difficult to debate the meaning of intent 
on the basis of actual case law. I mention three reasons. First, people often do not 
agree on how the facts of a case should be evaluated. This is especially so in case 
of mental states. Second, these differences often remain implicit, because it is very 
difficult to express in words how multiple relevant mental states in a case relate 
to each other. Third, the discussion is more or less confined to situations that 
happened to surface in case law.
The framework offered by Desirability Maximization Theory makes it possible 
to postulate numbers for the purposes of discussion. Every possible situation can 
be precisely simulated on the basis of postulated numbers. This makes it possible 
to discuss all kinds of interesting doctrinal questions. What conviction grade suf-
fices for intent? Does a negative appreciation grade as to the result negate intent? 
Can a low conviction grade for a result be compensated by a high appreciation 
grade for that result?
61 See further Section 9.5.
62 See De Hullu 2003, p. 237; Van Dijk 2008, p. 405.
63 See further Section 9.3.7. This does not amount to conditional intent in some volitionist views, 
however. This is the case if Desirability Maximization Theory predicts that D would not act if he 
had been more certain. See Section 9.4.3 on ‘counterfactual what-if desires’.
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In this contribution, I will focus on one aspect of the intent debate. I will some-
times postulate numbers to elucidate how the cognitivist and volitionist theory 
might differ. It is hoped that this can contribute to a clearer understanding of how 
substantive law should be interpreted.
9.3.5 Non-Awareness Assumption
1. D did not want to die.
2a. If there is a substantial chance of V dying, there is also a significant chance of 
D dying.
2b. If D had been aware of the substantial chance of V’s death, he would also have 
been aware of a significant chance of his own death.
3a. The option involving a significant chance of his own death would be less desir-
able to D than other options.
3b. D would not opt for the least desirable option.
3c. Thus, D would not act whilst being aware of a significant chance of his own 
death.
4. D has not been aware of the substantial chance of another person’s death.
The final assumption in the Porsche case is that D has not been aware of the sub-
stantial chance of another person’s death whilst overtaking. This non-awareness 
assumption (4) follows logically from the truth of the self-preservation assump-
tion (1), danger perception assumption (2) and rationality assumption (3). The req-
uisite condition of intent – D acted whilst being aware of the substantial chance 
of another person’s death – can only be established if one of the following three 
alternative assumptions is accepted.
1’. D wanted to die or was indifferent to the prospect of dying.
2’. D failed to perceive that a substantial chance of V’s death implied a significant 
chance of his own death.
3’. D chose the least desirable option.
Assumption 3’ directly contradicts the desirability maximization thesis. Abandon-
ing this thesis comes at the price of rendering human action completely unintelli-
gible. Rejecting this thesis in the legal context is not a viable option.64
Assumptions 1’ and 2’ are not in conflict with Desirability Maximization 
Theory. In the first case, D has a positive appreciation grade, a zero appreciation 
grade or only a low negative appreciation grade with regard to his own demise. 
In the second case, D has a low conviction grade as to the possibility of his own 
64 See for a philosophical rejection: Clarke 1994; Gert 2005. Even if the rejection is valid, it is to 
be expected that people would only in exceptional cases violate the desirability maximization 
thesis. Thus, the alternative assumption is still not a plausible evidentiary assumption.
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death. In both cases, the option of overtaking may have the highest desirability, 
because the prospect of one’s own death does not have a large impact. It is to be 
noted, however, that it must further be assumed that the actor is rather indifferent 
to the prospect of killing others.65 Although this assumption is less implausible 
than the assumption that someone is indifferent to his own life, it is still a rather 
bold assumption to make.66
Assumptions 1’ and 2’ might be true, but they are prima facie implausible. The 
Court of Appeal’s verdict that was challenged before the Supreme Court contained 
no evidence with respect to the veracity of these assumptions. Thus, the Supreme 
Court was right to quash the conviction. The Arnhem Court of Appeal, to which 
the Porsche case was referred, held that it could not provide an adequate moti-
vation for a finding of intent.67 It seems plausible, therefore, that there was no 
evidence to support these alternative assumptions.
9.3.6 The Upshot of the Porsche Case: The Cognitive Element Is Not Fulfilled
The self-preservation assumption – i.e. the assumption that D did not want to 
die – lies at the heart of the Supreme Court’s ruling. The Court made clear that 
this evidentiary assumption is rebuttable: “absent indications to the contrary”. 
Although the central assumption is evidentiary in nature, the ruling does have 
implications for substantive law. The psychological assumptions and the mental 
terms used to delineate intent imply that the Supreme Court sympathizes with a 
psychological theory of intent. This raises the question of which of the two psycho-
logical theories of intent best explains this ruling.68
The generally accepted academic view is that the Supreme Court emphasized 
the volitional element of intent in the Porsche case.69 This entails that the case 
fits perfectly into the mould of the volitionist theory, in which the distinction 
between intent and negligence revolves exclusively around the volitional element. 
Conditional intent entails ‘knowing’ and ‘wanting’, whereas conscious negligence 
entails ‘knowing’ and ‘not wanting’. Thus, the cognitive element is fulfilled, but 
the volitional element is not fulfilled because D did not want to kill anyone.
The volitionist characterization of the Porsche case has all the hallmarks of 
a knee-jerk response. The starting point of this response is the assumption with 
regard to D’s volitions. This evidentiary assumption is more or less automatically 
connected to the volitional element of intent – a substantive law requirement. 
Simply put, D did not want to kill himself and others; ergo, the volitional element 
is not fulfilled. This knee-jerk response is followed by a second one. It is more or 
65 In order to prove intent, the actor must at least be aware of the substantial chance of another 
person’s death. This means that the conviction grade with respect to another person’s death 
cannot be that low.
66 See further Section 9.5.
67 Arnhem Court of Appeal 10 March 1997, ECLI:NL:GHARN:1997:AJ6387.
68 It is noted that the Supreme Court does not explicitly reject the normativist theory of intent. It is 
fair to say, however, that the volitionist and cognitivist theory are the most promising candidates 
to explain the Supreme Court’s view. See also Section 9.2.6.
69 See Section 9.3.1.
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less automatically assumed that the cognitive element must have been fulfilled, 
so that this is a case of conscious negligence.
I disagree with the dominant interpretation of the Porsche case. If the 
Supreme Court does indeed say something pertinent with regard to the concept 
of intent, it is about the importance of cognition. The speculations about D’s voli-
tions (self-preservation assumption) are only a means to enable an inference with 
respect to D’s cognition (non-awareness assumption). The volitions are used in an 
evidentiary manner, whereas the ensuing inference about cognition is relevant to 
the concept of intent.
This cognitivist interpretation finds support in the Supreme Court’s dictum, 
which was quoted in Section 9.2.7. The Court explicitly holds that the unlikeliness 
of D accepting the substantial chance of his own death and the aborted overtak-
ing manoeuvres indicate that the fatal overtaking manoeuvre “in the defend-
ant’s imagination and expectation would not result in a collision”. This leads the 
Supreme Court to conclude that the Court of Appeal’s verdict was insufficiently 
motivated.
The conclusion is that the non-awareness assumption – the assumption that D 
did not imagine or expect a collision – stands in the way of proof of intent according 
to the Supreme Court. Since the terms ‘imagination’ and ‘expectation’ clearly refer 
to cognitive mental states, it seems logical to conclude that this pertains to the 
cognitive element of intent. If D did not imagine or expect a collision, it seems plau-
sible that he also did not imagine or expect to kill other people. Thus, the cognitive 
element of intent is not fulfilled.
9.3.7 The Analytical Connection between the Cognitive and Volitional Element
According to the cognitivist theory, the volitional element is analytically depend-
ent on the cognitive element.70 If the cognitive element is fulfilled (awareness 
of a substantial chance), the volitional element is necessarily fulfilled as well. If 
the cognitive element is negated (no awareness of a substantial chance), the voli-
tional element is necessarily negated as well. The volitionist characterization of 
conscious negligence (‘knowing’ + ‘not wanting’) is almost regarded as a crime 
against logic. This section addresses the question of why ‘wanting’ might be con-
tingent on ‘knowing’.
The dependency thesis can be explained on the basis of Desirability Maximiza-
tion Theory. According to this theory, the substantial chance of a result is part of 
an option that is more desirable than (or at least as desirable as) any other option 
open to the actor. The fact that there is no option available to the actor with a 
higher desirability necessarily qualifies as ‘wanting’. Of course, the actor could 
hope for the result not to happen, but since this hope does not induce the actor to 
choose otherwise, this is not enough to qualify it as ‘not wanting’.
70 See Section 9.2.5.
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This can be illustrated as follows. Assume that D, a wanted criminal, receives 
a stop signal from a police officer. In her mind, D can either continue to drive 
towards the police officer in the hope that the officer will jump out of the way or 
she can stop with the consequence that she will be apprehended. This is pictured 
in Tables 9.4 and 9.5.
Table 9.4 Desirabilities of Possibilities
Possibility Desirability Conviction Appreciation
Escape and kill V 0.10 × -50 = -5 0.10 -50
Escape without killing V 0.90 × 10 = 9 0.90 10
Not escaping -10
Table 9.5 Desirabilities of Options
Option Total desirability
Escaping -5 + 9 = 4
Not escaping -10
The numbers displayed in Tables 9.4 and 9.5 indicate that D will continue to drive 
towards the police officer. This decision is qualified as intent. The substantial 
chance (10%) to kill V is part of an option (escaping) that has a higher desirability 
(4) than the option of not escaping (-10). It can still be said that D hopes that 
the police officer will not be killed. ‘Hoping’ is manifested by the very negative 
appreciation grade with respect to the option of killing V in the process of escaping 
(-50).71 Since this hope fails to alter D’s decision, it is still held that the volitional 
element is fulfilled. The volitional element is determined on the basis of the rel-
ative strength of the desirability (4 > -10), rather than on the basis of the negative 
appreciation grade as to killing V in the process of escaping (-50).
The second aspect of the dependency thesis is that ‘not knowing’ implies ‘not 
wanting’. To illustrate this, the abovementioned example can be adapted in two 
ways. First, let us assume that D is only aware of a non-substantial chance of 
killing the police officer (e.g. a conviction grade of 0.01). Second, let us assume 
that D is completely indifferent to the possibility of killing a police officer (an 
appreciation grade of 0). This means that the desirability of the option of escaping 
is not influenced in any way by the possibility that the officer might be killed.72 
Tables 9.6 and 9.7 portray the situation.
71 It is noted that this appreciation grade pertains to two connected possibilities (escaping and kill-
ing V). It may be assumed that the sole prospect of killing V would be negatively appreciated as 
well, since the prospect of escaping is positively appreciated.
72 This is why the prospect of ‘escaping and killing V’ has the same appreciation grade (10) as the 
prospect of ‘escaping without killing V’. The possibility of V’s death has no influence.
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Table 9.6 Desirabilities of Possibilities
Possibility Desirability Conviction Appreciation
Escape and kill V 0.01 × 10 = 0.10 0.01 10
Escape without killing V 0.99 × 10 = 9.90 0.99 10
Not escaping -10
Table 9.7 Desirabilities of Options
Option Total desirability
Escaping 0.10 + 9.90 = 10
Not escaping -10
In this example, the option of escaping is even more desirable relative to the option 
of not escaping. According to the cognitivist theory, the cognitive element is not 
fulfilled, since D did not act despite awareness of a substantial chance.73 Thus, 
the same goes for the volitional element. D can only be said to have accepted a 
non-substantial chance (1∕100) of death as part of the package. This volitional act 
is not sufficient to fulfil the volitional element according to the cognitivist theory.
It is to be noted that this example might lead to the attribution of intent in 
some volitionist theories, which will be examined in Section 9.4. If conscious 
awareness of the substantial chance is not required for the cognitive element, the 
indifference displayed by D might be held to fulfil the volitional element.74 An 
important factor in that respect might be that Desirability Maximization Theory 
predicts that D would also have acted if he had been more certain.
Finally, I will briefly address the question of how the cognitive boundary 
between intent and negligence is to be justified. Why is acting (or failing to act) 
despite awareness of the substantial chance necessarily a manifestation of intent? 
The rationale for this cognitive boundary can be found in the omission to choose 
for avoidance of the option involving a substantial chance of the result.75 It is noted 
that control is required to be part of the actor’s intentional object.76 This entails 
that he believes that he could choose for a different course of action (putative con-
trol). Thus, a train operator who is aware of the substantial chance that his train 
will drive over someone standing on the rails does not act with conditional intent, 
since he does not believe he can avoid this chance. The omission to choose other-
73 It is noted that D did not act with direct intent, since she did not act in order to cause the result. 
It is an open question whether direct intent also requires awareness of a substantial chance. See 
Van Dijk 2008, pp. 363-369, claiming that this is indeed required. See Machielse 2013, note 3.5 on 
‘opzet’ for the opposite, generally accepted view.
74 See also Section 9.4.6, where it is submitted that something more in the way of volition might be 
required in a legal system, such as Germany, where the cognitive element does not pertain to a 
substantial chance.
75 See Van Dijk 2008, p. 420.
76 See Van Dijk 2008, pp. 380-381 and 418-420.
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wise when the actor thought he could do so is a prima facie77 reason for criminal 
responsibility for intentional offences.
Although this omission to choose differently can be explained by reference to 
the actor’s preferences – i.e. the substantial chance of a result is part of an option 
that is more desirable than (or at least as desirable as) any other option open to 
the actor – it is not necessarily the case that the prohibited result is positively 
appreciated. As a matter of fact, in most cases of conditional intent the result is 
probably negatively appreciated by the actor. As such, it would be better to abandon 
the terms ‘wanting’ and ‘volitional element’ from the cognitivist vocabulary, as it 
can only breed confusion.78
The justification for requiring a relatively high conviction grade (awareness 
of a substantial chance) is more difficult to provide. Why should someone who 
is truly indifferent about causing death profit from the fact that only a non- 
substantial chance was foreseen? The best answer might be that this question 
begs the  question. The assumption that underlies this question (D is truly indif-
ferent) stands in need of adequate proof. It is generally very difficult to predict with 
sufficient certainty whether D would really act despite a higher conviction grade. 
Just as the proof of the pudding is in the eating, proof of immorality is in acting 
despite actual awareness of a substantial chance.
9.3.8 What Can We Say about Volition in the Porsche Case?
In the previous section, it was outlined that the volitional element is contingent 
on the cognitive element according to the cognitivist theory. The conclusion that 
the cognitive element in the Porsche case is negated leads therefore automatically 
to the conclusion that the volitional element is negated as well. This conclusion is 
based on analytical grounds. It is not necessary to base this on further psycholog-
ical assumptions.
According to the volitionist theory of intent, ‘knowing’ and ‘wanting’ are not 
analytically connected.79 Since both elements must be fulfilled to establish condi-
tional intent, a volitionist might opt to assess the volitional element straightaway. 
If it is not fulfilled, there can be no intent. In the Porsche case, a volitionist might 
argue that the volitional element is not fulfilled, because D did not accept the 
death of another person. Does this mean that volitionists could rightfully claim 
that the Porsche case is about the volitional element after all?
The assumption that D did not accept the death of another person is indeed 
plausible. I would argue, however, that the non-acceptance assumption follows 
from the non-awareness assumption. This is not an analytical conclusion, as was 
the case with respect to the cognitivist theory, but a fallible psychological infer-
ence. Someone who does not directly intend to kill another person ordinarily has 
77 It is a prima facie reason, because justifications and excuses stand in the way of criminal respon-
sibility. In Dutch criminal law, justifications and excuses are determined after the determination 
of intent.
78 See Van Dijk 2008, pp. 428-430.
79 See Section 9.2.5.
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no reason to speculate about how he appreciates the prospect of causing death. 
It is only necessary to face up to the acceptance question when someone actually 
foresees that causing death is a possibility. Thus, if the non-awareness assumption 
is true, the non-acceptance assumption is probably true as well. It is important to 
note that this condition of non-acceptance involves the absence of a mental state. 
It is not a mental act of negative appreciation (‘I do not accept this’); there simply 
is no appreciation act.
This must surely be a disappointing conclusion for volitionists. Is the absence 
of a volitional mental state, which is inferred from the absence of a cognitive 
mental state, all we can say about the supposedly all-deciding volitionist criterion 
that distinguishes conscious negligence from conditional intent? It seems that the 
Porsche case as such does not allow for saying anything more about the volitionist 
criterion. All we can say about the volitional element is that there is no evidence for 
a volitional act with respect to the death of others when D embarked on his final 
overtaking manoeuvre.
9.4 A Volitionist Analysis of the Porsche Case
9.4.1 Introduction
I have argued that the cognitivist theory of intent gives the most straightforward 
interpretation of the Porsche case. The most suitable characterization of D is ‘not 
knowing’ and ‘not wanting’. To explain the Porsche case according to the volition-
ist theory, one has to argue that this case can be characterized as ‘knowing’ and 
‘not wanting’. This approach faces two difficult questions. First, how can the cog-
nitive element be fulfilled when D did not imagine or expect a collision? Second, 
is there a criterion for the volitional element that functions independently of the 
cognitive element so as to create an exclusive volitionist distinction between intent 
and negligence?
In the following sections, I discuss several possible answers to those questions. 
Subsequently, I tackle the question of which of these volitionist interpretations 
provide the best explanation of the Dutch Supreme Court’s view. Finally, the inter-
pretation with the most explanatory power is examined in more detail.
9.4.2 The Cognitive Element: Prior Awareness, Minor Awareness or Non-Conscious 
Awareness?
Introduction
If the Porsche case is regarded as a manifestation of conscious negligence as inter-
preted by volitionists, this means that the cognitive element of intent must be 
fulfilled. This raises the question of how the cognitive element can be fulfilled 
when D did not imagine or expect a collision. In Section 9.3.6, I argued that not 
imagining or not expecting the result negates the cognitive element. Thus, the 
Porsche case can only be regarded as a manifestation of conscious negligence if the 
cognitive element is interpreted differently. I propose that this might be achieved 
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by employing the concepts of prior awareness, minor awareness or non-conscious 
awareness.
Prior Awareness
This approach explores the gap between a partial belief and a full belief. This 
can be illustrated using Desirability Maximization Theory. Assume that D has a 
conviction grade of 0.25 for the possibility that overtaking will result in a collision 
killing V and a conviction grade of 0.75 as to a successful overtaking manoeuvre.80 
Since a high-speed head-on collision is extremely dangerous to himself, Desirabil-
ity Maximization Theory predicts that D would not overtake.
A less sophisticated psychological theory might hold that humans convert 
this graded judgment into a dichotomous judgment before making a decision.81 
According to this psychological theory, the most probable prospect is elevated to 
the level of a full belief. Since the probability of not colliding (75%) is perceived to 
be larger than the probability of colliding (25%), this would give rise to the belief 
that a collision will not happen. Such an all or nothing judgment is tantamount to 
a conviction grade of 0 with respect to the prospect of a collision. Once D judges 
that no collision will occur, there is nothing to stop him from acting.
This scenario can be explored by using prior awareness (a conviction grade of 
0.25) for the cognitive element, rather than the later dichotomous judgment that 
induced D to overtake. Thus, the cognitive element is fulfilled because D has – at 
least at some point – been aware of the substantial chance of a lethal collision.
The convergence heuristic might provide adequate results in many situations, 
but it is not a good heuristic in dangerous traffic situations. The convergence of a 
conviction grade as to the prospect that an accident will occur into the full belief 
that nothing will happen makes no sense from a self-preservation perspective, 
because it involves ignoring information that is highly relevant to survival.82
Minor Awareness
This approach drops the requirement that D must be aware of a substantial 
chance.83 This approach may even be congruent with Desirability Maximization 
Theory. The negative desirability of a non-substantial chance of a lethal collision 
may be outweighed by the positive desirability of the other possibility – a success-
ful overtaking manoeuvre – that is deemed to happen with near certainty. This is 
pictured in Tables 9.8 and 9.9.
80 It is further assumed that 25% is a ‘substantial chance’ as is required for conditional intent.
81 This may explain Remmelink’s view with regard to conscious negligence: “This may be the case 
with a driver who drives at high speed through a busy street to catch his train. The possibility of 
a collision flashes through his mind, but is pushed back by the consideration that he has often 
done this without causing accidents”. See Remmelink 1996, p. 205.
82 In Section 9.3.3, it was argued that it is preferable to overestimate danger to oneself, because it 
is better to err on the safe side. The convergence heuristic has the effect of severely underesti-
mating danger.
83 See for this view Machielse 2013, note 3.5 on ‘opzet’. See also Blomsma 2012, pp. 112-115.
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Table 9.8 Desirabilities of Possibilities
Possibility Desirability Conviction Appreciation
Killing oneself and others 0.01 × -80 = -0.80 0.01 -80
Successful overtaking 0.99 × 1 = 0.99 0.99 1
Not overtaking 0
Table 9.9 Desirabilities of Options
Option Total desirability
Overtaking -0.80 + 0.99 = 0.19
Not overtaking 0
In this example, an appreciation grade of just 1 as to a successful overtaking 
manoeuvre is sufficient to induce the actor to overtake. The actor accepts the 
non-substantial chance (1∕100) of killing others, because it is part of a package with 
an overall positive desirability. In this example, D also accepts the non-substantial 
chance of his own demise.
Strictly speaking, one cannot employ the Supreme Court’s phrase that over-
taking “in the defendant’s imagination and expectation would not result in a 
collision”. However, in common parlance phrases like ‘expecting that not’ or ‘not 
expecting that’ might also refer to conviction grades slightly above 0.84 Thus, the 
minor awareness approach might be congruent with the Supreme Court’s charac-
terization of D’s mental state.
It must be admitted that these word games are somewhat confusing, because 
the low conviction grade is characterized as ‘knowing’ in the context of the cog-
nitive element and as ‘expecting that not’ in what must be another context. This 
comes down to the following: D knows that he might cause an accident, but he 
does not expect it. The first characterization focusses on the fact that there is some 
level of awareness, whereas the second characterization elevates the most probable 
prospect (not causing an accident) to the level of a full belief. Both conversions are 
part of the linguistic process of describing D’s mental state.
Non-Conscious Awareness
This approach drops the requirement that D must be consciously aware of a sub-
stantial chance.85 It is helpful to employ a distinction that is made by Duff. He 
distinguishes three categories of knowledge: explicit knowledge, tacit knowledge 
and latent knowledge.86
84 The same occurs in the higher regions. Legal terms like ‘knowingly’ (oblique intent) are usually 
taken to refer to ‘virtual certainty’. See Blomsma 2012, pp. 72-73. The same reasoning can be 
applied to the phrase the Supreme Court commonly uses to designate conscious negligence: 
“assumed that the result would not occur”. See Section 9.4.5.
85 See for this view Knigge 2009, claiming that non-conscious ‘wanting’ and ‘knowing’ ought to 
have a role in determining intent.
86 Duff 1983. See also Shute 2002.
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Explicit knowledge involves a conscious mental process. This occurs when 
someone consciously contemplates a specific risk. The other two kinds of knowl-
edge are of a non-conscious nature. Tacit knowledge guides a person’s actions, 
although he is not consciously aware of it. One might say that his knowledge of a 
specific risk is suppressed or subconscious. Latent knowledge might be described 
as a person’s knowledge of ‘risks in general’, which would make him explicitly 
or tacitly aware of the specific risk if he attended properly to the situation. Latent 
knowledge is some kind of background knowledge that makes someone capable of 
explicitly or tacitly noticing a specific risk.
In my view, the cognitive element of intent requires explicit knowledge: con-
scious awareness of a substantial chance of another person’s death. I take it that 
the Supreme Court’s phrase that overtaking “in the defendant’s imagination and 
expectation would not result in a collision” refers to explicit knowledge. Thus, in 
my view, the cognitive element is negated.
Adherents of the volitionist theory might invoke the concepts of tacit and 
latent knowledge to argue that the cognitive element is fulfilled after all.87 They 
might hold that D was subconsciously guided by the substantial chance of another 
person’s death (tacit knowledge) or that D would have been explicitly or tacitly 
aware of the substantial chance if he had attended properly to his driving (latent 
knowledge).88 In this view, non-conscious knowledge (tacit or latent knowledge) is 
sufficient to fulfil the cognitive element.
9.4.3 The Volitional Element: Actual What-If Desires, Counterfactual What-If Desires 
or Crypto-Cognitivism?
Introduction
To explain the Porsche case according to the volitionist theory, one has to argue that 
this case can be characterized as ‘knowing’ and ‘not wanting’. In the preceding 
section, I explained how the cognitive element might be fulfilled. In this section, 
I discuss three ways in which the volitional element can be negated: actual what-if 
desires, counterfactual what-if desires and crypto-cognitivism. These criteria are 
to function independently of the cognitive element so as to create an exclusive 
volitionist distinction between intent and negligence.
Actual What-If Desires
This approach holds that the volitional element depends on the answer to a hypo-
thetical question the actor posed to himself: would I act if I had been certain about 
causing another person’s death? This criterion can be traced back to a formula 
devised by the German scholar Frank.89 The aim of Frank’s formula is to establish 
that it was immaterial to the actor’s will formation (Willensbildung) whether the 
87 I do not necessarily buy into this distinction, but that is not pertinent to the argument.
88 It is noted that attributing tacit knowledge is problematic in the Porsche case, because one 
would have to argue that D was also subconsciously guided by the knowledge of a significant 
chance of his own death.
89 Frank 1931, p. 190. This view is defended by Remmelink (see Section 9.2.5).
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consequence was imagined as certain or only as possible. In that case, the person 
can be blamed to the same extent as someone acting with oblique intent: the cer-
tainty of a consequence provides no reason to refrain from acting.
It is possible to apply this criterion to the Porsche case. It must then be held 
that D actually contemplated that he would not act if the death of another person 
were certain. As was explained in Section 9.3.8, this does not seem all that plau-
sible. Why would someone speculate about the desirability of a course of action 
involving the death of another person if he does not even imagine or expect a 
collision?
Counterfactual What-If Desires
This approach holds that the volitional element depends on the answer to the 
question whether the actor would have acted if he had been certain about the 
consequence. This counterfactual criterion can be traced back to another formula 
by Frank.
How would the perpetrator have behaved with certain knowledge of the offence 
elements? [...] If one comes to the conclusion that the perpetrator would also have 
acted with certain knowledge, […] then intent is to be affirmed; if one comes to the 
conclusion that he would have refrained from the act, then intent is to be rejected.90
According to this formula, the volitional element involves a prediction about how 
the actor would have acted in a counterfactual state of mind. Frank urges that the 
answer should not just depend on the actor’s character; it should depend primarily 
on how he positions himself with respect to his specific goal.
Frank’s formula could be utilized on the basis of Desirability Maximization 
Theory. The theory holds that the desirability of a possibility is determined by 
multiplying the conviction grade by the appreciation grade. Thus, the lower the 
conviction grade, the less influence is exerted by the appreciation grade. Frank’s 
formula basically requires one to set the conviction grade to 1, thus attaching all 
the importance to the appreciation grade with respect to the possibility.
Let us once again take the example of D facing the option of escaping or not 
escaping when driving towards a police officer.91 Let us assume that D has a 
conviction grade of 0.01 with regard to killing the officer. That means that the 
desirability of this possibility is 100 times lower than the appreciation grade, so 
that it exerts relatively little influence on decision making. Table 9.10 contains the 
desirabilities as to killing the officer for the conviction grades of 0.01 and 1 with 
respect to three widely different appreciation grades.
90 Frank 1931, p. 190.
91 See Section 9.3.7.
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Table 9.10 Influence of Conviction on Desirability
Desirability at C = 0.01 Desirability at C = 1 Change in desirability
0.01 × -50 = -0.5 1 × -50 = -50 -49.5
0.01 × 0 = 0 1 × 0 = 0 0
0.01 × 50 = 0.5 1 × 50 = 50 +49.5
The starting point of Frank’s formula is that D did actually act despite the convic-
tion grade of 0.01 as to killing the officer. The question to be answered is whether 
this would be different if she had been certain. In that case, there are only two 
simple options left: escaping by killing the officer and not escaping by stopping 
the car.92 Thus, D would act under certainty if the desirability of escaping by kill-
ing the officer is higher than the desirability of not escaping.
In the first example (an appreciation grade of -50), this would generally not 
be the case. Certainty as to death greatly decreases (-49.5) the desirability of the 
option of escaping.93 This can only be outweighed if the option of not escaping has 
a very negative desirability. In the second example (an appreciation grade of 0), 
D would act in case of certainty, since the possibility of death has no influence on 
the desirability of escaping. In the third example (an appreciation grade of 50), 
D would also act in case of certainty, because the desirability of escaping greatly 
increases (+49.5) in comparison to the actual situation.
Desirability Maximization Theory shows that cognition exerts a tremendous 
influence on decision making. In the example case, the desirability is changed 
with a factor 100 in case of non-zero appreciation grades. Frank’s formula removes 
this cognitive factor from the moral assessment. Criminal responsibility for an 
intentional offence is made largely dependent on the appreciation grade with 
respect to the result.
Let us now apply Desirability Maximization Theory to the Porsche case. Since 
certainty as to another person’s death is connected to a high probability of one’s 
own death, one can be fairly confident that D would not have acted had he been 
certain. The high conviction grade leads to a very negative desirability for the 
option of overtaking.
Against this use of Frank’s formula, one could argue that D would refrain 
from his act for the wrong reasons. A more demanding version of the criterion 
might ask whether D would have acted if the only pertinent consequence under 
consideration was another person’s death.94 This criterion relates more directly to 
what needs to be established: indifference with regard to another person’s death.
Actual what-if desires (preceding section) and counterfactual what-if desires 
(this section) are both methods to gauge indifference. In the first criterion, indif-
ference depends on a prediction of behaviour by the actor himself. In the second 
criterion, indifference depends on a prediction of behaviour by an outside observer. 
92 The possibility of escaping without killing V seizes to be part of the option of escaping.
93 The desirability of the combined prospect of escaping and killing V is less negative than -50, 
since the sole possibility of escaping is positively appreciated.
94 E.g. a successful overtaking manoeuvre by D, whereas V would be killed by an evasive manoeuvre.
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Since it is not all that likely that people actually pose what-if questions to them-
selves when acting, the second criterion appears to be most useful in practice.
Crypto-Cognitivism
This approach entails that the volitional element is gauged by reference to cog-
nitive mental states. In this approach, one purports to say something about voli-
tions or the absence thereof whilst actually saying something about cognitions 
or the absence thereof. This interpretation takes as a starting point the Supreme 
Court’s phrase that the overtaking manoeuvre “in the defendant’s imagination 
and expectation would not result in a collision”. Since this cognitive depiction has 
not yet been used to negate the cognitive element, it is still possible to use it at the 
volitional stage. There are three ways to argue that the volitional element is not 
fulfilled.
1. D was (almost) fully convinced that V would not die.
2. D was (almost) fully unconvinced that V would die.
3. D did not consider V’s death.
The first two options refer to an explicit mental state. The first option closely 
resembles the Supreme Court’s depiction: the mental object is about V not dying. 
In the second option, the mental object is about V dying. The third option refers 
to the absence of an explicit mental state. The possibility of V’s death is not con-
sidered at all.
Crypto-cognitivism involves the use of cognitive mental terms to delineate the 
volitional element. This raises the question of how we can distinguish cognitive 
from volitional mental states. The philosopher of mind Kenny gives a useful char-
acterization of both mental states.
Among the characterizations we may assign to human mental states and actions, 
there are two which stand out as the most important. We may characterize certain 
states as true (or false); we may characterize others as good (or evil). Beliefs, most 
obviously, may be described as true or false; desires, most obviously, may be de-
scribed as good or evil. Those states and activities which can be evaluated on the 
true/false scale belong to the cognitive side of the soul; those states and activities 
which are evaluated on the good/evil scale belong to the affective, volitional side 
of the soul. At the highest level, the truth-bearing (or falseness-bearing) items are 
actualizations of the intellect; the goodness-bearing (or badness-bearing) items are 
actualizations of the will.95
Searle, another philosopher of mind, points out that it is part of the definition of 
‘belief’ that beliefs are candidates for truth or falsity.96 Since this truth-candidacy 
95 Kenny 2001, pp. 74-75. See also Kenny 1978, p. 46: “Affective states of mind are neither true nor 
false but consist in an attitude of pursuit or avoidance: such things as purpose, intention, desire, 
volition.”
96 Searle 1992, p. 62.
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characteristic is part of the definition, it is not open to empirical verification or 
falsification. In his article about knowledge and belief in the criminal law, Shute 
suggests that this truth-candidacy characteristic can function as some kind of test. 
“It helps distinguish beliefs from other ‘non-cognitive’ psychological states, such 
as ‘desire’, ‘hope’, ‘want’, or ‘care’, which are neither true nor false but characteris-
tically reflect a person’s attitude to a given state of affairs.”97
Let us apply the truth-candidacy test to the Supreme Court’s phrase that the 
overtaking manoeuvre “in the defendant’s imagination and expectation would not 
result in a collision”. The nouns ‘imagination’ and ‘expectation’ clearly refer to 
mental states that can become true or false in the future. If these terms are indeed 
used to delineate the volitional element, this surely qualifies as crypto-cognitivism.
9.4.4 The Most Likely Volitionist Explanation of Conscious Negligence 
The volitionist theory holds that conscious negligence can be characterized as a 
combination of ‘knowing’ and ‘not wanting’. I have discussed three ways to fulfil 
the cognitive element and three ways to negate the volitional element. Table 9.11 
shows that there might be nine volitionist explanations of conscious negligence.
Table 9.11 Volitionist Explanations of Conscious Negligence
Cognitive element Volitional element
Actual what-if desires Counterfactual  
what-if desires
Crypto-cognitivism
Prior awareness x x x
Minor awareness x x x
Non-conscious awareness x x x
The question is whether one of these combinations can explain the view of the 
Dutch Supreme Court. The passages quoted below contain relevant informa-
tion about the delineation of conscious negligence. The first passage is from the 
 Porsche case and the second passage is from the HIV I case. The latter passage, 
which is often referred to by lower courts and advisory opinions by the advocate 
general, contains the most elaborate exposition of the Supreme Court’s view.
Porsche
[Conditional intent to kill is present in case of very dangerous traffic behaviour if the 
defendant] instead of counting on a good outcome, consciously accepts and takes 
for granted the substantial chance that others will die as a result of his conduct.98
HIV I
[To establish conditional intent] it is not only required that the defendant has knowl-
edge of the substantial chance that the result will occur, but also that he consciously 
97 Shute 2002, p. 183.
98 Supreme Court 15 October 1996, ECLI:NL:HR:1996:ZD0139.
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accepted (took for granted) that chance at the time of his act. From the mere fact that 
this knowledge is present [...] it cannot necessarily be inferred that he  consciously 
accepted the substantial chance of the result, because in case of that knowledge 
conscious negligence might also be adopted. Of someone who has knowledge of a 
substantial chance of the result, but who [...] assumed that the result would not oc-
cur, it can be said that he acted with (gross) inadvertence but it cannot be said that 
[he acted with conditional intent].99
In the latter passage, the Supreme Court explicitly states that knowledge can both 
be present in conditional intent and conscious negligence. This can be construed 
as a rejection of the cognitivist theory and an endorsement of the volitionist theory. 
This raises the question of how the cognitive and volitional element are to be inter-
preted in the eyes of the Supreme Court.
I start with the volitional element. It seems that crypto-cognitivism is the most 
promising candidate. The Supreme Court has never given any indication that 
actual or counterfactual what-if desires might be relevant to the interpretation 
of intent. This is different, however, with respect to crypto-cognitivism. Both the 
Porsche case and the HIV I case provide evidence that the Supreme Court is suf-
fering from crypto-cognitivism.
In the Porsche case, the Supreme Court distinguished conscious negligence 
from conditional intent by contrasting ‘counting on a good outcome’ (negligence) 
with ‘consciously accepting a substantial chance’ (intent). In the HIV I case, the 
Supreme Court contrasted ‘assuming that the result would not occur’ (negli-
gence) with ‘consciously accepting a substantial chance’ (intent). If we apply the 
truth-candidacy test to the verbs ‘counting on’ and ‘assuming’, it is clear that they 
are cognitive verbs: they refer to mental states that can become true or false. Since 
the Supreme Court employs these verbs to delineate the volitional element, the 
Court appears to have fallen prey to crypto-cognitivism. This also means that 
the final conclusion of the Porsche case, i.e. that overtaking “in the defendant’s 
imagination and expectation would not result in a collision”, may well have been 
intended to pertain to the volitional element as well.
The next question is which approach best explains the cognitive element. The 
first approach (prior awareness) cannot be ruled out. The Supreme Court holds 
that conscious negligence is present if “someone who has knowledge of a substan-
tial chance of the result [...] assumed that the result would not occur”. This might 
be explained by the convergence theory, i.e. the graded judgment (knowledge 
of a substantial chance) is converted by the actor into a dichotomous judgment 
(the result will not occur) before making a decision. Although this approach can 
explain the Supreme Court’s wording, the lack of explicit endorsement speaks 
against this interpretation. It would seem that invoking such a distinct psycholog-
ical theory is in need of explicit endorsement.
The second approach (minor awareness) should probably be rejected. The 
Supreme Court has consistently held that conditional intent requires that D “has 
99 Supreme Court 25 March 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AE9049.
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knowledge of the substantial chance that the result will occur”.100 It seems, there-
fore, that awareness of only a non-substantial chance is not sufficient for the cog-
nitive element.
In my view, the third approach (non-conscious awareness) offers the most 
probable explanation of the cognitive element.101 When the Supreme Court 
contrasts conditional intent with conscious negligence, it uses the term ‘knowl-
edge’ (wetenschap). In common parlance, this term often refers to knowledge of 
a non-conscious nature (tacit or latent knowledge). It is possible to interpret the 
cognitive element like this. Although D is not explicitly (consciously) aware of the 
substantial chance at the time of the actus reus, the cognitive element is nonethe-
less fulfilled because D knows in a latent or tacit sense that there is a substantial 
chance of the result.
Of the nine volitionist explanations of conscious negligence, the combination 
of non-conscious awareness (cognitive element) and crypto-cognitivism (volitional 
element) is the most likely. This leads to the following explanation of the Porsche 
case. The cognitive element is fulfilled, because D knows in a latent or tacit sense 
that there is a substantial chance of V’s death. The volitional element is negated, 
because D did not expect V to die.
9.4.5 Does Crypto-Cognitivism Lead to the Same Outcome as Real Cognitivism?
In this section, I want to address the question of whether the real cognitivist 
interpretation of intent leads to the same outcome as the crypto-cognitivist inter-
pretation. In the real cognitivist interpretation, the absence of conscious (explicit) 
awareness of a substantial chance negates the cognitive element.102 In the crypto- 
cognitivist interpretation, ‘counting on a good outcome’ or ‘assuming that the 
result would not occur’ negates the volitional element. I take it that these phrases 
refer to conscious (explicit) knowledge as well.103 The question to be answered now 
is whether these cognitive delineations have exactly the same meaning.
On the face of it, there are two differences. First, the real cognitivist criterion 
pertains to the prohibited result, whereas the crypto-cognitivist criterion pertains 
to the absence of the prohibited result. Second, the real cognitivist criterion refers 
to a conviction grade (substantial chance), whereas the crypto-cognitivist criterion 
seems to refer to a full conviction (counting on; assuming).
100 See Supreme Court 25 March 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AE9049 (HIV I). But see Blomsma 2012, 
p. 114, inter alia referring to the same case: “It seems dolus eventualis requires that defendant 
must be aware of a chance. This chance must also be considerable, but this is established objec-
tively: the defendant need not be aware of this.” See further the extended contribution (Van Dijk 
forthcoming) about the difference between objective and subjective probability.
101 See Van Dijk 2008, pp. 425-426.
102 In this and the following section, I denote the cognitivist interpretation of the cognitive ele-
ment as ‘conscious awareness’ (i.e. explicit awareness) so as to contrast it to the ‘non-conscious 
awareness’ that suffices in the volitionist interpretation of the cognitive element.
103 If this were not the case, it is difficult to explain how the cognitive element can be fulfilled (knowl-
edge of a substantial chance of the result), whilst the volitional element is not fulfilled (assumed 
that the result would not occur). If the cognitive element refers to non-conscious knowledge, 
whilst the volitional element refers to conscious knowledge, there is no contradiction.
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To make for easier comparison, I propose to compare both criteria on the same 
dimension, i.e. a conviction grade with regard to the prohibited result. The question 
becomes thus as follows: does conviction grade x qualify as intent according to the 
real cognitivist or the crypto-cognitivist interpretation? That leaves the question of 
how ‘counting on a good outcome’ or ‘assuming that the result would not occur’ 
should be converted. Strictly speaking, these phrases should be converted into a 
conviction grade of 0 as to the prohibited result. However, in common  parlance 
phrases like ‘assuming that not-Φ’ or ‘not assuming that Φ’ might also refer to 
conviction grades slightly above 0.104 It is acceptable to say ‘I do not expect it to 
rain’ if one is aware of a slight chance of rain.
The real cognitivist and the crypto-cognitivist criterion might lead to a differ-
ent outcome. These differences are connected to the fact that it is unclear what 
conviction grade (x) is minimally required to qualify as a ‘substantial chance’.105 
I address two potential differences.
First difference. It may be that a mental state which can only just be regarded 
as ‘conscious awareness of a substantial chance that Φ’ (a conviction grade of x) 
can also be described as ‘assuming that not-Φ’. This is especially possible if a 
low probability suffices for a ‘substantial chance’ (e.g. x = 5%). Assume that D 
has a conviction grade of 0.05. The real cognitivist interpretation classifies this 
as intent, because D acted despite conscious awareness of a substantial chance. 
The crypto-cognitivist interpretation, however, might classify this as conscious 
negligence. The cognitive element might be fulfilled on account of non-conscious 
awareness of a substantial chance. The volitional element might be negated, 
because a conviction grade of 0.05 is low enough to say that D assumed that the 
result would not occur.
Second difference. It may be that a mental state which falls just short of ‘con-
scious awareness of a substantial chance that Φ’ (a conviction grade of < x) cannot 
be described as ‘assuming that not-Φ’. This is especially possible if a relatively 
high probability is required for a ‘substantial chance’ (e.g. x = 60%). Assume that 
D has a conviction grade of 0.59. The real cognitivist interpretation classifies this 
as conscious negligence, because D did not act whilst being consciously aware 
of a substantial chance. The crypto-cognitivist interpretation, however, might 
classify this as intent. The cognitive element might be fulfilled on account of non- 
conscious awareness of a substantial chance. The volitional element might not be 
negated, because a conviction grade of 0.59 is too high to say that D assumed that 
the result would not occur.
This is theory. In practice, it would appear to be extremely difficult to make 
such nuanced distinctions. Absent any guidance from the Supreme Court, I think 
it best to assume that there is no gap between the real cognitivist and the crypto- 
cognitivist interpretation. Thus, ‘conscious awareness of a substantial chance 
that Φ’ never leads to the classification ‘assuming that not-Φ’ and ‘conscious 
awareness of a non-substantial chance that Φ’ always leads to the classification 
104 The same occurs in the higher regions. Legal terms like ‘knowingly’ (oblique intent) are usually 
taken to refer to ‘virtual certainty’. See Blomsma 2012, pp. 72-73.
105 See Section 9.2.6.
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‘assuming that not-Φ’. According to this analysis, both the real cognitivist and the 
 crypto-cognitivist interpretation of conscious negligence lead to the same result.106 
In both cases, the absence of conscious awareness of a substantial chance results 
in the negation of intent. It is either classified as ‘not knowing’ or as ‘not wanting’.
9.4.6 How Did the Cognitive Boundary Come About?
Introduction
In this section, I want to address the question of why the Supreme Court might 
have opted for the combination of non-conscious awareness (cognitive element) 
and crypto-cognitivism (volitional element). I put forward two hypotheses. The 
first hypothesis is that the Court tried to reconcile a truly cognitivist interpreta-
tion with an exclusive volitionist distinction. The second hypothesis is that the 
Court failed to accurately translate the more volitional terms that are employed in 
German case law.
First Hypothesis: Torn between Two Theories
The first hypothesis is that the Supreme Court wants to hold on to an exclusive 
volitionist boundary between intent and negligence, although it does not want 
a truly volitional boundary. To explain this, it is useful to briefly reiterate why 
‘knowing’ implies ‘wanting’ according to the cognitivist theory.107
The dependency thesis can be explained on the basis of Desirability Maximiza-
tion Theory. According to this theory, the substantial chance of a result is part of 
an option that is more desirable than (or at least as desirable as) any other option 
open to the actor. The fact that there is no option available to the actor with a 
higher desirability necessarily qualifies as ‘wanting’. Of course, the actor could 
hope for the result not to happen, but since this hope does not induce the actor to 
choose otherwise, this is not enough to qualify it as ‘not wanting’. In the volitionist 
theory, however, there can be a divergence between ‘knowing’ and ‘wanting’. This 
can be illustrated as follows.
1. D is consciously aware of a substantial chance that option A will bring about Φ.
2. D chooses option A.
3. However, the volitional element with respect to Φ is not fulfilled.
A truly volitional way to achieve this result is by focussing directly on the appre-
ciation grade with respect to the result. Assume that D drives towards a police 
officer despite foreseeing the substantial chance that the officer will be killed. She 
very much hopes that the officer will not be killed, which is manifested by a very 
negative appreciation grade as to that possibility. The volitional element is negated 
on account of the negative appreciation grade with respect to killing that officer. 
This result might also be achieved on the basis of Frank’s formula with respect to 
106 It is noted that the cognitive element of the volitionist interpretation (non-conscious awareness 
of a substantial chance) is not likely to lead to differences.
107 See Section 9.3.7.
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counterfactual what-if desires. If the possibility of death is very negatively appreci-
ated, this can only be outweighed if the alternative option (e.g. not escaping) has a 
very negative desirability.108 Thus, D would probably not act under certainty.
It might be that the Supreme Court is torn between the two theories. On the 
one hand, it agrees with the cognitivists that hoping without acting upon it should 
not negate intent. On the other hand, it wants to maintain an exclusive volitionist 
distinction between intent and negligence. This leads to a difficult situation. It is 
not possible to have a ‘hopeless’ distinction between intent and negligence if con-
scious awareness of a substantial chance functions as criterion for the cognitive 
element. The combination of non-conscious awareness and crypto-cognitivism 
provides a way out. If non-conscious awareness of a substantial chance functions as 
the criterion for the cognitive element, it is still possible to use conscious awareness 
as a criterion for the volitional element. This entails that the difference between 
intent and negligence can still revolve exclusively around the volitional element. 
Conscious awareness of a substantial chance is categorized as ‘wanting’, whereas 
the absence thereof is categorized as ‘not wanting’.
Second Hypothesis: Lost in Translation
There is an alternative explanation, however. This explanation entails that the 
Supreme Court actually intended to address volitional issues when using cognitive 
terms.
Machielse, a close observer of the Supreme Court, puts forward that the termi-
nology used in the Porsche case is probably inspired by German case law.109 It is 
interesting to take a closer look at this likely source of inspiration. In the case law 
in question, the German Federal Court of Justice defined conscious negligence 
as ‘not agreeing with the result, which is recognized as possible’. This is speci-
fied as ‘trusting in the non-occurrence of the result’ and ‘seriously – and not just 
vaguely – trusting in the non-occurrence of the result’.110
Two points are worth mentioning. First, the German Court actually defined 
conscious negligence in volitional terms (not agreeing). Second, the verb used to 
specify this condition (trusting) is more volitional in nature than the verbs used 
by the Dutch Supreme Court. ‘Seriously trusting’ is both cognitive and volitional: 
it involves an expectation of a state of affairs and a judgment of the state of affairs 
as good.111
108 See Section 9.4.3.
109 See Machielse 2013, note 3.3 on ‘opzet’, referring to Federal Court of Justice 20 November 1986, 
NStZ 1987, 362. Machielse is a Professor of Criminal Law and has been an advocate general of 
the Supreme Court since 1996.
110 See Federal Court of Justice 20 November 1986, NStZ 1987, 362: “daß der bewußt fahrlässig 
Handelnde mit der als möglich erkannten Folge nicht einverstanden ist und deshalb auf ihren 
Nichteintritt vertraut” and “[sie kann] ernsthaft und nicht nur vage darauf vertraut haben, den W 
[…] nicht zu verletzen”. See also Federal Court of Justice 22 March 2012, NStZ 2012, 384: “wenn er 
trotz erkannter objektiver Gefährlichkeit der Tat ernsthaft und nicht nur vage auf ein Ausbleiben 
des tödlichen Erfolges vertraut (Fehlen des Willenselements).”
111 See Kenny 1978, p. 46. A German thesaurus lists both ‘erwarten’ (expecting) and ‘erhof-
fen’ (hoping) as synonyms for ‘vertrauen auf ’ (trusting in). See <www.synonyme.woxikon.de/
synonyme>.
CriminalLiabilityforSeriousTrafficOffences.indd   216 3-12-2014   10:16:32
217
A Cognivist and Volitionist Analysis of Conditional Intent and Conscious Negligence
It cannot be excluded that the German volitional demarcation somehow got 
lost in translation. In this view, the Dutch Supreme Court neglected to use a voli-
tional term like ‘not agreeing’ when defining conscious negligence in the Porsche 
case and substituted the mixed term ‘trusting in’ for the more cognitive term 
‘counting on’. This was operationalized with the cognitive terms ‘imagination’ 
and ‘expectation’. Finally, in the HIV I case, the Supreme Court employed the 
completely cognitive term ‘assuming’ to define conscious negligence.
If this hypothesis is true, terms like ‘counting on’ (erop rekenen), ‘imagina-
tion’ (voorstelling), ‘expectation’ (verwachting) and ‘assuming’ (ervan uitgaan) were 
meant to be interpreted in a more volitional way. In this interpretation, not all 
beliefs in the non-occurrence of the result negate the volitional element. Expecting 
the non-occurrence of a result one really wants to avoid would negate the volitional 
element. The abovementioned example, in which D drives towards a police officer 
whilst hoping the officer will survive, might provide an example. However, expect-
ing the non-occurrence of a result one is indifferent about – e.g. an appreciation 
grade of 0 as to V’s death – might still be regarded as intent.
It is noted that transplanting a German criterion to the Dutch system is not 
without difficulties. In Dutch law, the cognitive element pertains to a ‘substantial 
chance’. In German law, however, the cognitive element pertains to a prospect 
which is “possible and not entirely far-fetched”.112 Let us assume, arguendo, that 
in German law a conviction grade of 0.01 (1%) suffices, whereas in Dutch law 
a conviction grade of 0.10 (10%) is required. It would appear that acting despite 
believing there is a 1% chance of causing an evil result is less blameworthy than 
acting despite believing there is a 10% chance of causing an evil result (ceteris 
paribus).113 It may well be that acting despite a 0.01 conviction grade is not regarded 
as blameworthy enough by itself to qualify as intent. Therefore, something more 
in the way of volition is required. This reasoning is less convincing in the Nether-
lands. It is difficult to fathom how acting despite a 0.10 conviction grade of causing 
an evil result could not meet the blameworthiness threshold. This is even more so 
if a ‘substantial chance’ would require a higher subjective probability than 10%.114
What if the ‘shared intentions’ of past or present Supreme Court judges are 
best described as aspiring to a truly volitional boundary?115 Should the conclusion 
of Section 9.4.5, i.e. the real cognitivist and the crypto-cognitivist interpretation 
probably lead to the same outcome, be revised? I would argue against that for two 
reasons. First, the use of cognitive terms all but obliges the interpreter to assume a 
cognitive boundary between intent and negligence. The presumed intention of the 
Court should have little bearing on the interpretation of the words used to define 
112 See, e.g., Federal Court of Justice 22 March 2012, NStZ 2012, 384: “Bedingt vorsätzliches Han-
deln setzt nach ständiger Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichtshofs voraus, dass der Täter den 
Eintritt des tatbestandlichen Erfolges als möglich und nicht ganz fernliegend erkennt”.
113 The interpretation of intent is only related to prima facie blameworthiness, since justifications 
and excuses do not negate intent. This is why the comparison pertains to an evil result.
114 The term ‘substantial’ certainly seems to point in that direction. See, e.g., Lichtenstein & 
Newman 1967.
115 See Marmor 1992, pp. 159-165, about ‘shared intentions’.
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intent. Second, as was explained above, a truly volitional boundary is less viable in 
a system where a substantial chance is required for the cognitive element.
9.4.7 Conclusion: Beyond Humpty Dumpty
I maintain that any writer of a book is fully authorised in attaching any meaning he 
likes to any word or phrase he intends to use. If I find an author saying, at the be-
ginning of his book, ‘Let it be understood that by the word black I shall always mean 
white, and that by the word white I shall always mean black,’ I meekly accept his 
ruling, however injudicious I may think it.116 – Lewis Carroll
Lewis Carroll was not only a writer but also a logician. This epigraph comes from 
a book about logic. In his literary work, Carroll created the egg-shaped character 
Humpty Dumpty, who at one point said: “When I use a word […] it means just 
what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.”117 Labelling a cognitive bound-
ary as volitional or employing cognitive terms to express a volitional boundary is 
like using ‘black’ to mean ‘white’ and ‘white’ to mean ‘black’. The legal concept 
of intent – on any interpretation – already has a meaning that differs consider-
ably from common parlance. It is up to the Supreme Court, legal scholars and 
teachers to explain the concept to legal practitioners, students and citizens. There 
may be good reasons to attribute an extraordinary meaning to the legal concept of 
intent.118 There is no justification, however, for attaching an extraordinary mean-
ing to terms used to explain this concept.
This leads to a simple piece of advice. If the Supreme Court agrees with the cog-
nitivist theory, it should not classify the boundary as volitional. Using the wrong 
label is liable to cause confusion and pointless academic debate. If the Supreme 
Court agrees with the volitionist theory, however, it should not use cognitive terms 
to mark the boundary. This is liable to result in an unintended interpretation of 
intent.
9.5 Final Conclusion
In the prolegomenon, I submitted that there is great disparity in the way in which 
comparable cases of extremely dangerous traffic behaviour are handled by differ-
ent lower courts. One and the same case might just as well lead to a conviction 
as to an acquittal for (attempted) intentional homicide, depending on the court 
that handles the case. Generally, the one outcome is just as ‘cassation proof’ as 
the other outcome. There is a large cassation free zone, which is outside the reach 
116 Carroll 1958, p. 166.
117 Carroll 1971, p. 190.
118 Attaching a meaning to intent that is much wider than the plain meaning of the term need not 
conflict with the legality principle. In order to guide behaviour, citizens generally do not have to 
know how intent is interpreted. Mens rea terms are primarily directed at judges. See Robinson 
2005 about fair adjudication.
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of the Supreme Court. It is submitted that the facts and circumstances of the 
Porsche case also fall in this cassation free zone. The facts and circumstances of 
the Porsche case might be presented in such a way that the Supreme Court would 
not quash a conviction.
The disparity in Dutch criminal law can be explained in two different ways. 
First, courts may entertain a different interpretation of substantive law. Second, 
courts may assess facts and circumstances of a case in a different way. Variance 
between court decisions and error of court decisions could be reduced if it were 
clear how intent should be interpreted and what rules of inference should be used 
to assess the presence of intent. The present contribution allows for two conclu-
sions in that respect. First, intent should be interpreted in a cognitive way. Second, 
Desirability Maximization Theory might be used to assess whether intent has 
been present. Taken together, these conclusions lead to a simple rule of thumb 
for the lower courts: do not convict of (attempted) intentional homicide in traffic 
cases. This will be explained in a general way below.
To assess intent according to a cognitivist interpretation, a relatively straight-
forward question must be answered: did D act despite conscious awareness of the 
substantial chance of the result? This question can be answered on the basis of 
Desirability Maximization Theory. The theory predicts that homicidal intent in 
traffic cases can only be proved in highly exceptional circumstances.
The implausibility of homicidal intent in Porsche-like cases depends on the 
tight connection between the required mental state (awareness of a substantial 
chance of V’s death) and a mental state with extreme negative desirability (a sig-
nificant chance of D’s own death). Multiplication of the conviction grade (signifi-
cant chance) by the extremely negative appreciation grade would lead to a negative 
desirability that is unlikely to be outweighed by the positive desirability of a suc-
cessful overtaking manoeuvre. Thus, both intent to kill oneself and intent to kill 
others cannot be explained by Desirability Maximization Theory.
Obviously, the prospect of one’s own death would provide a strong incentive 
to avoid a collision. But one’s own death is by no means the only negative collat-
eral consequence associated with a collision. The most important negative conse-
quences are listed below. These consequences would as a rule be appreciated very 
negatively.
1. Killing or injuring oneself
2. Damaging one’s vehicle
3. Termination of one’s journey
4. Criminal or civil liability
5. Killing or injuring loved ones
6. Killing or injuring unknown others
It seems obvious that the prospects of injuring oneself, damaging one’s vehicle, 
the termination of one’s journey and legal liability would also provide strong 
incentives to avoid a collision. These are all selfish incentives, thus keeping within 
the spirit of the Porsche case.
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The fifth prospect, killing or injuring loved ones, is more altruistic in nature. 
In some court cases, the possibility of killing others is connected to the possibility 
of killing or injuring loved ones. In one case, D braked forcefully whilst he was 
being tailgated at a speed of over 100 km/h.119 He had told his girlfriend to buckle 
up because he was going to have to step on the brakes. The other car swerved to 
the left in response to the braking manoeuvre and collided with a tree. D was 
convicted of intentional homicide. This example is indicative for cases where a col-
lision is not only dangerous for oneself but for loved ones as well. It is difficult to 
see how awareness of the substantial chance of V’s death cannot be accompanied 
by awareness of lethal danger for D and his girlfriend. How can this daunting 
prospect be outweighed by whatever motive drove D to brake (e.g. spooking V)?
The sixth prospect, killing or injuring unknown others, is completely altruistic 
in nature. In many non-traffic cases, there is some animosity between D and V 
that might explain D’s behaviour. In most traffic cases, however, V is completely 
unknown to D. For most people, the prospect of killing or injuring unknown 
others would be very undesirable indeed. German doctrine has a special rule that 
pertains to killing other people. The so-called Hemmschwellentheorie holds that 
there is a high psychological threshold with respect to killing fellow humans.120 In 
a 2010 decision, the German Federal Court of Justice stated the following.
Because of the high inhibition threshold with respect to killing, one must always 
consider the possibility that the perpetrator did not recognize the risk of killing or at 
least trusted that such a result would not occur.121
Recently, the Federal Court has downplayed the value of the threshold theory.122 
The Court made clear that the theory is not to function as an empty catchphrase. 
That does not alter the fact, however, that the theory, if you want to call it that, 
appeals to a very commonsensical assumption. The prospect that certain conduct 
might lead to the death of a fellow human would generally provide a strong incen-
tive to abstain from that conduct. The same goes – to a lesser extent – for the 
prospect of injuring someone else. In my opinion, courts should not assume too 
easily that a driver’s self-serving motives (e.g. reaching one’s destination quickly) 
would outweigh the substantial chance of causing another human’s death.
Quite a few convictions of (attempted) intentional homicide in the Netherlands 
are characterized by inequality of risk for D and V.123 This occurs, inter alia, when 
dangerous road traffic behaviour results in a collision with a pedestrian or a bicy-
clist. Such a collision is much more dangerous for V than for D. The reasoning 
in these cases seems to be that the vulnerability of V sets it completely apart from 
Porsche-like cases. Due to the relative invulnerability of D, conscious acceptance 
119 Supreme Court 20 January 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2526.
120 See Blomsma 2012, pp. 120-134; Puppe 2012; Goeckenjan, this book, Section 5.4.1.
121 Federal Court of Justice 2 February 2010, NStZ 2010, 511.
122 Federal Court of Justice 22 March 2012, NStZ 2012, 384. See, e.g., Fahl 2013, proclaiming the end 
of the theory.
123 See, e.g., Supreme Court 23 January 2001, ECLI:NL:HR:2001:AA9594; Supreme Court 17 February 
2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AN9360.
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of V’s death is perfectly compatible with not foreseeing and not accepting one’s 
own death.
This reasoning is misguided in two ways. First, in many cases D might just as 
well have collided with a much more risky object such as a car or a tree. Second, 
the remaining collateral consequences of a collision, which were elaborated upon 
above, would also provide a very strong incentive to avoid a collision. Collision 
awareness is generally hard to reconcile with Desirability Maximization Theory. 
This collision-avoidance assumption, which is only slightly easier to rebut than 
the Porsche case’s self-preservation assumption, deserves to be taken seriously as 
well.
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